CVE-2020-4788: Speculation on incompletely validated data on IBM Power9
cover CVE-2020-4788: Speculation on incompletely validated data on IBM Power9
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This series flushes the cache on kernel entry and after kernel user accesses.
Thanks to Nick Piggin, Russell Currey, Christopher M. Riedl, Michael Ellerman and Spoorthy S for their work in developing, optimising, testing and backporting these fixes, and to the many others who helped behind the scenes.
Daniel Axtens (1):
selftests/powerpc: entry flush test
Michael Ellerman (1):
powerpc: Only include kup-radix.h for 64-bit Book3S
Nicholas Piggin (2):
powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry
powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
Russell Currey (1):
selftests/powerpc: rfi_flush: disable entry flush if present
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 + .../powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h | 29 ++-- arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h | 12 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h | 19 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h | 27 ++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 7 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 4 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 88 +++++----- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 122 ++++++++++++- arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 14 ++ arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 104 +++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 17 ++ arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 8 + .../selftests/powerpc/security/.gitignore | 1 + .../selftests/powerpc/security/Makefile | 2 +- .../selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c | 163 ++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/powerpc/security/rfi_flush.c | 35 +++- 17 files changed, 592 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/5 selftests/powerpc: rfi_flush: disable entry flush if present
From: Russell Currey <[email protected]>
commit fcb48454c23c5679d1a2e252f127642e91b05cbe upstream.
We are about to add an entry flush. The rfi (exit) flush test measures the number of L1D flushes over a syscall with the RFI flush enabled and disabled. But if the entry flush is also enabled, the effect of enabling and disabling the RFI flush is masked.
If there is a debugfs entry for the entry flush, disable it during the RFI flush and restore it later.
--- .../selftests/powerpc/security/rfi_flush.c | 35 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/rfi_flush.c +29 -6
@@ -50,16 +50,30 @@ int rfi_flush_test(void)__u64 l1d_misses_total =0 ;unsigned long iterations =100000 , zero_size =24 *1024 ;unsigned long l1d_misses_expected; -int rfi_flush_org, rfi_flush; +int rfi_flush_orig, rfi_flush; +int have_entry_flush, entry_flush_orig;SKIP_IF (geteuid () !=0 ); -if (read_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , &rfi_flush_org)) { +if (read_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , &rfi_flush_orig) <0 ) {perror ("Unable to read powerpc/rfi_flush debugfs file" );SKIP_IF (1 ); } - rfi_flush = rfi_flush_org; +if (read_debugfs_file ("powerpc/entry_flush" , &entry_flush_orig) <0 ) { + have_entry_flush =0 ; + }else { + have_entry_flush =1 ; + +if (entry_flush_orig !=0 ) { +if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/entry_flush" ,0 ) <0 ) { +perror ("error writing to powerpc/entry_flush debugfs file" ); +return 1 ; + } + } + } + + rfi_flush = rfi_flush_orig; fd =perf_event_open_counter (PERF_TYPE_RAW ,/* L1d miss */ 0x400f0 ,-1 );FAIL_IF (fd <0 );
@@ -68,6 +82,7 @@ int rfi_flush_test(void)FAIL_IF (perf_event_enable (fd)); +// disable L1 prefetching set_dscr (1 ); iter = repetitions;
@@ -109,8 +124,8 @@ int rfi_flush_test(void) repetitions * l1d_misses_expected /2 , passes, repetitions); -if (rfi_flush == rfi_flush_org) { - rfi_flush = !rfi_flush_org; +if (rfi_flush == rfi_flush_orig) { + rfi_flush = !rfi_flush_orig;if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , rfi_flush) <0 ) {perror ("error writing to powerpc/rfi_flush debugfs file" );return 1 ;
@@ -126,11 +141,19 @@ int rfi_flush_test(void)set_dscr (0 ); -if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , rfi_flush_org) <0 ) { +if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , rfi_flush_orig) <0 ) {perror ("unable to restore original value of powerpc/rfi_flush debugfs file" );return 1 ; } +if (have_entry_flush) { +if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/entry_flush" , entry_flush_orig) <0 ) { +perror ("unable to restore original value of powerpc/entry_flush " +"debugfs file" ); +return 1 ; + } + } +return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 2/5 powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry
In reply to Daniel AxtensFrom: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.
[backporting note: we need to mark some exception handlers as out-of-line
because the flushing makes them take too much space -- dja]
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h | 9 ++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h | 10 ++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 4 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 49 +++++++++++++-- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 +++ arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 11 ++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 4 ++ 11 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -0
@@ -2667,6 +2667,7 @@ mds=off [X86] tsx_async_abort=off [X86] kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] + no_entry_flush [PPC] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on
@@ -2989,6 +2990,8 @@ noefi Disable EFI runtime services support. + no_entry_flush [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache when entering the kernel. + noexec [IA-64] noexec [X86]
arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h +8 -1
@@ -61,11 +61,18 @@nop ; \ nop +#define ENTRY_FLUSH_SLOT \ + ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION; \ + nop; \ + nop; \ + nop; +/* * r10 must be free to use, r13 must be paca */ #define INTERRUPT_TO_KERNEL \ - STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_SLOT + STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_SLOT; \ + ENTRY_FLUSH_SLOT/* * Macros for annotating the expected destination of (h)rfid
arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h +10 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ label##3: \ FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 955b-956b; \ .popsection; +#define ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ +957: \ + .pushsection __entry_flush_fixup,"a"; \ + .align 2; \ +958: \ + FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 957b-958b; \ + .popsection; +#define RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ 951: \ .pushsection __rfi_flush_fixup,"a"; \
@@ -237,8 +245,10 @@ label##3: \#include <linux/types.h> extern long stf_barrier_fallback; +extern long entry_flush_fallback;extern long __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup;extern long __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup; +extern long __start___entry_flush_fixup, __stop___entry_flush_fixup;extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;extern long __start___barrier_nospec_fixup, __stop___barrier_nospec_fixup;extern long __start__btb_flush_fixup, __stop__btb_flush_fixup;
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h +4 -0
@@ -84,12 +84,16 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(u64 feature)// Software required to flush link stack on context switch #define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK 0x0000000000001000ull +// The L1-D cache should be flushed when entering the kernel +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY 0x0000000000004000ull +// Features enabled by default #define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \ (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \ SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \ SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \ + SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY | \ SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h +3 -0
@@ -52,12 +52,15 @@ enum l1d_flush_type { };void setup_rfi_flush (enum l1d_flush_type ,bool enable); +void setup_entry_flush (bool enable); +void setup_uaccess_flush (bool enable);void do_rfi_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC void setup_barrier_nospec (void );#else static inline void setup_barrier_nospec (void ) { };#endif +void do_entry_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);void do_barrier_nospec_fixups (bool enable);extern bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +43 -6
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arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +59 -1
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arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +7 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,13 @@ SECTIONS __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .; } + . = ALIGN(8); + __entry_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__entry_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start___entry_flush_fixup = .; + *(__entry_flush_fixup) + __stop___entry_flush_fixup = .; + } + . = ALIGN(8); __stf_exit_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__stf_exit_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup = .;
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c +54 -0
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arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +11 -0
@@ -122,12 +122,23 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void) type =L1D_FLUSH_ORI ; } +/* +* If we are non-Power9 bare metal, we don't need to flush on kernel +* entry: it fixes a P9 specific vulnerability. +*/ +if (!pvr_version_is (PVR_POWER9 )) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ); + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && \ (security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR ) || \security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV ));setup_rfi_flush (type, enable);setup_count_cache_flush (); + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ); +setup_entry_flush (enable); }static void __init pnv_setup_arch (void )
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +4 -0
@@ -561,6 +561,10 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)setup_rfi_flush (types, enable);setup_count_cache_flush (); + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ); +setup_entry_flush (enable); }#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 3/5 powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
In reply to Daniel AxtensFrom: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 + .../powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h | 24 +++--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h | 9 +++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h | 17 +++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 81 ++++++------------- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 62 ++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 ++ arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 50 ++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 4 + arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 4 + 13 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -0
@@ -2668,6 +2668,7 @@ tsx_async_abort=off [X86] kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] no_entry_flush [PPC] + no_uaccess_flush [PPC] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on
@@ -3041,6 +3042,9 @@ nospec_store_bypass_disable [HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability + no_uaccess_flush + [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache after accessing user data. + noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h +15 -9
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@#else /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (uaccess_flush_key); +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KUAP #include <asm/reg.h>
@@ -77,6 +79,17 @@ static inline void set_kuap(unsigned long value)isync (); } +static inline bool +bad_kuap_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long address,bool is_write) +{ +return WARN (mmu_has_feature (MMU_FTR_RADIX_KUAP ) && + (regs->kuap & (is_write ?AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_WRITE :AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_READ )), +"Bug: %s fault blocked by AMR!" , is_write ?"Write" :"Read" ); +} +#else /* CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */ +static inline void set_kuap (unsigned long value) { } +#endif /* !CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */ + static __always_inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) {
@@ -94,17 +107,10 @@ static inline void prevent_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long size, unsigned long dir) {set_kuap (AMR_KUAP_BLOCKED ); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&uaccess_flush_key)) +do_uaccess_flush (); } -static inline bool -bad_kuap_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long address,bool is_write) -{ -return WARN (mmu_has_feature (MMU_FTR_RADIX_KUAP ) && - (regs->kuap & (is_write ?AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_WRITE :AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_READ )), -"Bug: %s fault blocked by AMR!" , is_write ?"Write" :"Read" ); -} -#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */ -#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BOOK3S_64_KUP_RADIX_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h +3 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@hrfid ; \ b hrfi_flush_fallback +#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +/* Prototype for function defined in exceptions-64s.S */ +void do_uaccess_flush (void );#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_EXCEPTION_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h +9 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ label##3: \ FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 955b-956b; \ .popsection; +#define UACCESS_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ +959: \ + .pushsection __uaccess_flush_fixup,"a"; \ + .align 2; \ +960: \ + FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 959b-960b; \ + .popsection; +#define ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ 957: \ .pushsection __entry_flush_fixup,"a"; \
@@ -248,6 +256,7 @@ extern long stf_barrier_fallback;extern long entry_flush_fallback;extern long __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup;extern long __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup; +extern long __start___uaccess_flush_fixup, __stop___uaccess_flush_fixup;extern long __start___entry_flush_fixup, __stop___entry_flush_fixup;extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;extern long __start___barrier_nospec_fixup, __stop___barrier_nospec_fixup;
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h +13 -4
@@ -45,15 +45,24 @@ static inline void setup_kuep(bool disabled) { }void setup_kuap (bool disabled);#else static inline void setup_kuap (bool disabled) { } -static inline void allow_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from, -unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { } -static inline void prevent_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from, -unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { } +static inline bool bad_kuap_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long address,bool is_write) {return false; } + +/* +* book3s/64/kup-radix.h defines these functions for the !KUAP case to flush +* the L1D cache after user accesses. Only include the empty stubs for other +* platforms. +*/ +#ifndef CONFIG_PPC64 +static inline void allow_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from, +unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { } +static inline void prevent_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from, +unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */ static inline void allow_read_from_user (const void __user *from,unsigned long size)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h +3 -0
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(u64 feature)// The L1-D cache should be flushed when entering the kernel #define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY 0x0000000000004000ull +// The L1-D cache should be flushed after user accesses from the kernel +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS 0x0000000000008000ull// Features enabled by default #define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
@@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(u64 feature) SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \ SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \ SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY | \ + SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS | \ SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h +1 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void);#else static inline void setup_barrier_nospec (void ) { };#endif +void do_uaccess_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);void do_entry_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);void do_barrier_nospec_fixups (bool enable);extern bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +24 -57
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arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +62 -0
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arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +7 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,13 @@ SECTIONS __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .; } + . = ALIGN(8); + __uaccess_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__uaccess_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start___uaccess_flush_fixup = .; + *(__uaccess_flush_fixup) + __stop___uaccess_flush_fixup = .; + } + . = ALIGN(8); __entry_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__entry_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { __start___entry_flush_fixup = .;
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c +50 -0
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arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +4 -0
@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void) enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) &&security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY );setup_entry_flush (enable); + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ); +setup_uaccess_flush (enable); }static void __init pnv_setup_arch (void )
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +4 -0
@@ -565,6 +565,10 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void) enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) &&security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY );setup_entry_flush (enable); + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ); +setup_uaccess_flush (enable); }#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 4/5 powerpc: Only include kup-radix.h for 64-bit Book3S
In reply to Daniel AxtensFrom: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 178d52c6e89c38d0553b0ac8b99927b11eb995b0 upstream.
In kup.h we currently include kup-radix.h for all 64-bit builds, which includes Book3S and Book3E. The latter doesn't make sense, Book3E never uses the Radix MMU.
This has worked up until now, but almost by accident, and the recent uaccess flush changes introduced a build breakage on Book3E because of the bad structure of the code.
So disentangle things so that we only use kup-radix.h for Book3S. This requires some more stubs in kup.h.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h | 5 +++-- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h | 14 +++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h +3 -2
@@ -11,13 +11,12 @@#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ -.macro kuap_restore_amr gpr#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KUAP +.macro kuap_restore_amr gpr BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION_NESTED(67) ld \gpr, STACK_REGS_KUAP(r1) mtspr SPRN_AMR, \gpr END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_NESTED_IFSET(MMU_FTR_RADIX_KUAP, 67) -#endif .endm .macro kuap_check_amr gpr1, gpr2
@@ -31,6 +30,7 @@END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_NESTED_IFSET (MMU_FTR_RADIX_KUAP ,67 ) #endif .endm +#endif .macro kuap_save_amr_and_lock gpr1, gpr2, use_cr, msr_pr_cr #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KUAP
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ bad_kuap_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, bool is_write) "Bug: %s fault blocked by AMR!", is_write ? "Write" : "Read"); }#else /* CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */ +static inline void kuap_restore_amr (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long amr) { }static inline void set_kuap (unsigned long value) { }#endif /* !CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h +11 -3
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@#define KUAP_WRITE 2#define KUAP_READ_WRITE (KUAP_READ | KUAP_WRITE) -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 #include <asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h> #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_8xx
@@ -24,9 +24,15 @@ .macro kuap_restore sp, current, gpr1, gpr2, gpr3 .endm +.macro kuap_restore_amr gpr +.endm + .macro kuap_check current, gpr .endm +.macro kuap_check_amr gpr1, gpr2 +.endm + #endif #else /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
@@ -52,17 +58,19 @@ bad_kuap_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, bool is_write) return false; } +static inline void kuap_check_amr (void ) { } +/* * book3s/64/kup-radix.h defines these functions for the !KUAP case to flush * the L1D cache after user accesses. Only include the empty stubs for other * platforms. */ -#ifndef CONFIG_PPC64 +#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 static inline void allow_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from,unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { }static inline void prevent_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from,unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { } -#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */ static inline void allow_read_from_user (const void __user *from,unsigned long size)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 5/5 selftests/powerpc: entry flush test
In reply to Daniel Axtenscommit 89a83a0c69c81a25ce91002b90ca27ed86132a0a upstream.
Add a test modelled on the RFI flush test which counts the number of L1D misses doing a simple syscall with the entry flush on and off.
For simplicity of backporting, this test duplicates a lot of code from the upstream rfi_flush. This is cleaned up upstream, but we don't clean it up here because it would involve bringing in even more commits.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 6 +- .../selftests/powerpc/security/.gitignore | 1 + .../selftests/powerpc/security/Makefile | 2 +- .../selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c | 163 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ void setup_uaccess_flush(bool enable)return ;if (!no_uaccess_flush) -uaccess_flush_enable (true); +uaccess_flush_enable (enable); }#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +4 -2
@@ -124,10 +124,12 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)/* * If we are non-Power9 bare metal, we don't need to flush on kernel -* entry: it fixes a P9 specific vulnerability. +* entry or after user access: they fix a P9 specific vulnerability. */ -if (!pvr_version_is (PVR_POWER9 )) +if (!pvr_version_is (PVR_POWER9 )) {security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ); +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ); + } enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && \ (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR) || \
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -1 +1,2 @@ rfi_flush +entry_flush
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ -TEST_GEN_PROGS := rfi_flush +TEST_GEN_PROGS := rfi_flush entry_flush top_srcdir = ../../../../.. CFLAGS += -I../../../../../usr/include
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c new file +163 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1