Drivers: hv: vmbus: More VMBus-hardening changes
Subsystems (2)
v3 cover Drivers: hv: vmbus: More VMBus-hardening changes
Integrating feedback from Juan, Michael and Wei. [1] Changelogs are inline/in the patches.
Thanks,
Andrea
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Andrea Parri (Microsoft) (6):
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Initialize memory to be sent to the host
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Reduce number of references to message in
vmbus_on_msg_dpc()
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Copy the hv_message in vmbus_on_msg_dpc()
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Avoid use-after-free in vmbus_onoffer_rescind()
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Resolve race condition in vmbus_onoffer_rescind()
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Do not allow overwriting
vmbus_connection.channels[]drivers/hv/channel.c | 4 +-- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 2 +- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++------------ include/linux/hyperv.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 1/6 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Initialize memory to be sent to the host
__vmbus_open() and vmbus_teardown_gpadl() do not inizialite the memory for the vmbus_channel_open_channel and the vmbus_channel_gpadl_teardown objects they allocate respectively. These objects contain padding bytes and fields that are left uninitialized and that are later sent to the host, potentially leaking guest data. Zero initialize such fields to avoid leaking sensitive information to the host.
---
Changes since v2:
- Add Reviewed-by: tag
drivers/hv/channel.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/channel.c +2 -2
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ static int __vmbus_open(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel, goto error_clean_ring;/* Create and init the channel open message */ - open_info =kmalloc (sizeof (*open_info) + + open_info =kzalloc (sizeof (*open_info) +sizeof (struct vmbus_channel_open_channel ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!open_info) {
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ int vmbus_teardown_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, u32 gpadl_handle)unsigned long flags;int ret; - info =kmalloc (sizeof (*info) + + info =kzalloc (sizeof (*info) +sizeof (struct vmbus_channel_gpadl_teardown ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!info)return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 2/6 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Reduce number of references to message in vmbus_on_msg_dpc()
In reply to Andrea Parri (Microsoft)Simplify the function by removing various references to the hv_message 'msg', introduce local variables 'msgtype' and 'payload_size'.
---
Changes since v2:
- Squash patches #2 and #3
- Revisit commit message
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +14 -14
@@ -1057,9 +1057,11 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)struct hv_message *msg = (struct hv_message *)page_addr +VMBUS_MESSAGE_SINT ;struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr; +enum vmbus_channel_message_type msgtype;const struct vmbus_channel_message_table_entry *entry;struct onmessage_work_context *ctx;u32 message_type = msg->header.message_type; +__u8 payload_size;/* * 'enum vmbus_channel_message_type' is supposed to always be 'u32' as
@@ -1073,40 +1075,38 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)return ; hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg->u.payload; + msgtype = hdr->msgtype;trace_vmbus_on_msg_dpc (hdr); -if (hdr->msgtype >=CHANNELMSG_COUNT ) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"unknown msgtype=%d\n" , hdr->msgtype); +if (msgtype >=CHANNELMSG_COUNT ) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"unknown msgtype=%d\n" , msgtype); goto msg_handled; } -if (msg->header.payload_size >HV_MESSAGE_PAYLOAD_BYTE_COUNT ) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"payload size is too large (%d)\n" , - msg->header.payload_size); + payload_size = msg->header.payload_size; +if (payload_size >HV_MESSAGE_PAYLOAD_BYTE_COUNT ) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"payload size is too large (%d)\n" , payload_size); goto msg_handled; } - entry = &channel_message_table[hdr->msgtype]; + entry = &channel_message_table[msgtype];if (!entry->message_handler) goto msg_handled; -if (msg->header.payload_size < entry->min_payload_len) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"message too short: msgtype=%d len=%d\n" , - hdr->msgtype, msg->header.payload_size); +if (payload_size < entry->min_payload_len) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"message too short: msgtype=%d len=%d\n" , msgtype, payload_size); goto msg_handled; }if (entry->handler_type ==VMHT_BLOCKING ) { - ctx =kmalloc (sizeof (*ctx) + msg->header.payload_size, -GFP_ATOMIC ); + ctx =kmalloc (sizeof (*ctx) + payload_size,GFP_ATOMIC );if (ctx ==NULL )return ;INIT_WORK (&ctx->work, vmbus_onmessage_work); -memcpy (&ctx->msg, msg,sizeof (msg->header) + - msg->header.payload_size); +memcpy (&ctx->msg, msg,sizeof (msg->header) + payload_size);/* * The host can generate a rescind message while we
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)* by offer_in_progress and by channel_mutex. See also the * inline comments in vmbus_onoffer_rescind(). */ -switch (hdr->msgtype) { +switch (msgtype) {case CHANNELMSG_RESCIND_CHANNELOFFER :/* * If we are handling the rescind message;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [PATCH v3 2/6] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Reduce number of references to message in vmbus_on_msg_dpc()
From: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, December 8, 2020 11:08 PM
Quoted 94 lines
Simplify the function by removing various references to the
hv_message'msg', introduce local variables 'msgtype' and 'payload_size'.Suggested-by Juan Vazquez <[email protected]>Suggested-by Michael Kelley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]>---
Changes since v2:
- Squash patches #2 and #3
- Revisit commit messagedrivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +13
-13@@ -1057,9 +1057,11 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)struct hv_message *msg = (struct hv_message *)page_addr +VMBUS_MESSAGE_SINT ;struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr; +enum vmbus_channel_message_type msgtype;const struct vmbus_channel_message_table_entry *entry;struct onmessage_work_context *ctx;u32 message_type = msg->header.message_type; +__u8 payload_size;/* * 'enum vmbus_channel_message_type' is supposed to always be 'u32' as @@ -1073,40 +1075,38 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)return ; hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg->u.payload; + msgtype = hdr->msgtype;trace_vmbus_on_msg_dpc (hdr); -if (hdr->msgtype >=CHANNELMSG_COUNT ) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"unknown msgtype=%d\n" , hdr->msgtype); +if (msgtype >=CHANNELMSG_COUNT ) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"unknown msgtype=%d\n" , msgtype); goto msg_handled; } -if (msg->header.payload_size >HV_MESSAGE_PAYLOAD_BYTE_COUNT ) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"payload size is too large (%d)\n" , - msg->header.payload_size); + payload_size = msg->header.payload_size; +if (payload_size >HV_MESSAGE_PAYLOAD_BYTE_COUNT ) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"payload size is too large (%d)\n" , payload_size); goto msg_handled; } - entry = &channel_message_table[hdr->msgtype]; + entry = &channel_message_table[msgtype];if (!entry->message_handler) goto msg_handled; -if (msg->header.payload_size < entry->min_payload_len) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"message too short: msgtype=%d len=%d\n" , - hdr->msgtype, msg->header.payload_size); +if (payload_size < entry->min_payload_len) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"message too short: msgtype=%d len=%d\n" , msgtype, payload_size); goto msg_handled; }if (entry->handler_type ==VMHT_BLOCKING ) { - ctx =kmalloc (sizeof (*ctx) + msg->header.payload_size, -GFP_ATOMIC ); + ctx =kmalloc (sizeof (*ctx) + payload_size,GFP_ATOMIC );if (ctx ==NULL )return ;INIT_WORK (&ctx->work, vmbus_onmessage_work); -memcpy (&ctx->msg, msg,sizeof (msg->header) + - msg->header.payload_size); +memcpy (&ctx->msg, msg,sizeof (msg->header) + payload_size);/* drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +1
-2* The host can generate a rescind message while we @@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)* by offer_in_progress and by channel_mutex. See also the * inline comments in vmbus_onoffer_rescind(). */ -switch (hdr->msgtype) { +switch (msgtype) {case CHANNELMSG_RESCIND_CHANNELOFFER :/* * If we are handling the rescind message; --
Quoted 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 3/6 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Copy the hv_message in vmbus_on_msg_dpc()
In reply to Andrea Parri (Microsoft)Since the message is in memory shared with the host, an erroneous or a malicious Hyper-V could 'corrupt' the message while vmbus_on_msg_dpc() or individual message handlers are executing. To prevent it, copy the message into private memory.
---
Changes since v2:
- Revisit commit message and inline comment
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +14 -5
@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data) {struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu = (void *)data;void *page_addr = hv_cpu->synic_message_page; -struct hv_message *msg = (struct hv_message *)page_addr + +struct hv_message msg_copy, *msg = (struct hv_message *)page_addr +VMBUS_MESSAGE_SINT ;struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr;enum vmbus_channel_message_type msgtype;const struct vmbus_channel_message_table_entry *entry;struct onmessage_work_context *ctx; -u32 message_type = msg->header.message_type;__u8 payload_size; +u32 message_type;/* * 'enum vmbus_channel_message_type' is supposed to always be 'u32' as
@@ -1070,11 +1070,20 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)*/ BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (enum vmbus_channel_message_type ) !=sizeof (u32)); +/* +* Since the message is in memory shared with the host, an erroneous or +* malicious Hyper-V could modify the message while vmbus_on_msg_dpc() +* or individual message handlers are executing; to prevent this, copy +* the message into private memory. +*/ +memcpy (&msg_copy, msg,sizeof (struct hv_message )); + + message_type = msg_copy.header.message_type;if (message_type ==HVMSG_NONE )/* no msg */ return ; - hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg->u.payload; + hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg_copy.u.payload; msgtype = hdr->msgtype;trace_vmbus_on_msg_dpc (hdr);
@@ -1084,7 +1093,7 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data) goto msg_handled; } - payload_size = msg->header.payload_size; + payload_size = msg_copy.header.payload_size;if (payload_size >HV_MESSAGE_PAYLOAD_BYTE_COUNT ) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"payload size is too large (%d)\n" , payload_size); goto msg_handled;
@@ -1106,7 +1115,7 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)return ;INIT_WORK (&ctx->work, vmbus_onmessage_work); -memcpy (&ctx->msg, msg,sizeof (msg->header) + payload_size); +memcpy (&ctx->msg, &msg_copy,sizeof (msg->header) + payload_size);/* * The host can generate a rescind message while we
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [PATCH v3 3/6] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Copy the hv_message in vmbus_on_msg_dpc()
From: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, December 8, 2020 11:08 PM
Quoted 77 lines
Since the message is in memory shared with the host, an erroneous or a malicious Hyper-V could 'corrupt' the message while
vmbus_on_msg_dpc()or individual message handlers are executing. To prevent it, copy the message into private memory.Reported-by Juan Vazquez <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]>---
Changes since v2:
- Revisit commit message and inline commentdrivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +14
-6@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data) {struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu = (void *)data;void *page_addr = hv_cpu->synic_message_page; -struct hv_message *msg = (struct hv_message *)page_addr + +struct hv_message msg_copy, *msg = (struct hv_message *)page_addr +VMBUS_MESSAGE_SINT ;struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr;enum vmbus_channel_message_type msgtype;const struct vmbus_channel_message_table_entry *entry;struct onmessage_work_context *ctx; -u32 message_type = msg->header.message_type;__u8 payload_size; +u32 message_type;/* * 'enum vmbus_channel_message_type' is supposed to always be 'u32' as @@ -1070,11 +1070,20 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)*/ BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (enum vmbus_channel_message_type ) !=sizeof (u32)); +/* +* Since the message is in memory shared with the host, an erroneous or +* malicious Hyper-V could modify the message while vmbus_on_msg_dpc() +* or individual message handlers are executing; to prevent this, copy +* the message into private memory. +*/ +memcpy (&msg_copy, msg,sizeof (struct hv_message )); + + message_type = msg_copy.header.message_type;if (message_type ==HVMSG_NONE )/* no msg */ return ; - hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg->u.payload; + hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg_copy.u.payload; msgtype = hdr->msgtype;trace_vmbus_on_msg_dpc (hdr);@@ -1084,7 +1093,7 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data) goto msg_handled; } - payload_size = msg->header.payload_size; + payload_size = msg_copy.header.payload_size;if (payload_size >HV_MESSAGE_PAYLOAD_BYTE_COUNT ) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"payload size is too large (%d)\n" , payload_size); goto msg_handled;@@ -1106,7 +1115,7 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)return ;INIT_WORK (&ctx->work, vmbus_onmessage_work); -memcpy (&ctx->msg, msg,sizeof (msg->header) + payload_size); +memcpy (&ctx->msg, &msg_copy,sizeof (msg->header) + payload_size);/* * The host can generate a rescind message while we --
Quoted 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 4/6 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Avoid use-after-free in vmbus_onoffer_rescind()
In reply to Andrea Parri (Microsoft)When channel->device_obj is non-NULL, vmbus_onoffer_rescind() could invoke put_device(), that will eventually release the device and free the channel object (cf. vmbus_device_release()). However, a pointer to the object is dereferenced again later to load the primary_channel. The use-after-free can be avoided by noticing that this load/check is redundant if device_obj is non-NULL: primary_channel must be NULL if device_obj is non-NULL, cf. vmbus_add_channel_work().
---
Changes since v2:
- Add Reviewed-by: tag
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +1 -2
@@ -1116,8 +1116,7 @@ static void vmbus_onoffer_rescind(struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr)vmbus_device_unregister (channel->device_obj);put_device (dev); } - } -if (channel->primary_channel !=NULL ) { + }else if (channel->primary_channel !=NULL ) {/* * Sub-channel is being rescinded. Following is the channel * close sequence when initiated from the driveri (refer to
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 5/6 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Resolve race condition in vmbus_onoffer_rescind()
In reply to Andrea Parri (Microsoft)An erroneous or malicious host could send multiple rescind messages for a same channel. In vmbus_onoffer_rescind(), the guest maps the channel ID to obtain a pointer to the channel object and it eventually releases such object and associated data. The host could time rescind messages and lead to an use-after-free. Add a new flag to the channel structure to make sure that only one instance of vmbus_onoffer_rescind() can get the reference to the channel object.
--- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 12 ++++++++++++ include/linux/hyperv.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +12 -0
@@ -1063,6 +1063,18 @@ static void vmbus_onoffer_rescind(struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr)mutex_lock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); channel =relid2channel (rescind->child_relid); +if (channel !=NULL ) { +/* +* Guarantee that no other instance of vmbus_onoffer_rescind() +* has got a reference to the channel object. Synchronize on +* &vmbus_connection.channel_mutex. +*/ +if (channel->rescind_ref) { +mutex_unlock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); +return ; + } + channel->rescind_ref = true; + }mutex_unlock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex);if (channel ==NULL ) {
include/linux/hyperv.h +1 -0
@@ -809,6 +809,7 @@ struct vmbus_channel {u8 monitor_bit;bool rescind;/* got rescind msg */ +bool rescind_ref;/* got rescind msg, got channel reference */ struct completion rescind_event;u32 ringbuffer_gpadlhandle;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [PATCH v3 5/6] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Resolve race condition in vmbus_onoffer_rescind()
From: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, December 8, 2020 11:08 PM
Quoted 53 lines
An erroneous or malicious host could send multiple rescind messages for a same channel. In
vmbus_onoffer_rescind(), the guest maps the channel ID to obtain a pointer to the channel object and it eventually releases such object and associated data. The host could time rescind messages and lead to an use-after-free. Add a new flag to the channel structure to make sure that only one instance ofvmbus_onoffer_rescind()can get the reference to the channel object.Reported-by Juan Vazquez <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]>--- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 12 ++++++++++++ include/linux/hyperv.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +12
-0@@ -1063,6 +1063,18 @@ static void vmbus_onoffer_rescind(struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr) mutex_lock(&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); channel =relid2channel (rescind->child_relid); +if (channel !=NULL ) { +/* +* Guarantee that no other instance of vmbus_onoffer_rescind() +* has got a reference to the channel object. Synchronize on +* &vmbus_connection.channel_mutex. +*/ +if (channel->rescind_ref) { +mutex_unlock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); +return ; + } + channel->rescind_ref = true; + }mutex_unlock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex);drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +0
-0if (channel ==NULL ) {include/linux/hyperv.h +1
-1@@ -809,6 +809,7 @@ struct vmbus_channel {u8 monitor_bit;bool rescind;/* got rescind msg */ +bool rescind_ref;/* got rescind msg, got channel reference */ struct completion rescind_event;u32 ringbuffer_gpadlhandle; --
Quoted 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 6/6 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Do not allow overwriting vmbus_connection.channels[]
In reply to Andrea Parri (Microsoft)Currently, vmbus_onoffer() and vmbus_process_offer() are not validating whether a given entry in the vmbus_connection.channels[] array is empty before filling the entry with a call of vmbus_channel_map_relid(). An erroneous or malicious host could rely on this to leak channel objects. Do not allow overwriting an entry vmbus_connection.channels[].
---
Changes since v2:
- Release channel_mutex before 'return' in vmbus_onoffer() error path
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +26 -14
@@ -354,10 +354,12 @@ static void free_channel(struct vmbus_channel *channel)kobject_put (&channel->kobj); } -void vmbus_channel_map_relid (struct vmbus_channel *channel) +int vmbus_channel_map_relid (struct vmbus_channel *channel) { -if (WARN_ON (channel->offermsg.child_relid >=MAX_CHANNEL_RELIDS )) -return ; +u32 relid = channel->offermsg.child_relid; + +if (WARN_ON (relid >=MAX_CHANNEL_RELIDS || vmbus_connection.channels[relid] !=NULL )) +return -EINVAL ;/* * The mapping of the channel's relid is visible from the CPUs that * execute vmbus_chan_sched() by the time that vmbus_chan_sched() will
@@ -383,18 +385,17 @@ void vmbus_channel_map_relid(struct vmbus_channel *channel)* of the VMBus driver and vmbus_chan_sched() can not run before * vmbus_bus_resume() has completed execution (cf. resume_noirq). */ -smp_store_mb ( - vmbus_connection.channels[channel->offermsg.child_relid], - channel); +smp_store_mb (vmbus_connection.channels[relid], channel); +return 0 ; }void vmbus_channel_unmap_relid (struct vmbus_channel *channel) { -if (WARN_ON (channel->offermsg.child_relid >=MAX_CHANNEL_RELIDS )) +u32 relid = channel->offermsg.child_relid; + +if (WARN_ON (relid >=MAX_CHANNEL_RELIDS ))return ; -WRITE_ONCE ( - vmbus_connection.channels[channel->offermsg.child_relid], -NULL ); +WRITE_ONCE (vmbus_connection.channels[relid],NULL ); }static void vmbus_release_relid (u32 relid)
@@ -601,6 +602,12 @@ static void vmbus_process_offer(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel)*/ atomic_dec (&vmbus_connection.offer_in_progress); +if (vmbus_channel_map_relid (newchannel)) { +mutex_unlock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); +kfree (newchannel); +return ; + } +list_for_each_entry (channel, &vmbus_connection.chn_list, listentry) { if (guid_equal(&channel->offermsg.offer.if_type, &newchannel->offermsg.offer.if_type) &&
@@ -619,6 +626,7 @@ static void vmbus_process_offer(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel)* Check to see if this is a valid sub-channel. */ if (newchannel->offermsg.offer.sub_channel_index ==0 ) { +vmbus_channel_unmap_relid (newchannel);mutex_unlock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex);/* * Don't call free_channel(), because newchannel->kobj
@@ -635,8 +643,6 @@ static void vmbus_process_offer(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel)list_add_tail (&newchannel->sc_list, &channel->sc_list); } -vmbus_channel_map_relid (newchannel); -mutex_unlock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex);cpus_read_unlock ();
@@ -920,6 +926,8 @@ static void vmbus_onoffer(struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr) oldchannel =find_primary_channel_by_offer (offer);if (oldchannel !=NULL ) { +u32 relid = offer->child_relid; +/* * We're resuming from hibernation: all the sub-channel and * hv_sock channels we had before the hibernation should have
@@ -954,8 +962,12 @@ static void vmbus_onoffer(struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr)atomic_dec (&vmbus_connection.offer_in_progress);WARN_ON (oldchannel->offermsg.child_relid !=INVALID_RELID ); +if (WARN_ON (vmbus_connection.channels[relid] !=NULL )) { +mutex_unlock (&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); +return ; + }/* Fix up the relid. */ - oldchannel->offermsg.child_relid = offer->child_relid; + oldchannel->offermsg.child_relid = relid; offer_sz =sizeof (*offer);if (memcmp (offer, &oldchannel->offermsg, offer_sz) !=0 ) {
@@ -967,7 +979,7 @@ static void vmbus_onoffer(struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr)* reoffers the device upon resume. */ pr_debug ("vmbus offer changed: relid=%d\n" , - offer->child_relid); + relid); print_hex_dump_debug("Old vmbus offer: ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 4,
drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h +1 -1
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ int vmbus_add_channel_kobj(struct hv_device *device_obj,void vmbus_remove_channel_attr_group (struct vmbus_channel *channel); -void vmbus_channel_map_relid (struct vmbus_channel *channel); +int vmbus_channel_map_relid (struct vmbus_channel *channel);void vmbus_channel_unmap_relid (struct vmbus_channel *channel);struct vmbus_channel *relid2channel (u32 relid);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 8 lines · Andrea Parri (Microsoft)
Integrating feedback from Juan, Michael and Wei. [1] Changelogs are inline/in the patches.
Thanks,
Andrea
Quoted 7 lines
Andrea Parri (Microsoft) (6):
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Initialize memory to be sent to the host
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Reduce number of references to message invmbus_on_msg_dpc()Drivers: hv: vmbus: Copy the
hv_messageinvmbus_on_msg_dpc()
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Avoid use-after-free invmbus_onoffer_rescind()
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Resolve race condition invmbus_onoffer_rescind()
I've applied the first five to hyperv-next.
Quoted 2 lines
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Do not allow overwriting
vmbus_connection.channels[]
This one lacks a review-by tag.
Wei.
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/hv/channel.c | 4 +-- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 2 +- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++------------ include/linux/hyperv.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)Signature · 1 line
2.25.1