Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
Subsystems (9)
v4 cover Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
This fourth patch series mainly reorder patches and add more documentation as requested by Jarkko. This series is based on v5.11-rc4.
The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring. This keyring is useful to "untrust" certificates or files. Enabling to safely update this keyring without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
Previous patch series:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Regards,
Alex Shi (1):
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
David Howells (1):
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
Mickaël Salaün (8):
tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
keyring
MAINTAINERS | 2 + certs/.gitignore | 1 + certs/Kconfig | 17 +- certs/Makefile | 15 +- certs/blacklist.c | 217 ++++++++++++++---- certs/system_keyring.c | 5 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 +- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 14 +- include/linux/key.h | 1 + include/linux/verification.h | 2 + scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 4 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 26 +-- security/keys/key.c | 2 + tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++ 15 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-) create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
base-commit: 19c329f6808995b142b3966301f217c831e7cf31
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 1/10 tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate hash from a given certificate. This is useful to generate a blacklist key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.
This kind of hash formatting is required to populate the file pointed out by CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, but only the kernel code was available to understand how to effectively create such hash.
---
Changes since v3:
* Explain in the commit message that this kind of formating is not new but it wasn't documented.
Changes since v1:
* Fix typo.
* Use "if" block instead of "||" .
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+) create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -4120,6 +4120,7 @@ F: Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst F: certs/ F: scripts/extract-cert.c F: scripts/sign-file.c +F: tools/certs/ CFAG12864B LCD DRIVER M: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <[email protected]>
tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh new file +91 -0
91 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 2/10 certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.
This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.
Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.
---
Changes since v3:
* Improve commit description.
* Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help.
* Remove Acked-by Jarkko Sakkinen because of the above changes.
Changes since v2:
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
Changes since v1:
* Prefix script path with $(scrtree)/ (suggested by David Howells).
* Fix hexadecimal number check.
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + certs/.gitignore | 1 + certs/Kconfig | 7 ++++-- certs/Makefile | 15 +++++++++++- scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -4118,6 +4118,7 @@ L: [email protected] S: Maintained F: Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst F: certs/ +F: scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk F: scripts/extract-cert.c F: scripts/sign-file.c F: tools/certs/
certs/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +blacklist_hashes_checked x509_certificate_list
certs/Kconfig +5 -2
@@ -80,7 +80,10 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... . This will be included into a C - wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should - be a string of hex digits. + wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> must be a + string starting with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a colon (":"), and + finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters (up to 128). + Certificate hashes can be generated with + tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh . endmenu
certs/Makefile +14 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,20 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"") + +quiet_cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = CHECK $(patsubst "%",%,$(2)) + cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = $(AWK) -f $(srctree)/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk $(2); touch $@ + +$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST)) + +$(obj)/blacklist_hashes.o: $(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked + +targets += blacklist_hashes_checked +$(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked: $(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_FILENAME) scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk FORCE + $(call if_changed,check_blacklist_hashes,$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST)) + obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o + else obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o endif
@@ -29,7 +42,7 @@ $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREF $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS)) endif # CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING -clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list +clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list blacklist_hashes_checked ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) ###############################################################################
scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +#!/usr/bin/awk -f +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Author: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]> +# +# Check that a CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST file contains a valid array of +# hash strings. Such string must start with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a +# colon (":"), and finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters +# (up to 128). + +BEGIN { + RS = "," +} +{ + if (!match($0, "^[ \t\n\r]*\"([^\"]*)\"[ \t\n\r]*$", part1)) { + print "Not a string (item " NR "):", $0; + exit 1; + } + if (!match(part1[1], "^(tbs|bin):(.*)$", part2)) { + print "Unknown prefix (item " NR "):", part1[1]; + exit 1; + } + if (!match(part2[2], "^([0-9a-f]+)$", part3)) { + print "Not a lowercase hexadecimal string (item " NR "):", part2[2]; + exit 1; + } + if (length(part3[1]) > 128) { + print "Hash string too long (item " NR "):", part3[1]; + exit 1; + } + if (length(part3[1]) % 2 == 1) { + print "Not an even number of hexadecimal characters (item " NR "):", part3[1]; + exit 1; + } +}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 3/10 certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string. This string is then search for in the description of the keys from the blacklist keyring. When adding a key to the blacklist keyring, blacklist_vet_description() checks the hash prefix and the hexadecimal string, but not that this string is lowercase. It is then valid to set hashes with uppercase hexadecimal, which will be silently ignored by the kernel.
Add an additional check to blacklist_vet_description() to check that hexadecimal strings are in lowercase.
---
Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.
* Rearrange Cc order.
--- certs/blacklist.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc) found_colon: desc++;for (; *desc; desc++) { -if (!isxdigit (*desc)) +if (!isxdigit (*desc) ||isupper (*desc))return -EINVAL ; n++; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 4/10 certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it.
Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc().
ima_mok_init() allocates another blacklist keyring (with different properties) dedicated to IMA. We can also use KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually.
Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed or modified.
[[email protected]: Fix argument bit-ORing in ima_mok_init() and extend commit description]
---
Changes since v3:
* Extend ima_mok_init() description (suggested by Jarkko Sakkinen).
* Add Acked-by Jarkko Sakkinen.
Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick rewritten v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3 and fix ima_mok_init().
--- certs/blacklist.c | 2 +- include/linux/key.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 4 +--- security/keys/key.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)KEY_USR_VIEW |KEY_USR_READ |KEY_USR_SEARCH ,KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | -KEY_FLAG_KEEP , +KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP , NULL, NULL);if (IS_ERR (blacklist_keyring))panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n" );
include/linux/key.h +1 -0
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0004/* Key is built into kernel */ #define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION 0x0008/* Override the check on restricted keyrings */ #define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING 0x0010/* allocating a user or user session keyring */ +#define KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP 0x0020/* Set the KEEP flag on the key/keyring */ extern void key_revoke (struct key *key);extern void key_invalidate (struct key *key);
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c +1 -3
@@ -38,13 +38,11 @@ __init int ima_mok_init(void) (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) |KEY_USR_VIEW |KEY_USR_READ |KEY_USR_WRITE |KEY_USR_SEARCH , -KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA , +KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP , restriction, NULL);if (IS_ERR (ima_blacklist_keyring))panic ("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring." ); - -set_bit (KEY_FLAG_KEEP , &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);return 0 ; }device_initcall (ima_mok_init);
security/keys/key.c +2 -0
@@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->flags |=1 <<KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN ;if (flags &KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING ) key->flags |=1 <<KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING ; +if (flags &KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP ) + key->flags |=1 <<KEY_FLAG_KEEP ;#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING key->magic =KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC ;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 5/10 certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Use GLOBAL_ROOT_UID and GLOBAL_ROOT_GID definitions, and add appropriate include files.
---
Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.
--- certs/blacklist.c | 4 ++-- certs/system_keyring.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +2 -2
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "blacklist.h"
@@ -156,8 +157,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void) blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".blacklist", - KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), - current_cred(), + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(), (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
certs/system_keyring.c +3 -2
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <linux/verification.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) builtin_trusted_keys = keyring_alloc(".builtin_trusted_keys", - KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(), ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH), KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING secondary_trusted_keys = keyring_alloc(".secondary_trusted_keys", - KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(), ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_WRITE),
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 6/10 certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it already included errors.
Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and then a valid hexadecimal string.
---
Changes since v2:
* Fix typo in blacklist_vet_description() comment, spotted by Tyler Hicks.
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
Changes since v1:
* Return ENOPKG (instead of EINVAL) when a hash is greater than the maximum currently known hash (suggested by David Howells).
--- certs/blacklist.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +36 -10
@@ -18,6 +18,16 @@#include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "blacklist.h" +/* +* According to crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo(), +* the size of the currently longest supported hash algorithm is 512 bits, +* which translates into 128 hex characters. +*/ +#define MAX_HASH_LEN 128 + +static const char tbs_prefix[] ="tbs" ; +static const char bin_prefix[] ="bin" ; +static struct key *blacklist_keyring;/*
@@ -26,24 +36,40 @@ static struct key *blacklist_keyring;*/ static int blacklist_vet_description (const char *desc) { -int n =0 ; - -if (*desc ==':' ) -return -EINVAL ; -for (; *desc; desc++) -if (*desc ==':' ) - goto found_colon; +int i, prefix_len, tbs_step =0 , bin_step =0 ; + +/* The following algorithm only works if prefix lengths match. */ +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (tbs_prefix) !=sizeof (bin_prefix)); + prefix_len =sizeof (tbs_prefix) -1 ; +for (i =0 ; *desc; desc++, i++) { +if (*desc ==':' ) { +if (tbs_step == prefix_len) + goto found_colon; +if (bin_step == prefix_len) + goto found_colon; +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (i >= prefix_len) +return -EINVAL ; +if (*desc == tbs_prefix[i]) + tbs_step++; +if (*desc == bin_prefix[i]) + bin_step++; + }return -EINVAL ; found_colon: desc++; -for (; *desc; desc++) { +for (i =0 ; *desc && i <MAX_HASH_LEN ; desc++, i++) {if (!isxdigit (*desc) ||isupper (*desc))return -EINVAL ; - n++; } +if (*desc) +/* The hash is greater than MAX_HASH_LEN. */ +return -ENOPKG ; -if (n ==0 || n &1 ) +/* Checks for an even number of hexadecimal characters. */ +if (i ==0 || i &1 )return -EINVAL ;return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 7/10 certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
certs/blacklist.c:84: warning: Function parameter or member 'hash' not described in 'mark_hash_blacklisted'
---
Changes since v3:
* Add Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen.
Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to avoid future merge conflicts.
* Rearrange Signed-off-by and Reviewed-by order.
--- certs/blacklist.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {/** * mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist -* @hash - The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783") +* @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783") */ int mark_hash_blacklisted (const char *hash) {
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 8/10 certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper. This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private, which help to manage them consistently.
---
Changes since v2:
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
--- certs/blacklist.c | 73 ++++++++++++++----- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 +- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 14 +++- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 26 +------ 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +55 -18
@@ -103,11 +103,43 @@ static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = { .describe = blacklist_describe, }; +static char *get_raw_hash (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type) +{ +size_t type_len; +const char *type_prefix; +char *buffer, *p; + +switch (hash_type) { +case BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS : + type_len =sizeof (tbs_prefix) -1 ; + type_prefix = tbs_prefix; +break ; +case BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY : + type_len =sizeof (bin_prefix) -1 ; + type_prefix = bin_prefix; +break ; +default : +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } + buffer =kmalloc (type_len +1 + hash_len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!buffer) +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + p =memcpy (buffer, type_prefix, type_len); + p += type_len; + *p++ =':' ; +bin2hex (p, hash, hash_len); + p += hash_len *2 ; + *p ='\0' ; +return buffer; +} +/** -* mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist +* mark_raw_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist * @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783") */ -int mark_hash_blacklisted (const char *hash) +static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted (const char *hash) {key_ref_t key;
@@ -127,29 +159,33 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)return 0 ; } +int mark_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type) +{ +const char *buffer; + + buffer =get_raw_hash (hash, hash_len, hash_type); +if (IS_ERR (buffer)) +return PTR_ERR (buffer); +kfree (buffer); +return 0 ; +}/** * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash -* @type: Type of hash +* @hash_type: Type of hash */ -int is_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len,const char *type) +int is_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type) {key_ref_t kref; -size_t type_len =strlen (type); -char *buffer, *p; +const char *buffer;int ret =0 ; - buffer =kmalloc (type_len +1 + hash_len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!buffer) -return -ENOMEM ; - p =memcpy (buffer, type, type_len); - p += type_len; - *p++ =':' ; -bin2hex (p, hash, hash_len); - p += hash_len *2 ; - *p =0 ; - + buffer =get_raw_hash (hash, hash_len, hash_type); +if (IS_ERR (buffer)) +return PTR_ERR (buffer); kref =keyring_search (make_key_ref (blacklist_keyring, true), &key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);if (!IS_ERR (kref)) {
@@ -164,7 +200,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);int is_binary_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len) { -if (is_hash_blacklisted (hash, hash_len,"bin" ) == -EKEYREJECTED ) +if (is_hash_blacklisted (hash, hash_len,BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY ) == + -EKEYREJECTED )return -EPERM ;return 0 ;
@@ -194,7 +231,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n" );for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++) -if (mark_hash_blacklisted (*bl) <0 ) +if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted (*bl) <0 )pr_err ("- blacklisting failed\n" );return 0 ; }
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +2 -1
@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)if (ret <0 ) goto error_2; - ret =is_hash_blacklisted (sig->digest, sig->digest_size,"tbs" ); + ret =is_hash_blacklisted (sig->digest, sig->digest_size, +BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS );if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED ) {pr_err ("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n" , sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
include/keys/system_keyring.h +11 -3
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@#include <linux/key.h> +enum blacklist_hash_type { +/* TBSCertificate hash */ +BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS =1 , +/* Raw data hash */ +BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY =2 , +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
@@ -32,13 +39,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING -extern int mark_hash_blacklisted (const char *hash); +extern int mark_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);extern int is_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, -const char *type); +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);extern int is_binary_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len);#else static inline int is_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, -const char *type) +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type) {return 0 ; }
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +2 -24
@@ -15,35 +15,13 @@ static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ;static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid__initdata =EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID ; -/* -* Blacklist a hash. -*/ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash (const char *source,const void *data, -size_t len,const char *type, -size_t type_len) -{ -char *hash, *p; - - hash =kmalloc (type_len + len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!hash) -return ; - p =memcpy (hash, type, type_len); - p += type_len; -bin2hex (p, data, len); - p += len *2 ; - *p =0 ; - -mark_hash_blacklisted (hash); -kfree (hash); -} -/* * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. */ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { -uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); +mark_hash_blacklisted (data, len,BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS ); }/*
@@ -52,7 +30,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { -uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); +mark_hash_blacklisted (data, len,BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY ); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 9/10 PKCS#7: Fix missing include
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add missing linux/types.h for size_t.
[DH: Changed from stddef.h]
---
Changes since v3:
* Add Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen.
Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.
--- include/linux/verification.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
include/linux/verification.h +2 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H#define _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H +#include <linux/types.h> +/* * Indicate that both builtin trusted keys and secondary trusted keys * should be used.
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v4 10/10 certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update;
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the root user rights.
See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
---
Changes since v3:
* Update commit message for print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
Changes since v2:
* Add comment for blacklist_key_instantiate().
--- certs/Kconfig | 10 ++++++ certs/blacklist.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
certs/Kconfig +10 -0
@@ -86,4 +86,14 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST Certificate hashes can be generated with tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh . +config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE + bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys" + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if + they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted + keyring. The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key + payload. Blacklist keys cannot be removed. + endmenu
certs/blacklist.c +71 -19
144 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
David Howells
maintainerHi Mickaël,
I could pull your patches (unless Jarkko wants to), but can you please drop the patches that are also in my keys-misc branch lest one or other (or both) of our branches get dropped in the next merge window due to conflicts?
Ideally, can you base your branch on my keys-misc branch?
Thanks,
David
Quoted 2 lines · David Howells
Hi Mickaël,
Hi David,
Quoted 6 lines
I could pull your patches (unless Jarkko wants to), but can you please drop the patches that are also in my keys-misc branch lest one or other (or both) of our branches get dropped in the next merge window due to conflicts?
Ideally, can you base your branch on my keys-misc branch?
Sure, I'm rebasing and testing a new patch series.
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks,
David
I noticed that commits in your branch are not up to date with latest Jarkoo reviews on my patches (see changes since v2). There is no conflict if you replace conflicting patches from your branch by patches from this series. Could you replace your duplicate commits with this patch series?
Quoted 20 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 2 lines · David Howells
Hi Mickaël,
Hi David,
Quoted 6 lines
I could pull your patches (unless Jarkko wants to), but can you please drop the patches that are also in my keys-misc branch lest one or other (or both) of our branches get dropped in the next merge window due to conflicts?
Ideally, can you base your branch on my keys-misc branch?
Sure, I'm rebasing and testing a new patch series.
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks,
David
Quoted 8 lines · David Howells
Hi Mickaël,
I could pull your patches (unless Jarkko wants to), but can you please drop the patches that are also in my keys-misc branch lest one or other (or both) of our branches get dropped in the next merge window due to conflicts?
Ideally, can you base your branch on my keys-misc branch?
David, please pull :-)
If possible add to all:
Was a chaotic week. My test environment was broken until Wed because of issues with BuildRoot (that I reported and BR devs were able to reproduce related to LINUX_OVERRIDE_SRCDIR).
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks,
David
/Jarkko