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smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions

PATCH Superseded Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov 3 participants 10 messages Jan 24, 2021 – Feb 2, 2021

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions

syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger SMK_LONGLABEL, for smk_write_syslog if bigger than PAGE_SIZE - 1.

---
 security/smack/smackfs.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/smack/smackfs.c +6 -2
index 5d44b7d258ef..88678c6f1b8c 100644
@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -2647,6 +2647,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
@@ -2744,6 +2746,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 */
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov

syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger SMK_LONGLABEL, for smk_write_syslog if bigger than PAGE_SIZE - 1.

Thank you for the patch. Unfortunately, SMK_LONGLABEL isn't the right value in some of these cases.

Quoted 44 lines
---
 security/smack/smackfs.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/smack/smackfs.c +6 -2
index 5d44b7d258ef..88678c6f1b8c 100644
@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -2647,6 +2647,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
@@ -2744,6 +2746,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 */
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
#2 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 5 lines · Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov

syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger SMK_LONGLABEL, for smk_write_syslog if bigger than PAGE_SIZE - 1.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Thank you for the patch. Unfortunately, SMK_LONGLABEL isn't the right value in some of these cases.

Since it uses sscanf(), I think that whitespaces must be excluded from upper limit check. I'm proposing adding __GFP_NOWARM on the memdup_user_nul() side at
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] .

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions

syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger than PAGE_SIZE.

Per smackfs doc, smk_write_net4addr accepts any label or -CIPSO, smk_write_net6addr accepts any label or -DELETE. I couldn't find any general rule for other label lengths except SMK_LABELLEN, SMK_LONGLABEL, SMK_CIPSOMAX which are documented.

Let's constrain, in general, smackfs label lengths for PAGE_SIZE. Although fuzzer crashes write to smackfs/netlabel on 0x400000 length.

Here is a quick way to reproduce the WARNING:
python -c "print('A' * 0x400000)" > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel

---
 security/smack/smackfs.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/smack/smackfs.c +19 -2
index 5d44b7d258ef..22ded2c26089 100644
@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -1834,6 +1834,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	/* Enough data must be present */
+	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
 		return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2005,6 +2009,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
 		return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2092,6 +2099,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
 		return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2648,6 +2658,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	/* Enough data must be present */
+	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
 		return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2740,10 +2754,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
+	 * No partial write.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#4 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
security/smack/smackfs.c +3 -0
@@ -2005,6 +2009,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))
 		return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2740,10 +2754,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*

security/smack/smackfs.c static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, · line 2766

Quoted 10 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +3 -0
+	 * No partial write.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))

Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like

  char buffer[20000];

  memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
  memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
  write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));

?

#5 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines

security/smack/smackfs.c static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, · line 2766

Quoted 12 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +3 -0
 	/*
+	 * No partial write.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data))

Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like

Quoted 7 lines
  char buffer[20000];

  memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
  memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
  write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));

?

It does, in this case. Then I need to patch another version with whitespace stripping before, after label. I just followed the same thing that I see in security/selinux/selinuxfs.c sel_write_enforce() etc.

It has the same memdup_user_nul() and count >= PAGE_SIZE check prior to that.

#6 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Quoted 8 lines

Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like

  char buffer[20000];

  memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
  memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
  write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

?

It does, in this case. Then I need to patch another version with whitespace stripping before, after label. I just followed the same thing that I see in security/selinux/selinuxfs.c sel_write_enforce() etc.

It has the same memdup_user_nul() and count >= PAGE_SIZE check prior to that.

Since sel_write_enforce() accepts string representation of an integer value, PAGE_SIZE is sufficient. But since smk_write_onlycap() and smk_write_relabel_self() accept list of space-delimited words, you need to prove why PAGE_SIZE does not break userspace in your patch.

Also, due to the "too small to fail" memory-allocation rule, memdup_user_nul() for count < PAGE_SIZE * 8 bytes is "never fails with -ENOMEM unless SIGKILLed by the OOM killer". Also, memdup_user_nul() for count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1 bytes is "never succeeds". Thus, you can safely add

	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1)
		return -EINVAL; // or -ENOMEM if you want compatibility

to smackfs write functions. But it is a strange requirement that the caller of memdup_user_nul() has to be aware of upper limit in a way that we won't hit

	/*
	 * There are several places where we assume that the order value is sane
	 * so bail out early if the request is out of bound.
	 */
	if (unlikely(order >= MAX_ORDER)) {
		WARN_ON_ONCE(!(gfp_mask & __GFP_NOWARN));
		return NULL;
	}

path. memdup_user_nul() side should do

	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1)
		return -ENOMEM;

check and return -ENOMEM if memdup_user_nul() does not want to use __GFP_NOWARN. I still believe that memdup_user_nul() side should be fixed.

maintainer
#7 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Tetsuo Handa
Quoted 9 lines · Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Quoted 9 lines

Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like

  char buffer[20000];

  memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
  memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
  write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));

?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

It does, in this case. Then I need to patch another version with whitespace stripping before, after label. I just followed the same thing that I see in security/selinux/selinuxfs.c sel_write_enforce() etc.

It has the same memdup_user_nul() and count >= PAGE_SIZE check prior to that.

Since sel_write_enforce() accepts string representation of an integer value, PAGE_SIZE is sufficient. But since smk_write_onlycap() and smk_write_relabel_self() accept list of space-delimited words, you need to prove why PAGE_SIZE does not break userspace in your patch.

if PAGE_SIZE >= SMK_LOADSIZE all legitimate requests can be made using PAGE_SIZE as a limit. Your example with 19990 spaces before the data demonstrates that the interface is inadequately documented. Tizen and Automotive Grade Linux are going to be fine with a PAGE_SIZE limit. The best way to address this concern is to go ahead with the PAGE_SIZE limit and create ABI documents for the smackfs interfaces. I will take your patch for the former and create a patch for the latter.

Quoted 29 lines

Also, due to the "too small to fail" memory-allocation rule, memdup_user_nul() for count < PAGE_SIZE * 8 bytes is "never fails with -ENOMEM unless SIGKILLed by the OOM killer". Also, memdup_user_nul() for count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1 bytes is "never succeeds". Thus, you can safely add

	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1)
		return -EINVAL; // or -ENOMEM if you want compatibility

to smackfs write functions. But it is a strange requirement that the caller of memdup_user_nul() has to be aware of upper limit in a way that we won't hit

	/*
	 * There are several places where we assume that the order value is sane
	 * so bail out early if the request is out of bound.
	 */
	if (unlikely(order >= MAX_ORDER)) {
		WARN_ON_ONCE(!(gfp_mask & __GFP_NOWARN));
		return NULL;
	}

path. memdup_user_nul() side should do

	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1)
		return -ENOMEM;

check and return -ENOMEM if memdup_user_nul() does not want to use __GFP_NOWARN. I still believe that memdup_user_nul() side should be fixed.

#8 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines

if PAGE_SIZE >= SMK_LOADSIZE all legitimate requests can be made using PAGE_SIZE as a limit. Your example with 19990 spaces before the data demonstrates that the interface is inadequately documented. Tizen and Automotive Grade Linux are going to be fine with a PAGE_SIZE limit. The best way to address this concern is to go ahead with the PAGE_SIZE limit and create ABI documents for the smackfs interfaces. I will take your patch for the former and create a patch for the latter.

Please let me know if there is anything else required for this patch. AFAIU, we agreed with PAGE_SIZE as the limit.

maintainer
#9 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Quoted 7 lines

if PAGE_SIZE >= SMK_LOADSIZE all legitimate requests can be made using PAGE_SIZE as a limit. Your example with 19990 spaces before the data demonstrates that the interface is inadequately documented. Tizen and Automotive Grade Linux are going to be fine with a PAGE_SIZE limit. The best way to address this concern is to go ahead with the PAGE_SIZE limit and create ABI documents for the smackfs interfaces. I will take your patch for the former and create a patch for the latter.

Please let me know if there is anything else required for this patch. AFAIU, we agreed with PAGE_SIZE as the limit.

I am in the process of adding your patch to smack-next for 5.12.

I will have a separate documentation patch.