KEYS, trusted: a bunch of bug fixes
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[email protected]
maintainerv5 cover KEYS, trusted: a bunch of bug fixes
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
This patch set contains a bunch of disjoint bug fixes.
v5:
* Call tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() inside tpm2_seal_trusted() and tpm2_unseal_trusted().
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAFA6WYO4HJThYHhBxbx0Tr97sF_JFvTBur9uTGSQTtyQaOKpig@mail.gmail.com/
v4:
* Do not create stubs for tpm_transmit_cmd(), tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops().
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/
v3:
* Reordered patches a bit, i.e. trivial fixes in the head and the least trivial in the tail.
<no xref>
* Added the missing "return -ENODEV;" to tpm_transmit_cmd(), when the kernel is compiled without TPM support.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/
v2:
* Fix a kernel test bot warning.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/
Jarkko Sakkinen (3):
KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()
KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing
KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 ---- include/linux/tpm.h | 5 ++++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++---- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
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2.30.0
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH v5 1/3 KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the return value:
1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated.
2. A negative value on error.
However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read counts to the user space does not make any possible sense.
Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value.
--- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +17 -3
@@ -403,9 +403,12 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,int ret; ret =tpm_get_random (chip, ononce,TPM_NONCE_SIZE ); -if (ret !=TPM_NONCE_SIZE ) +if (ret <0 )return ret; +if (ret !=TPM_NONCE_SIZE ) +return -EIO ; +tpm_buf_reset (tb,TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND ,TPM_ORD_OSAP );tpm_buf_append_u16 (tb, type);tpm_buf_append_u32 (tb, handle);
@@ -496,8 +499,12 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, goto out; ret =tpm_get_random (chip, td->nonceodd,TPM_NONCE_SIZE ); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; +if (ret !=TPM_NONCE_SIZE ) - goto out; +return -EIO ; + ordinal =htonl (TPM_ORD_SEAL ); datsize =htonl (datalen); pcrsize =htonl (pcrinfosize);
@@ -601,9 +608,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal =htonl (TPM_ORD_UNSEAL ); ret =tpm_get_random (chip, nonceodd,TPM_NONCE_SIZE ); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; +if (ret !=TPM_NONCE_SIZE ) {pr_info ("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n" , ret); -return ret; +return -EIO ; } ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
@@ -1013,8 +1023,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,case Opt_new: key_len = payload->key_len; ret =tpm_get_random (chip, payload->key, key_len); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; +if (ret != key_len) {pr_info ("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n" , ret); + ret = -EIO ; goto out; }if (tpm2)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()
Quoted 14 lines · On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 01:56 +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
When
tpm_get_random()was introduced, it defined the following API for the return value:1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated.
2. A negative value on error.However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read counts to the user space does not make any possible sense.
Fix this by returning
-EIOwhentpm_get_random()returns a positive value.
Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 41ab999c80f1 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver")Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Cc "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Kent Yoder <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
thanks,
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH v5 2/3 KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing
In reply to [email protected]From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Consider the following transcript:
$ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u add_key: Invalid argument
The documentation has the following description:
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
default 1 (resealing allowed)
The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL.
[*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
--- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +1 -1
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,case Opt_migratable:if (*args[0 ].from =='0' ) pay->migratable =0 ; -else +else if (*args[0 ].from !='1' )return -EINVAL ;break ;case Opt_pcrlock:
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH v5 3/3 KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
In reply to [email protected]From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT need to be done as a one single atom.
Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.
--- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 ---- include/linux/tpm.h | 5 ++++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +0 -4
@@ -164,8 +164,6 @@ extern const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops;extern struct idr dev_nums_idr;ssize_t tpm_transmit (struct tpm_chip *chip,u8 *buf,size_t bufsiz); -ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct tpm_buf *buf, -size_t min_rsp_body_length,const char *desc);int tpm_get_timeouts (struct tpm_chip *);int tpm_auto_startup (struct tpm_chip *chip);
@@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec)int tpm_chip_start (struct tpm_chip *chip);void tpm_chip_stop (struct tpm_chip *chip);struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops (struct tpm_chip *chip); -__must_check int tpm_try_get_ops (struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_put_ops (struct tpm_chip *chip);struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc (struct device *dev,const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
include/linux/tpm.h +4 -1
@@ -404,6 +404,10 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc)#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM ) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE )extern int tpm_is_tpm2 (struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops (struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern void tpm_put_ops (struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct tpm_buf *buf, +size_t min_rsp_body_length,const char *desc);extern int tpm_pcr_read (struct tpm_chip *chip,u32 pcr_idx,struct tpm_digest *digest); extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
@@ -417,7 +421,6 @@ static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) {return -ENODEV ; } -static inline int tpm_pcr_read (struct tpm_chip *chip,int pcr_idx,struct tpm_digest *digest) {
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +19 -5
@@ -79,10 +79,16 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,if (i ==ARRAY_SIZE (tpm2_hash_map))return -EINVAL ; - rc =tpm_buf_init (&buf,TPM2_ST_SESSIONS ,TPM2_CC_CREATE ); + rc =tpm_try_get_ops (chip);if (rc)return rc; + rc =tpm_buf_init (&buf,TPM2_ST_SESSIONS ,TPM2_CC_CREATE ); +if (rc) { +tpm_put_ops (chip); +return rc; + } +tpm_buf_append_u32 (&buf, options->keyhandle); tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, NULL /* nonce */, 0,
@@ -130,7 +136,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - rc =tpm_send (chip, buf.data,tpm_buf_length (&buf)); + rc =tpm_transmit_cmd (chip, &buf,4 ,"sealing data" );if (rc) goto out;
@@ -157,6 +163,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, rc = -EPERM ; } +tpm_put_ops (chip);return rc; }
@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - rc =tpm_send (chip, buf.data,tpm_buf_length (&buf)); + rc =tpm_transmit_cmd (chip, &buf,4 ,"loading blob" );if (!rc) *blob_handle =be32_to_cpup ( (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE ]);
@@ -260,7 +267,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->blobauth/* hmac */ , TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - rc =tpm_send (chip, buf.data,tpm_buf_length (&buf)); + rc =tpm_transmit_cmd (chip, &buf,6 ,"unsealing" );if (rc >0 ) rc = -EPERM ;
@@ -304,12 +311,19 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,u32 blob_handle;int rc; - rc =tpm2_load_cmd (chip, payload, options, &blob_handle); + rc =tpm_try_get_ops (chip);if (rc)return rc; + rc =tpm2_load_cmd (chip, payload, options, &blob_handle); +if (rc) + goto out; + rc =tpm2_unseal_cmd (chip, payload, options, blob_handle);tpm2_flush_context (chip, blob_handle); +out: +tpm_put_ops (chip); +return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): CAFA6WYOAbHV=sOxuUdJq91sZbKDMbo6D5KXcSp9ix0PWLpSdaA@mail.gmail.com
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
Quoted 29 lines · Sumit Garg
Quoted 21 lines · On Fri, 29 Jan 2021 at 05:26, <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from
tpm_try_get_ops()andtpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken insidetpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key loadTPM2_CC_LOAD,TPM2_CC_UNSEALandTPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXTneed to be done as a one single atom.Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops()andtpm_put_ops(), and usetpm_transmit_cmd()to send TPM commands instead oftpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.Fixes 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")Reported-by "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Cc Sumit Garg <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>Quoted 6 lines
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 ---- include/linux/tpm.h | 5 ++++-security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c| 24 ++++++++++++++++++-----3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Quoted 1 line
Acked-by Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Thanks.
/Jarkko
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
Quoted 22 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 13 lines · On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 01:56 +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from
tpm_try_get_ops()andtpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken insidetpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key loadTPM2_CC_LOAD,TPM2_CC_UNSEALandTPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXTneed to be done as a one single atom.Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops()andtpm_put_ops(), and usetpm_transmit_cmd()to send TPM commands instead oftpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")Reported-by "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Cc Sumit Garg <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Quoted 2 lines
TPM 2.0)
Thanks, is it OK to apply the whole series?
/Jarkko
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
Quoted 23 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 22 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 20 lines · On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 01:56 +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from
tpm_try_get_ops()andtpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken insidetpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key loadTPM2_CC_LOAD,TPM2_CC_UNSEALandTPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXTneed to be done as a one single atom.Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops()andtpm_put_ops(), and usetpm_transmit_cmd()to send TPM commands instead oftpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.Fixes 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")Reported-by "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Cc Sumit Garg <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
TPM 2.0)
Thanks, is it OK to apply the whole series?
Yes. The testing was with the entire patch set, but I didn't explicitly test each change. For the other two patches, please add my Reviewed-by.
Mimi
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
Quoted 27 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 26 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 24 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 13 lines · On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 01:56 +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from
tpm_try_get_ops()andtpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken insidetpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key loadTPM2_CC_LOAD,TPM2_CC_UNSEALandTPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXTneed to be done as a one single atom.Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops()andtpm_put_ops(), and usetpm_transmit_cmd()to send TPM commands instead oftpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")Reported-by "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Cc Sumit Garg <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>TPM 2.0)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thanks, is it OK to apply the whole series?
Yes. The testing was with the entire patch set, but I didn't explicitly test each change. For the other two patches, please add my Reviewed-by.
Mimi
Thank you. I will do that.
/Jarkko