KASAN for powerpc64 radix
Subsystems (7)
v10 cover KASAN for powerpc64 radix
Building on the work of Christophe, Aneesh and Balbir, I've ported KASAN to 64-bit Book3S kernels running on the Radix MMU.
v10 rebases on top of next-20210125, fixing things up to work on top of the latest changes, and fixing some review comments from Christophe. I have tested host and guest with 64k pages for this spin.
It does not apply to powerpc/next, sorry: there are conflicting kasan changes staged in next.
There is now only 1 failing KUnit test: kasan_global_oob - gcc puts the ASAN init code in a section called '.init_array'. Powerpc64 module loading code goes through and _renames_ any section beginning with '.init' to begin with '_init' in order to avoid some complexities around our 24-bit indirect jumps. This means it renames '.init_array' to '_init_array', and the generic module loading code then fails to recognise the section as a constructor and thus doesn't run it. This hack dates back to 2003 and so I'm not going to try to unpick it in this series. (I suspect this may have previously worked if the code ended up in .ctors rather than .init_array but I don't keep my old binaries around so I have no real way of checking.)
(The previously failing stack tests are now skipped due to more accurate configuration settings.)
Details from v9: This is a significant reworking of the previous versions. Instead of the previous approach which supported inline instrumentation, this series provides only outline instrumentation.
To get around the problem of accessing the shadow region inside code we run with translations off (in 'real mode'), we we restrict checking to when translations are enabled. This is done via a new hook in the kasan core and by excluding larger quantites of arch code from instrumentation. The upside is that we no longer require that you be able to specify the amount of physically contiguous memory on the system at compile time. Hopefully this is a better trade-off. More details in patch 6.
kexec works. Both 64k and 4k pages work. Running as a KVM host works, but nothing in arch/powerpc/kvm is instrumented. It's also potentially a bit fragile - if any real mode code paths call out to instrumented code, things will go boom.
Kind regards,
Daniel
PATCH v10 1/6 kasan: allow an architecture to disable inline instrumentation
For annoying architectural reasons, it's very difficult to support inline instrumentation on powerpc64.
Add a Kconfig flag to allow an arch to disable inline. (It's a bit annoying to be 'backwards', but I'm not aware of any way to have an arch force a symbol to be 'n', rather than 'y'.)
We also disable stack instrumentation in this case as it does things that are functionally equivalent to inline instrumentation, namely adding code that touches the shadow directly without going through a C helper.
--- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
lib/Kconfig.kasan +8 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC bool +config ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE + def_bool n + config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address)
@@ -130,6 +133,7 @@ config KASAN_OUTLINE config KASAN_INLINE bool "Inline instrumentation" + depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE help Compiler directly inserts code checking shadow memory before memory accesses. This is faster than outline (in some workloads
@@ -141,6 +145,7 @@ endchoice config KASAN_STACK bool "Enable stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS + depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE default y if CC_IS_GCC help The LLVM stack address sanitizer has a know problem that
@@ -154,6 +159,9 @@ config KASAN_STACK but clang users can still enable it for builds without CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST. On gcc it is assumed to always be safe to use and enabled by default. + If the architecture disables inline instrumentation, this is + also disabled as it adds inline-style instrumentation that + is run unconditionally. config KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY bool "Enable memory corruption identification"
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v10 2/6 kasan: allow architectures to provide an outline readiness check
In reply to Daniel AxtensAllow architectures to define a kasan_arch_is_ready() hook that bails out of any function that's about to touch the shadow unless the arch says that it is ready for the memory to be accessed. This is fairly uninvasive and should have a negligible performance penalty.
This will only work in outline mode, so an arch must specify ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE if it requires this.
--
I discuss the justfication for this later in the series. Also, both previous RFCs for ppc64 - by 2 different people - have needed this trick! See:
- https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/592820/ # ppc64 hash series
- https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/795211/ # ppc radix series
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 4 ++++ mm/kasan/common.c | 4 ++++ mm/kasan/generic.c | 3 +++ mm/kasan/shadow.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
include/linux/kasan.h +4 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ struct kunit_kasan_expectation {#endif +#ifndef kasan_arch_is_ready +static inline bool kasan_arch_is_ready (void ) {return true; } +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#include <linux/pgtable.h>
mm/kasan/common.c +4 -0
@@ -348,6 +348,10 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,if (unlikely (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU ))return false; +/* We can't read the shadow byte if the arch isn't ready */ +if (!kasan_arch_is_ready ()) +return false; +if (!kasan_byte_accessible (tagged_object)) {kasan_report_invalid_free (tagged_object, ip);return true;
mm/kasan/generic.c +3 -0
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static __always_inline bool check_region_inline(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, unsigned long ret_ip) { + if (!kasan_arch_is_ready()) + return true; +if (unlikely (size ==0 ))return true;
mm/kasan/shadow.c +4 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) address =kasan_reset_tag (address); size =round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); +/* Don't touch the shadow memory if arch isn't ready */ +if (!kasan_arch_is_ready ()) +return ; +/* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */ if (is_kfence_address (address))return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v10 3/6 kasan: define and use MAX_PTRS_PER_* for early shadow tables
In reply to Daniel Axtenspowerpc has a variable number of PTRS_PER_*, set at runtime based on the MMU that the kernel is booted under.
This means the PTRS_PER_* are no longer constants, and therefore breaks the build.
Define default MAX_PTRS_PER_*s in the same style as MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D. As KASAN is the only user at the moment, just define them in the kasan header, and have them default to PTRS_PER_* unless overridden in arch code.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 18 +++++++++++++++--- mm/kasan/init.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +15 -3
@@ -43,10 +43,22 @@ static inline bool kasan_arch_is_ready(void) { return true; }#define PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS 0#endif +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE PTRS_PER_PTE +#endif + +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD PTRS_PER_PMD +#endif + +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD PTRS_PER_PUD +#endif +extern unsigned char kasan_early_shadow_page[PAGE_SIZE ]; -extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE +PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS ]; -extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD ]; -extern pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD ]; +extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE +PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS ]; +extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD ]; +extern pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD ];extern p4d_t kasan_early_shadow_p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D ]; int kasan_populate_early_shadow(const void *shadow_start,
mm/kasan/init.c +3 -3
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_p4d_table(pgd_t pgd) }#endif #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >3 -pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss; +pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;static inline bool kasan_pud_table (p4d_t p4d) {return p4d_page (p4d) ==virt_to_page (lm_alias (kasan_early_shadow_pud));
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d) }#endif #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >2 -pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss; +pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;static inline bool kasan_pmd_table (pud_t pud) {return pud_page (pud) ==virt_to_page (lm_alias (kasan_early_shadow_pmd));
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)return false; }#endif -pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS] +pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS] __page_aligned_bss;static inline bool kasan_pte_table (pmd_t pmd)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v10 4/6 kasan: Document support on 32-bit powerpc
In reply to Daniel AxtensKASAN is supported on 32-bit powerpc and the docs should reflect this.
Document s390 support while we're at it.
--- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 7 +++++-- Documentation/powerpc/kasan.txt | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/powerpc/kasan.txt
Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +5 -2
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ out-of-bounds accesses for global variables is only supported since Clang 11. Tag-based KASAN is only supported in Clang. Currently generic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm, arm64, xtensa, s390 -and riscv architectures, and tag-based KASAN modes are supported only for arm64. +and riscv architectures. It is also supported on 32-bit powerpc kernels. +Tag-based KASAN modes are supported only for arm64. Usage -----
@@ -332,7 +333,9 @@ CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ With ``CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC``, KASAN can cover vmalloc space at the -cost of greater memory usage. Currently this is only supported on x86. +cost of greater memory usage. Currently this supported on x86, s390 +and 32-bit powerpc. It is optional, except on 32-bit powerpc kernels +with module support, where it is required. This works by hooking into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocating real shadow memory to back the mappings.
Documentation/powerpc/kasan.txt new file +12 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +KASAN is supported on powerpc on 32-bit only. + +32 bit support +============== + +KASAN is supported on both hash and nohash MMUs on 32-bit. + +The shadow area sits at the top of the kernel virtual memory space above the +fixmap area and occupies one eighth of the total kernel virtual memory space. + +Instrumentation of the vmalloc area is optional, unless built with modules, +in which case it is required.
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v10 5/6 powerpc/mm/kasan: rename kasan_init_32.c to init_32.c
In reply to Daniel Axtenskasan is already implied by the directory name, we don't need to repeat it.
---
arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/{kasan_init_32.c => init_32.c} | 0
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/{kasan_init_32.c => init_32.c} (100%)arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE := n -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC32) += kasan_init_32.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC32) += init_32.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_8xx) += 8xx.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_32) += book3s_32.o
arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/init_32.c renamed from arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c +0 -0
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v10 6/6 powerpc: Book3S 64-bit outline-only KASAN support
In reply to Daniel AxtensImplement a limited form of KASAN for Book3S 64-bit machines running under the Radix MMU, supporting only outline mode.
- Enable the compiler instrumentation to check addresses and maintain the shadow region. (This is the guts of KASAN which we can easily reuse.)
- Require kasan-vmalloc support to handle modules and anything else in vmalloc space.
- KASAN needs to be able to validate all pointer accesses, but we can't instrument all kernel addresses - only linear map and vmalloc. On boot, set up a single page of read-only shadow that marks all iomap and vmemmap accesses as valid.
- Make our stack-walking code KASAN-safe by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK - generic code, arm64, s390 and x86 all do this for similar sorts of
reasons: when unwinding a stack, we might touch memory that KASAN has marked as being out-of-bounds. In our case we often get this when checking for an exception frame because we're checking an arbitrary offset into the stack frame.
See commit 20955746320e ("s390/kasan: avoid false positives during stack unwind"), commit bcaf669b4bdb ("arm64: disable kasan when accessing frame->fp in unwind_frame"), commit 91e08ab0c851 ("x86/dumpstack:
Prevent KASAN false positive warnings") and commit 6e22c8366416 ("tracing, kasan: Silence Kasan warning in check_stack of stack_tracer")
- Document KASAN in both generic and powerpc docs.
Background
----------
KASAN support on Book3S is a bit tricky to get right:
- It would be good to support inline instrumentation so as to be able to catch stack issues that cannot be caught with outline mode.
- Inline instrumentation requires a fixed offset.
- Book3S runs code with translations off ("real mode") during boot, including a lot of generic device-tree parsing code which is used to determine MMU features.
[ppc64 mm note: The kernel installs a linear mapping at effective address c000...-c008.... This is a one-to-one mapping with physical memory from 0000... onward. Because of how memory accesses work on powerpc 64-bit Book3S, a kernel pointer in the linear map accesses the same memory both with translations on (accessing as an 'effective address'), and with translations off (accessing as a 'real address'). This works in both guests and the hypervisor. For more details, see s5.7 of Book III of version 3 of the ISA, in particular the Storage Control Overview, s5.7.3, and s5.7.5 - noting that this KASAN implementation currently only supports Radix.]
- Some code - most notably a lot of KVM code - also runs with translations off after boot.
- Therefore any offset has to point to memory that is valid with translations on or off.
One approach is just to give up on inline instrumentation. This way boot-time checks can be delayed until after the MMU is set is up, and we can just not instrument any code that runs with translations off after booting. Take this approach for now and require outline instrumentation.
Previous attempts allowed inline instrumentation. However, they came with some unfortunate restrictions: only physically contiguous memory could be used and it had to be specified at compile time. Maybe we can do better in the future.
--- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 9 +- Documentation/powerpc/kasan.txt | 48 +++++++++- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 4 +- arch/powerpc/Kconfig.debug | 3 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h | 4 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 4 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/radix.h | 13 ++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kasan.h | 22 +++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 11 +++ arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 16 ++-- arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile | 5 ++ arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/Makefile | 9 ++ arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/init_book3s_64.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/mm/ptdump/ptdump.c | 20 ++++- arch/powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype | 1 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 6 ++ arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Makefile | 3 + 18 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/init_book3s_64.c
Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +5 -4
@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ out-of-bounds accesses for global variables is only supported since Clang 11. Tag-based KASAN is only supported in Clang. Currently generic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm, arm64, xtensa, s390 -and riscv architectures. It is also supported on 32-bit powerpc kernels. -Tag-based KASAN modes are supported only for arm64. +and riscv architectures. It is also supported on powerpc for 32-bit powerpc +kernels and for 64-bit kernels running under the Radix MMU. Tag-based KASAN +modes are supported only for arm64. Usage -----
@@ -334,8 +335,8 @@ CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC With ``CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC``, KASAN can cover vmalloc space at the cost of greater memory usage. Currently this supported on x86, s390 -and 32-bit powerpc. It is optional, except on 32-bit powerpc kernels -with module support, where it is required. +and powerpc. It is optional, except on 64-bit powerpc kernels, and on +32-bit powerpc kernels with module support, where it is required. This works by hooking into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocating real shadow memory to back the mappings.
Documentation/powerpc/kasan.txt +47 -1
54 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +3 -1
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ config PPC # Please keep this list sorted alphabetically. # select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if PPC32 + select ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE if PPC_RADIX_MMU select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
@@ -183,7 +184,8 @@ config PPC select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP if PPC_BOOK3S_64 && PPC_RADIX_MMU select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 - select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 + select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC_RADIX_MMU + select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
arch/powerpc/Kconfig.debug +2 -1
@@ -397,4 +397,5 @@ config PPC_FAST_ENDIAN_SWITCH config KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET hex depends on KASAN - default 0xe0000000 + default 0xe0000000 if PPC32 + default 0xa80e000000000000 if PPC64
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h +4 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@#include <asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h> #endif +#define H_PTRS_PER_PTE (1 << H_PTE_INDEX_SIZE) +#define H_PTRS_PER_PMD (1 << H_PMD_INDEX_SIZE) +#define H_PTRS_PER_PUD (1 << H_PUD_INDEX_SIZE) +/* Bits to set in a PMD/PUD/PGD entry valid bit*/ #define HASH_PMD_VAL_BITS (0x8000000000000000UL)#define HASH_PUD_VAL_BITS (0x8000000000000000UL)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h +4 -0
@@ -230,6 +230,10 @@ extern unsigned long __pmd_frag_size_shift;#define PTRS_PER_PUD (1 << PUD_INDEX_SIZE)#define PTRS_PER_PGD (1 << PGD_INDEX_SIZE) +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE ((H_PTRS_PER_PTE > R_PTRS_PER_PTE) ? H_PTRS_PER_PTE : R_PTRS_PER_PTE) +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD ((H_PTRS_PER_PMD > R_PTRS_PER_PMD) ? H_PTRS_PER_PMD : R_PTRS_PER_PMD) +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD ((H_PTRS_PER_PUD > R_PTRS_PER_PUD) ? H_PTRS_PER_PUD : R_PTRS_PER_PUD) +/* PMD_SHIFT determines what a second-level page table entry can map */ #define PMD_SHIFT (PAGE_SHIFT + PTE_INDEX_SIZE)#define PMD_SIZE (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/radix.h +10 -3
@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@#define RADIX_PMD_SHIFT (PAGE_SHIFT + RADIX_PTE_INDEX_SIZE)#define RADIX_PUD_SHIFT (RADIX_PMD_SHIFT + RADIX_PMD_INDEX_SIZE)#define RADIX_PGD_SHIFT (RADIX_PUD_SHIFT + RADIX_PUD_INDEX_SIZE) + +#define R_PTRS_PER_PTE (1 << RADIX_PTE_INDEX_SIZE) +#define R_PTRS_PER_PMD (1 << RADIX_PMD_INDEX_SIZE) +#define R_PTRS_PER_PUD (1 << RADIX_PUD_INDEX_SIZE) +/* * Size of EA range mapped by our pagetables. */
@@ -68,11 +73,11 @@* * * 3rd quadrant expanded: -* +------------------------------+ +* +------------------------------+ Highest address (0xc010000000000000) +* +------------------------------+ KASAN shadow end (0xc00fc00000000000) * | | * | | -* | | -* +------------------------------+ Kernel vmemmap end (0xc010000000000000) +* +------------------------------+ Kernel vmemmap end/shadow start (0xc00e000000000000) * | | * | 512TB | * | |
@@ -126,6 +131,8 @@#define RADIX_VMEMMAP_SIZE RADIX_KERN_MAP_SIZE#define RADIX_VMEMMAP_END (RADIX_VMEMMAP_START + RADIX_VMEMMAP_SIZE) +/* For the sizes of the shadow area, see kasan.h */ +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__#define RADIX_PTE_TABLE_SIZE (sizeof(pte_t) << RADIX_PTE_INDEX_SIZE)#define RADIX_PMD_TABLE_SIZE (sizeof(pmd_t) << RADIX_PMD_INDEX_SIZE)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kasan.h +22 -0
@@ -30,7 +30,29 @@#define KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ASM_CONST(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32 #define KASAN_SHADOW_END (-(-KASAN_SHADOW_START >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 +/* +* The shadow ends before the highest accessible address +* because we don't need a shadow for the shadow. Instead: +* c00e000000000000 << 3 + a80e000000000000000 = c00fc00000000000 +*/ +#define KASAN_SHADOW_END 0xc00fc00000000000UL + +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (powerpc_kasan_enabled_key); + +static __always_inline bool kasan_arch_is_ready(void) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&powerpc_kasan_enabled_key)) +return true; +return false; +} + +#define kasan_arch_is_ready kasan_arch_is_ready +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN void kasan_early_init (void );
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +11 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_early_32.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_cputable.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_prom_init.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_btext.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_paca.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_setup_64.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_mce.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_mce_power.o := n + +# we have to be particularly careful in ppc64 to exclude code that +# runs with translations off, as we cannot access the shadow with +# translations off. However, ppc32 can sanitize this. +ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 +KASAN_SANITIZE_traps.o := n +endif ifdef CONFIG_KASAN CFLAGS_early_32.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +9 -7
@@ -2157,8 +2157,8 @@ void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack,break ; stack = (unsigned long *) sp; - newsp = stack[0 ]; - ip = stack[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE ]; + newsp =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[0 ]); + ip =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE ]);if (!firstframe || ip != lr) {printk ("%s[" REG "] [" REG "] %pS" , loglvl, sp, ip, (void *)ip);
@@ -2176,17 +2176,19 @@ void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack,* See if this is an exception frame. * We look for the "regshere" marker in the current frame. */ -if (validate_sp (sp, tsk,STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE ) - && stack[STACK_FRAME_MARKER ] ==STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER ) { +if (validate_sp (sp, tsk,STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE ) && + (READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[STACK_FRAME_MARKER ]) == +STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER )) {struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) (sp +STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD ); - lr = regs->link; + lr =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->link);printk ("%s--- interrupt: %lx at %pS\n" , - loglvl, regs->trap, (void *)regs->nip); + loglvl,READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->trap), + (void *)READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->nip));__show_regs (regs);printk ("%s--- interrupt: %lx\n" , - loglvl, regs->trap); + loglvl,READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->trap)); firstframe =1 ; }
arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile +5 -0
@@ -136,3 +136,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_64_PR) += kvm-pr.o obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_64_HV) += kvm-hv.o obj-y += $(kvm-book3s_64-builtin-objs-y) + +# KVM does a lot in real-mode, and 64-bit Book3S KASAN doesn't support that +ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 +KASAN_SANITIZE := n +endif
arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/Makefile +9 -0
@@ -21,3 +21,12 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_PKEY) += pkeys.o # Instrumenting the SLB fault path can lead to duplicate SLB entries KCOV_INSTRUMENT_slb.o := n + +# Parts of these can run in real mode and therefore are +# not safe with the current outline KASAN implementation +KASAN_SANITIZE_mmu_context.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_pgtable.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_radix_pgtable.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_radix_tlb.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_slb.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_pkeys.o := n
arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE := n obj-$(CONFIG_PPC32) += init_32.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_8xx) += 8xx.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_32) += book3s_32.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += init_book3s_64.o
arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/init_book3s_64.c new file +95 -0
95 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/powerpc/mm/ptdump/ptdump.c +19 -1
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <asm/fixmap.h> #include <linux/const.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/hugetlb.h>
@@ -317,6 +318,23 @@ static void walk_pud(struct pg_state *st, p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long start)unsigned long addr;unsigned int i; +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 ) +/* +* On radix + KASAN, we want to check for the KASAN "early" shadow +* which covers huge quantities of memory with the same set of +* read-only PTEs. If it is, we want to note the first page (to see +* the status change), and then note the last page. This gives us good +* results without spending ages noting the exact same PTEs over 100s of +* terabytes of memory. +*/ +if (p4d_page (*p4d) ==virt_to_page (lm_alias (kasan_early_shadow_pud))) { +walk_pmd (st, pud, start); + addr = start + (PTRS_PER_PUD -1 ) *PUD_SIZE ; +walk_pmd (st, pud, addr); +return ; + } +#endif +for (i =0 ; i <PTRS_PER_PUD ; i++, pud++) { addr = start + i *PUD_SIZE ;if (!pud_none (*pud) && !pud_is_leaf (*pud))
@@ -387,11 +405,11 @@ static void populate_markers(void)#endif address_markers[i++].start_address =FIXADDR_START ; address_markers[i++].start_address =FIXADDR_TOP ; +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN address_markers[i++].start_address =KASAN_SHADOW_START ; address_markers[i++].start_address =KASAN_SHADOW_END ;#endif -#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ }static int ptdump_show (struct seq_file *m,void *v)
arch/powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype +1 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config PPC_BOOK3S_64 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING select IRQ_WORK select PPC_MM_SLICES + select KASAN_VMALLOC if KASAN config PPC_BOOK3E_64 bool "Embedded processors"
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +6 -0
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +# nothing that deals with real mode is safe to KASAN +# in particular, idle code runs a bunch of things in real mode +KASAN_SANITIZE_idle.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_pci-ioda.o := n + obj-y += setup.o opal-call.o opal-wrappers.o opal.o opal-async.o obj-y += idle.o opal-rtc.o opal-nvram.o opal-lpc.o opal-flash.o obj-y += rng.o opal-elog.o opal-dump.o opal-sysparam.o opal-sensor.o
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Makefile +3 -0
@@ -30,3 +30,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM) += svm.o obj-$(CONFIG_FA_DUMP) += rtas-fadump.o obj-$(CONFIG_SUSPEND) += suspend.o + +# nothing that operates in real mode is safe for KASAN +KASAN_SANITIZE_ras.o := n
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v10 6/6] powerpc: Book3S 64-bit outline-only KASAN support
Le 03/02/2021 à 12:59, Daniel Axtens a écrit :
Quoted 34 lines
Implement a limited form of KASAN for Book3S 64-bit machines running under the Radix MMU, supporting only outline mode.
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +6
-5@@ -2157,8 +2157,8 @@ void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack,break ; stack = (unsigned long *) sp; - newsp = stack[0 ]; - ip = stack[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE ]; + newsp =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[0 ]); + ip =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE ]);if (!firstframe || ip != lr) {printk ("%s[" REG "] [" REG "] %pS" , loglvl, sp, ip, (void *)ip);@@ -2176,17 +2176,19 @@ void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack,* See if this is an exception frame. * We look for the "regshere" marker in the current frame. */ -if (validate_sp (sp, tsk,STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE ) - && stack[STACK_FRAME_MARKER ] ==STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER ) { +if (validate_sp (sp, tsk,STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE ) && + (READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[STACK_FRAME_MARKER ]) == +STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER )) {struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) (sp +STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD ); - lr = regs->link; + lr =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->link); printk("%s--- interrupt: %lx at %pS\n",
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack, · line 2194
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +3
-2- loglvl, regs->trap, (void *)regs->nip); + loglvl,READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->trap), + (void *)READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->nip));__show_regs (regs);printk ("%s--- interrupt: %lx\n" , - loglvl, regs->trap); + loglvl,READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->trap)); firstframe =1 ; }
The above changes look like a bug fix not directly related to KASAN. Should be split out in another patch I think.
Christophe
Re: [PATCH v10 6/6] powerpc: Book3S 64-bit outline-only KASAN support
Quoted 43 lines · Christophe Leroy
Le 03/02/2021 à 12:59, Daniel Axtens a écrit :
Quoted 42 lines
Implement a limited form of KASAN for Book3S 64-bit machines running under the Radix MMU, supporting only outline mode.
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +9
-7@@ -2157,8 +2157,8 @@ void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack,break ; stack = (unsigned long *) sp; - newsp = stack[0 ]; - ip = stack[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE ]; + newsp =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[0 ]); + ip =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE ]);if (!firstframe || ip != lr) {printk ("%s[" REG "] [" REG "] %pS" , loglvl, sp, ip, (void *)ip);@@ -2176,17 +2176,19 @@ void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack,* See if this is an exception frame. * We look for the "regshere" marker in the current frame. */ -if (validate_sp (sp, tsk,STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE ) - && stack[STACK_FRAME_MARKER ] ==STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER ) { +if (validate_sp (sp, tsk,STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE ) && + (READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (stack[STACK_FRAME_MARKER ]) == +STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER )) {struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) (sp +STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD ); - lr = regs->link; + lr =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->link);printk ("%s--- interrupt: %lx at %pS\n" , - loglvl, regs->trap, (void *)regs->nip); + loglvl,READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->trap), + (void *)READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->nip));__show_regs (regs);printk ("%s--- interrupt: %lx\n" , - loglvl, regs->trap); + loglvl,READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (regs->trap));
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack, · line 2194
Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +0
-0firstframe =1 ; }The above changes look like a bug fix not directly related to KASAN. Should be split out in another patch I think.
That code corresponds to the following part of the patch description:
| - Make our stack-walking code KASAN-safe by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK -
| generic code, arm64, s390 and x86 all do this for similar sorts of
| reasons: when unwinding a stack, we might touch memory that KASAN has
| marked as being out-of-bounds. In our case we often get this when
| checking for an exception frame because we're checking an arbitrary
| offset into the stack frame.
|
| See commit 20955746320e ("s390/kasan: avoid false positives during stack
| unwind"), commit bcaf669b4bdb ("arm64: disable kasan when accessing
| frame->fp in unwind_frame"), commit 91e08ab0c851 ("x86/dumpstack:
| Prevent KASAN false positive warnings") and commit 6e22c8366416
| ("tracing, kasan: Silence Kasan warning in check_stack of stack_tracer")include/linux/compiler.h describes it as follows:
/*
* Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() instead of READ_ONCE() if you need
* to hide memory access from KASAN.
*/
So I think it is sufficently connected with KASAN to be in this patch.
Kind regards,
Daniel
Quoted 2 lines
Christophe