4.19.176-rc1 review
Subsystems (3)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 4.19.176-rc1 review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.176 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 13 Feb 2021 15:01:39 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.176-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.19.176-rc1
Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup
Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
squashfs: add more sanity checks in inode lookup
Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
squashfs: add more sanity checks in id lookup
Ming Lei <[email protected]>
blk-mq: don't hold q->sysfs_lock in blk_mq_map_swqueue
Ming Lei <[email protected]>
block: don't hold q->sysfs_lock in elevator_init_mq
Peter Gonda <[email protected]>
Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through svm_register_enc_region
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
memcg: fix a crash in wb_workfn when a device disappears
Qian Cai <[email protected]>
include/trace/events/writeback.h: fix -Wstringop-truncation warnings
Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
lib/string: Add strscpy_pad() function
Dave Wysochanski <[email protected]>
SUNRPC: Handle 0 length opaque XDR object data properly
Dave Wysochanski <[email protected]>
SUNRPC: Move simple_get_bytes and simple_get_netobj into private header
Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
iwlwifi: mvm: guard against device removal in reprobe
Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
iwlwifi: pcie: fix context info memory leak
Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>
iwlwifi: pcie: add a NULL check in iwl_pcie_txq_unmap
Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
iwlwifi: mvm: take mutex for calling iwl_mvm_get_sync_time()
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
pNFS/NFSv4: Try to return invalid layout in pnfs_layout_process()
Pan Bian <[email protected]>
chtls: Fix potential resource leak
David Collins <[email protected]>
regulator: core: avoid regulator_resolve_supply() race condition
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
af_key: relax availability checks for skb size calculation
Sibi Sankar <[email protected]>
remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_mss: Validate MBA firmware size before load
Sibi Sankar <[email protected]>
remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_mss: Validate modem blob firmware size before load
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
fgraph: Initialize tracing_graph_pause at task creation
zhengbin <[email protected]>
block: fix NULL pointer dereference in register_disk
Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
tracing/kprobe: Fix to support kretprobe events on unloaded modules
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 18 +++--- block/blk-mq.c | 7 --- block/elevator.c | 14 ++--- block/genhd.c | 10 ++-- drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_cm.c | 7 +-- .../net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c | 3 + drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c | 3 +- .../wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/ctxt-info-gen3.c | 11 +++- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c | 5 ++ drivers/regulator/core.c | 39 +++++++++---- drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c | 11 +++- fs/fs-writeback.c | 2 +- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 8 ++- fs/squashfs/export.c | 41 +++++++++++--- fs/squashfs/id.c | 40 ++++++++++--- fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h | 1 + fs/squashfs/super.c | 6 +- fs/squashfs/xattr.h | 10 +++- fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/backing-dev.h | 10 ++++ include/linux/kprobes.h | 2 +- include/linux/string.h | 4 ++ include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h | 3 +- include/trace/events/writeback.h | 35 ++++++------ init/init_task.c | 3 +- kernel/kprobes.c | 34 ++++++++--- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 2 - kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c | 4 +- lib/string.c | 47 ++++++++++++--- mm/backing-dev.c | 1 + net/key/af_key.c | 6 +- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 30 +--------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h | 45 +++++++++++++++ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 31 +--------- 35 files changed, 379 insertions(+), 184 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/24 tracing/kprobe: Fix to support kretprobe events on unloaded modules
From: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
commit 97c753e62e6c31a404183898d950d8c08d752dbd upstream.
Fix kprobe_on_func_entry() returns error code instead of false so that register_kretprobe() can return an appropriate error code.
append_trace_kprobe() expects the kprobe registration returns -ENOENT when the target symbol is not found, and it checks whether the target module is unloaded or not. If the target module doesn't exist, it defers to probe the target symbol until the module is loaded.
However, since register_kretprobe() returns -EINVAL instead of -ENOENT in that case, it always fail on putting the kretprobe event on unloaded modules. e.g.
Kprobe event:/sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo p xfs:xfs_end_io >> kprobe_events
[ 16.515574] trace_kprobe: This probe might be able to register after target module is loaded. Continue.
Kretprobe event: (p -> r)/sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo r xfs:xfs_end_io >> kprobe_events
sh: write error: Invalid argument /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat error_log
[ 41.122514] trace_kprobe: error: Failed to register probe event
Command: r xfs:xfs_end_io
^To fix this bug, change kprobe_on_func_entry() to detect symbol lookup failure and return -ENOENT in that case. Otherwise it returns -EINVAL or 0 (succeeded, given address is on the entry).
--- include/linux/kprobes.h | 2 +- kernel/kprobes.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/kprobes.h +1 -1
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ extern void kprobes_inc_nmissed_count(stextern bool arch_within_kprobe_blacklist (unsigned long addr);extern int arch_populate_kprobe_blacklist (void );extern bool arch_kprobe_on_func_entry (unsigned long offset); -extern bool kprobe_on_func_entry (kprobe_opcode_t *addr,const char *sym,unsigned long offset); +extern int kprobe_on_func_entry (kprobe_opcode_t *addr,const char *sym,unsigned long offset);extern bool within_kprobe_blacklist (unsigned long addr);extern int kprobe_add_ksym_blacklist (unsigned long entry);
kernel/kprobes.c +25 -9
@@ -1921,29 +1921,45 @@ bool __weak arch_kprobe_on_func_entry(unreturn !offset; } -bool kprobe_on_func_entry (kprobe_opcode_t *addr,const char *sym,unsigned long offset) +/** +* kprobe_on_func_entry() -- check whether given address is function entry +* @addr: Target address +* @sym: Target symbol name +* @offset: The offset from the symbol or the address +* +* This checks whether the given @addr+@offset or @sym+@offset is on the +* function entry address or not. +* This returns 0 if it is the function entry, or -EINVAL if it is not. +* And also it returns -ENOENT if it fails the symbol or address lookup. +* Caller must pass @addr or @sym (either one must be NULL), or this +* returns -EINVAL. +*/ +int kprobe_on_func_entry (kprobe_opcode_t *addr,const char *sym,unsigned long offset) {kprobe_opcode_t *kp_addr =_kprobe_addr (addr, sym, offset);if (IS_ERR (kp_addr)) -return false; +return PTR_ERR (kp_addr); -if (!kallsyms_lookup_size_offset ((unsigned long )kp_addr,NULL , &offset) || - !arch_kprobe_on_func_entry (offset)) -return false; +if (!kallsyms_lookup_size_offset ((unsigned long )kp_addr,NULL , &offset)) +return -ENOENT ; -return true; +if (!arch_kprobe_on_func_entry (offset)) +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; }int register_kretprobe (struct kretprobe *rp) { -int ret =0 ; +int ret;struct kretprobe_instance *inst;int i;void *addr; -if (!kprobe_on_func_entry (rp->kp.addr, rp->kp.symbol_name, rp->kp.offset)) -return -EINVAL ; + ret =kprobe_on_func_entry (rp->kp.addr, rp->kp.symbol_name, rp->kp.offset); +if (ret) +return ret;/* If only rp->kp.addr is specified, check reregistering kprobes */ if (rp->kp.addr &&check_kprobe_rereg (&rp->kp))
kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c +2 -2
@@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ bool trace_kprobe_on_func_entry(struct t {struct trace_kprobe *tk = (struct trace_kprobe *)call->data; -return kprobe_on_func_entry (tk->rp.kp.addr, +return (kprobe_on_func_entry (tk->rp.kp.addr, tk->rp.kp.addr ?NULL : tk->rp.kp.symbol_name, - tk->rp.kp.addr ?0 : tk->rp.kp.offset); + tk->rp.kp.addr ?0 : tk->rp.kp.offset) ==0 ); }bool trace_kprobe_error_injectable (struct trace_event_call *call)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/24 block: fix NULL pointer dereference in register_disk
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: zhengbin <[email protected]>
commit 4d7c1d3fd7c7eda7dea351f071945e843a46c145 upstream.
If __device_add_disk-->bdi_register_owner-->bdi_register--> bdi_register_va-->device_create_vargs fails, bdi->dev is still NULL, __device_add_disk-->register_disk will visit bdi->dev->kobj. This patch fixes that.
--- block/genhd.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
block/genhd.c +6 -4
@@ -652,10 +652,12 @@ exit:kobject_uevent (&part_to_dev (part)->kobj,KOBJ_ADD );disk_part_iter_exit (&piter); - err =sysfs_create_link (&ddev->kobj, - &disk->queue->backing_dev_info->dev->kobj, -"bdi" ); -WARN_ON (err); +if (disk->queue->backing_dev_info->dev) { + err =sysfs_create_link (&ddev->kobj, + &disk->queue->backing_dev_info->dev->kobj, +"bdi" ); +WARN_ON (err); + } }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/24 fgraph: Initialize tracing_graph_pause at task creation
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
commit 7e0a9220467dbcfdc5bc62825724f3e52e50ab31 upstream.
On some archs, the idle task can call into cpu_suspend(). The cpu_suspend() will disable or pause function graph tracing, as there's some paths in bringing down the CPU that can have issues with its return address being modified. The task_struct structure has a "tracing_graph_pause" atomic counter, that when set to something other than zero, the function graph tracer will not modify the return address.
The problem is that the tracing_graph_pause counter is initialized when the function graph tracer is enabled. This can corrupt the counter for the idle task if it is suspended in these architectures.
CPU 1 CPU 2
----- -----
do_idle()
cpu_suspend()
pause_graph_tracing()
task_struct->tracing_graph_pause++ (0 -> 1)
start_graph_tracing()
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(cpu)
task-struct->tracing_graph_pause = 0 (1 -> 0)
unpause_graph_tracing()
task_struct->tracing_graph_pause-- (0 -> -1)The above should have gone from 1 to zero, and enabled function graph tracing again. But instead, it is set to -1, which keeps it disabled.
There's no reason that the field tracing_graph_pause on the task_struct can not be initialized at boot up.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=211339
--- init/init_task.c | 3 ++- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
init/init_task.c +2 -1
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ struct task_struct init_task .lockdep_recursion = 0,#endif #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER - .ret_stack = NULL, + .ret_stack = NULL, + .tracing_graph_pause = ATOMIC_INIT(0),#endif #if defined(CONFIG_TRACING ) && defined(CONFIG_PREEMPT ) .trace_recursion = 0,
kernel/trace/ftrace.c +0 -2
@@ -6875,7 +6875,6 @@ static int alloc_retstack_tasklist(struc }if (t->ret_stack ==NULL ) { -atomic_set (&t->tracing_graph_pause,0 );atomic_set (&t->trace_overrun,0 ); t->curr_ret_stack =-1 ; t->curr_ret_depth =-1 ;
@@ -7088,7 +7087,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct ftrace_ret_static void graph_init_task (struct task_struct *t,struct ftrace_ret_stack *ret_stack) { -atomic_set (&t->tracing_graph_pause,0 );atomic_set (&t->trace_overrun,0 ); t->ftrace_timestamp =0 ;/* make curr_ret_stack visible before we add the ret_stack */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/24 remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_mss: Validate modem blob firmware size before load
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sibi Sankar <[email protected]>
commit 135b9e8d1cd8ba5ac9ad9bcf24b464b7b052e5b8 upstream
The following mem abort is observed when one of the modem blob firmware size exceeds the allocated mpss region. Fix this by restricting the copy size to segment size using request_firmware_into_buf before load.
Err Logs:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address Mem abort info: ... Call trace: __memcpy+0x110/0x180 rproc_start+0xd0/0x190 rproc_boot+0x404/0x550 state_store+0x54/0xf8 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x60 sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x80 kernfs_fop_write+0x140/0x230 vfs_write+0xc4/0x208 ksys_write+0x74/0xf8
...
--- drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c +2 -3
@@ -739,14 +739,13 @@ static int q6v5_mpss_load(struct q6v5 *qif (phdr->p_filesz) {snprintf (seg_name,sizeof (seg_name),"modem.b%02d" , i); - ret =request_firmware (&seg_fw, seg_name, qproc->dev); + ret =request_firmware_into_buf (&seg_fw, seg_name, qproc->dev, + ptr, phdr->p_filesz);if (ret) {dev_err (qproc->dev,"failed to load %s\n" , seg_name); goto release_firmware; } -memcpy (ptr, seg_fw->data, seg_fw->size); -release_firmware (seg_fw); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/24 remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_mss: Validate MBA firmware size before load
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sibi Sankar <[email protected]>
commit e013f455d95add874f310dc47c608e8c70692ae5 upstream
The following mem abort is observed when the mba firmware size exceeds the allocated mba region. MBA firmware size is restricted to a maximum size of 1M and remaining memory region is used by modem debug policy firmware when available. Hence verify whether the MBA firmware size lies within the allocated memory region and is not greater than 1M before loading.
Err Logs:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address Mem abort info: ... Call trace: __memcpy+0x110/0x180 rproc_start+0x40/0x218 rproc_boot+0x5b4/0x608 state_store+0x54/0xf8 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x60 sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x80 kernfs_fop_write+0x140/0x230 vfs_write+0xc4/0x208 ksys_write+0x74/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
...
--- drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c +6 -0
@@ -340,6 +340,12 @@ static int q6v5_load(struct rproc *rproc {struct q6v5 *qproc = rproc->priv; +/* MBA is restricted to a maximum size of 1M */ +if (fw->size > qproc->mba_size || fw->size >SZ_1M ) { +dev_err (qproc->dev,"MBA firmware load failed\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +memcpy (qproc->mba_region, fw->data, fw->size);return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/24 af_key: relax availability checks for skb size calculation
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit afbc293add6466f8f3f0c3d944d85f53709c170f ]
xfrm_probe_algs() probes kernel crypto modules and changes the availability of struct xfrm_algo_desc. But there is a small window where ealg->available and aalg->available get changed between count_ah_combs()/count_esp_combs() and dump_ah_combs()/dump_esp_combs(), in this case we may allocate a smaller skb but later put a larger amount of data and trigger the panic in skb_put().
Fix this by relaxing the checks when counting the size, that is, skipping the test of ->available. We may waste some memory for a few of sizeof(struct sadb_comb), but it is still much better than a panic.
--- net/key/af_key.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/key/af_key.c +3 -3
@@ -2908,7 +2908,7 @@ static int count_ah_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)break ;if (!aalg->pfkey_supported)continue ; -if (aalg_tmpl_set (t, aalg) && aalg->available) +if (aalg_tmpl_set (t, aalg)) sz +=sizeof (struct sadb_comb ); }return sz +sizeof (struct sadb_prop );
@@ -2926,7 +2926,7 @@ static int count_esp_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)if (!ealg->pfkey_supported)continue ; -if (!(ealg_tmpl_set (t, ealg) && ealg->available)) +if (!(ealg_tmpl_set (t, ealg)))continue ;for (k =1 ; ; k++) {
@@ -2937,7 +2937,7 @@ static int count_esp_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)if (!aalg->pfkey_supported)continue ; -if (aalg_tmpl_set (t, aalg) && aalg->available) +if (aalg_tmpl_set (t, aalg)) sz +=sizeof (struct sadb_comb ); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/24 regulator: core: avoid regulator_resolve_supply() race condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Collins <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eaa7995c529b54d68d97a30f6344cc6ca2f214a7 ]
The final step in regulator_register() is to call regulator_resolve_supply() for each registered regulator (including the one in the process of being registered). The regulator_resolve_supply() function first checks if rdev->supply is NULL, then it performs various steps to try to find the supply. If successful, rdev->supply is set inside of set_supply().
This procedure can encounter a race condition if two concurrent tasks call regulator_register() near to each other on separate CPUs and one of the regulators has rdev->supply_name specified. There is currently nothing guaranteeing atomicity between the rdev->supply check and set steps. Thus, both tasks can observe rdev->supply==NULL in their regulator_resolve_supply() calls. This then results in both creating a struct regulator for the supply. One ends up actually stored in rdev->supply and the other is lost (though still present in the supply's consumer_list).
Here is a kernel log snippet showing the issue:
[ 12.421768] gpu_cc_gx_gdsc: supplied by pm8350_s5_level
[ 12.425854] gpu_cc_gx_gdsc: supplied by pm8350_s5_level
[ 12.429064] debugfs: Directory 'regulator.4-SUPPLY' with parent
'17a00000.rsc:rpmh-regulator-gfxlvl-pm8350_s5_level'
already present!Avoid this race condition by holding the rdev->mutex lock inside of regulator_resolve_supply() while checking and setting rdev->supply.
--- drivers/regulator/core.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/regulator/core.c +28 -11
@@ -1567,23 +1567,34 @@ static int regulator_resolve_supply(struct regulator_dev *rdev) {struct regulator_dev *r;struct device *dev = rdev->dev.parent; -int ret; +int ret =0 ;/* No supply to resovle? */ if (!rdev->supply_name)return 0 ; -/* Supply already resolved? */ +/* Supply already resolved? (fast-path without locking contention) */ if (rdev->supply)return 0 ; +/* +* Recheck rdev->supply with rdev->mutex lock held to avoid a race +* between rdev->supply null check and setting rdev->supply in +* set_supply() from concurrent tasks. +*/ +regulator_lock (rdev); + +/* Supply just resolved by a concurrent task? */ +if (rdev->supply) + goto out; + r =regulator_dev_lookup (dev, rdev->supply_name);if (IS_ERR (r)) { ret =PTR_ERR (r);/* Did the lookup explicitly defer for us? */ if (ret == -EPROBE_DEFER ) -return ret; + goto out;if (have_full_constraints ()) { r = dummy_regulator_rdev;
@@ -1591,15 +1602,18 @@ static int regulator_resolve_supply(struct regulator_dev *rdev) }else {dev_err (dev,"Failed to resolve %s-supply for %s\n" , rdev->supply_name, rdev->desc->name); -return -EPROBE_DEFER ; + ret = -EPROBE_DEFER ; + goto out; } }if (r == rdev) {dev_err (dev,"Supply for %s (%s) resolved to itself\n" , rdev->desc->name, rdev->supply_name); -if (!have_full_constraints ()) -return -EINVAL ; +if (!have_full_constraints ()) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } r = dummy_regulator_rdev;get_device (&r->dev); }
@@ -1613,7 +1627,8 @@ static int regulator_resolve_supply(struct regulator_dev *rdev)if (r->dev.parent && r->dev.parent != rdev->dev.parent) {if (!device_is_bound (r->dev.parent)) {put_device (&r->dev); -return -EPROBE_DEFER ; + ret = -EPROBE_DEFER ; + goto out; } }
@@ -1621,13 +1636,13 @@ static int regulator_resolve_supply(struct regulator_dev *rdev) ret =regulator_resolve_supply (r);if (ret <0 ) {put_device (&r->dev); -return ret; + goto out; } ret =set_supply (rdev, r);if (ret <0 ) {put_device (&r->dev); -return ret; + goto out; }/* Cascade always-on state to supply */
@@ -1636,11 +1651,13 @@ static int regulator_resolve_supply(struct regulator_dev *rdev)if (ret <0 ) {_regulator_put (rdev->supply); rdev->supply =NULL ; -return ret; + goto out; } } -return 0 ; +out: +regulator_unlock (rdev); +return ret; }/* Internal regulator request function */
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH 4.19 07/24] regulator: core: avoid regulator_resolve_supply() race condition
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: David Collins <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
eaa7995c529b54d68d97a30f6344cc6ca2f214a7]The final step in
regulator_register()is to callregulator_resolve_supply()for each registered regulator
This is buggy without a followup which doesn't seem to have been backported here.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19 07/24] regulator: core: avoid regulator_resolve_supply() race condition
Quoted 10 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: David Collins <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
eaa7995c529b54d68d97a30f6344cc6ca2f214a7]The final step in
regulator_register()is to callregulator_resolve_supply()for each registered regulatorThis is buggy without a followup which doesn't seem to have been backported here.
Would that be 14a71d509ac8 ("regulator: Fix lockdep warning resolving supplies")? Looks like it made it into the 5.4.y and 5.10.y queues, but not 4.19.y.
Sasha, any reason for this?
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH 4.19 07/24] regulator: core: avoid regulator_resolve_supply() race condition
Quoted 11 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 5 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 2 lines
The final step in
regulator_register()is to callregulator_resolve_supply()for each registered regulatorThis is buggy without a followup which doesn't seem to have been backported here.
Would that be
14a71d509ac8("regulator: Fix lockdep warning resolving supplies")? Looks like it made it into the 5.4.y and 5.10.y queues, but not 4.19.y.
Yes, that's the one.
Sasha Levin
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19 07/24] regulator: core: avoid regulator_resolve_supply() race condition
Quoted 6 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 2 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 2 lines
The final step in
regulator_register()is to callregulator_resolve_supply()for each registered regulator
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This is buggy without a followup which doesn't seem to have been backported here.
Would that be
14a71d509ac8("regulator: Fix lockdep warning resolving supplies")? Looks like it made it into the 5.4.y and 5.10.y queues, but not 4.19.y.Yes, that's the one.
I've grabbed these two additional commits for 4.19:
05f224ca6693 ("regulator: core: Clean enabling always-on regulators + their supplies") 2bb166636933 ("regulator: core: enable power when setting up constraints")
And queued up 14a71d509ac8. Thanks for the heads-up!
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Sasha
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/24 chtls: Fix potential resource leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pan Bian <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b6011966ac6f402847eb5326beee8da3a80405c7 ]
The dst entry should be released if no neighbour is found. Goto label free_dst to fix the issue. Besides, the check of ndev against NULL is redundant.
--- drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_cm.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_cm.c +3 -4
@@ -1051,11 +1051,9 @@ static struct sock *chtls_recv_sock(struct sock *lsk, tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(iph +1 ); n =dst_neigh_lookup (dst, &iph->saddr);if (!n || !n->dev) - goto free_sk; + goto free_dst; ndev = n->dev; -if (!ndev) - goto free_dst;if (is_vlan_dev (ndev)) ndev =vlan_dev_real_dev (ndev);
@@ -1117,7 +1115,8 @@ static struct sock *chtls_recv_sock(struct sock *lsk, free_csk:chtls_sock_release (&csk->kref); free_dst: -neigh_release (n); +if (n) +neigh_release (n);dst_release (dst); free_sk:inet_csk_prepare_forced_close (newsk);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/24 pNFS/NFSv4: Try to return invalid layout in pnfs_layout_process()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 08bd8dbe88825760e953759d7ec212903a026c75 ]
If the server returns a new stateid that does not match the one in our cache, then try to return the one we hold instead of just invalidating it on the client side. This ensures that both client and server will agree that the stateid is invalid.
--- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfs/pnfs.c +7 -1
@@ -2301,7 +2301,13 @@ pnfs_layout_process(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp)* We got an entirely new state ID. Mark all segments for the * inode invalid, and retry the layoutget */ -pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid (lo, &free_me); +struct pnfs_layout_range range = { + .iomode =IOMODE_ANY , + .length =NFS4_MAX_UINT64 , + }; +pnfs_set_plh_return_info (lo,IOMODE_ANY ,0 ); +pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return (lo, &lo->plh_return_segs, + &range,0 ); goto out_forget; }
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/24 iwlwifi: mvm: take mutex for calling iwl_mvm_get_sync_time()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5c56d862c749669d45c256f581eac4244be00d4d ]
We need to take the mutex to call iwl_mvm_get_sync_time(), do it.
--- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c +3 -0
@@ -520,7 +520,10 @@ static ssize_t iwl_dbgfs_os_device_timediff_read(struct file *file,const size_t bufsz =sizeof (buf);int pos =0 ; +mutex_lock (&mvm->mutex);iwl_mvm_get_sync_time (mvm, &curr_gp2, &curr_os); +mutex_unlock (&mvm->mutex); +do_div (curr_os,NSEC_PER_USEC ); diff = curr_os - curr_gp2; pos +=scnprintf (buf + pos, bufsz - pos,"diff=%lld\n" , diff);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/24 iwlwifi: pcie: add a NULL check in iwl_pcie_txq_unmap
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 98c7d21f957b10d9c07a3a60a3a5a8f326a197e5 ]
I hit a NULL pointer exception in this function when the init flow went really bad.
--- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c +5 -0
@@ -631,6 +631,11 @@ static void iwl_pcie_txq_unmap(struct iwl_trans *trans, int txq_id)struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie =IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS (trans);struct iwl_txq *txq = trans_pcie->txq[txq_id]; +if (!txq) { +IWL_ERR (trans,"Trying to free a queue that wasn't allocated?\n" ); +return ; + } +spin_lock_bh (&txq->lock);while (txq->write_ptr != txq->read_ptr) { IWL_DEBUG_TX_REPLY(trans, "Q %d Free %d\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/24 iwlwifi: pcie: fix context info memory leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2d6bc752cc2806366d9a4fd577b3f6c1f7a7e04e ]
If the image loader allocation fails, we leak all the previously allocated memory. Fix this.
--- .../net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/ctxt-info-gen3.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/ctxt-info-gen3.c +9 -2
@@ -159,8 +159,10 @@ int iwl_pcie_ctxt_info_gen3_init(struct iwl_trans *trans,/* Allocate IML */ iml_img =dma_alloc_coherent (trans->dev, trans->iml_len, &trans_pcie->iml_dma_addr,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!iml_img) -return -ENOMEM ; +if (!iml_img) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto err_free_ctxt_info; + }memcpy (iml_img, trans->iml, trans->iml_len);
@@ -177,6 +179,11 @@ int iwl_pcie_ctxt_info_gen3_init(struct iwl_trans *trans,return 0 ; +err_free_ctxt_info: +dma_free_coherent (trans->dev,sizeof (*trans_pcie->ctxt_info_gen3), + trans_pcie->ctxt_info_gen3, + trans_pcie->ctxt_info_dma_addr); + trans_pcie->ctxt_info_gen3 =NULL ; err_free_prph_info: dma_free_coherent(trans->dev, sizeof(*prph_info),
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/24 iwlwifi: mvm: guard against device removal in reprobe
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7a21b1d4a728a483f07c638ccd8610d4b4f12684 ]
If we get into a problem severe enough to attempt a reprobe, we schedule a worker to do that. However, if the problem gets more severe and the device is actually destroyed before this worker has a chance to run, we use a free device. Bump up the reference count of the device until the worker runs to avoid this situation.
--- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c +2 -1
@@ -1192,6 +1192,7 @@ static void iwl_mvm_reprobe_wk(struct work_struct *wk) reprobe = container_of(wk, struct iwl_mvm_reprobe, work);if (device_reprobe (reprobe->dev))dev_err (reprobe->dev,"reprobe failed!\n" ); +put_device (reprobe->dev);kfree (reprobe);module_put (THIS_MODULE ); }
@@ -1242,7 +1243,7 @@ void iwl_mvm_nic_restart(struct iwl_mvm *mvm, bool fw_error)module_put (THIS_MODULE );return ; } - reprobe->dev = mvm->trans->dev; + reprobe->dev =get_device (mvm->trans->dev);INIT_WORK (&reprobe->work, iwl_mvm_reprobe_wk);schedule_work (&reprobe->work); } else if (mvm->fwrt.cur_fw_img == IWL_UCODE_REGULAR &&
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/24 SUNRPC: Move simple_get_bytes and simple_get_netobj into private header
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dave Wysochanski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ba6dfce47c4d002d96cd02a304132fca76981172 ]
Remove duplicated helper functions to parse opaque XDR objects and place inside new file net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h. In the new file carry the license and copyright from the source file net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c. Finally, update the comment inside include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h since lockd is not the only user of struct xdr_netobj.
--- include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h | 3 +- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 30 +----------------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 31 ++---------------- 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h +1 -2
@@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ struct rpc_rqst;#define XDR_QUADLEN (l) (((l) + 3) >> 2)/* -* Generic opaque `network object.' At the kernel level, this type -* is used only by lockd. +* Generic opaque `network object.' */ #define XDR_MAX_NETOBJ 1024struct xdr_netobj {
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +1 -29
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/hashtable.h> +#include "auth_gss_internal.h" #include "../netns.h" static const struct rpc_authops authgss_ops;
@@ -147,35 +148,6 @@ gss_cred_set_ctx(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)clear_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW , &cred->cr_flags); } -static const void * -simple_get_bytes (const void *p,const void *end,void *res,size_t len) -{ -const void *q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len); -if (unlikely (q > end || q < p)) -return ERR_PTR (-EFAULT ); -memcpy (res, p, len); -return q; -} - -static inline const void * -simple_get_netobj (const void *p,const void *end,struct xdr_netobj *dest) -{ -const void *q; -unsigned int len; - - p =simple_get_bytes (p, end, &len,sizeof (len)); -if (IS_ERR (p)) -return p; - q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len); -if (unlikely (q > end || q < p)) -return ERR_PTR (-EFAULT ); - dest->data =kmemdup (p, len,GFP_NOFS ); -if (unlikely (dest->data ==NULL )) -return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - dest->len = len; -return q; -} -static struct gss_cl_ctx *gss_cred_get_ctx (struct rpc_cred *cred) {
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h new file +42 -0
42 lines not on this page · raw message
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c +2 -29
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h> +#include "auth_gss_internal.h" +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG )# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH#endif
@@ -187,35 +189,6 @@ get_gss_krb5_enctype(int etype)return NULL ; } -static const void * -simple_get_bytes (const void *p,const void *end,void *res,int len) -{ -const void *q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len); -if (unlikely (q > end || q < p)) -return ERR_PTR (-EFAULT ); -memcpy (res, p, len); -return q; -} - -static const void * -simple_get_netobj (const void *p,const void *end,struct xdr_netobj *res) -{ -const void *q; -unsigned int len; - - p =simple_get_bytes (p, end, &len,sizeof (len)); -if (IS_ERR (p)) -return p; - q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len); -if (unlikely (q > end || q < p)) -return ERR_PTR (-EFAULT ); - res->data =kmemdup (p, len,GFP_NOFS ); -if (unlikely (res->data ==NULL )) -return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - res->len = len; -return q; -} -static inline const void *get_key (const void *p,const void *end,struct krb5_ctx *ctx,struct crypto_skcipher **res)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/24 SUNRPC: Handle 0 length opaque XDR object data properly
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dave Wysochanski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e4a7d1f7707eb44fd953a31dd59eff82009d879c ]
When handling an auth_gss downcall, it's possible to get 0-length opaque object for the acceptor. In the case of a 0-length XDR object, make sure simple_get_netobj() fills in dest->data = NULL, and does not continue to kmemdup() which will set dest->data = ZERO_SIZE_PTR for the acceptor.
The trace event code can handle NULL but not ZERO_SIZE_PTR for a string, and so without this patch the rpcgss_context trace event will crash the kernel as follows:
[ 162.887992] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [ 162.898693] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 162.900830] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 162.902940] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 162.904027] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 162.905493] CPU: 4 PID: 4321 Comm: rpc.gssd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0 #133 [ 162.908548] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 162.910978] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20 [ 162.912505] Code: 48 89 f9 74 09 48 83 c1 01 80 39 00 75 f7 31 d2 44 0f b6 04 16 44 88 04 11 48 83 c2 01 45 84 c0 75 ee c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <80> 3f 00 74 10 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3 31 [ 162.920101] RSP: 0018:ffffaec900c77d90 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 162.922263] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000fffde697 [ 162.925158] RDX: 000000000000002f RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 0000000000000010 [ 162.928073] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000e10 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 162.930976] R10: ffff8e698a590cb8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000e10 [ 162.933883] R13: 00000000fffde697 R14: 000000010034d517 R15: 0000000000070028 [ 162.936777] FS: 00007f1e1eb93700(0000) GS:ffff8e6ab7d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 162.940067] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 162.942417] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000104eba000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 162.945300] Call Trace: [ 162.946428] trace_event_raw_event_rpcgss_context+0x84/0x140 [auth_rpcgss] [ 162.949308] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x35/0x5a0 [ 162.951224] ? gss_pipe_downcall+0x3a3/0x6a0 [auth_rpcgss] [ 162.953484] gss_pipe_downcall+0x585/0x6a0 [auth_rpcgss] [ 162.955953] rpc_pipe_write+0x58/0x70 [sunrpc] [ 162.957849] vfs_write+0xcb/0x2c0 [ 162.959264] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 [ 162.960706] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 162.962238] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 162.964346] RIP: 0033:0x7f1e1f1e57df
--- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h +6 -3
@@ -34,9 +34,12 @@ simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *dest) q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);if (unlikely (q > end || q < p))return ERR_PTR (-EFAULT ); - dest->data =kmemdup (p, len,GFP_NOFS ); -if (unlikely (dest->data ==NULL )) -return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); +if (len) { + dest->data =kmemdup (p, len,GFP_NOFS ); +if (unlikely (dest->data ==NULL )) +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + }else + dest->data =NULL ; dest->len = len;return q; }
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/24 lib/string: Add strscpy_pad() function
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 458a3bf82df4fe1f951d0f52b1e0c1e9d5a88a3b ]
We have a function to copy strings safely and we have a function to copy strings and zero the tail of the destination (if source string is shorter than destination buffer) but we do not have a function to do both at once. This means developers must write this themselves if they desire this functionality. This is a chore, and also leaves us open to off by one errors unnecessarily.
Add a function that calls strscpy() then memset()s the tail to zero if the source string is shorter than the destination buffer.
--- include/linux/string.h | 4 ++++ lib/string.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/string.h +4 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ size_t strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t);#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRSCPYssize_t strscpy (char *,const char *,size_t );#endif + +/* Wraps calls to strscpy()/memset(), no arch specific code required */ +ssize_t strscpy_pad (char *dest,const char *src,size_t count); +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCATextern char *strcat (char *,const char *);#endif
lib/string.c +40 -7
65 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/24 include/trace/events/writeback.h: fix -Wstringop-truncation warnings
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d1a445d3b86c9341ce7a0954c23be0edb5c9bec5 ]
There are many of those warnings.
In file included from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h:15,
from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/current.h:13,
from ./include/linux/thread_info.h:21,
from ./include/asm-generic/preempt.h:5,
from ./arch/powerpc/include/generated/asm/preempt.h:1,
from ./include/linux/preempt.h:78,
from ./include/linux/spinlock.h:51,
from fs/fs-writeback.c:19:In function 'strncpy',
inlined from 'perf_trace_writeback_page_template' at./include/trace/events/writeback.h:56:1:./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]
return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Fix it by using the new strscpy_pad() which was introduced in "lib/string:
Add strscpy_pad() function" and will always be NUL-terminated instead of strncpy(). Also, change strlcpy() to use strscpy_pad() in this file for consistency.
--- include/trace/events/writeback.h | 38 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/writeback.h +20 -18
@@ -65,8 +65,9 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_dirty_page, ),TP_fast_assign ( -strncpy (__entry->name, - mapping ? dev_name(inode_to_bdi(mapping->host)->dev) : "(unknown)", 32); +strscpy_pad (__entry->name, + mapping ?dev_name (inode_to_bdi (mapping->host)->dev) :"(unknown)" , + 32); __entry->ino = mapping ? mapping->host->i_ino :0 ; __entry->index = page->index; ),
@@ -95,8 +96,8 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_dirty_inode_template,struct backing_dev_info *bdi =inode_to_bdi (inode);/* may be called for files on pseudo FSes w/ unregistered bdi */ -strncpy (__entry->name, - bdi->dev ?dev_name (bdi->dev) :"(unknown)" ,32 ); +strscpy_pad (__entry->name, + bdi->dev ?dev_name (bdi->dev) :"(unknown)" ,32 ); __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; __entry->state = inode->i_state; __entry->flags = flags;
@@ -175,8 +176,8 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_write_inode_template, ),TP_fast_assign ( -strncpy (__entry->name, - dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); +strscpy_pad (__entry->name, + dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; __entry->sync_mode = wbc->sync_mode; __entry->cgroup_ino =__trace_wbc_assign_cgroup (wbc);
@@ -219,8 +220,9 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_work_class, __field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino) ),TP_fast_assign ( - strncpy(__entry->name, - wb->bdi->dev ? dev_name(wb->bdi->dev) : "(unknown)", 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, + wb->bdi->dev ? dev_name(wb->bdi->dev) : + "(unknown)", 32); __entry->nr_pages = work->nr_pages; __entry->sb_dev = work->sb ? work->sb->s_dev :0 ; __entry->sync_mode = work->sync_mode;
@@ -273,7 +275,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_class, __field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino) ),TP_fast_assign ( - strncpy(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); __entry->cgroup_ino =__trace_wb_assign_cgroup (wb); ), TP_printk("bdi %s: cgroup_ino=%u",
@@ -295,7 +297,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_bdi_register,__array (char, name,32 ) ),TP_fast_assign ( - strncpy(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32); ),TP_printk ("bdi %s" , __entry->name
@@ -320,7 +322,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(wbc_class, ),TP_fast_assign ( - strncpy(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32); __entry->nr_to_write = wbc->nr_to_write; __entry->pages_skipped = wbc->pages_skipped; __entry->sync_mode = wbc->sync_mode;
@@ -371,7 +373,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_queue_io, __field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino) ),TP_fast_assign ( - strncpy(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); + strncpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); __entry->older = dirtied_before; __entry->age = (jiffies - dirtied_before) *1000 /HZ ; __entry->moved = moved;
@@ -456,7 +458,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(bdi_dirty_ratelimit, ),TP_fast_assign ( - strlcpy(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); __entry->write_bw =KBps (wb->write_bandwidth); __entry->avg_write_bw =KBps (wb->avg_write_bandwidth); __entry->dirty_rate =KBps (dirty_rate);
@@ -521,7 +523,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(balance_dirty_pages, TP_fast_assign( unsigned long freerun = (thresh + bg_thresh) / 2; -strlcpy (__entry->bdi,dev_name (wb->bdi->dev),32 ); +strscpy_pad (__entry->bdi,dev_name (wb->bdi->dev),32 ); __entry->limit = global_wb_domain.dirty_limit; __entry->setpoint = (global_wb_domain.dirty_limit +
@@ -581,8 +583,8 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_sb_inodes_requeue, ),TP_fast_assign ( -strncpy (__entry->name, - dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); +strscpy_pad (__entry->name, + dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; __entry->state = inode->i_state; __entry->dirtied_when = inode->dirtied_when;
@@ -655,8 +657,8 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_single_inode_template, ),TP_fast_assign ( -strncpy (__entry->name, - dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); +strscpy_pad (__entry->name, + dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; __entry->state = inode->i_state; __entry->dirtied_when = inode->dirtied_when;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/24 memcg: fix a crash in wb_workfn when a device disappears
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 68f23b89067fdf187763e75a56087550624fdbee ]
Without memcg, there is a one-to-one mapping between the bdi and bdi_writeback structures. In this world, things are fairly straightforward; the first thing bdi_unregister() does is to shutdown the bdi_writeback structure (or wb), and part of that writeback ensures that no other work queued against the wb, and that the wb is fully drained.
With memcg, however, there is a one-to-many relationship between the bdi and bdi_writeback structures; that is, there are multiple wb objects which can all point to a single bdi. There is a refcount which prevents the bdi object from being released (and hence, unregistered). So in theory, the bdi_unregister() *should* only get called once its refcount goes to zero (bdi_put will drop the refcount, and when it is zero, release_bdi gets called, which calls bdi_unregister).
Unfortunately, del_gendisk() in block/gen_hd.c never got the memo about the Brave New memcg World, and calls bdi_unregister directly. It does this without informing the file system, or the memcg code, or anything else. This causes the root wb associated with the bdi to be unregistered, but none of the memcg-specific wb's are shutdown. So when one of these wb's are woken up to do delayed work, they try to dereference their wb->bdi->dev to fetch the device name, but unfortunately bdi->dev is now NULL, thanks to the bdi_unregister() called by del_gendisk(). As a result, *boom*.
Fortunately, it looks like the rest of the writeback path is perfectly happy with bdi->dev and bdi->owner being NULL, so the simplest fix is to create a bdi_dev_name() function which can handle bdi->dev being NULL. This also allows us to bulletproof the writeback tracepoints to prevent them from dereferencing a NULL pointer and crashing the kernel if one is tracing with memcg's enabled, and an iSCSI device dies or a USB storage stick is pulled.
The most common way of triggering this will be hotremoval of a device while writeback with memcg enabled is going on. It was triggering several times a day in a heavily loaded production environment.
Google Bug Id: 145475544
--- fs/fs-writeback.c | 2 +- include/linux/backing-dev.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/trace/events/writeback.h | 29 +++++++++++++---------------- mm/backing-dev.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
fs/fs-writeback.c +1 -1
@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ void wb_workfn(struct work_struct *work) struct bdi_writeback, dwork);long pages_written; -set_worker_desc ("flush-%s" ,dev_name (wb->bdi->dev)); +set_worker_desc ("flush-%s" ,bdi_dev_name (wb->bdi)); current->flags |=PF_SWAPWRITE ; if (likely(!current_is_workqueue_rescuer() ||
include/linux/backing-dev.h +10 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> +#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/writeback.h> #include <linux/blk-cgroup.h> #include <linux/backing-dev-defs.h>
@@ -498,4 +499,13 @@ static inline int bdi_rw_congested(struct backing_dev_info *bdi) (1 << WB_async_congested)); } +extern const char *bdi_unknown_name; + +static inline const char *bdi_dev_name (struct backing_dev_info *bdi) +{ +if (!bdi || !bdi->dev) +return bdi_unknown_name; +return dev_name (bdi->dev); +} +#endif /* _LINUX_BACKING_DEV_H */
include/trace/events/writeback.h +13 -16
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_dirty_page,TP_fast_assign (strscpy_pad (__entry->name, - mapping ?dev_name (inode_to_bdi (mapping->host)->dev) :"(unknown)" , - 32); +bdi_dev_name (mapping ?inode_to_bdi (mapping->host) : + NULL), 32); __entry->ino = mapping ? mapping->host->i_ino :0 ; __entry->index = page->index; ),
@@ -96,8 +96,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_dirty_inode_template,struct backing_dev_info *bdi =inode_to_bdi (inode);/* may be called for files on pseudo FSes w/ unregistered bdi */ -strscpy_pad (__entry->name, - bdi->dev ?dev_name (bdi->dev) :"(unknown)" ,32 ); +strscpy_pad (__entry->name,bdi_dev_name (bdi),32 ); __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; __entry->state = inode->i_state; __entry->flags = flags;
@@ -177,7 +176,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_write_inode_template,TP_fast_assign (strscpy_pad (__entry->name, - dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); + bdi_dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)), 32); __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; __entry->sync_mode = wbc->sync_mode; __entry->cgroup_ino =__trace_wbc_assign_cgroup (wbc);
@@ -220,9 +219,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_work_class, __field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino) ),TP_fast_assign ( - strscpy_pad(__entry->name, - wb->bdi->dev ? dev_name(wb->bdi->dev) : - "(unknown)", 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32); __entry->nr_pages = work->nr_pages; __entry->sb_dev = work->sb ? work->sb->s_dev :0 ; __entry->sync_mode = work->sync_mode;
@@ -275,7 +272,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_class, __field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino) ),TP_fast_assign ( - strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32); __entry->cgroup_ino =__trace_wb_assign_cgroup (wb); ), TP_printk("bdi %s: cgroup_ino=%u",
@@ -297,7 +294,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_bdi_register,__array (char, name,32 ) ),TP_fast_assign ( - strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(bdi), 32); ),TP_printk ("bdi %s" , __entry->name
@@ -322,7 +319,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(wbc_class, ), TP_fast_assign( - strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(bdi), 32); __entry->nr_to_write = wbc->nr_to_write; __entry->pages_skipped = wbc->pages_skipped; __entry->sync_mode = wbc->sync_mode;
@@ -373,7 +370,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_queue_io, __field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino) ),TP_fast_assign ( - strncpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32); __entry->older = dirtied_before; __entry->age = (jiffies - dirtied_before) *1000 /HZ ; __entry->moved = moved;
@@ -458,7 +455,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(bdi_dirty_ratelimit, ),TP_fast_assign ( - strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32); + strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32); __entry->write_bw =KBps (wb->write_bandwidth); __entry->avg_write_bw =KBps (wb->avg_write_bandwidth); __entry->dirty_rate =KBps (dirty_rate);
@@ -523,7 +520,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(balance_dirty_pages, TP_fast_assign( unsigned long freerun = (thresh + bg_thresh) / 2; -strscpy_pad (__entry->bdi,dev_name (wb->bdi->dev),32 ); +strscpy_pad (__entry->bdi,bdi_dev_name (wb->bdi),32 ); __entry->limit = global_wb_domain.dirty_limit; __entry->setpoint = (global_wb_domain.dirty_limit +
@@ -584,7 +581,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_sb_inodes_requeue,TP_fast_assign (strscpy_pad (__entry->name, - dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); + bdi_dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)), 32); __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; __entry->state = inode->i_state; __entry->dirtied_when = inode->dirtied_when;
@@ -658,7 +655,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_single_inode_template,TP_fast_assign (strscpy_pad (__entry->name, - dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32); + bdi_dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)), 32); __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; __entry->state = inode->i_state; __entry->dirtied_when = inode->dirtied_when;
mm/backing-dev.c +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct backing_dev_info noop_backing_dev_info = {EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (noop_backing_dev_info);static struct class *bdi_class; +const char *bdi_unknown_name ="(unknown)" ;/* * bdi_lock protects updates to bdi_list. bdi_list has RCU reader side
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/24 Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through svm_register_enc_region
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Peter Gonda <[email protected]>
commit 19a23da53932bc8011220bd8c410cb76012de004 upstream.
Grab kvm->lock before pinning memory when registering an encrypted region; sev_pin_memory() relies on kvm->lock being held to ensure correctness when checking and updating the number of pinned pages.
Add a lockdep assertion to help prevent future regressions.
V2
- Fix up patch description
- Correct file paths svm.c -> sev.c
- Add unlock of kvm->lock on sev_pin_memory error
V1
- https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +11 -7
@@ -1832,6 +1832,8 @@ static struct page **sev_pin_memory(strustruct page **pages;unsigned long first, last; +lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->lock); +if (ulen ==0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)return NULL ;
@@ -7084,12 +7086,21 @@ static int svm_register_enc_region(strucif (!region)return -ENOMEM ; +mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); region->pages =sev_pin_memory (kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages,1 );if (!region->pages) { ret = -ENOMEM ; +mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); goto e_free; } + region->uaddr = range->addr; + region->size = range->size; + +mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); +list_add_tail (®ion->list, &sev->regions_list); +mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); +/* * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
@@ -7098,13 +7109,6 @@ static int svm_register_enc_region(struc*/ sev_clflush_pages (region->pages, region->npages); - region->uaddr = range->addr; - region->size = range->size; - -mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); -list_add_tail (®ion->list, &sev->regions_list); -mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); -return ret; e_free:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/24 block: dont hold q->sysfs_lock in elevator_init_mq
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
commit c48dac137a62a5d6fa1ef3fa445cbd9c43655a76 upstream.
The original comment says:
q->sysfs_lock must be held to provide mutual exclusion between elevator_switch() and here.
Which is simply wrong. elevator_init_mq() is only called from blk_mq_init_allocated_queue, which is always called before the request queue is registered via blk_register_queue(), for dm-rq or normal rq based driver. However, queue's kobject is only exposed and added to sysfs in blk_register_queue(). So there isn't such race between elevator_switch() and elevator_init_mq().
So avoid to hold q->sysfs_lock in elevator_init_mq().
--- block/elevator.c | 14 +++++--------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
block/elevator.c +5 -9
@@ -980,23 +980,19 @@ int elevator_init_mq(struct request_queuif (q->nr_hw_queues !=1 )return 0 ; -/* -* q->sysfs_lock must be held to provide mutual exclusion between -* elevator_switch() and here. -*/ -mutex_lock (&q->sysfs_lock); +WARN_ON_ONCE (test_bit (QUEUE_FLAG_REGISTERED , &q->queue_flags)); +if (unlikely (q->elevator)) - goto out_unlock; + goto out; e =elevator_get (q,"mq-deadline" , false);if (!e) - goto out_unlock; + goto out; err =blk_mq_init_sched (q, e);if (err)elevator_put (e); -out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&q->sysfs_lock); +out:return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/24 blk-mq: dont hold q->sysfs_lock in blk_mq_map_swqueue
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
commit c6ba933358f0d7a6a042b894dba20cc70396a6d3 upstream.
blk_mq_map_swqueue() is called from blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() and blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues(). For the former caller, the kobject isn't exposed to userspace yet. For the latter caller, hctx sysfs entries and debugfs are un-registered before updating nr_hw_queues.
On the other hand, commit 2f8f1336a48b ("blk-mq: always free hctx after request queue is freed") moves freeing hctx into queue's release handler, so there won't be race with queue release path too.
So don't hold q->sysfs_lock in blk_mq_map_swqueue().
--- block/blk-mq.c | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
block/blk-mq.c +0 -7
@@ -2324,11 +2324,6 @@ static void blk_mq_map_swqueue(struct restruct blk_mq_ctx *ctx;struct blk_mq_tag_set *set = q->tag_set; -/* -* Avoid others reading imcomplete hctx->cpumask through sysfs -*/ -mutex_lock (&q->sysfs_lock); -queue_for_each_hw_ctx (q, hctx, i) {cpumask_clear (hctx->cpumask); hctx->nr_ctx =0 ;
@@ -2362,8 +2357,6 @@ static void blk_mq_map_swqueue(struct re hctx->ctxs[hctx->nr_ctx++] = ctx; } -mutex_unlock (&q->sysfs_lock); -queue_for_each_hw_ctx (q, hctx, i) {/* * If no software queues are mapped to this hardware queue,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/24 squashfs: add more sanity checks in id lookup
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
commit f37aa4c7366e23f91b81d00bafd6a7ab54e4a381 upstream.
Sysbot has reported a number of "slab-out-of-bounds reads" and "use-after-free read" errors which has been identified as being caused by a corrupted index value read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block).
This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the following corruption.
1. It checks against corruption of the ids count. This can either lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected table to be read.
In the case of a too large ids count, this would often have been trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces a more exact check, which can identify too small values.
2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.
--- fs/squashfs/id.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h | 1 + fs/squashfs/super.c | 6 +++--- fs/squashfs/xattr.h | 10 +++++++++- 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/squashfs/id.c +32 -8
@@ -48,10 +48,15 @@ int squashfs_get_id(struct super_block *struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info;int block =SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK (index);int offset =SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK_OFFSET (index); -u64 start_block =le64_to_cpu (msblk->id_table[block]); +u64 start_block;__le32 disk_id;int err; +if (index >= msblk->ids) +return -EINVAL ; + + start_block =le64_to_cpu (msblk->id_table[block]); + err =squashfs_read_metadata (sb, &disk_id, &start_block, &offset,sizeof (disk_id));if (err <0 )
@@ -69,7 +74,10 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_id_index_table(str u64 id_table_start, u64 next_table, unsigned short no_ids) { unsigned int length = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK_BYTES(no_ids); +unsigned int indexes =SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCKS (no_ids); +int n;__le64 *table; +u64 start, end;TRACE ("In read_id_index_table, length %d\n" , length);
@@ -80,20 +88,36 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_id_index_table(strreturn ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );/* -* length bytes should not extend into the next table - this check -* also traps instances where id_table_start is incorrectly larger -* than the next table start +* The computed size of the index table (length bytes) should exactly +* match the table start and end points */ -if (id_table_start + length > next_table) +if (length != (next_table - id_table_start))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); table =squashfs_read_table (sb, id_table_start, length); +if (IS_ERR (table)) +return table;/* -* table[0] points to the first id lookup table metadata block, this -* should be less than id_table_start +* table[0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations +* of the compressed id blocks. Each entry should be less than +* the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference between them +* should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less. table[indexes - 1] +* should be less than id_table_start, and again the difference +* should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less */ -if (!IS_ERR (table) &&le64_to_cpu (table[0 ]) >= id_table_start) { +for (n =0 ; n < (indexes -1 ); n++) { + start =le64_to_cpu (table[n]); + end =le64_to_cpu (table[n +1 ]); + +if (start >= end || (end - start) >SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE ) { +kfree (table); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } + } + + start =le64_to_cpu (table[indexes -1 ]); +if (start >= id_table_start || (id_table_start - start) >SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE ) {kfree (table);return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }
fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h +1 -0
@@ -77,5 +77,6 @@ struct squashfs_sb_info {unsigned int inodes;unsigned int fragments;int xattr_ids; + unsigned int ids; };#endif
fs/squashfs/super.c +3 -3
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct su msblk->directory_table =le64_to_cpu (sblk->directory_table_start); msblk->inodes =le32_to_cpu (sblk->inodes); msblk->fragments =le32_to_cpu (sblk->fragments); + msblk->ids =le16_to_cpu (sblk->no_ids); flags =le16_to_cpu (sblk->flags);TRACE ("Found valid superblock on %pg\n" , sb->s_bdev);
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct suTRACE ("Block size %d\n" , msblk->block_size);TRACE ("Number of inodes %d\n" , msblk->inodes);TRACE ("Number of fragments %d\n" , msblk->fragments); -TRACE ("Number of ids %d\n" ,le16_to_cpu (sblk->no_ids)); +TRACE ("Number of ids %d\n" , msblk->ids);TRACE ("sblk->inode_table_start %llx\n" , msblk->inode_table);TRACE ("sblk->directory_table_start %llx\n" , msblk->directory_table); TRACE("sblk->fragment_table_start %llx\n",
@@ -244,8 +245,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct su allocate_id_index_table:/* Allocate and read id index table */ msblk->id_table =squashfs_read_id_index_table (sb, -le64_to_cpu (sblk->id_table_start), next_table, -le16_to_cpu (sblk->no_ids)); +le64_to_cpu (sblk->id_table_start), next_table, msblk->ids);if (IS_ERR (msblk->id_table)) {ERROR ("unable to read id index table\n" ); err =PTR_ERR (msblk->id_table);
fs/squashfs/xattr.h +9 -1
@@ -30,8 +30,16 @@ extern int squashfs_xattr_lookup(structstatic inline __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table (struct super_block *sb,u64 start,u64 *xattr_table_start,int *xattr_ids) { +struct squashfs_xattr_id_table *id_table; + + id_table =squashfs_read_table (sb, start,sizeof (*id_table)); +if (IS_ERR (id_table)) +return (__le64 *) id_table; + + *xattr_table_start =le64_to_cpu (id_table->xattr_table_start); +kfree (id_table); +ERROR ("Xattrs in filesystem, these will be ignored\n" ); - *xattr_table_start = start;return ERR_PTR (-ENOTSUPP ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/24 squashfs: add more sanity checks in inode lookup
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
commit eabac19e40c095543def79cb6ffeb3a8588aaff4 upstream.
Sysbot has reported an "slab-out-of-bounds read" error which has been identified as being caused by a corrupted "ino_num" value read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block).
This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the following corruption.
1. It checks against corruption of the inodes count. This can either lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected table to be read.
In the case of a too large inodes count, this would often have been trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces a more exact check, which can identify too small values.
2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.
--- fs/squashfs/export.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/squashfs/export.c +33 -8
@@ -54,12 +54,17 @@ static long long squashfs_inode_lookup(sstruct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info;int blk =SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK (ino_num -1 );int offset =SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK_OFFSET (ino_num -1 ); -u64 start =le64_to_cpu (msblk->inode_lookup_table[blk]); +u64 start;__le64 ino;int err;TRACE ("Entered squashfs_inode_lookup, inode_number = %d\n" , ino_num); +if (ino_num ==0 || (ino_num -1 ) >= msblk->inodes) +return -EINVAL ; + + start =le64_to_cpu (msblk->inode_lookup_table[blk]); + err =squashfs_read_metadata (sb, &ino, &start, &offset,sizeof (ino));if (err <0 )return err;
@@ -124,7 +129,10 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_inode_lookup_table u64 lookup_table_start, u64 next_table, unsigned int inodes) { unsigned int length = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK_BYTES(inodes); +unsigned int indexes =SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCKS (inodes); +int n;__le64 *table; +u64 start, end;TRACE ("In read_inode_lookup_table, length %d\n" , length);
@@ -134,20 +142,37 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_inode_lookup_tableif (inodes ==0 )return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); -/* length bytes should not extend into the next table - this check -* also traps instances where lookup_table_start is incorrectly larger -* than the next table start +/* +* The computed size of the lookup table (length bytes) should exactly +* match the table start and end points */ -if (lookup_table_start + length > next_table) +if (length != (next_table - lookup_table_start))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); table =squashfs_read_table (sb, lookup_table_start, length); +if (IS_ERR (table)) +return table;/* -* table[0] points to the first inode lookup table metadata block, -* this should be less than lookup_table_start +* table0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations +* of the compressed inode lookup blocks. Each entry should be +* less than the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference +* between them should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less. +* table[indexes - 1] should be less than lookup_table_start, and +* again the difference should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less */ -if (!IS_ERR (table) &&le64_to_cpu (table[0 ]) >= lookup_table_start) { +for (n =0 ; n < (indexes -1 ); n++) { + start =le64_to_cpu (table[n]); + end =le64_to_cpu (table[n +1 ]); + +if (start >= end || (end - start) >SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE ) { +kfree (table); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } + } + + start =le64_to_cpu (table[indexes -1 ]); +if (start >= lookup_table_start || (lookup_table_start - start) >SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE ) {kfree (table);return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/24 squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
commit 506220d2ba21791314af569211ffd8870b8208fa upstream.
Sysbot has reported a warning where a kmalloc() attempt exceeds the maximum limit. This has been identified as corruption of the xattr_ids count when reading the xattr id lookup table.
This patch adds a number of additional sanity checks to detect this corruption and others.
1. It checks for a corrupted xattr index read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block). This would cause an out of bounds read.
2. It checks against corruption of the xattr_ids count. This can either lead to the above kmalloc failure, or a smaller than expected table to be read.
3. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.
--- fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c +57 -9
@@ -44,10 +44,15 @@ int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_bstruct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info;int block =SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK (index);int offset =SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_OFFSET (index); -u64 start_block =le64_to_cpu (msblk->xattr_id_table[block]); +u64 start_block;struct squashfs_xattr_id id;int err; +if (index >= msblk->xattr_ids) +return -EINVAL ; + + start_block =le64_to_cpu (msblk->xattr_id_table[block]); + err =squashfs_read_metadata (sb, &id, &start_block, &offset,sizeof (id));if (err <0 )
@@ -63,13 +68,17 @@ int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_b/* * Read uncompressed xattr id lookup table indexes from disk into memory */ -__le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table (struct super_block *sb,u64 start, +__le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table (struct super_block *sb,u64 table_start,u64 *xattr_table_start,int *xattr_ids) { -unsigned int len; +struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info; +unsigned int len, indexes;struct squashfs_xattr_id_table *id_table; +__le64 *table; +u64 start, end; +int n; - id_table =squashfs_read_table (sb, start,sizeof (*id_table)); + id_table =squashfs_read_table (sb, table_start,sizeof (*id_table));if (IS_ERR (id_table))return (__le64 *) id_table;
@@ -83,13 +92,52 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(strif (*xattr_ids ==0 )return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); -/* xattr_table should be less than start */ -if (*xattr_table_start >= start) + len =SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES (*xattr_ids); + indexes =SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCKS (*xattr_ids); + +/* +* The computed size of the index table (len bytes) should exactly +* match the table start and end points +*/ + start = table_start +sizeof (*id_table); + end = msblk->bytes_used; + +if (len != (end - start))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - len =SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES (*xattr_ids); + table =squashfs_read_table (sb, start, len); +if (IS_ERR (table)) +return table; + +/* table[0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations +* of the compressed xattr id blocks. Each entry should be less than +* the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference between them +* should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less. table[indexes - 1] +* should be less than table_start, and again the difference +* shouls be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less. +* +* Finally xattr_table_start should be less than table[0]. +*/ +for (n =0 ; n < (indexes -1 ); n++) { + start =le64_to_cpu (table[n]); + end =le64_to_cpu (table[n +1 ]); + +if (start >= end || (end - start) >SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE ) { +kfree (table); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } + } + + start =le64_to_cpu (table[indexes -1 ]); +if (start >= table_start || (table_start - start) >SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE ) { +kfree (table); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } -TRACE ("In read_xattr_index_table, length %d\n" , len); +if (*xattr_table_start >=le64_to_cpu (table[0 ])) { +kfree (table); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } -return squashfs_read_table (sb, start +sizeof (*id_table), len); +return table; }
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.176 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 13 Feb 2021 15:01:39 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.176-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
The following lockdep noticed on the arm beaglebone x15 device. I have not bisected this problem yet.
Suspecting this patch,
Quoted 2 lines
David Collins <[email protected]>
regulator: core: avoidregulator_resolve_supply()race condition
[ 2.470568] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 2.470580] 4.19.176-rc1 #1 Not tainted
[ 2.470590] --------------------------------------------
[ 2.470600] swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 2.470611] (ptrval) (&rdev->mutex){+.+.}, at: regulator_enable+0x44/0x20c
[ 2.470639]
[ 2.470639] but task is already holding lock:
[ 2.470650] (ptrval) (&rdev->mutex){+.+.}, at:
regulator_lock_nested+0x28/0x88
[ 2.470676]
[ 2.470676] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 2.470687] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 2.470687]
[ 2.470698] CPU0
[ 2.470707] ----
[ 2.470716] lock(&rdev->mutex);
[ 2.470728] lock(&rdev->mutex);
[ 2.470740]
[ 2.470740] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 2.470740]
[ 2.470752] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 2.470752]
[ 2.470765] 2 locks held by swapper/0/1:
[ 2.470774] #0: (ptrval) (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __driver_attach+0x78/0x168
[ 2.470797] #1: (ptrval) (&rdev->mutex){+.+.}, at:
regulator_lock_nested+0x28/0x88
[ 2.470820]
[ 2.470820] stack backtrace:
[ 2.470836] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.19.176-rc1 #1
[ 2.470846] Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree)
[ 2.470871] [<c0416430>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040f920>]
(show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[ 2.470891] [<c040f920>] (show_stack) from [<c1306bec>]
(dump_stack+0xe8/0x114)
[ 2.470910] [<c1306bec>] (dump_stack) from [<c04c2a04>]
(__lock_acquire+0x7cc/0x1acc)
[ 2.470925] [<c04c2a04>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c04c46ec>]
(lock_acquire+0xdc/0x238)
[ 2.470941] [<c04c46ec>] (lock_acquire) from [<c130a008>]
(__mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf4)
[ 2.470958] [<c130a008>] (__mutex_lock) from [<c130aa88>]
(mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x34)
[ 2.470974] [<c130aa88>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c0ae9434>]
(regulator_enable+0x44/0x20c)
[ 2.470990] [<c0ae9434>] (regulator_enable) from [<c0ae9780>]
(regulator_resolve_supply+0x184/0x2c8)
[ 2.471006] [<c0ae9780>] (regulator_resolve_supply) from
[<c0ae98e8>] (regulator_register_resolve_supply+0x24/0x8c)
[ 2.471022] [<c0ae98e8>] (regulator_register_resolve_supply) from
[<c0c294f0>] (class_for_each_device+0x70/0xe8)
[ 2.471037] [<c0c294f0>] (class_for_each_device) from [<c0aea368>]
(regulator_register+0xa18/0xc58)
[ 2.471053] [<c0aea368>] (regulator_register) from [<c0aebd64>]
(devm_regulator_register+0x54/0x84)
[ 2.471069] [<c0aebd64>] (devm_regulator_register) from
[<c0af8c28>] (pbias_regulator_probe+0x1f4/0x2d0)
[ 2.471084] [<c0af8c28>] (pbias_regulator_probe) from [<c0c29da0>]
(platform_drv_probe+0x58/0xa8)
[ 2.471101] [<c0c29da0>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c0c273b8>]
(really_probe+0x310/0x418)
[ 2.471119] [<c0c273b8>] (really_probe) from [<c0c276e4>]
(driver_probe_device+0x88/0x1dc)
[ 2.471135] [<c0c276e4>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0c27984>]
(__driver_attach+0x14c/0x168)
[ 2.471150] [<c0c27984>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0c24e08>]
(bus_for_each_dev+0x84/0xc4)
[ 2.471167] [<c0c24e08>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0c26a18>]
(driver_attach+0x2c/0x30)
[ 2.471184] [<c0c26a18>] (driver_attach) from [<c0c26380>]
(bus_add_driver+0x1d0/0x274)
[ 2.471199] [<c0c26380>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c0c28a4c>]
(driver_register+0x84/0x118)
[ 2.471213] [<c0c28a4c>] (driver_register) from [<c0c29cf0>]
(__platform_driver_register+0x50/0x58)
[ 2.471231] [<c0c29cf0>] (__platform_driver_register) from
[<c1ca3174>] (pbias_regulator_driver_init+0x24/0x28)
[ 2.471249] [<c1ca3174>] (pbias_regulator_driver_init) from
[<c0403a68>] (do_one_initcall+0xa0/0x394)
[ 2.471268] [<c0403a68>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c1c01454>]
(kernel_init_freeable+0x3ec/0x484)
[ 2.471283] [<c1c01454>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c1306ff4>]
(kernel_init+0x18/0x128)
[ 2.471299] [<c1306ff4>] (kernel_init) from [<c04010ac>]
(ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28)
[ 2.471310] Exception stack(0xee19bfb0 to 0xee19bff8)
[ 2.471323] bfa0: 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 2.471336] bfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 2.471348] bfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000
[ 2.471385] vtt_fixed: supplied by smps3metadata:
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git commit: 30e16c3fd5acd42264d873aacb75891f3cd202c4
git describe: v4.19.175-25-g30e16c3fd5ac
make_kernelversion: 4.19.176-rc1
kernel-config:
http://snapshots.linaro.org/openembedded/lkft/lkft/sumo/am57xx-evm/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19/747/config
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 17 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 15 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.176 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 13 Feb 2021 15:01:39 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.176-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
The following lockdep noticed on the arm beaglebone x15 device. I have not bisected this problem yet.
Suspecting this patch,Quoted 2 lines
David Collins <[email protected]>
regulator: core: avoidregulator_resolve_supply()race condition
Sasha queued up a fix for this, let me push out a -rc2 with that in there to see if this resolves the issue.
thanks
greg k-h
Quoted 27 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 25 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.176 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 13 Feb 2021 15:01:39 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.176-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
The following lockdep noticed on the arm beaglebone x15 device. I have not bisected this problem yet.
Suspecting this patch,
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
David Collins <[email protected]>
regulator: core: avoidregulator_resolve_supply()race conditionSasha queued up a fix for this, let me push out a -rc2 with that in there to see if this resolves the issue.
The reported issue is fixed on 4.19.176-rc2.
- Naresh
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 29 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 27 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 25 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.176 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 13 Feb 2021 15:01:39 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.176-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
The following lockdep noticed on the arm beaglebone x15 device. I have not bisected this problem yet.
Suspecting this patch,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
David Collins <[email protected]>
regulator: core: avoidregulator_resolve_supply()race conditionSasha queued up a fix for this, let me push out a -rc2 with that in there to see if this resolves the issue.
The reported issue is fixed on 4.19.176-rc2.
Wonderful, thanks for letting me know.
greg k-h
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.176 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 13 Feb 2021 15:01:39 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.176-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah