x86/sev-es: SEV-ES Fixes for v5.12
Subsystems (6)
v2 cover x86/sev-es: SEV-ES Fixes for v5.12
From: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Hi,
here are a couple of fixes for 5.12 in the SEV-ES guest support code. Patches 1-3 have in a similar form already been posted, so this is v2. The last two patches are new an arose from me running an SEV-ES guest with more debugging features and instrumentation enabled. I changed the first patches according to the review comments I received.
Please review.
Thanks,
Joerg
Joerg Roedel (5):
x86/sev-es: Introduce ip_within_syscall_gap() helper x86/sev-es: Check if regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST
stack
x86/sev-es: Optimize __sev_es_ist_enter() for better readability x86/sev-es: Correctly track IRQ states in runtime #VC handler x86/sev-es: Use __copy_from_user_inatomic()
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 15 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 3 +- arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 7 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
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PATCH v2 1/5 x86/sev-es: Introduce ip_within_syscall_gap() helper
From: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Introduce a helper to check whether an exception came from the syscall gap and use it in the SEV-ES code. Extend the check to also cover the compatibility SYSCALL entry path.
--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +2 -0
@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* Switch to the kernel stack */ movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp +SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->sp */
arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void __end_SYSENTER_singlestep_region(void);void entry_SYSENTER_compat (void );void __end_entry_SYSENTER_compat (void );void entry_SYSCALL_compat (void ); +void entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack (void );void entry_INT80_compat (void );#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV void xen_entry_INT80_compat (void );
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h +15 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ struct pt_regs {#include <asm/paravirt_types.h> #endif +#include <asm/proto.h> +struct cpuinfo_x86 ;struct task_struct ;
@@ -175,6 +177,19 @@ static inline bool any_64bit_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #define current_user_stack_pointer () current_pt_regs()->sp#define compat_user_stack_pointer () current_pt_regs()->sp + +static inline bool ip_within_syscall_gap (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +bool ret = (regs->ip >= (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_64 && + regs->ip < (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack); + +#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION + ret = ret || (regs->ip >= (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_compat && + regs->ip < (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack); +#endif + +return ret; +}#endif static inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer (struct pt_regs *regs)
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +1 -2
@@ -694,8 +694,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *r* In the SYSCALL entry path the RSP value comes from user-space - don't * trust it and switch to the current kernel stack */ -if (regs->ip >= (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_64 && - regs->ip < (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack) { +if (ip_within_syscall_gap (regs)) { sp =this_cpu_read (cpu_current_top_of_stack); goto sync; }
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2.30.1 _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
[tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev-es: Introduce ip_within_syscall_gap() helper
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 78a81d88f60ba773cbe890205e1ee67f00502948 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/78a81d88f60ba773cbe890205e1ee67f00502948 Author: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 03 Mar 2021 15:17:12 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 08 Mar 2021 14:22:17 +01:00
x86/sev-es: Introduce ip_within_syscall_gap() helper
Introduce a helper to check whether an exception came from the syscall gap and use it in the SEV-ES code. Extend the check to also cover the compatibility SYSCALL entry path.
--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +2 -0
@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* Switch to the kernel stack */ movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp +SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->sp */
arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void __end_SYSENTER_singlestep_region(void);void entry_SYSENTER_compat (void );void __end_entry_SYSENTER_compat (void );void entry_SYSCALL_compat (void ); +void entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack (void );void entry_INT80_compat (void );#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV void xen_entry_INT80_compat (void );
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h +15 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ struct pt_regs {#include <asm/paravirt_types.h> #endif +#include <asm/proto.h> +struct cpuinfo_x86 ;struct task_struct ;
@@ -175,6 +177,19 @@ static inline bool any_64bit_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #define current_user_stack_pointer () current_pt_regs()->sp#define compat_user_stack_pointer () current_pt_regs()->sp + +static inline bool ip_within_syscall_gap (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +bool ret = (regs->ip >= (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_64 && + regs->ip < (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack); + +#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION + ret = ret || (regs->ip >= (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_compat && + regs->ip < (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack); +#endif + +return ret; +}#endif static inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer (struct pt_regs *regs)
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +1 -2
@@ -694,8 +694,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *r* In the SYSCALL entry path the RSP value comes from user-space - don't * trust it and switch to the current kernel stack */ -if (regs->ip >= (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_64 && - regs->ip < (unsigned long )entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack) { +if (ip_within_syscall_gap (regs)) { sp =this_cpu_read (cpu_current_top_of_stack); goto sync; }
PATCH v2 2/5 x86/sev-es: Check if regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack
In reply to Joerg RoedelFrom: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
The code in the NMI handler to adjust the #VC handler IST stack is needed in case an NMI hits when the #VC handler is still using its IST stack.
But the check for this condition also needs to look if the regs->sp value is trusted, meaning it was not set by user-space. Extend the check to not use regs->sp when the NMI interrupted user-space code or the SYSCALL gap.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +12 -2
@@ -121,8 +121,18 @@ static void __init setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)cea_set_pte ((void *)vaddr, pa,PAGE_KERNEL ); } -static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(unsigned long sp) +static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs) { +unsigned long sp = regs->sp; + +/* User-mode RSP is not trusted */ +if (user_mode (regs)) +return false; + +/* SYSCALL gap still has user-mode RSP */ +if (ip_within_syscall_gap (regs)) +return false; +return ((sp >=__this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (VC )) && (sp <__this_cpu_ist_top_va (VC ))); }
@@ -144,7 +154,7 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) old_ist =__this_cpu_read (cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ]);/* Make room on the IST stack */ -if (on_vc_stack (regs->sp)) +if (on_vc_stack (regs)) new_ist =ALIGN_DOWN (regs->sp,8 ) -sizeof (old_ist);else new_ist = old_ist -sizeof (old_ist);
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2.30.1 _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
[tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev-es: Check regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 545ac14c16b5dbd909d5a90ddf5b5a629a40fa94 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/545ac14c16b5dbd909d5a90ddf5b5a629a40fa94 Author: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 03 Mar 2021 15:17:13 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Tue, 09 Mar 2021 12:26:26 +01:00
x86/sev-es: Check regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack
The code in the NMI handler to adjust the #VC handler IST stack is needed in case an NMI hits when the #VC handler is still using its IST stack.
But the check for this condition also needs to look if the regs->sp value is trusted, meaning it was not set by user-space. Extend the check to not use regs->sp when the NMI interrupted user-space code or the SYSCALL gap.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +12 -2
@@ -121,8 +121,18 @@ static void __init setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)cea_set_pte ((void *)vaddr, pa,PAGE_KERNEL ); } -static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(unsigned long sp) +static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs) { +unsigned long sp = regs->sp; + +/* User-mode RSP is not trusted */ +if (user_mode (regs)) +return false; + +/* SYSCALL gap still has user-mode RSP */ +if (ip_within_syscall_gap (regs)) +return false; +return ((sp >=__this_cpu_ist_bottom_va (VC )) && (sp <__this_cpu_ist_top_va (VC ))); }
@@ -144,7 +154,7 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) old_ist =__this_cpu_read (cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ]);/* Make room on the IST stack */ -if (on_vc_stack (regs->sp)) +if (on_vc_stack (regs)) new_ist =ALIGN_DOWN (regs->sp,8 ) -sizeof (old_ist);else new_ist = old_ist -sizeof (old_ist);
PATCH v2 3/5 x86/sev-es: Optimize __sev_es_ist_enter() for better readability
In reply to Joerg RoedelFrom: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Reorganize the code and improve the comments to make the function more readable and easier to understand.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +24 -12
@@ -137,29 +137,41 @@ static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs) }/* -* This function handles the case when an NMI is raised in the #VC exception -* handler entry code. In this case, the IST entry for #VC must be adjusted, so -* that any subsequent #VC exception will not overwrite the stack contents of the -* interrupted #VC handler. +* This function handles the case when an NMI is raised in the #VC +* exception handler entry code, before the #VC handler has switched off +* its IST stack. In this case, the IST entry for #VC must be adjusted, +* so that any nested #VC exception will not overwrite the stack +* contents of the interrupted #VC handler. * * The IST entry is adjusted unconditionally so that it can be also be -* unconditionally adjusted back in sev_es_ist_exit(). Otherwise a nested -* sev_es_ist_exit() call may adjust back the IST entry too early. +* unconditionally adjusted back in __sev_es_ist_exit(). Otherwise a +* nested sev_es_ist_exit() call may adjust back the IST entry too +* early. +* +* The __sev_es_ist_enter() and __sev_es_ist_exit() functions always run +* on the NMI IST stack, as they are only called from NMI handling code +* right now. */ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) {unsigned long old_ist, new_ist;/* Read old IST entry */ - old_ist =__this_cpu_read (cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ]); + new_ist = old_ist =__this_cpu_read (cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ]); -/* Make room on the IST stack */ +/* +* If NMI happened while on the #VC IST stack, set the new IST +* value below regs->sp, so that the interrupted stack frame is +* not overwritten by subsequent #VC exceptions. +*/ if (on_vc_stack (regs)) - new_ist =ALIGN_DOWN (regs->sp,8 ) -sizeof (old_ist); -else - new_ist = old_ist -sizeof (old_ist); + new_ist = regs->sp; -/* Store old IST entry */ +/* +* Reserve additional 8 bytes and store old IST value so this +* adjustment can be unrolled in __sev_es_ist_exit(). +*/ + new_ist -=sizeof (old_ist); *(unsigned long *)new_ist = old_ist;/* Set new IST entry */
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2.30.1 _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
[tip: x86/seves] x86/sev-es: Optimize __sev_es_ist_enter() for better readability
The following commit has been merged into the x86/seves branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/seves branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 799de1baaf3509a54ff713efb768020f8defd709 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/799de1baaf3509a54ff713efb768020f8defd709 Author: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 03 Mar 2021 15:17:14 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 13:37:22 +01:00
x86/sev-es: Optimize __sev_es_ist_enter() for better readability
Reorganize the code and improve the comments to make the function more readable and easier to understand.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +24 -12
@@ -137,29 +137,41 @@ static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs) }/* -* This function handles the case when an NMI is raised in the #VC exception -* handler entry code. In this case, the IST entry for #VC must be adjusted, so -* that any subsequent #VC exception will not overwrite the stack contents of the -* interrupted #VC handler. +* This function handles the case when an NMI is raised in the #VC +* exception handler entry code, before the #VC handler has switched off +* its IST stack. In this case, the IST entry for #VC must be adjusted, +* so that any nested #VC exception will not overwrite the stack +* contents of the interrupted #VC handler. * * The IST entry is adjusted unconditionally so that it can be also be -* unconditionally adjusted back in sev_es_ist_exit(). Otherwise a nested -* sev_es_ist_exit() call may adjust back the IST entry too early. +* unconditionally adjusted back in __sev_es_ist_exit(). Otherwise a +* nested sev_es_ist_exit() call may adjust back the IST entry too +* early. +* +* The __sev_es_ist_enter() and __sev_es_ist_exit() functions always run +* on the NMI IST stack, as they are only called from NMI handling code +* right now. */ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) {unsigned long old_ist, new_ist;/* Read old IST entry */ - old_ist =__this_cpu_read (cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ]); + new_ist = old_ist =__this_cpu_read (cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ]); -/* Make room on the IST stack */ +/* +* If NMI happened while on the #VC IST stack, set the new IST +* value below regs->sp, so that the interrupted stack frame is +* not overwritten by subsequent #VC exceptions. +*/ if (on_vc_stack (regs)) - new_ist =ALIGN_DOWN (regs->sp,8 ) -sizeof (old_ist); -else - new_ist = old_ist -sizeof (old_ist); + new_ist = regs->sp; -/* Store old IST entry */ +/* +* Reserve additional 8 bytes and store old IST value so this +* adjustment can be unrolled in __sev_es_ist_exit(). +*/ + new_ist -=sizeof (old_ist); *(unsigned long *)new_ist = old_ist;/* Set new IST entry */
PATCH v2 4/5 x86/sev-es: Correctly track IRQ states in runtime #VC handler
In reply to Joerg RoedelFrom: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Call irqentry_nmi_enter()/irqentry_nmi_exit() in the #VC handler to correctly track the IRQ state during its execution.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +4 -2
@@ -1270,13 +1270,12 @@ static __always_inline bool on_vc_fallback_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK (exc_vmm_communication) {struct sev_es_runtime_data *data =this_cpu_read (runtime_data); +irqentry_state_t irq_state;struct ghcb_state state;struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;enum es_result result;struct ghcb *ghcb; -lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled (); -/* * Handle #DB before calling into !noinstr code to avoid recursive #DB. */
@@ -1285,6 +1284,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)return ; } + irq_state =irqentry_nmi_enter (regs); +lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled ();instrumentation_begin ();/*
@@ -1347,6 +1348,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication) out:instrumentation_end (); +irqentry_nmi_exit (regs, irq_state);return ;
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2.30.1 _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
[tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev-es: Correctly track IRQ states in runtime #VC handler
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 62441a1fb53263bda349b6e5997c3cc5c120d89e Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/62441a1fb53263bda349b6e5997c3cc5c120d89e Author: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 03 Mar 2021 15:17:15 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Tue, 09 Mar 2021 12:33:46 +01:00
x86/sev-es: Correctly track IRQ states in runtime #VC handler
Call irqentry_nmi_enter()/irqentry_nmi_exit() in the #VC handler to correctly track the IRQ state during its execution.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +4 -2
@@ -1258,13 +1258,12 @@ static __always_inline bool on_vc_fallback_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK (exc_vmm_communication) {struct sev_es_runtime_data *data =this_cpu_read (runtime_data); +irqentry_state_t irq_state;struct ghcb_state state;struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;enum es_result result;struct ghcb *ghcb; -lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled (); -/* * Handle #DB before calling into !noinstr code to avoid recursive #DB. */
@@ -1273,6 +1272,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)return ; } + irq_state =irqentry_nmi_enter (regs); +lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled ();instrumentation_begin ();/*
@@ -1335,6 +1336,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication) out:instrumentation_end (); +irqentry_nmi_exit (regs, irq_state);return ;
PATCH v2 5/5 x86/sev-es: Use __copy_from_user_inatomic()
In reply to Joerg RoedelFrom: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
The #VC handler must run atomic and can not be put to sleep. This is a problem when it tries to fetch instruction bytes from user-space via copy_from_user.
Introduce a insn_fetch_from_user_inatomic() helper which uses __copy_from_user_inatomic() to safely copy the instruction bytes to kernel memory in the #VC handler.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx);int insn_get_code_seg_params (struct pt_regs *regs);int insn_fetch_from_user (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE ]); +int insn_fetch_from_user_inatomic (struct pt_regs *regs, +unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE ]);bool insn_decode (struct insn *insn,struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE ],int buf_size);
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +1 -1
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_decode_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)int res;if (user_mode (ctxt->regs)) { - res =insn_fetch_from_user (ctxt->regs, buffer); + res =insn_fetch_from_user_inatomic (ctxt->regs, buffer);if (!res) { ctxt->fi.vector =X86_TRAP_PF ; ctxt->fi.error_code =X86_PF_INSTR |X86_PF_USER ;
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c +52 -14
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2.30.1 _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
[tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev-es: Use __copy_from_user_inatomic()
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: bffe30dd9f1f3b2608a87ac909a224d6be472485 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/bffe30dd9f1f3b2608a87ac909a224d6be472485 Author: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 03 Mar 2021 15:17:16 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Tue, 09 Mar 2021 12:37:54 +01:00
x86/sev-es: Use __copy_from_user_inatomic()
The #VC handler must run in atomic context and cannot sleep. This is a problem when it tries to fetch instruction bytes from user-space via copy_from_user().
Introduce a insn_fetch_from_user_inatomic() helper which uses __copy_from_user_inatomic() to safely copy the instruction bytes to kernel memory in the #VC handler.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx);int insn_get_code_seg_params (struct pt_regs *regs);int insn_fetch_from_user (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE ]); +int insn_fetch_from_user_inatomic (struct pt_regs *regs, +unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE ]);bool insn_decode (struct insn *insn,struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE ],int buf_size);
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +1 -1
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_decode_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)int res;if (user_mode (ctxt->regs)) { - res =insn_fetch_from_user (ctxt->regs, buffer); + res =insn_fetch_from_user_inatomic (ctxt->regs, buffer);if (!res) { ctxt->fi.vector =X86_TRAP_PF ; ctxt->fi.error_code =X86_PF_INSTR |X86_PF_USER ;
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c +52 -14
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