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u-boot: Support SPL Verified Boot

RFC In review Klaus Heinrich Kiwi 2 participants 5 messages Mar 6, 2021 – Mar 10, 2021

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#0 lore raw

cover u-boot: Support SPL Verified Boot

This patch series aims at extending U-Boot's verified boot support to also include SPL signing.

The proposal is to some of the infrastructure (variables, functions) used to sign the Kernel FitImage to more common locations, and then essentially duplicate the method currently used to sign the Kernel fitImage to also sign the U-Boot fitImage.

In the UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE = "1" scenario, nothing really changes: The Kernel fitImage is created, then signed, and the pubkey is added to u-boot.dtb which is concatenated with the u-boot-nodtb.bin to create the u-boot final image.

In case SPL_SIGN_ENABLE = "1", The U-Boot PN will take care of (re-) creating the U-Boot fitImage (using custom .its script) after compile, sign it, and contatenate the u-boot-spl.dtb (with the public key) with u-boot-spl-nodtb.bin to create the final U-Boot SPl on deploy.

In case both UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE and SPL_SIGN_ENABLE are set, the Kernel PN will take care of creating and signing the U-Boot fitImage (becase we need to also sign the FDT image containing the Kernel pubkey), and take care of deploying it.

I tested all three scenarios using OpenBMC upstream, and although there might be some areas of improvement (like deploying the new binaries and symlinks with more useful names), it appears to work well.

One caveat is that when moving between the scenarios above, the user might need to remove the tmp/ directory, since there could be a collision for some of the files deployed into the images directory, since the configuration may determine which PN does that.

Reviews, thoughts and comments are very very welcome,

Thanks,

-Klaus

#1 lore raw

RFC 1/3 u-boot: Move definitions to common locations

Move some definitions from u-boot.inc into uboot-config.bbclass and similarly from kernel-fitimage.bbclass into uboot-sign.bbclass, so that they can be useful when signing the U-boot proper fitimage, for a verified-boot SPL.

---
 meta/classes/kernel-fitimage.bbclass | 58 ----------------------------
 meta/classes/uboot-config.bbclass    | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/classes/uboot-sign.bbclass      | 35 +++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot.inc   | 46 ----------------------
 4 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
meta/classes/kernel-fitimage.bbclass +0 -58
index f5082c93df..76e2e6c136 100644
@@ -53,30 +53,6 @@ python __anonymous () {
                 d.appendVarFlag('do_assemble_fitimage_initramfs', 'depends', ' %s:do_populate_sysroot' % uboot_pn)
 }
 
-# Options for the device tree compiler passed to mkimage '-D' feature:
-UBOOT_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS ??= ""
-
-# fitImage Hash Algo
-FIT_HASH_ALG ?= "sha256"
-
-# fitImage Signature Algo
-FIT_SIGN_ALG ?= "rsa2048"
-
-# Generate keys for signing fitImage
-FIT_GENERATE_KEYS ?= "0"
-
-# Size of private key in number of bits
-FIT_SIGN_NUMBITS ?= "2048"
-
-# args to openssl genrsa (Default is just the public exponent)
-FIT_KEY_GENRSA_ARGS ?= "-F4"
-
-# args to openssl req (Default is -batch for non interactive mode and
-# -new for new certificate)
-FIT_KEY_REQ_ARGS ?= "-batch -new"
-
-# Standard format for public key certificate
-FIT_KEY_SIGN_PKCS ?= "-x509"
 
 # Description string
 FIT_DESC ?= "U-Boot fitImage for ${DISTRO_NAME}/${PV}/${MACHINE}"
@@ -84,13 +60,6 @@ FIT_DESC ?= "U-Boot fitImage for ${DISTRO_NAME}/${PV}/${MACHINE}"
 # Sign individual images as well
 FIT_SIGN_INDIVIDUAL ?= "0"
 
-# mkimage command
-UBOOT_MKIMAGE ?= "uboot-mkimage"
-UBOOT_MKIMAGE_SIGN ?= "${UBOOT_MKIMAGE}"
-
-# Arguments passed to mkimage for signing
-UBOOT_MKIMAGE_SIGN_ARGS ?= ""
-
 #
 # Emit the fitImage ITS header
 #
@@ -692,33 +661,6 @@ do_assemble_fitimage_initramfs() {
 
 addtask assemble_fitimage_initramfs before do_deploy after do_bundle_initramfs
 
-do_generate_rsa_keys() {
-	if [ "${UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE}" = "0" ] && [ "${FIT_GENERATE_KEYS}" = "1" ]; then
-		bbwarn "FIT_GENERATE_KEYS is set to 1 eventhough UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE is set to 0. The keys will not be generated as they won't be used."
-	fi
-
-	if [ "${UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE}" = "1" ] && [ "${FIT_GENERATE_KEYS}" = "1" ]; then
-
-		# Generate keys only if they don't already exist
-		if [ ! -f "${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYDIR}/${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYNAME}".key ] || \
-			[ ! -f "${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYDIR}/${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYNAME}".crt]; then
-
-			# make directory if it does not already exist
-			mkdir -p "${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYDIR}"
-
-			echo "Generating RSA private key for signing fitImage"
-			openssl genrsa ${FIT_KEY_GENRSA_ARGS} -out \
-				"${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYDIR}/${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYNAME}".key \
-				"${FIT_SIGN_NUMBITS}"
-
-			echo "Generating certificate for signing fitImage"
-			openssl req ${FIT_KEY_REQ_ARGS} "${FIT_KEY_SIGN_PKCS}" \
-				-key "${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYDIR}/${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYNAME}".key \
-				-out "${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYDIR}/${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYNAME}".crt
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
 addtask generate_rsa_keys before do_assemble_fitimage after do_compile
 
 kernel_do_deploy[vardepsexclude] = "DATETIME"
meta/classes/uboot-config.bbclass +56 -0

63 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/classes/uboot-sign.bbclass +35 -0
index 713196df41..d57bef6669 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
 #
 # For more details on signature process, please refer to U-Boot documentation.
 
+# We need some variables from u-boot-config
+inherit uboot-config
+
 # Signature activation.
 UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE ?= "0"
 
@@ -41,6 +44,38 @@ UBOOT_DTB_SYMLINK ?= "u-boot-${MACHINE}.dtb"
 UBOOT_NODTB_IMAGE ?= "u-boot-nodtb-${MACHINE}-${PV}-${PR}.${UBOOT_SUFFIX}"
 UBOOT_NODTB_BINARY ?= "u-boot-nodtb.${UBOOT_SUFFIX}"
 UBOOT_NODTB_SYMLINK ?= "u-boot-nodtb-${MACHINE}.${UBOOT_SUFFIX}"
+UBOOT_ITS_IMAGE ?= "u-boot-${MACHINE}-${PV}-${PR}.its"
+UBOOT_ITS ?= "u-boot.its"
+UBOOT_ITS_SYMLINK ?= "u-boot-${MACHINE}.its"
+SPL_DIR ?= "${@os.path.dirname(d.getVar("SPL_BINARY")) or '.'}"
+SPL_DTB_IMAGE ?= "u-boot-spl-${MACHINE}-${PV}-${PR}.dtb"
+SPL_DTB_BINARY ?= "u-boot-spl.dtb"
+SPL_DTB_SYMLINK ?= "u-boot-spl-${MACHINE}.dtb"
+SPL_NODTB_IMAGE ?= "${@os.path.splitext(d.getVar("SPL_BINARYNAME"))[0]}-nodtb-${MACHINE}-${PV}-${PR}${@os.path.splitext(d.getVar("SPL_BINARYNAME"))[1]}"
+SPL_NODTB_BINARY ?= "${@os.path.splitext(d.getVar("SPL_BINARYNAME"))[0]}-nodtb${@os.path.splitext(d.getVar("SPL_BINARYNAME"))[1]}"
+SPL_NODTB_SYMLINK ?= "${@os.path.splitext(d.getVar("SPL_BINARYNAME"))[0]}-nodtb-${MACHINE}${@os.path.splitext(d.getVar("SPL_BINARYNAME"))[1]}"
+
+# fitImage Hash Algo
+FIT_HASH_ALG ?= "sha256"
+
+# fitImage Signature Algo
+FIT_SIGN_ALG ?= "rsa2048"
+
+# Generate keys for signing fitImage
+FIT_GENERATE_KEYS ?= "0"
+
+# Size of private key in number of bits
+FIT_SIGN_NUMBITS ?= "2048"
+
+# args to openssl genrsa (Default is just the public exponent)
+FIT_KEY_GENRSA_ARGS ?= "-F4"
+
+# args to openssl req (Default is -batch for non interactive mode and
+# -new for new certificate)
+FIT_KEY_REQ_ARGS ?= "-batch -new"
+
+# Standard format for public key certificate
+FIT_KEY_SIGN_PKCS ?= "-x509"
 
 # Functions in this bbclass is for u-boot only
 UBOOT_PN = "${@d.getVar('PREFERRED_PROVIDER_u-boot') or 'u-boot'}"
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot.inc +0 -46

52 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#2 lore raw

RFC 2/3 u-boot: Add infrastructure to SPL verified boot

In reply to Klaus Heinrich Kiwi

Add the necessary infrastructure to create a U-boot proper fitimage, sign it (using the same keys as the kernel-fitimage), and put the public key in the SPL binary so that verified SPL boot can be accomplished.

---
 meta/classes/kernel-fitimage.bbclass |   7 +
 meta/classes/uboot-sign.bbclass      | 306 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 296 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
meta/classes/kernel-fitimage.bbclass +7 -0
index 76e2e6c136..3b72d5495a 100644
@@ -694,6 +694,13 @@ kernel_do_deploy_append() {
 			# ${UBOOT_DTB_IMAGE} since it contains ${PV} which is aimed
 			# for u-boot, but we are in kernel env now.
 			install -m 0644 ${B}/u-boot-${MACHINE}*.dtb "$deployDir/"
+			if [ "${SPL_SIGN_ENABLE}" = "1" -a -n "${UBOOT_BINARY}" -a -n "${SPL_DTB_BINARY}" ] ; then
+				# If we're also signing the uboot fit, now we need to
+				# deploy it, as well as u-boot-spl.dtb
+				install -m 0644 ${B}/u-boot-spl-${MACHINE}*.dtb "$deployDir/"
+				echo "Copying u-boot-fitImage file..."
+				install -m 0644 ${B}/u-boot-fitImage "$deployDir/u-boot-fitImage-${MACHINE}.${UBOOT_SUFFIX}"
+			fi
 		fi
 	fi
 }
meta/classes/uboot-sign.bbclass +289 -17

360 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#3 lore raw

RFC 3/3 u-boot: Use a different Key for SPL signing

In reply to Klaus Heinrich Kiwi

Duplicate the variables governing u-boot signing so that we can have a different set of keys/parameters signing the SPL.

---
 meta/classes/uboot-config.bbclass |  2 ++
 meta/classes/uboot-sign.bbclass   | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
meta/classes/uboot-config.bbclass +2 -0
index 31487c1418..3bba02828b 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ UBOOT_EXTLINUX_SYMLINK ?= "${UBOOT_EXTLINUX_CONF_NAME}-${MACHINE}-${PR}"
 
 # Options for the device tree compiler passed to mkimage '-D' feature:
 UBOOT_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS ??= ""
+SPL_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS ??= ""
 
 # mkimage command
 UBOOT_MKIMAGE ?= "uboot-mkimage"
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ UBOOT_MKIMAGE_SIGN ?= "${UBOOT_MKIMAGE}"
 
 # Arguments passed to mkimage for signing
 UBOOT_MKIMAGE_SIGN_ARGS ?= ""
+SPL_MKIMAGE_SIGN_ARGS ?= ""
 
 python () {
     ubootmachine = d.getVar("UBOOT_MACHINE")
meta/classes/uboot-sign.bbclass +44 -11

104 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#4 lore raw
In reply to Klaus Heinrich Kiwi

Hello,

Quoted 2 lines · Klaus Heinrich Kiwi

This patch series aims at extending U-Boot's verified boot support to also include SPL signing.

If u-boot is signed, which part is responsible of the signature verification ?

doesn't each CPU vendor provide it's own way of signing the first component that will be loader by the ROM code ?

so I'm wondering in which case does this apply ?

Quoted 30 lines

The proposal is to some of the infrastructure (variables, functions) used to sign the Kernel FitImage to more common locations, and then essentially duplicate the method currently used to sign the Kernel fitImage to also sign the U-Boot fitImage.

In the UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE = "1" scenario, nothing really changes: The Kernel fitImage is created, then signed, and the pubkey is added to u-boot.dtb which is concatenated with the u-boot-nodtb.bin to create the u-boot final image.

In case SPL_SIGN_ENABLE = "1", The U-Boot PN will take care of (re-) creating the U-Boot fitImage (using custom .its script) after compile, sign it, and contatenate the u-boot-spl.dtb (with the public key) with u-boot-spl-nodtb.bin to create the final U-Boot SPl on deploy.

In case both UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE and SPL_SIGN_ENABLE are set, the Kernel PN will take care of creating and signing the U-Boot fitImage (becase we need to also sign the FDT image containing the Kernel pubkey), and take care of deploying it.

I tested all three scenarios using OpenBMC upstream, and although there might be some areas of improvement (like deploying the new binaries and symlinks with more useful names), it appears to work well.

One caveat is that when moving between the scenarios above, the user might need to remove the tmp/ directory, since there could be a collision for some of the files deployed into the images directory, since the configuration may determine which PN does that.

Quoted 10 lines

Reviews, thoughts and comments are very very welcome,

Thanks,

-Klaus

Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards

Signature · 10 lines
Ayoub Zaki
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