Count rlimits in each user namespace
Subsystems (12)
v8 cover Count rlimits in each user namespace
Preface
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These patches are for binding the rlimit counters to a user in user namespace. This patch set can be applied on top of:
git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git v5.11
Problem
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The RLIMIT_NPROC, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, RLIMIT_SIGPENDING, RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE rlimits implementation places the counters in user_struct [1]. These limits are global between processes and persists for the lifetime of the process, even if processes are in different user namespaces.
To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to set RLIMIT_NPROC=1.
service-A
\- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1) \- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1)
The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1. When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in container2 it fails since user X already has one running process.
The problem is not that the limit from container1 affects container2. The problem is that limit is verified against the global counter that reflects the number of processes in all containers.
This problem can be worked around by using different users for each container but in this case we face a different problem of uid mapping when transferring files from one container to another.
Eric W. Biederman mentioned this issue [2][3].
Introduced changes
------------------
To address the problem, we bind rlimit counters to user namespace. Each counter reflects the number of processes in a given uid in a given user namespace. The result is a tree of rlimit counters with the biggest value at the root (aka init_user_ns). The limit is considered exceeded if it's exceeded up in the tree.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/containers/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/containers/2020-August/042096.html
[3]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/containers/2020-October/042524.html
Changelog
---------
v8:
* Used atomic_t for ucounts reference counting. Also added counter overflow check (thanks to Linus Torvalds for the idea).
* Fixed other issues found by lkp-tests project in the patch that Reimplements RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts.
v7:
* Fixed issues found by lkp-tests project in the patch that Reimplements RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts.
v6:
* Fixed issues found by lkp-tests project.
* Rebased onto v5.11.
v5:
* Split the first commit into two commits: change ucounts.count type to atomic_long_t and add ucounts to cred. These commits were merged by mistake during the rebase.
* The __get_ucounts() renamed to alloc_ucounts().
* The cred.ucounts update has been moved from commit_creds() as it did not allow to handle errors.
* Added error handling of set_cred_ucounts().
v4:
* Reverted the type change of ucounts.count to refcount_t.
* Fixed typo in the kernel/cred.c
v3:
* Added get_ucounts() function to increase the reference count. The existing get_counts() function renamed to __get_ucounts().
* The type of ucounts.count changed from atomic_t to refcount_t.
* Dropped 'const' from set_cred_ucounts() arguments.
* Fixed a bug with freeing the cred structure after calling cred_alloc_blank().
* Commit messages have been updated.
* Added selftest.
v2:
* RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, RLIMIT_SIGPENDING and RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE are migrated to ucounts.
* Added ucounts for pair uid and user namespace into cred.
* Added the ability to increase ucount by more than 1.
v1:
* After discussion with Eric W. Biederman, I increased the size of ucounts to atomic_long_t.
* Added ucount_max to avoid the fork bomb.
--
Alexey Gladkov (8):
Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user
namespaces
fs/exec.c | 6 +- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 16 +- fs/io-wq.c | 22 ++- fs/io-wq.h | 2 +- fs/io_uring.c | 2 +- fs/proc/array.c | 2 +- include/linux/cred.h | 4 + include/linux/hugetlb.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm.h | 4 +- include/linux/sched/user.h | 7 - include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 2 +- include/linux/signal_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 26 ++- ipc/mqueue.c | 41 ++--- ipc/shm.c | 26 +-- kernel/cred.c | 50 +++++- kernel/exit.c | 2 +- kernel/fork.c | 18 +- kernel/signal.c | 57 +++---- kernel/sys.c | 14 +- kernel/ucount.c | 140 ++++++++++++--- kernel/user.c | 3 - kernel/user_namespace.c | 9 +- mm/memfd.c | 4 +- mm/mlock.c | 23 ++- mm/mmap.c | 4 +- mm/shmem.c | 8 +- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/Makefile | 6 + tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/config | 1 + .../selftests/rlimits/rlimits-per-userns.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++ 32 files changed, 512 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/config create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/rlimits-per-userns.c
Signature · 6 lines
2.29.2 _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
PATCH v8 1/8 Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE and RLIMIT_MEMLOCK use unsigned long to store their counters. As a preparation for moving rlimits based on ucounts, we need to increase the size of the variable to long.
--- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ++-- kernel/ucount.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/user_namespace.h +2 -2
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct user_namespace {struct ctl_table_header *sysctls;#endif struct ucounts *ucounts; -int ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS ]; +long ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS ]; } __randomize_layout;struct ucounts {
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct ucounts {struct user_namespace *ns;kuid_t uid;int count; -atomic_t ucount[UCOUNT_COUNTS ]; +atomic_long_t ucount[UCOUNT_COUNTS ]; };extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
kernel/ucount.c +8 -8
@@ -175,14 +175,14 @@ static void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts)kfree (ucounts); } -static inline bool atomic_inc_below (atomic_t *v,int u) +static inline bool atomic_long_inc_below (atomic_long_t *v,int u) { -int c, old; - c =atomic_read (v); +long c, old; + c =atomic_long_read (v);for (;;) {if (unlikely (c >= u))return false; - old =atomic_cmpxchg (v, c, c+1 ); + old =atomic_long_cmpxchg (v, c, c+1 );if (likely (old == c))return true; c = old;
@@ -196,17 +196,17 @@ struct ucounts *inc_ucount(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,struct user_namespace *tns; ucounts =get_ucounts (ns, uid);for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = tns->ucounts) { -int max; +long max; tns = iter->ns; max =READ_ONCE (tns->ucount_max[type]); -if (!atomic_inc_below (&iter->ucount[type], max)) +if (!atomic_long_inc_below (&iter->ucount[type], max)) goto fail; }return ucounts; fail: bad = iter;for (iter = ucounts; iter != bad; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) -atomic_dec (&iter->ucount[type]); +atomic_long_dec (&iter->ucount[type]);put_ucounts (ucounts);return NULL ;
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ void dec_ucount(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type) {struct ucounts *iter;for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) { -int dec =atomic_dec_if_positive (&iter->ucount[type]); +long dec =atomic_long_dec_if_positive (&iter->ucount[type]);WARN_ON_ONCE (dec <0 ); }put_ucounts (ucounts);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
PATCH v8 2/8 Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
In reply to Alexey GladkovFor RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for user in the user_namespace.
Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds().
Changelog
v6:
* Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts pointer empty.
--- fs/exec.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++ include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ++++ kernel/cred.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/fork.c | 6 +++++ kernel/sys.c | 12 ++++++++++ kernel/ucount.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +++ 8 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +4 -0
@@ -1360,6 +1360,10 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)WRITE_ONCE (me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id +1 );flush_signal_handlers (me,0 ); + retval =set_cred_ucounts (bprm->cred); +if (retval <0 ) + goto out_unlock; +/* * install the new credentials for this executable */
include/linux/cred.h +2 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ struct cred {#endif struct user_struct *user;/* real user ID subscription */ struct user_namespace *user_ns;/* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */ +struct ucounts *ucounts;struct group_info *group_info;/* supplementary groups for euid/fsgid */ /* RCU deletion */ union {
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);extern int set_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *);extern int cred_fscmp (const struct cred *,const struct cred *);extern void __init cred_init (void ); +extern int set_cred_ucounts (struct cred *);/* * check for validity of credentials
include/linux/user_namespace.h +4 -0
@@ -97,11 +97,15 @@ struct ucounts { };extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns; +extern struct ucounts init_ucounts;bool setup_userns_sysctls (struct user_namespace *ns);void retire_userns_sysctls (struct user_namespace *ns);struct ucounts *inc_ucount (struct user_namespace *ns,kuid_t uid,enum ucount_type type);void dec_ucount (struct ucounts *ucounts,enum ucount_type type); +struct ucounts *alloc_ucounts (struct user_namespace *ns,kuid_t uid); +struct ucounts *get_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts); +void put_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts);#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
kernel/cred.c +40 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ struct cred init_cred = { .user = INIT_USER, .user_ns = &init_user_ns, .group_info = &init_groups, + .ucounts = &init_ucounts, };static inline void set_cred_subscribers (struct cred *cred,int n)
@@ -119,6 +120,8 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)if (cred->group_info)put_group_info (cred->group_info);free_uid (cred->user); +if (cred->ucounts) +put_ucounts (cred->ucounts);put_user_ns (cred->user_ns);kmem_cache_free (cred_jar, cred); }
@@ -222,6 +225,7 @@ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS new->magic =CRED_MAGIC ;#endif + new->ucounts =get_ucounts (&init_ucounts);if (security_cred_alloc_blank (new,GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ) <0 ) goto error;
@@ -284,6 +288,11 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)if (security_prepare_creds (new, old,GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ) <0 ) goto error; + + new->ucounts =get_ucounts (new->ucounts); +if (!new->ucounts) + goto error; +validate_creds (new);return new;
@@ -363,6 +372,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) ret =create_user_ns (new);if (ret <0 ) goto error_put; +if (set_cred_ucounts (new) <0 ) + goto error_put; }#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
@@ -653,6 +664,31 @@ int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *a, const struct cred *b) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (cred_fscmp); +int set_cred_ucounts (struct cred *new) +{ +struct task_struct *task = current; +const struct cred *old = task->real_cred; +struct ucounts *old_ucounts = new->ucounts; + +if (new->user == old->user && new->user_ns == old->user_ns) +return 0 ; + +/* +* This optimization is needed because alloc_ucounts() uses locks +* for table lookups. +*/ +if (old_ucounts && old_ucounts->ns == new->user_ns &&uid_eq (old_ucounts->uid, new->euid)) +return 0 ; + +if (!(new->ucounts =alloc_ucounts (new->user_ns, new->euid))) +return -EAGAIN ; + +if (old_ucounts) +put_ucounts (old_ucounts); + +return 0 ; +} +/* * initialise the credentials stuff */
@@ -719,6 +755,10 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)if (security_prepare_creds (new, old,GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ) <0 ) goto error; + new->ucounts =get_ucounts (new->ucounts); +if (!new->ucounts) + goto error; +put_cred (old);validate_creds (new);return new;
kernel/fork.c +6 -0
@@ -2957,6 +2957,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)if (err) goto bad_unshare_cleanup_cred; +if (new_cred) { + err =set_cred_ucounts (new_cred); +if (err) + goto bad_unshare_cleanup_cred; + } +if (new_fs || new_fd || do_sysvsem || new_cred || new_nsproxy) {if (do_sysvsem) {/*
kernel/sys.c +12 -0
@@ -553,6 +553,10 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)if (retval <0 ) goto error; + retval =set_cred_ucounts (new); +if (retval <0 ) + goto error; +return commit_creds (new); error:
@@ -611,6 +615,10 @@ long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid)if (retval <0 ) goto error; + retval =set_cred_ucounts (new); +if (retval <0 ) + goto error; +return commit_creds (new); error:
@@ -686,6 +694,10 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)if (retval <0 ) goto error; + retval =set_cred_ucounts (new); +if (retval <0 ) + goto error; +return commit_creds (new); error:
kernel/ucount.c +37 -3
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@#include <linux/kmemleak.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +struct ucounts init_ucounts = { + .ns = &init_user_ns, + .uid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID , + .count =1 , +}; +#define UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS 10static struct hlist_head ucounts_hashtable[(1 <<UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS )];static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (ucounts_lock);
@@ -125,7 +131,15 @@ static struct ucounts *find_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, strucreturn NULL ; } -static struct ucounts *get_ucounts (struct user_namespace *ns,kuid_t uid) +static void hlist_add_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts) +{ +struct hlist_head *hashent =ucounts_hashentry (ucounts->ns, ucounts->uid); +spin_lock_irq (&ucounts_lock); +hlist_add_head (&ucounts->node, hashent); +spin_unlock_irq (&ucounts_lock); +} + +struct ucounts *alloc_ucounts (struct user_namespace *ns,kuid_t uid) {struct hlist_head *hashent =ucounts_hashentry (ns, uid);struct ucounts *ucounts, *new;
@@ -160,7 +174,26 @@ static struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)return ucounts; } -static void put_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts) +struct ucounts *get_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts) +{ +unsigned long flags; + +if (!ucounts) +return NULL ; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&ucounts_lock, flags); +if (ucounts->count ==INT_MAX ) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"ucounts: counter has reached its maximum value" ); + ucounts =NULL ; + }else { + ucounts->count +=1 ; + } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ucounts_lock, flags); + +return ucounts; +} + +void put_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts) {unsigned long flags;
@@ -194,7 +227,7 @@ struct ucounts *inc_ucount(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, {struct ucounts *ucounts, *iter, *bad;struct user_namespace *tns; - ucounts =get_ucounts (ns, uid); + ucounts =alloc_ucounts (ns, uid);for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = tns->ucounts) {long max; tns = iter->ns;
@@ -237,6 +270,7 @@ static __init int user_namespace_sysctl_init(void)BUG_ON (!user_header);BUG_ON (!setup_userns_sysctls (&init_user_ns));#endif +hlist_add_ucounts (&init_ucounts);return 0 ; }subsys_initcall (user_namespace_sysctl_init);
kernel/user_namespace.c +3 -0
@@ -1281,6 +1281,9 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns)put_user_ns (cred->user_ns);set_cred_user_ns (cred,get_user_ns (user_ns)); +if (set_cred_ucounts (cred) <0 ) +return -EINVAL ; +return 0 ; }
Signature · 6 lines
2.29.2 _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
PATCH v8 3/8 Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
In reply to Alexey GladkovThe current implementation of the ucounts reference counter requires the use of spin_lock. We're going to use get_ucounts() in more performance critical areas like a handling of RLIMIT_SIGPENDING.
Now we need to use spin_lock only if we want to change the hashtable.
--- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 +-- kernel/ucount.c | 60 +++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/linux/user_namespace.h +2 -2
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ struct ucounts {struct hlist_node node;struct user_namespace *ns;kuid_t uid; -int count; +atomic_t count;atomic_long_t ucount[UCOUNT_COUNTS ]; };
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ void retire_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns);struct ucounts *inc_ucount (struct user_namespace *ns,kuid_t uid,enum ucount_type type);void dec_ucount (struct ucounts *ucounts,enum ucount_type type);struct ucounts *alloc_ucounts (struct user_namespace *ns,kuid_t uid); -struct ucounts *get_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts); +struct ucounts *__must_check get_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts);void put_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts);#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
kernel/ucount.c +26 -34
94 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
Quoted 6 lines · Alexey Gladkov
kernel/ucount.c +4
-0+/* 127: arbitrary random number, small enough to assemble well */ +#define refcount_zero_or_close_to_overflow (ucounts) \ + ((unsigned int) atomic_read(&ucounts->count) + 127u <= 127u) +
kernel/ucount.c static void hlist_add_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts) · line 155
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/ucount.c +10
-0+struct ucounts *get_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts) +{ +if (ucounts) { +if (refcount_zero_or_close_to_overflow (ucounts)) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"ucounts: counter has reached its maximum value" ); +return NULL ; + } +atomic_inc (&ucounts->count); + } +return ucounts;
Side note: you probably should just make the limit be the "oh, the count overflows into the sign bit".
The reason the page cache did that tighter thing is that it actually has _two_ limits:
- the "try_get_page()" thing uses the sign bit as a "uhhuh, I've now
used up half of the available reference counting bits, and I will refuse to use any more".
This is basically your "get_ucounts()" function. It's a "I want a
refcount, but I'm willing to deal with failures".
- the page cache has a _different_ set of "I need to unconditionally
get a refcount, and I can *not* deal with failures".
This is basically the traditional "get_page()", which is only used
in fairly controlled places, and should never be something that can overflow.
And *that* special code then uses that
"zero_or_close_to_overflow()" case as a "doing a get_page() in this situation is very very wrong". This is purely a debugging feature used for a VM_BUG_ON() (that has never triggered, as far as I know).
For your ucounts situation, you don't have that second case at all, so you have no reason to ever allow the count to even get remotely close to overflowing.
A reference count being within 128 counts of overflow (when we're talking a 32-bit count) is basically never a good idea. It means that you are way too close to the limit, and there's a risk that lots of concurrent people all first see an ok value, and then *all* decide to do the increment, and then you're toast.
In contrast, if you use the sign bit as a "ok, let's stop incrementing", the fact that your "overflow" test and the increment aren't atomic really isn't a big deal.
(And yes, you could use a cmpxchg to *make* the overflow test atomic, but it's often much much more expensive, so..)
Linus
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
In reply to Alexey GladkovQuoted 3 lines · Alexey Gladkov
The current implementation of the ucounts reference counter requires the use of
spin_lock. We're going to useget_ucounts()in more performance critical areas like a handling ofRLIMIT_SIGPENDING.
This really looks like it should be refcount_t. I read the earlier thread[1] on this, and it's not clear to me that this is a "normal" condition. I think there was a bug in that version (This appeared to *instantly* crash at boot with mnt_init() calling alloc_mnt_ns() calling inc_ucount()). The current code looks like just a "regular" reference counter of the allocated struct ucounts. Overflow should be very unexpected, yes? And operating on a "0" ucounts should be a bug too, right?
kernel/ucount.c static void hlist_add_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts) · line 144
Quoted 4 lines
[...]
kernel/ucount.c +3
-0+/* 127: arbitrary random number, small enough to assemble well */ +#define refcount_zero_or_close_to_overflow (ucounts) \ + ((unsigned int) atomic_read(&ucounts->count) + 127u <= 127u)
Regardless, this should absolutely not have "refcount" as a prefix. I realize it's only used here, but that's needlessly confusing with regard to it being atomic_t not refcount_t.
kernel/ucount.c static void hlist_add_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts) · line 156
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/ucount.c +11
-0+struct ucounts *get_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts) +{ +if (ucounts) { +if (refcount_zero_or_close_to_overflow (ucounts)) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"ucounts: counter has reached its maximum value" ); +return NULL ; + } +atomic_inc (&ucounts->count); + } +return ucounts; +}
I feel like this should just be:
refcount_inc_not_zero(&ucounts->count);
Or, to address Linus's comment in the v3 series, change get_ucounts to not return NULL first -- I can't see why that can ever happen in v8.
-Kees
Signature · 5 lines
Kees Cook _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 3 lines · Alexey Gladkov
The current implementation of the ucounts reference counter requires the use of
spin_lock. We're going to useget_ucounts()in more performance critical areas like a handling ofRLIMIT_SIGPENDING.This really looks like it should be
refcount_t.
No.
refcount_t didn't have the capabilities required.
It just saturates, and doesn't have the "don't do this" case, which the ucounts case *DOES* have.
In other words, refcount_t is entirely misdesigned for this - because it's literally designed for "people can't handle overflow, so we warn and saturate".
ucounts can never saturate, because they replace saturation with "don't do that then".
In other words, ucounts work like the page counts do (which also don't saturate, they just say "ok, you can't get a reference".
I know you are attached to refcounts, but really: they are not only more expensive, THEY LITERALLY DO THE WRONG THING.
Linus
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Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
Quoted 2 lines · Linus Torvalds
It just saturates, and doesn't have the "don't do this" case, which the ucounts case *DOES* have.
Right -- I saw that when digging through the thread. I'm honestly curious, though, why did the 0-day bot find a boot crash? (I can't imagine ucounts wrapped in 0.4 seconds.) So it looked like an increment-from-zero case, which seems like it would be a bug?
Quoted 2 lines
I know you are attached to refcounts, but really: they are not only more expensive, THEY LITERALLY DO THE WRONG THING.
Heh, right -- I'm not arguing that refcount_t MUST be used, I just didn't see the code path that made them unsuitable: hitting INT_MAX - 128 seems very hard to do. Anyway, I'll go study it more to try to understand what I'm missing.
Signature · 5 lines
Kees Cook _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
Quoted 5 lines · Kees Cook
Right -- I saw that when digging through the thread. I'm honestly curious, though, why did the 0-day bot find a boot crash? (I can't imagine ucounts wrapped in 0.4 seconds.) So it looked like an increment-from-zero case, which seems like it would be a bug?
Agreed. It's almost certainly a bug. Possibly a use-after-free, but more likely just a "this count had never gotten initialized to anything but zero, but is used by the init process (and kernel threads) and will be incremented but never be free'd, so we never noticed"
Quoted 4 lines
Heh, right -- I'm not arguing that
refcount_tMUST be used, I just didn't see the code path that made them unsuitable: hittingINT_MAX- 128 seems very hard to do. Anyway, I'll go study it more to try to understand what I'm missing.
So as you may have seen later in the thread, I don't like the "INT_MAX
- 128" as a limit.
I think the page count thing does the right thing: it has separate "debug checks" and "limit checks", and the way it's done it never really needs to worry about doing the (often) expensive cmpxchg loop, because the limit check is _so_ far off the final case that we don't care, and the debug checks aren't about races, they are about "uhhuh, yoiu used this wrong".
So what the page code does is:
- try_get_page() has a limit check _and_ a debug check:
(a) the limit check is "you've used up half the refcounts, I'm not
giving you any more".
(b) the debug check is "you can't get a page that has a zero count
or has underflowed".
it's not obvious that it has both of those checks, because they are
merged into one single WARN_ON_ONCE(), but that's purely for "we actually want that warning for the limit check, because that looks like somebody trying an attack" and it just got combined.
So technically, the code really should do
page = compound_head(page);
/* Debug check for mis-use of the count */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(page_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow(page)))
return false;
/*
* Limit check - we're not incrementing the
* count (much) past the halfway point
*/
if (page_ref_count(page) <= 0)
return false;
/* The actual atomic reference - the above were done "carelessly" */
page_ref_inc(page);
return true; because the "oh, we're not allowing you this ref" is not
_technically_ wrong, it's just traditionally wrong, if you see what I mean.
and notice how none of the above really cares about the "page_ref_inc()" itself being atomic wrt the checks. It's ok if we race, and the page ref goes a bit above the half-way point. You can't race _so_ much that you actually overflow, because our limit check is _so_ far away from the overflow area that it's not an issue.
And similarly, the debug check with page_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow() is one of those things that are trying to see underflows or bad use-cases, and trying to do that atomically with the actual ref update doesn't really help. The underfulow or mis-use will have happened before we increment the page count.
So the above is very close to what the ucounts code I think really wants to do: the "zero_or_close_to_overflow" is an error case: it means something just underflowed, or you were trying to increment a ref to something you didn't have a reference to in the first place.
And the "<= 0" check is just the cheap test for "I'm giving you at most half the counter space, because I don't want to have to even remotely worry about overflow".
Note that the above very intentionally does allow the "we can go over the limit" case for another reason: we still have that regular *unconditional* get_page(), that has a "I absolutely need a temporary ref to this page, but I know it's not some long-term thing that a user can force". That's not only our traditional model, but it's something that some kernel code simply does need, so it's a good feature in itself. That might be less of an issue for ucounts, but for pages, we somethines do have "I need to take a ref to this page just for my own use while I then drop the page lock and do something else".
The "put_page()" case then has its own debug check (in "put_page_testzero()") which says "hey, you can't put a page that has no refcount.
Thct could could easily use that "zero_or_close_to_overflow(()" rule too, but if you actually do underflow for real, you'll see the zero (again - races aren't really important because even if you have some attack vector that depends on the race, such attack vectors will also have to depend on doing the thing over and over and over again until it successfully hits the race, so you'll see the zero case in practice, and trying to be "atomic" for debug testing is thus pointless.
So I do think out page counting this is actually pretty good.
And it's possible that "refcount_t" could use that exact same model, and actually then offer that option that ucounts wants, of a "try to get a refcount, but if we have too many refcounts, then never mind, I can just return an error to user space instead".
Hmm? On x86 (and honestly, these days on arm too with the new atomics), it's generally quite a bit cheaper to do an atomic increment/decrement than it is to do a cmpxchg loop. That seems to become even more true as microarchitectures optimize those atomics - apparently AMD actually does regular locked ops by doing them optimistically out-of-order, and verifying that the serialization requirements hold after-the-fact. So plain simple locked ops that historically used to be quite expensive are getting less so (because they've obviously gotten much more important over the years).
Linus
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Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
Quoted 9 lines · Linus Torvalds
Note that the above very intentionally does allow the "we can go over the limit" case for another reason: we still have that regular *unconditional*
get_page(), that has a "I absolutely need a temporary ref to this page, but I know it's not some long-term thing that a user can force". That's not only our traditional model, but it's something that some kernel code simply does need, so it's a good feature in itself. That might be less of an issue for ucounts, but for pages, we somethines do have "I need to take a ref to this page just for my own use while I then drop the page lock and do something else".
Right, get_page() has a whole other set of requirements. :) I just couldn't find the "we _must_ to get a reference to ucounts" code path, so I was scratching my head.
Quoted 4 lines
And it's possible that "
refcount_t" could use that exact same model, and actually then offer that option that ucounts wants, of a "try to get a refcount, but if we have too many refcounts, then never mind, I can just return an error to user space instead".
Yeah, if there starts to be more of these cases, I think it'd be a nice addition. And with the recent performance work Will Deacon did on refcount_t, I think any general performance concerns are met now. But I'd love to just leave refcount_t alone until we can really show a need for an API change. :P
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
PATCH v8 4/8 Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
In reply to Alexey GladkovThe rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to set RLIMIT_NPROC=1.
service-A
\- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1) \- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1)
The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1. When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in container2 it fails since user X already has one running process.
We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability.
--- fs/exec.c | 2 +- fs/io-wq.c | 22 ++++++------ fs/io-wq.h | 2 +- fs/io_uring.c | 2 +- include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++ include/linux/sched/user.h | 1 - include/linux/user_namespace.h | 13 ++++++++ kernel/cred.c | 10 +++--- kernel/exit.c | 2 +- kernel/fork.c | 9 ++--- kernel/sys.c | 2 +- kernel/ucount.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/user.c | 1 - kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +- 14 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +1 -1
@@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,* whether NPROC limit is still exceeded. */ if ((current->flags &PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED ) && -atomic_read (¤t_user ()->processes) >rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC )) { +is_ucounts_overlimit (current_ucounts (),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ))) { retval = -EAGAIN ; goto out_ret; }
fs/io-wq.c +10 -12
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/blk-cgroup.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include "../kernel/sched/sched.h" #include "io-wq.h"
@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ struct io_wq {io_wq_work_fn *do_work;struct task_struct *manager; -struct user_struct *user; +const struct cred *cred;refcount_t refs;struct completion done;
@@ -234,7 +235,7 @@ static void io_worker_exit(struct io_worker *worker)if (worker->flags &IO_WORKER_F_RUNNING )atomic_dec (&acct->nr_running);if (!(worker->flags &IO_WORKER_F_BOUND )) -atomic_dec (&wqe->wq->user->processes); +dec_rlimit_ucounts (wqe->wq->cred->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 ); worker->flags =0 ;preempt_enable ();
@@ -364,15 +365,15 @@ static void __io_worker_busy(struct io_wqe *wqe, struct io_worker *worker, worker->flags |=IO_WORKER_F_BOUND ; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND ].nr_workers--; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_BOUND ].nr_workers++; -atomic_dec (&wqe->wq->user->processes); +dec_rlimit_ucounts (wqe->wq->cred->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 ); }else { worker->flags &= ~IO_WORKER_F_BOUND ; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND ].nr_workers++; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_BOUND ].nr_workers--; -atomic_inc (&wqe->wq->user->processes); +inc_rlimit_ucounts (wqe->wq->cred->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 ); }io_wqe_inc_running (wqe, worker); - } + } }/*
@@ -707,7 +708,7 @@ static bool create_io_worker(struct io_wq *wq, struct io_wqe *wqe, int index)raw_spin_unlock_irq (&wqe->lock);if (index ==IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND ) -atomic_inc (&wq->user->processes); +inc_rlimit_ucounts (wq->cred->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 );refcount_inc (&wq->refs);wake_up_process (worker->task);
@@ -838,7 +839,7 @@ static bool io_wq_can_queue(struct io_wqe *wqe, struct io_wqe_acct *acct,if (free_worker)return true; -if (atomic_read (&wqe->wq->user->processes) >= acct->max_workers && +if (is_ucounts_overlimit (wqe->wq->cred->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC , acct->max_workers) && !(capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return false;
@@ -1074,7 +1075,7 @@ struct io_wq *io_wq_create(unsigned bounded, struct io_wq_data *data) wq->do_work = data->do_work;/* caller must already hold a reference to this */ - wq->user = data->user; + wq->cred = data->cred; ret = -ENOMEM ;for_each_node (node) {
@@ -1090,10 +1091,7 @@ struct io_wq *io_wq_create(unsigned bounded, struct io_wq_data *data) wqe->node = alloc_node; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_BOUND ].max_workers = bounded;atomic_set (&wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_BOUND ].nr_running,0 ); -if (wq->user) { - wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND ].max_workers = -task_rlimit (current,RLIMIT_NPROC ); - } + wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND ].max_workers =task_rlimit (current,RLIMIT_NPROC );atomic_set (&wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND ].nr_running,0 ); wqe->wq = wq;raw_spin_lock_init (&wqe->lock);
fs/io-wq.h +1 -1
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ typedef void (free_work_fn)(struct io_wq_work *);typedef struct io_wq_work *(io_wq_work_fn )(struct io_wq_work *);struct io_wq_data { -struct user_struct *user; +const struct cred *cred;io_wq_work_fn *do_work;free_work_fn *free_work;
fs/io_uring.c +1 -1
@@ -8084,7 +8084,7 @@ static int io_init_wq_offload(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,unsigned int concurrency;int ret =0 ; - data.user = ctx->user; + data.cred = ctx->creds; data.free_work = io_free_work; data.do_work = io_wq_submit_work;
include/linux/cred.h +2 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)#define task_uid (task) (task_cred_xxx((task), uid))#define task_euid (task) (task_cred_xxx((task), euid)) +#define task_ucounts (task) (task_cred_xxx((task), ucounts))#define current_cred_xxx (xxx) \ ({ \
@@ -388,6 +389,7 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)#define current_fsgid () (current_cred_xxx(fsgid))#define current_cap () (current_cred_xxx(cap_effective))#define current_user () (current_cred_xxx(user)) +#define current_ucounts () (current_cred_xxx(ucounts))extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
include/linux/sched/user.h +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@*/ struct user_struct {refcount_t __count;/* reference count */ -atomic_t processes;/* How many processes does this user have? */ atomic_t sigpending;/* How many pending signals does this user have? */ #ifdef CONFIG_FANOTIFY atomic_t fanotify_listeners;
include/linux/user_namespace.h +13 -0
@@ -50,9 +50,12 @@ enum ucount_type { UCOUNT_INOTIFY_INSTANCES, UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES, #endif + UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, UCOUNT_COUNTS, }; +#define MAX_PER_NAMESPACE_UCOUNTS UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC + struct user_namespace { struct uid_gid_map uid_map; struct uid_gid_map gid_map;
@@ -107,6 +110,16 @@ struct ucounts *alloc_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid);struct ucounts *__must_check get_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts);void put_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts); +static inline long get_ucounts_value (struct ucounts *ucounts,enum ucount_type type) +{ +return atomic_long_read (&ucounts->ucount[type]); +} + +bool inc_rlimit_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts,enum ucount_type type,long v); +bool inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test (struct ucounts *ucounts,enum ucount_type type,long v,long max); +void dec_rlimit_ucounts (struct ucounts *ucounts,enum ucount_type type,long v); +bool is_ucounts_overlimit (struct ucounts *ucounts,enum ucount_type type,unsigned long max); +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns (struct user_namespace *ns)
kernel/cred.c +5 -5
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)kdebug ("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})" , p->cred,atomic_read (&p->cred->usage),read_cred_subscribers (p->cred)); -atomic_inc (&p->cred->user->processes); +inc_rlimit_ucounts (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 );return 0 ; }
@@ -395,8 +395,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) }#endif -atomic_inc (&new->user->processes); p->cred = p->real_cred =get_cred (new); +inc_rlimit_ucounts (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 );alter_cred_subscribers (new,2 );validate_creds (new);return 0 ;
@@ -496,12 +496,12 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)* in set_user(). */ alter_cred_subscribers (new,2 ); -if (new->user != old->user) -atomic_inc (&new->user->processes); +if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns) +inc_rlimit_ucounts (new->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 );rcu_assign_pointer (task->real_cred, new);rcu_assign_pointer (task->cred, new);if (new->user != old->user) -atomic_dec (&old->user->processes); +dec_rlimit_ucounts (old->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 );alter_cred_subscribers (old,-2 );/* send notifications */
kernel/exit.c +1 -1
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ void release_task(struct task_struct *p)/* don't need to get the RCU readlock here - the process is dead and * can't be modifying its own credentials. But shut RCU-lockdep up */ rcu_read_lock (); -atomic_dec (&__task_cred (p)->user->processes); +dec_rlimit_ucounts (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 );rcu_read_unlock ();cgroup_release (p);
kernel/fork.c +5 -4
@@ -819,9 +819,11 @@ void __init fork_init(void) init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_SIGPENDING ] = init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC ]; -for (i =0 ; i <UCOUNT_COUNTS ; i++) +for (i =0 ; i <MAX_PER_NAMESPACE_UCOUNTS ; i++) init_user_ns.ucount_max[i] = max_threads/2 ; + init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_NPROC ); +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK cpuhp_setup_state (CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN ,"fork:vm_stack_cache" ,NULL , free_vm_stack_cache);
@@ -1962,8 +1964,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON (!p->softirqs_enabled);#endif retval = -EAGAIN ; -if (atomic_read (&p->real_cred->user->processes) >= -task_rlimit (p,RLIMIT_NPROC )) { +if (is_ucounts_overlimit (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ))) {if (p->real_cred->user !=INIT_USER && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) goto bad_fork_free;
@@ -2366,7 +2367,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(#endif delayacct_tsk_free (p); bad_fork_cleanup_count: -atomic_dec (&p->cred->user->processes); +dec_rlimit_ucounts (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,1 );exit_creds (p); bad_fork_free: p->state =TASK_DEAD ;
kernel/sys.c +1 -1
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)* for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the * failure to the execve() stage. */ -if (atomic_read (&new_user->processes) >=rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ) && +if (is_ucounts_overlimit (new->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC )) && new_user !=INIT_USER ) current->flags |=PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED ;else
kernel/ucount.c +61 -0
91 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/user.c +0 -1
@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock);/* root_user.__count is 1, for init task cred */ struct user_struct root_user = { .__count =REFCOUNT_INIT (1 ), - .processes =ATOMIC_INIT (1 ), .sigpending =ATOMIC_INIT (0 ), .locked_shm =0 , .uid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ,
kernel/user_namespace.c +2 -1
@@ -118,9 +118,10 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) ns->owner = owner; ns->group = group;INIT_WORK (&ns->work, free_user_ns); -for (i =0 ; i <UCOUNT_COUNTS ; i++) { +for (i =0 ; i <MAX_PER_NAMESPACE_UCOUNTS ; i++) { ns->ucount_max[i] =INT_MAX ; } + ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ); ns->ucounts = ucounts;/* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
Signature · 6 lines
2.29.2 _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
PATCH v8 5/8 Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
In reply to Alexey GladkovThe rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
--- include/linux/sched/user.h | 4 ---- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 1 + ipc/mqueue.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++---------------- kernel/fork.c | 1 + kernel/ucount.c | 1 + kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
include/linux/sched/user.h +0 -4
@@ -18,10 +18,6 @@ struct user_struct {#endif #ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL atomic_long_t epoll_watches;/* The number of file descriptors currently watched */ -#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE -/* protected by mq_lock */ -unsigned long mq_bytes;/* How many bytes can be allocated to mqueue? */ #endif unsigned long locked_shm;/* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */ unsigned long unix_inflight;/* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
include/linux/user_namespace.h +1 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ enum ucount_type {UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES , #endifUCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC , +UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE , UCOUNT_COUNTS, };
ipc/mqueue.c +22 -19
91 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/fork.c +1 -0
@@ -823,6 +823,7 @@ void __init fork_init(void) init_user_ns.ucount_max[i] = max_threads/2 ; init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_NPROC ); + init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE );#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, "fork:vm_stack_cache",
kernel/ucount.c +1 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ static struct ctl_table user_table[] = {UCOUNT_ENTRY ("max_inotify_instances" ), UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"), #endif + { }, { }, { } };
kernel/user_namespace.c +1 -0
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) ns->ucount_max[i] =INT_MAX ; } ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ); + ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ); ns->ucounts = ucounts;/* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
PATCH v8 6/8 Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
In reply to Alexey GladkovThe rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
--- fs/proc/array.c | 2 +- include/linux/sched/user.h | 1 - include/linux/signal_types.h | 4 ++- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 1 + kernel/fork.c | 1 + kernel/signal.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++------------------ kernel/ucount.c | 1 + kernel/user.c | 1 - kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 + 9 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
fs/proc/array.c +1 -1
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static inline void task_sig(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)collect_sigign_sigcatch (p, &ignored, &caught); num_threads =get_nr_threads (p);rcu_read_lock ();/* FIXME: is this correct? */ - qsize =atomic_read (&__task_cred (p)->user->sigpending); + qsize =get_ucounts_value (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING );rcu_read_unlock (); qlim =task_rlimit (p,RLIMIT_SIGPENDING );unlock_task_sighand (p, &flags);
include/linux/sched/user.h +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@*/ struct user_struct {refcount_t __count;/* reference count */ -atomic_t sigpending;/* How many pending signals does this user have? */ #ifdef CONFIG_FANOTIFY atomic_t fanotify_listeners;#endif
include/linux/signal_types.h +3 -1
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ typedef struct kernel_siginfo { __SIGINFO; } kernel_siginfo_t; +struct ucounts ; +/* * Real Time signals may be queued. */
@@ -21,7 +23,7 @@ struct sigqueue {struct list_head list;int flags;kernel_siginfo_t info; -struct user_struct *user; +struct ucounts *ucounts; };/* flags values. */
include/linux/user_namespace.h +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ enum ucount_type {#endif UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE , +UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING , UCOUNT_COUNTS, };
kernel/fork.c +1 -0
@@ -824,6 +824,7 @@ void __init fork_init(void) init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_NPROC ); init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ); + init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_SIGPENDING );#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, "fork:vm_stack_cache",
kernel/signal.c +26 -31
75 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/ucount.c +1 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ static struct ctl_table user_table[] = {UCOUNT_ENTRY ("max_inotify_instances" ), UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"), #endif + { }, { }, { }, { }
kernel/user.c +0 -1
@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock);/* root_user.__count is 1, for init task cred */ struct user_struct root_user = { .__count =REFCOUNT_INIT (1 ), - .sigpending =ATOMIC_INIT (0 ), .locked_shm =0 , .uid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID , .ratelimit =RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT (root_user.ratelimit,0 ,0 ),
kernel/user_namespace.c +1 -0
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) } ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ); ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ); + ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_SIGPENDING ); ns->ucounts = ucounts;/* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
PATCH v8 7/8 Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
In reply to Alexey GladkovThe rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
Changelog
v8:
* Fix issues found by lkp-tests project.
v7:
* Keep only ucounts for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK checks instead of struct cred.
v6:
* Fix bug in hugetlb_file_setup() detected by trinity.
--- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 16 ++++++++-------- include/linux/hugetlb.h | 4 ++-- include/linux/mm.h | 4 ++-- include/linux/sched/user.h | 1 - include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 2 +- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 1 + ipc/shm.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- kernel/fork.c | 1 + kernel/ucount.c | 1 + kernel/user.c | 1 - kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 + mm/memfd.c | 4 ++-- mm/mlock.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- mm/mmap.c | 4 ++-- mm/shmem.c | 8 ++++---- 15 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +8 -8
@@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ static int get_hstate_idx(int page_size_log)* otherwise hugetlb_reserve_pages reserves one less hugepages than intended. */ struct file *hugetlb_file_setup (const char *name,size_t size, -vm_flags_t acctflag,struct user_struct **user, +vm_flags_t acctflag,struct ucounts **ucounts,int creat_flags,int page_size_log) {struct inode *inode;
@@ -1464,20 +1464,20 @@ struct file *hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size,if (hstate_idx <0 )return ERR_PTR (-ENODEV ); - *user =NULL ; + *ucounts =NULL ; mnt = hugetlbfs_vfsmount[hstate_idx];if (!mnt)return ERR_PTR (-ENOENT );if (creat_flags ==HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE && !can_do_hugetlb_shm ()) { - *user =current_user (); -if (user_shm_lock (size, *user)) { + *ucounts =current_ucounts (); +if (user_shm_lock (size, *ucounts)) {task_lock (current);pr_warn_once ("%s (%d): Using mlock ulimits for SHM_HUGETLB is deprecated\n" , current->comm, current->pid);task_unlock (current); }else { - *user =NULL ; + *ucounts =NULL ;return ERR_PTR (-EPERM ); } }
@@ -1504,9 +1504,9 @@ struct file *hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size,iput (inode); out: -if (*user) { -user_shm_unlock (size, *user); - *user =NULL ; +if (*ucounts) { +user_shm_unlock (size, *ucounts); + *ucounts =NULL ; }return file; }
include/linux/hugetlb.h +2 -2
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static inline struct hugetlbfs_inode_info *HUGETLBFS_I(struct inode *inode)extern const struct file_operations hugetlbfs_file_operations;extern const struct vm_operations_struct hugetlb_vm_ops;struct file *hugetlb_file_setup (const char *name,size_t size,vm_flags_t acct, -struct user_struct **user,int creat_flags, +struct ucounts **ucounts,int creat_flags,int page_size_log);static inline bool is_file_hugepages (struct file *file)
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static inline struct hstate *hstate_inode(struct inode *i)#define is_file_hugepages (file) falsestatic inline struct file *hugetlb_file_setup (const char *name,size_t size,vm_flags_t acctflag, -struct user_struct **user,int creat_flags, +struct ucounts **ucounts,int creat_flags,int page_size_log) {return ERR_PTR (-ENOSYS );
include/linux/mm.h +2 -2
@@ -1628,8 +1628,8 @@ extern bool can_do_mlock(void);#else static inline bool can_do_mlock (void ) {return false; }#endif -extern int user_shm_lock (size_t ,struct user_struct *); -extern void user_shm_unlock (size_t ,struct user_struct *); +extern int user_shm_lock (size_t ,struct ucounts *); +extern void user_shm_unlock (size_t ,struct ucounts *);/* * Parameter block passed down to zap_pte_range in exceptional cases.
include/linux/sched/user.h +0 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ struct user_struct {#ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL atomic_long_t epoll_watches;/* The number of file descriptors currently watched */ #endif -unsigned long locked_shm;/* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */ unsigned long unix_inflight;/* How many files in flight in unix sockets */ atomic_long_t pipe_bufs;/* how many pages are allocated in pipe buffers */
include/linux/shmem_fs.h +1 -1
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ extern struct file *shmem_file_setup_with_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt,extern int shmem_zero_setup (struct vm_area_struct *);extern unsigned long shmem_get_unmapped_area (struct file *,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long flags); -extern int shmem_lock (struct file *file,int lock,struct user_struct *user); +extern int shmem_lock (struct file *file,int lock,struct ucounts *ucounts);#ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM extern const struct address_space_operations shmem_aops;static inline bool shmem_mapping (struct address_space *mapping)
include/linux/user_namespace.h +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ enum ucount_type {UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING , +UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK , UCOUNT_COUNTS, };
ipc/shm.c +13 -13
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ struct shmid_kernel /* private to the kernel */time64_t shm_ctim;struct pid *shm_cprid;struct pid *shm_lprid; -struct user_struct *mlock_user; +struct ucounts *mlock_ucounts;/* The task created the shm object. NULL if the task is dead. */ struct task_struct *shm_creator;
@@ -286,10 +286,10 @@ static void shm_destroy(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *shp)shm_rmid (ns, shp);shm_unlock (shp);if (!is_file_hugepages (shm_file)) -shmem_lock (shm_file,0 , shp->mlock_user); -else if (shp->mlock_user) +shmem_lock (shm_file,0 , shp->mlock_ucounts); +else if (shp->mlock_ucounts)user_shm_unlock (i_size_read (file_inode (shm_file)), - shp->mlock_user); + shp->mlock_ucounts);fput (shm_file);ipc_update_pid (&shp->shm_cprid,NULL );ipc_update_pid (&shp->shm_lprid,NULL );
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params) shp->shm_perm.key = key; shp->shm_perm.mode = (shmflg &S_IRWXUGO ); - shp->mlock_user =NULL ; + shp->mlock_ucounts =NULL ; shp->shm_perm.security =NULL ; error =security_shm_alloc (&shp->shm_perm);
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)if (shmflg &SHM_NORESERVE ) acctflag =VM_NORESERVE ; file =hugetlb_file_setup (name, hugesize, acctflag, - &shp->mlock_user,HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE , + &shp->mlock_ucounts,HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE , (shmflg >>SHM_HUGE_SHIFT ) &SHM_HUGE_MASK ); }else {/*
@@ -698,8 +698,8 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params) no_id:ipc_update_pid (&shp->shm_cprid,NULL );ipc_update_pid (&shp->shm_lprid,NULL ); -if (is_file_hugepages (file) && shp->mlock_user) -user_shm_unlock (size, shp->mlock_user); +if (is_file_hugepages (file) && shp->mlock_ucounts) +user_shm_unlock (size, shp->mlock_ucounts);fput (file);ipc_rcu_putref (&shp->shm_perm, shm_rcu_free);return error;
@@ -1105,12 +1105,12 @@ static int shmctl_do_lock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid, int cmd) goto out_unlock0;if (cmd ==SHM_LOCK ) { -struct user_struct *user =current_user (); +struct ucounts *ucounts =current_ucounts (); - err =shmem_lock (shm_file,1 , user); + err =shmem_lock (shm_file,1 , ucounts);if (!err && !(shp->shm_perm.mode &SHM_LOCKED )) { shp->shm_perm.mode |=SHM_LOCKED ; - shp->mlock_user = user; + shp->mlock_ucounts = ucounts; } goto out_unlock0; }
@@ -1118,9 +1118,9 @@ static int shmctl_do_lock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid, int cmd)/* SHM_UNLOCK */ if (!(shp->shm_perm.mode &SHM_LOCKED )) goto out_unlock0; -shmem_lock (shm_file,0 , shp->mlock_user); +shmem_lock (shm_file,0 , shp->mlock_ucounts); shp->shm_perm.mode &= ~SHM_LOCKED ; - shp->mlock_user =NULL ; + shp->mlock_ucounts =NULL ;get_file (shm_file);ipc_unlock_object (&shp->shm_perm);rcu_read_unlock ();
kernel/fork.c +1 -0
@@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ void __init fork_init(void) init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_NPROC ); init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ); init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_SIGPENDING ); + init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK ] =task_rlimit (&init_task,RLIMIT_MEMLOCK );#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, "fork:vm_stack_cache",
kernel/ucount.c +1 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct ctl_table user_table[] = { { }, { }, { }, + { }, { } };#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
kernel/user.c +0 -1
@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock);/* root_user.__count is 1, for init task cred */ struct user_struct root_user = { .__count =REFCOUNT_INIT (1 ), - .locked_shm =0 , .uid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID , .ratelimit =RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT (root_user.ratelimit,0 ,0 ), };
kernel/user_namespace.c +1 -0
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ); ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE ); ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_SIGPENDING ); + ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK ] =rlimit (RLIMIT_MEMLOCK ); ns->ucounts = ucounts;/* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
mm/memfd.c +2 -2
@@ -297,9 +297,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, }if (flags &MFD_HUGETLB ) { -struct user_struct *user =NULL ; +struct ucounts *ucounts =NULL ; - file =hugetlb_file_setup (name,0 ,VM_NORESERVE , &user, + file =hugetlb_file_setup (name,0 ,VM_NORESERVE , &ucounts,HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE , (flags >>MFD_HUGE_SHIFT ) &MFD_HUGE_MASK );
mm/mlock.c +15 -8
@@ -818,9 +818,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(munlockall)*/ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (shmlock_user_lock); -int user_shm_lock (size_t size,struct user_struct *user) +int user_shm_lock (size_t size,struct ucounts *ucounts) {unsigned long lock_limit, locked; +bool overlimit;int allowed =0 ; locked = (size +PAGE_SIZE -1 ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -829,21 +830,27 @@ int user_shm_lock(size_t size, struct user_struct *user) allowed =1 ; lock_limit >>=PAGE_SHIFT ;spin_lock (&shmlock_user_lock); -if (!allowed && - locked + user->locked_shm > lock_limit && !capable (CAP_IPC_LOCK )) + overlimit =inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test (ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK , + locked, lock_limit); + +if (!allowed && overlimit && !capable (CAP_IPC_LOCK )) { +dec_rlimit_ucounts (ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK , locked); + goto out; + } +if (!get_ucounts (ucounts)) { +dec_rlimit_ucounts (ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK , locked); goto out; -get_uid (user); - user->locked_shm += locked; + } allowed =1 ; out:spin_unlock (&shmlock_user_lock);return allowed; } -void user_shm_unlock (size_t size,struct user_struct *user) +void user_shm_unlock (size_t size,struct ucounts *ucounts) {spin_lock (&shmlock_user_lock); - user->locked_shm -= (size +PAGE_SIZE -1 ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; +dec_rlimit_ucounts (ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK , (size +PAGE_SIZE -1 ) >>PAGE_SHIFT );spin_unlock (&shmlock_user_lock); -free_uid (user); +put_ucounts (ucounts); }
mm/mmap.c +2 -2
@@ -1607,7 +1607,7 @@ unsigned long ksys_mmap_pgoff(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, goto out_fput; } }else if (flags &MAP_HUGETLB ) { -struct user_struct *user =NULL ; +struct ucounts *ucounts =NULL ;struct hstate *hs; hs =hstate_sizelog ((flags >>MAP_HUGE_SHIFT ) &MAP_HUGE_MASK );
@@ -1623,7 +1623,7 @@ unsigned long ksys_mmap_pgoff(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,*/ file =hugetlb_file_setup (HUGETLB_ANON_FILE , len,VM_NORESERVE , - &user,HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE , + &ucounts,HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE , (flags >>MAP_HUGE_SHIFT ) &MAP_HUGE_MASK );if (IS_ERR (file))return PTR_ERR (file);
mm/shmem.c +4 -4
@@ -2225,7 +2225,7 @@ static struct mempolicy *shmem_get_policy(struct vm_area_struct *vma, }#endif -int shmem_lock (struct file *file,int lock,struct user_struct *user) +int shmem_lock (struct file *file,int lock,struct ucounts *ucounts) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct shmem_inode_info *info =SHMEM_I (inode);
@@ -2237,13 +2237,13 @@ int shmem_lock(struct file *file, int lock, struct user_struct *user)* no serialization needed when called from shm_destroy(). */ if (lock && !(info->flags &VM_LOCKED )) { -if (!user_shm_lock (inode->i_size, user)) +if (!user_shm_lock (inode->i_size, ucounts)) goto out_nomem; info->flags |=VM_LOCKED ;mapping_set_unevictable (file->f_mapping); } -if (!lock && (info->flags &VM_LOCKED ) && user) { -user_shm_unlock (inode->i_size, user); +if (!lock && (info->flags &VM_LOCKED ) && ucounts) { +user_shm_unlock (inode->i_size, ucounts); info->flags &= ~VM_LOCKED ;mapping_clear_unevictable (file->f_mapping); }
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2.29.2 _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
PATCH v8 8/8 kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
In reply to Alexey GladkovThe testcase runs few instances of the program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 from user uid=60000, in different user namespaces.
--- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/Makefile | 6 + tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/config | 1 + .../selftests/rlimits/rlimits-per-userns.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 171 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/config create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/rlimits-per-userns.c
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ TARGETS += proc TARGETS += pstore TARGETS += ptrace TARGETS += openat2 +TARGETS += rlimits TARGETS += rseq TARGETS += rtc TARGETS += seccomp
tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/.gitignore new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +rlimits-per-userns
tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/Makefile new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 -g +TEST_GEN_PROGS := rlimits-per-userns + +include ../lib.mk
tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/config new file +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_USER_NS=y
tools/testing/selftests/rlimits/rlimits-per-userns.c new file +161 -0
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2.29.2 _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers