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5.10.26-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 7 participants 169 messages Mar 22, 2021 – Mar 24, 2021 Page 2 of 2

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author maintainer
#143 lore raw

PATCH 134/157 iio: hid-sensor-temperature: Fix issues of timestamp channel

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Xiang <[email protected]>

commit 141e7633aa4d2838d1f6ad5c74cccc53547c16ac upstream.

This patch fixes 2 issues of timestamp channel:
1. This patch ensures that there is sufficient space and correct alignment for the timestamp.
2. Correct the timestamp channel scan index.

---
 drivers/iio/temperature/hid-sensor-temperature.c |   14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/temperature/hid-sensor-temperature.c +8 -6
@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@
 struct temperature_state {
 	struct hid_sensor_common common_attributes;
 	struct hid_sensor_hub_attribute_info temperature_attr;
-	s32 temperature_data;
+	struct {
+		s32 temperature_data;
+		u64 timestamp __aligned(8);
+	} scan;
 	int scale_pre_decml;
 	int scale_post_decml;
 	int scale_precision;
@@ -32,7 +35,7 @@ static const struct iio_chan_spec temper
 			BIT(IIO_CHAN_INFO_SAMP_FREQ) |
 			BIT(IIO_CHAN_INFO_HYSTERESIS),
 	},
-	IIO_CHAN_SOFT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+	IIO_CHAN_SOFT_TIMESTAMP(1),
 };
 
 /* Adjust channel real bits based on report descriptor */
@@ -123,9 +126,8 @@ static int temperature_proc_event(struct
 	struct temperature_state *temp_st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 
 	if (atomic_read(&temp_st->common_attributes.data_ready))
-		iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev,
-				&temp_st->temperature_data,
-				iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev));
+		iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, &temp_st->scan,
+						   iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev));
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -140,7 +142,7 @@ static int temperature_capture_sample(st
 
 	switch (usage_id) {
 	case HID_USAGE_SENSOR_DATA_ENVIRONMENTAL_TEMPERATURE:
-		temp_st->temperature_data = *(s32 *)raw_data;
+		temp_st->scan.temperature_data = *(s32 *)raw_data;
 		return 0;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
author maintainer
#144 lore raw

PATCH 135/157 counter: stm32-timer-cnt: fix ceiling write max value

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Fabrice Gasnier <[email protected]>

commit e4c3e133294c0a292d21073899b05ebf530169bd upstream.

The ceiling value isn't checked before writing it into registers. The user could write a value higher than the counter resolution (e.g. 16 or 32 bits indicated by max_arr). This makes most significant bits to be truncated. Fix it by checking the max_arr to report a range error [1] to the user.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/2/12/358

---
 drivers/counter/stm32-timer-cnt.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/counter/stm32-timer-cnt.c +5 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ struct stm32_timer_cnt {
 	struct regmap *regmap;
 	struct clk *clk;
 	u32 ceiling;
+	u32 max_arr;
 	bool enabled;
 	struct stm32_timer_regs bak;
 };
@@ -191,6 +192,9 @@ static ssize_t stm32_count_ceiling_write
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	if (ceiling > priv->max_arr)
+		return -ERANGE;
+
 	/* TIMx_ARR register shouldn't be buffered (ARPE=0) */
 	regmap_update_bits(priv->regmap, TIM_CR1, TIM_CR1_ARPE, 0);
 	regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, ceiling);
@@ -371,6 +375,7 @@ static int stm32_timer_cnt_probe(struct
 	priv->regmap = ddata->regmap;
 	priv->clk = ddata->clk;
 	priv->ceiling = ddata->max_arr;
+	priv->max_arr = ddata->max_arr;
 
 	priv->counter.name = dev_name(dev);
 	priv->counter.parent = dev;
author maintainer
#145 lore raw

PATCH 136/157 counter: stm32-timer-cnt: fix ceiling miss-alignment with reload register

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Fabrice Gasnier <[email protected]>

commit b14d72ac731753708a7c1a6b3657b9312b6f0042 upstream.

Ceiling value may be miss-aligned with what's actually configured into the ARR register. This is seen after probe as currently the ARR value is zero, whereas ceiling value is set to the maximum. So:
- reading ceiling reports zero
- in case the counter gets enabled without any prior configuration, it won't count.
- in case the function gets set by the user 1st, (priv->ceiling) is used.

Fix it by getting rid of the cached "priv->ceiling" variable. Rather use the ARR register value directly by using regmap read or write when needed. There should be no drawback on performance as priv->ceiling isn't used in performance critical path.
There's also no point in writing ARR while setting function (sms), so it can be safely removed.

---
 drivers/counter/stm32-timer-cnt.c |   11 +++--------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/counter/stm32-timer-cnt.c +3 -8
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ struct stm32_timer_cnt {
 	struct counter_device counter;
 	struct regmap *regmap;
 	struct clk *clk;
-	u32 ceiling;
 	u32 max_arr;
 	bool enabled;
 	struct stm32_timer_regs bak;
@@ -75,8 +74,10 @@ static int stm32_count_write(struct coun
 			     const unsigned long val)
 {
 	struct stm32_timer_cnt *const priv = counter->priv;
+	u32 ceiling;
 
-	if (val > priv->ceiling)
+	regmap_read(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, &ceiling);
+	if (val > ceiling)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_CNT, val);
@@ -138,10 +139,6 @@ static int stm32_count_function_set(stru
 
 	regmap_update_bits(priv->regmap, TIM_CR1, TIM_CR1_CEN, 0);
 
-	/* TIMx_ARR register shouldn't be buffered (ARPE=0) */
-	regmap_update_bits(priv->regmap, TIM_CR1, TIM_CR1_ARPE, 0);
-	regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, priv->ceiling);
-
 	regmap_update_bits(priv->regmap, TIM_SMCR, TIM_SMCR_SMS, sms);
 
 	/* Make sure that registers are updated */
@@ -199,7 +196,6 @@ static ssize_t stm32_count_ceiling_write
 	regmap_update_bits(priv->regmap, TIM_CR1, TIM_CR1_ARPE, 0);
 	regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, ceiling);
 
-	priv->ceiling = ceiling;
 	return len;
 }
 
@@ -374,7 +370,6 @@ static int stm32_timer_cnt_probe(struct
 
 	priv->regmap = ddata->regmap;
 	priv->clk = ddata->clk;
-	priv->ceiling = ddata->max_arr;
 	priv->max_arr = ddata->max_arr;
 
 	priv->counter.name = dev_name(dev);
author maintainer
#146 lore raw

PATCH 137/157 PCI: rpadlpar: Fix potential drc_name corruption in store functions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>

commit cc7a0bb058b85ea03db87169c60c7cfdd5d34678 upstream.

Both add_slot_store() and remove_slot_store() try to fix up the drc_name copied from the store buffer by placing a NUL terminator at nbyte + 1 or in place of a '\n' if present. However, the static buffer that we copy the drc_name data into is not zeroed and can contain anything past the n-th byte.

This is problematic if a '\n' byte appears in that buffer after nbytes and the string copied into the store buffer was not NUL terminated to start with as the strchr() search for a '\n' byte will mark this incorrectly as the end of the drc_name string resulting in a drc_name string that contains garbage data after the n-th byte.

Additionally it will cause us to overwrite that '\n' byte on the stack with NUL, potentially corrupting data on the stack.

The following debugging shows an example of the drmgr utility writing "PHB 4543" to the add_slot sysfs attribute, but add_slot_store() logging a corrupted string value.

drmgr: drmgr: -c phb -a -s PHB 4543 -d 1
add_slot_store: drc_name = PHB 4543°|<82>!, rc = -19

Fix this by using strscpy() instead of memcpy() to ensure the string is NUL terminated when copied into the static drc_name buffer. Further, since the string is now NUL terminated the code only needs to change '\n' to '\0' when present.

[mpe: Reformat change log and add mention of possible stack corruption]
---
 drivers/pci/hotplug/rpadlpar_sysfs.c |   14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/hotplug/rpadlpar_sysfs.c +6 -8
@@ -34,12 +34,11 @@ static ssize_t add_slot_store(struct kob
 	if (nbytes >= MAX_DRC_NAME_LEN)
 		return 0;
 
-	memcpy(drc_name, buf, nbytes);
+	strscpy(drc_name, buf, nbytes + 1);
 
 	end = strchr(drc_name, '\n');
-	if (!end)
-		end = &drc_name[nbytes];
-	*end = '\0';
+	if (end)
+		*end = '\0';
 
 	rc = dlpar_add_slot(drc_name);
 	if (rc)
@@ -65,12 +64,11 @@ static ssize_t remove_slot_store(struct
 	if (nbytes >= MAX_DRC_NAME_LEN)
 		return 0;
 
-	memcpy(drc_name, buf, nbytes);
+	strscpy(drc_name, buf, nbytes + 1);
 
 	end = strchr(drc_name, '\n');
-	if (!end)
-		end = &drc_name[nbytes];
-	*end = '\0';
+	if (end)
+		*end = '\0';
 
 	rc = dlpar_remove_slot(drc_name);
 	if (rc)
author maintainer
#147 lore raw

PATCH 138/157 perf/x86/intel: Fix a crash caused by zero PEBS status

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kan Liang <[email protected]>

commit d88d05a9e0b6d9356e97129d4ff9942d765f46ea upstream.

A repeatable crash can be triggered by the perf_fuzzer on some Haswell system.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

For some old CPUs (HSW and earlier), the PEBS status in a PEBS record may be mistakenly set to 0. To minimize the impact of the defect, the commit was introduced to try to avoid dropping the PEBS record for some cases. It adds a check in the intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(), and updates the local pebs_status accordingly. However, it doesn't correct the PEBS status in the PEBS record, which may trigger the crash, especially for the large PEBS.

It's possible that all the PEBS records in a large PEBS have the PEBS status 0. If so, the first get_next_pebs_record_by_bit() in the __intel_pmu_pebs_event() returns NULL. The at = NULL. Since it's a large PEBS, the 'count' parameter must > 1. The second get_next_pebs_record_by_bit() will crash.

Besides the local pebs_status, correct the PEBS status in the PEBS record as well.

---
 arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +1 -1
@@ -1894,7 +1894,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(str
 		 */
 		if (!pebs_status && cpuc->pebs_enabled &&
 			!(cpuc->pebs_enabled & (cpuc->pebs_enabled-1)))
-			pebs_status = cpuc->pebs_enabled;
+			pebs_status = p->status = cpuc->pebs_enabled;
 
 		bit = find_first_bit((unsigned long *)&pebs_status,
 					x86_pmu.max_pebs_events);
author maintainer
#148 lore raw

PATCH 139/157 perf/x86/intel: Fix unchecked MSR access error caused by VLBR_EVENT

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kan Liang <[email protected]>

commit 2dc0572f2cef87425147658698dce2600b799bd3 upstream.

On a Haswell machine, the perf_fuzzer managed to trigger this message:

[117248.075892] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x3f1 (tried to
write 0x0400000000000000) at rIP: 0xffffffff8106e4f4
(native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
[117248.089957] Call Trace:
[117248.092685]  intel_pmu_pebs_enable_all+0x31/0x40
[117248.097737]  intel_pmu_enable_all+0xa/0x10
[117248.102210]  __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x2df/0x2f0
[117248.107511]  finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x15f/0x280
[117248.112765]  schedule_tail+0xc/0x40
[117248.116562]  ret_from_fork+0x8/0x30

A fake event called VLBR_EVENT may use the bit 58 of the PEBS_ENABLE, if the precise_ip is set. The bit 58 is reserved by the HW. Accessing the bit causes the unchecked MSR access error.

The fake event doesn't support PEBS. The case should be rejected.

Fixes 097e4311cda9 ("perf/x86: Add constraint to create guest LBR event without hw counter")
---
 arch/x86/events/intel/core.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +3 -0
@@ -3562,6 +3562,9 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct pe
 		return ret;
 
 	if (event->attr.precise_ip) {
+		if ((event->attr.config & INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK) == INTEL_FIXED_VLBR_EVENT)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		if (!(event->attr.freq || (event->attr.wakeup_events && !event->attr.watermark))) {
 			event->hw.flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_AUTO_RELOAD;
 			if (!(event->attr.sample_type &
author maintainer
#149 lore raw

PATCH 140/157 x86/ioapic: Ignore IRQ2 again

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

commit a501b048a95b79e1e34f03cac3c87ff1e9f229ad upstream.

Vitaly ran into an issue with hotplugging CPU0 on an Amazon instance where the matrix allocator claimed to be out of vectors. He analyzed it down to the point that IRQ2, the PIC cascade interrupt, which is supposed to be not ever routed to the IO/APIC ended up having an interrupt vector assigned which got moved during unplug of CPU0.

The underlying issue is that IRQ2 for various reasons (see commit af174783b925 ("x86: I/O APIC: Never configure IRQ2" for details) is treated as a reserved system vector by the vector core code and is not accounted as a regular vector. The Amazon BIOS has an routing entry of pin2 to IRQ2 which causes the IO/APIC setup to claim that interrupt which is granted by the vector domain because there is no sanity check. As a consequence the allocation counter of CPU0 underflows which causes a subsequent unplug to fail with:

[ ... ] CPU 0 has 4294967295 vectors, 589 available. Cannot disable CPU

There is another sanity check missing in the matrix allocator, but the underlying root cause is that the IO/APIC code lost the IRQ2 ignore logic during the conversion to irqdomains.

For almost 6 years nobody complained about this wreckage, which might indicate that this requirement could be lifted, but for any system which actually has a PIC IRQ2 is unusable by design so any routing entry has no effect and the interrupt cannot be connected to a device anyway.

Due to that and due to history biased paranoia reasons restore the IRQ2 ignore logic and treat it as non existent despite a routing entry claiming otherwise.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +10 -0
@@ -1033,6 +1033,16 @@ static int mp_map_pin_to_irq(u32 gsi, in
 	if (idx >= 0 && test_bit(mp_irqs[idx].srcbus, mp_bus_not_pci)) {
 		irq = mp_irqs[idx].srcbusirq;
 		legacy = mp_is_legacy_irq(irq);
+		/*
+		 * IRQ2 is unusable for historical reasons on systems which
+		 * have a legacy PIC. See the comment vs. IRQ2 further down.
+		 *
+		 * If this gets removed at some point then the related code
+		 * in lapic_assign_system_vectors() needs to be adjusted as
+		 * well.
+		 */
+		if (legacy && irq == PIC_CASCADE_IR)
+			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&ioapic_mutex);
author maintainer
#150 lore raw

PATCH 141/157 kernel, fs: Introduce and use set_restart_fn() and arch_set_restart_data()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>

commit 5abbe51a526253b9f003e9a0a195638dc882d660 upstream.

Preparation for fixing get_nr_restart_syscall() on X86 for COMPAT.

Add a new helper which sets restart_block->fn and calls a dummy arch_set_restart_data() helper.

Fixes 609c19a385c8 ("x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code")
---
 fs/select.c                    |   10 ++++------
 include/linux/thread_info.h    |   13 +++++++++++++
 kernel/futex.c                 |    3 +--
 kernel/time/alarmtimer.c       |    2 +-
 kernel/time/hrtimer.c          |    2 +-
 kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c |    2 +-
 6 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/select.c +4 -6
@@ -1055,10 +1055,9 @@ static long do_restart_poll(struct resta
 
 	ret = do_sys_poll(ufds, nfds, to);
 
-	if (ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND) {
-		restart_block->fn = do_restart_poll;
-		ret = -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
-	}
+	if (ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND)
+		ret = set_restart_fn(restart_block, do_restart_poll);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1080,7 +1079,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(poll, struct pollfd __us
 		struct restart_block *restart_block;
 
 		restart_block = &current->restart_block;
-		restart_block->fn = do_restart_poll;
 		restart_block->poll.ufds = ufds;
 		restart_block->poll.nfds = nfds;
 
@@ -1091,7 +1089,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(poll, struct pollfd __us
 		} else
 			restart_block->poll.has_timeout = 0;
 
-		ret = -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
+		ret = set_restart_fn(restart_block, do_restart_poll);
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
include/linux/thread_info.h +13 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <linux/restart_block.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
 /*
@@ -39,6 +40,18 @@ enum {
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 
+#ifndef arch_set_restart_data
+#define arch_set_restart_data(restart) do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
+static inline long set_restart_fn(struct restart_block *restart,
+					long (*fn)(struct restart_block *))
+{
+	restart->fn = fn;
+	arch_set_restart_data(restart);
+	return -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
+}
+
 #ifndef THREAD_ALIGN
 #define THREAD_ALIGN	THREAD_SIZE
 #endif
kernel/futex.c +1 -2
@@ -2730,14 +2730,13 @@ retry:
 		goto out;
 
 	restart = &current->restart_block;
-	restart->fn = futex_wait_restart;
 	restart->futex.uaddr = uaddr;
 	restart->futex.val = val;
 	restart->futex.time = *abs_time;
 	restart->futex.bitset = bitset;
 	restart->futex.flags = flags | FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT;
 
-	ret = -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
+	ret = set_restart_fn(restart, futex_wait_restart);
 
 out:
 	if (to) {
kernel/time/alarmtimer.c +1 -1
@@ -848,9 +848,9 @@ static int alarm_timer_nsleep(const cloc
 	if (flags == TIMER_ABSTIME)
 		return -ERESTARTNOHAND;
 
-	restart->fn = alarm_timer_nsleep_restart;
 	restart->nanosleep.clockid = type;
 	restart->nanosleep.expires = exp;
+	set_restart_fn(restart, alarm_timer_nsleep_restart);
 	return ret;
 }
 
kernel/time/hrtimer.c +1 -1
@@ -1957,9 +1957,9 @@ long hrtimer_nanosleep(ktime_t rqtp, con
 	}
 
 	restart = &current->restart_block;
-	restart->fn = hrtimer_nanosleep_restart;
 	restart->nanosleep.clockid = t.timer.base->clockid;
 	restart->nanosleep.expires = hrtimer_get_expires_tv64(&t.timer);
+	set_restart_fn(restart, hrtimer_nanosleep_restart);
 out:
 	destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&t.timer);
 	return ret;
kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c +1 -1
@@ -1480,8 +1480,8 @@ static int posix_cpu_nsleep(const clocki
 		if (flags & TIMER_ABSTIME)
 			return -ERESTARTNOHAND;
 
-		restart_block->fn = posix_cpu_nsleep_restart;
 		restart_block->nanosleep.clockid = which_clock;
+		set_restart_fn(restart_block, posix_cpu_nsleep_restart);
 	}
 	return error;
 }
author maintainer
#151 lore raw

PATCH 142/157 x86: Move TS_COMPAT back to asm/thread_info.h

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>

commit 66c1b6d74cd7035e85c426f0af4aede19e805c8a upstream.

Move TS_COMPAT back to asm/thread_info.h, close to TS_I386_REGS_POKED.

It was moved to asm/processor.h by b9d989c7218a ("x86/asm: Move the thread_info::status field to thread_struct"), then later 37a8f7c38339 ("x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info") moved the 'status' field back but TS_COMPAT was forgotten.

Preparatory patch to fix the COMPAT case for get_nr_restart_syscall()

Fixes 609c19a385c8 ("x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code")
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h   |    9 ---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |    9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +0 -9
@@ -552,15 +552,6 @@ static inline void arch_thread_struct_wh
 	*size = fpu_kernel_xstate_size;
 }
 
-/*
- * Thread-synchronous status.
- *
- * This is different from the flags in that nobody else
- * ever touches our thread-synchronous status, so we don't
- * have to worry about atomic accesses.
- */
-#define TS_COMPAT		0x0002	/* 32bit syscall active (64BIT)*/
-
 static inline void
 native_load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
 {
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +9 -0
@@ -216,6 +216,15 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_fram
 
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * Thread-synchronous status.
+ *
+ * This is different from the flags in that nobody else
+ * ever touches our thread-synchronous status, so we don't
+ * have to worry about atomic accesses.
+ */
+#define TS_COMPAT		0x0002	/* 32bit syscall active (64BIT)*/
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 #define TS_I386_REGS_POKED	0x0004	/* regs poked by 32-bit ptracer */
 #endif
author maintainer
#152 lore raw

PATCH 143/157 x86: Introduce TS_COMPAT_RESTART to fix get_nr_restart_syscall()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>

commit 8c150ba2fb5995c84a7a43848250d444a3329a7d upstream.

The comment in get_nr_restart_syscall() says:

* The problem is that we can get here when ptrace pokes
* syscall-like values into regs even if we're not in a syscall
* at all.

Yes, but if not in a syscall then the

	status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)

check below can't really help:

- TS_COMPAT can't be set

- TS_I386_REGS_POKED is only set if regs->orig_ax was changed by 32bit debugger; and even in this case get_nr_restart_syscall() is only correct if the tracee is 32bit too.

Suppose that a 64bit debugger plays with a 32bit tracee and

* Tracee calls sleep(2) // TS_COMPAT is set
* User interrupts the tracee by CTRL-C after 1 sec and does "(gdb) call func()"
* gdb saves the regs by PTRACE_GETREGS
* does PTRACE_SETREGS to set %rip='func' and %orig_rax=-1
* PTRACE_CONT // TS_COMPAT is cleared
* func() hits int3.
* Debugger catches SIGTRAP.
* Restore original regs by PTRACE_SETREGS.
* PTRACE_CONT

get_nr_restart_syscall() wrongly returns __NR_restart_syscall==219, the tracee calls ia32_sys_call_table[219] == sys_madvise.

Add the sticky TS_COMPAT_RESTART flag which survives after return to user mode. It's going to be removed in the next step again by storing the information in the restart block. As a further cleanup it might be possible to remove also TS_I386_REGS_POKED with that.

Test-case:

  $ cvs -d :pserver:anoncvs:[email protected]:/cvs/systemtap co ptrace-tests
  $ gcc -o erestartsys-trap-debuggee ptrace-tests/tests/erestartsys-trap-debuggee.c --m32
  $ gcc -o erestartsys-trap-debugger ptrace-tests/tests/erestartsys-trap-debugger.c -lutil
  $ ./erestartsys-trap-debugger
  Unexpected: retval 1, errno 22
  erestartsys-trap-debugger: ptrace-tests/tests/erestartsys-trap-debugger.c:421
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |   14 +++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c           |   24 +-----------------------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +13 -1
@@ -225,10 +225,22 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_fram
  */
 #define TS_COMPAT		0x0002	/* 32bit syscall active (64BIT)*/
 
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 #define TS_I386_REGS_POKED	0x0004	/* regs poked by 32-bit ptracer */
+#define TS_COMPAT_RESTART	0x0008
+
+#define arch_set_restart_data	arch_set_restart_data
+
+static inline void arch_set_restart_data(struct restart_block *restart)
+{
+	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
+	if (ti->status & TS_COMPAT)
+		ti->status |= TS_COMPAT_RESTART;
+	else
+		ti->status &= ~TS_COMPAT_RESTART;
+}
 #endif
-#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 #define in_ia32_syscall() true
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +1 -23
@@ -766,30 +766,8 @@ handle_signal(struct ksignal *ksig, stru
 
 static inline unsigned long get_nr_restart_syscall(const struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	/*
-	 * This function is fundamentally broken as currently
-	 * implemented.
-	 *
-	 * The idea is that we want to trigger a call to the
-	 * restart_block() syscall and that we want in_ia32_syscall(),
-	 * in_x32_syscall(), etc. to match whatever they were in the
-	 * syscall being restarted.  We assume that the syscall
-	 * instruction at (regs->ip - 2) matches whatever syscall
-	 * instruction we used to enter in the first place.
-	 *
-	 * The problem is that we can get here when ptrace pokes
-	 * syscall-like values into regs even if we're not in a syscall
-	 * at all.
-	 *
-	 * For now, we maintain historical behavior and guess based on
-	 * stored state.  We could do better by saving the actual
-	 * syscall arch in restart_block or (with caveats on x32) by
-	 * checking if regs->ip points to 'int $0x80'.  The current
-	 * behavior is incorrect if a tracer has a different bitness
-	 * than the tracee.
-	 */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
-	if (current_thread_info()->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))
+	if (current_thread_info()->status & TS_COMPAT_RESTART)
 		return __NR_ia32_restart_syscall;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
author maintainer
#153 lore raw

PATCH 144/157 efivars: respect EFI_UNSUPPORTED return from firmware

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shawn Guo <[email protected]>

commit 483028edacab374060d93955382b4865a9e07cba upstream.

As per UEFI spec 2.8B section 8.2, EFI_UNSUPPORTED may be returned by EFI variable runtime services if no variable storage is supported by firmware. In this case, there is no point for kernel to continue efivars initialization. That said, efivar_init() should fail by returning an error code, so that efivarfs will not be mounted on /sys/firmware/efi/efivars at all. Otherwise, user space like efibootmgr will be confused by the EFIVARFS_MAGIC seen there, while EFI variable calls cannot be made successfully.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +4 -0
@@ -485,6 +485,10 @@ int efivar_init(int (*func)(efi_char16_t
 			}
 
 			break;
+		case EFI_UNSUPPORTED:
+			err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+			break;
 		case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
 			break;
 		default:
author maintainer
#154 lore raw

PATCH 145/157 ext4: fix error handling in ext4_end_enable_verity()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit f053cf7aa66cd9d592b0fc967f4d887c2abff1b7 upstream.

ext4 didn't properly clean up if verity failed to be enabled on a file:

- It left verity metadata (pages past EOF) in the page cache, which would be exposed to userspace if the file was later extended.

- It didn't truncate the verity metadata at all (either from cache or from disk) if an error occurred while setting the verity bit.

Fix these bugs by adding a call to truncate_inode_pages() and ensuring that we truncate the verity metadata (both from cache and from disk) in all error paths. Also rework the code to cleanly separate the success path from the error paths, which makes it much easier to understand.

---
 fs/ext4/verity.c |   93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/verity.c +57 -36
@@ -201,55 +201,76 @@ static int ext4_end_enable_verity(struct
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
 	const int credits = 2; /* superblock and inode for ext4_orphan_del() */
 	handle_t *handle;
+	struct ext4_iloc iloc;
 	int err = 0;
-	int err2;
 
-	if (desc != NULL) {
-		/* Succeeded; write the verity descriptor. */
-		err = ext4_write_verity_descriptor(inode, desc, desc_size,
-						   merkle_tree_size);
-
-		/* Write all pages before clearing VERITY_IN_PROGRESS. */
-		if (!err)
-			err = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
-	}
+	/*
+	 * If an error already occurred (which fs/verity/ signals by passing
+	 * desc == NULL), then only clean-up is needed.
+	 */
+	if (desc == NULL)
+		goto cleanup;
 
-	/* If we failed, truncate anything we wrote past i_size. */
-	if (desc == NULL || err)
-		ext4_truncate(inode);
+	/* Append the verity descriptor. */
+	err = ext4_write_verity_descriptor(inode, desc, desc_size,
+					   merkle_tree_size);
+	if (err)
+		goto cleanup;
 
 	/*
-	 * We must always clean up by clearing EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS and
-	 * deleting the inode from the orphan list, even if something failed.
-	 * If everything succeeded, we'll also set the verity bit in the same
-	 * transaction.
+	 * Write all pages (both data and verity metadata).  Note that this must
+	 * happen before clearing EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS; otherwise pages
+	 * beyond i_size won't be written properly.  For crash consistency, this
+	 * also must happen before the verity inode flag gets persisted.
 	 */
+	err = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
+	if (err)
+		goto cleanup;
 
-	ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
+	/*
+	 * Finally, set the verity inode flag and remove the inode from the
+	 * orphan list (in a single transaction).
+	 */
 
 	handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_INODE, credits);
 	if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
-		ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
-		return PTR_ERR(handle);
+		err = PTR_ERR(handle);
+		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-	err2 = ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
-	if (err2)
-		goto out_stop;
-
-	if (desc != NULL && !err) {
-		struct ext4_iloc iloc;
-
-		err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
-		if (err)
-			goto out_stop;
-		ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_VERITY);
-		ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
-		err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
-	}
-out_stop:
+	err = ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
+	if (err)
+		goto stop_and_cleanup;
+
+	err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
+	if (err)
+		goto stop_and_cleanup;
+
+	ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_VERITY);
+	ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
+	err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
+	if (err)
+		goto stop_and_cleanup;
+
 	ext4_journal_stop(handle);
-	return err ?: err2;
+
+	ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
+	return 0;
+
+stop_and_cleanup:
+	ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+cleanup:
+	/*
+	 * Verity failed to be enabled, so clean up by truncating any verity
+	 * metadata that was written beyond i_size (both from cache and from
+	 * disk), removing the inode from the orphan list (if it wasn't done
+	 * already), and clearing EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS.
+	 */
+	truncate_inode_pages(inode->i_mapping, inode->i_size);
+	ext4_truncate(inode);
+	ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
+	ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int ext4_get_verity_descriptor_location(struct inode *inode,
author maintainer
#155 lore raw

PATCH 146/157 ext4: find old entry again if failed to rename whiteout

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>

commit b7ff91fd030dc9d72ed91b1aab36e445a003af4f upstream.

If we failed to add new entry on rename whiteout, we cannot reset the old->de entry directly, because the old->de could have moved from under us during make indexed dir. So find the old entry again before reset is needed, otherwise it may corrupt the filesystem as below.

/dev/sda: Entry '00000001' in ??? (12) has deleted/unused inode 15. CLEARED. /dev/sda: Unattached inode 75
/dev/sda: UNEXPECTED INCONSISTENCY; RUN fsck MANUALLY.

Fixes 6b4b8e6b4ad ("ext4: fix bug for rename with RENAME_WHITEOUT")
---
 fs/ext4/namei.c |   29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/namei.c +27 -2
@@ -3604,6 +3604,31 @@ static int ext4_setent(handle_t *handle,
 	return retval;
 }
 
+static void ext4_resetent(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent,
+			  unsigned ino, unsigned file_type)
+{
+	struct ext4_renament old = *ent;
+	int retval = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * old->de could have moved from under us during make indexed dir,
+	 * so the old->de may no longer valid and need to find it again
+	 * before reset old inode info.
+	 */
+	old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, &old.de, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(old.bh))
+		retval = PTR_ERR(old.bh);
+	if (!old.bh)
+		retval = -ENOENT;
+	if (retval) {
+		ext4_std_error(old.dir->i_sb, retval);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ext4_setent(handle, &old, ino, file_type);
+	brelse(old.bh);
+}
+
 static int ext4_find_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir,
 				  const struct qstr *d_name)
 {
@@ -3926,8 +3951,8 @@ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old
 end_rename:
 	if (whiteout) {
 		if (retval) {
-			ext4_setent(handle, &old,
-				old.inode->i_ino, old_file_type);
+			ext4_resetent(handle, &old,
+				      old.inode->i_ino, old_file_type);
 			drop_nlink(whiteout);
 		}
 		unlock_new_inode(whiteout);
author maintainer
#156 lore raw

PATCH 147/157 ext4: stop inode update before return

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Pan Bian <[email protected]>

commit 512c15ef05d73a04f1aef18a3bc61a8bb516f323 upstream.

The inode update should be stopped before returing the error code.

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +3 -1
@@ -5385,8 +5385,10 @@ int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 			inode->i_gid = attr->ia_gid;
 		error = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
 		ext4_journal_stop(handle);
-		if (unlikely(error))
+		if (unlikely(error)) {
+			ext4_fc_stop_update(inode);
 			return error;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
author maintainer
#157 lore raw

PATCH 148/157 ext4: do not try to set xattr into ea_inode if value is empty

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>

commit 6b22489911b726eebbf169caee52fea52013fbdd upstream.

Syzbot report a warning that ext4 may create an empty ea_inode if set an empty extent attribute to a file on the file system which is no free blocks left.

  WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 10667 at fs/ext4/xattr.c:1640 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x10f8/0x1114 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1640
  ...
  Call trace:
   ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x10f8/0x1114 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1640
   ext4_xattr_block_set+0x1d0/0x1b1c fs/ext4/xattr.c:1942
   ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x8a0/0xf1c fs/ext4/xattr.c:2390
   ext4_xattr_set+0x120/0x1f0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2491
   ext4_xattr_trusted_set+0x48/0x5c fs/ext4/xattr_trusted.c:37
   __vfs_setxattr+0x208/0x23c fs/xattr.c:177
  ...

Now, ext4 try to store extent attribute into an external inode if ext4_xattr_block_set() return -ENOSPC, but for the case of store an empty extent attribute, store the extent entry into the extent attribute block is enough. A simple reproduce below.

fallocate test.img -l 1M
mkfs.ext4 -F -b 2048 -O ea_inode test.img
mount test.img /mnt
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/foo bs=2048 count=500
setfattr -n "user.test" /mnt/foo

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -2398,7 +2398,7 @@ retry_inode:
 				 * external inode if possible.
 				 */
 				if (ext4_has_feature_ea_inode(inode->i_sb) &&
-				    !i.in_inode) {
+				    i.value_len && !i.in_inode) {
 					i.in_inode = 1;
 					goto retry_inode;
 				}
author maintainer
#158 lore raw

PATCH 149/157 ext4: fix potential error in ext4_do_update_inode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shijie Luo <[email protected]>

commit 7d8bd3c76da1d94b85e6c9b7007e20e980bfcfe6 upstream.

If set_large_file = 1 and errors occur in ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(), the error code will be overridden, go to out_brelse to avoid this situation.

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +4 -4
@@ -5029,7 +5029,7 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t
 	struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
 	struct buffer_head *bh = iloc->bh;
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
-	int err = 0, rc, block;
+	int err = 0, block;
 	int need_datasync = 0, set_large_file = 0;
 	uid_t i_uid;
 	gid_t i_gid;
@@ -5141,9 +5141,9 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t
 					      bh->b_data);
 
 	BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata");
-	rc = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, bh);
-	if (!err)
-		err = rc;
+	err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, bh);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_brelse;
 	ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NEW);
 	if (set_large_file) {
 		BUFFER_TRACE(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh, "get write access");
author maintainer
#159 lore raw

PATCH 150/157 ext4: fix rename whiteout with fast commit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Harshad Shirwadkar <[email protected]>

commit 8210bb29c1b66200cff7b25febcf6e39baf49fbf upstream.

This patch adds rename whiteout support in fast commits. Note that the whiteout object that gets created is actually char device. Which imples, the function ext4_inode_journal_mode(struct inode *inode) would return "JOURNAL_DATA" for this inode. This has a consequence in fast commit code that it will make creation of the whiteout object a fast-commit ineligible behavior and thus will fall back to full commits. With this patch, this can be observed by running fast commits with rename whiteout and seeing the stats generated by ext4_fc_stats tracepoint as follows:

ext4_fc_stats: dev 254:32 fc ineligible reasons:
XATTR:0, CROSS_RENAME:0, JOURNAL_FLAG_CHANGE:0, NO_MEM:0, SWAP_BOOT:0, RESIZE:0, RENAME_DIR:0, FALLOC_RANGE:0, INODE_JOURNAL_DATA:16; num_commits:6, ineligible: 6, numblks: 3

So in short, this patch guarantees that in case of rename whiteout, we fall back to full commits.

Amir mentioned that instead of creating a new whiteout object for every rename, we can create a static whiteout object with irrelevant nlink. That will make fast commits to not fall back to full commit. But until this happens, this patch will ensure correctness by falling back to full commits.

---
 fs/ext4/ext4.h        |    2 ++
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c |    9 +++++++--
 fs/ext4/namei.c       |    3 +++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ext4.h +2 -0
@@ -2762,6 +2762,8 @@ void __ext4_fc_track_link(handle_t *hand
 	struct dentry *dentry);
 void ext4_fc_track_unlink(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry);
 void ext4_fc_track_link(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry);
+void __ext4_fc_track_create(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
+			    struct dentry *dentry);
 void ext4_fc_track_create(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry);
 void ext4_fc_track_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode);
 void ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(struct super_block *sb, int reason);
fs/ext4/fast_commit.c +7 -2
@@ -452,10 +452,10 @@ void ext4_fc_track_link(handle_t *handle
 	__ext4_fc_track_link(handle, d_inode(dentry), dentry);
 }
 
-void ext4_fc_track_create(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry)
+void __ext4_fc_track_create(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
+			  struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct __track_dentry_update_args args;
-	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
 	int ret;
 
 	args.dentry = dentry;
@@ -466,6 +466,11 @@ void ext4_fc_track_create(handle_t *hand
 	trace_ext4_fc_track_create(inode, dentry, ret);
 }
 
+void ext4_fc_track_create(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	__ext4_fc_track_create(handle, d_inode(dentry), dentry);
+}
+
 /* __track_fn for inode tracking */
 static int __track_inode(struct inode *inode, void *arg, bool update)
 {
fs/ext4/namei.c +3 -0
@@ -3864,6 +3864,7 @@ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old
 		retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, whiteout);
 		if (unlikely(retval))
 			goto end_rename;
+
 	}
 	if (!new.bh) {
 		retval = ext4_add_entry(handle, new.dentry, old.inode);
@@ -3937,6 +3938,8 @@ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old
 			ext4_fc_track_unlink(handle, new.dentry);
 		__ext4_fc_track_link(handle, old.inode, new.dentry);
 		__ext4_fc_track_unlink(handle, old.inode, old.dentry);
+		if (whiteout)
+			__ext4_fc_track_create(handle, whiteout, old.dentry);
 	}
 
 	if (new.inode) {
author maintainer
#160 lore raw

PATCH 151/157 MAINTAINERS: move some real subsystems off of the staging mailing list

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit f8d70fd6a5a7a38a95eb8021e00d2e547f88efec upstream.

The VME and Android drivers still have their MAINTAINERS entries pointing to the "driverdevel" mailing list, due to them having their codebase move out of the drivers/staging/ directory, but no one remembered to change the mailing list entries.

Move them both to linux-kernel for lack of a more specific place at the moment. These are both low-volume areas of the kernel, so this shouldn't be an issue.

Cc Martyn Welch <[email protected]>
Cc Manohar Vanga <[email protected]>
Cc Arve Hjønnevåg <[email protected]>
Cc Todd Kjos <[email protected]>
Cc Martijn Coenen <[email protected]>
Cc Joel Fernandes <[email protected]>
Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc Hridya Valsaraju <[email protected]>
Cc Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
---
 MAINTAINERS |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
MAINTAINERS +2 -2
@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ M:	Joel Fernandes <[email protected]
 M:	Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
 M:	Hridya Valsaraju <[email protected]>
 M:	Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
-L:	[email protected]
+L:	[email protected]
 S:	Supported
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging.git
 F:	drivers/android/
@@ -18705,7 +18705,7 @@ VME SUBSYSTEM
 M:	Martyn Welch <[email protected]>
 M:	Manohar Vanga <[email protected]>
 M:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
-L:	[email protected]
+L:	[email protected]
 S:	Maintained
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
 F:	Documentation/driver-api/vme.rst
author maintainer
#161 lore raw

PATCH 152/157 MAINTAINERS: move the staging subsystem to lists.linux.dev

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit e06da9ea3e3f6746a849edeae1d09ee821f5c2ce upstream.

The drivers/staging/ tree has a new mailing list, [email protected], so move the MAINTAINER entry to point to it so that we get patches sent to the proper place.

There was no need to specify a list for the hikey9xx driver, the tools pick up the "base" list for drivers/staging/* so remove that line to make the file simpler.

---
 MAINTAINERS |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
MAINTAINERS +1 -2
@@ -8001,7 +8001,6 @@ F:	drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_mai
 
 HISILICON STAGING DRIVERS FOR HIKEY 960/970
 M:	Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
-L:	[email protected]
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/staging/hikey9xx/
 
@@ -16665,7 +16664,7 @@ F:	drivers/staging/vt665?/
 
 STAGING SUBSYSTEM
 M:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
-L:	[email protected]
+L:	[email protected]
 S:	Supported
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging.git
 F:	drivers/staging/
author maintainer
#162 lore raw

PATCH 153/157 static_call: Fix static_call_update() sanity check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

commit 38c93587375053c5b9ef093f4a5ea754538cba32 upstream.

Sites that match init_section_contains() get marked as INIT. For built-in code init_sections contains both __init and __exit text. OTOH kernel_text_address() only explicitly includes __init text (and there are no __exit text markers).

Match what jump_label already does and ignore the warning for INIT sites. Also see the excellent changelog for commit: 8f35eaa5f2de ("jump_label: Don't warn on __exit jump entries")

---
 kernel/jump_label.c  |    8 ++++++++
 kernel/static_call.c |   11 ++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/jump_label.c +8 -0
@@ -407,6 +407,14 @@ static bool jump_label_can_update(struct
 		return false;
 
 	if (!kernel_text_address(jump_entry_code(entry))) {
+		/*
+		 * This skips patching built-in __exit, which
+		 * is part of init_section_contains() but is
+		 * not part of kernel_text_address().
+		 *
+		 * Skipping built-in __exit is fine since it
+		 * will never be executed.
+		 */
 		WARN_ONCE(!jump_entry_is_init(entry),
 			  "can't patch jump_label at %pS",
 			  (void *)jump_entry_code(entry));
kernel/static_call.c +10 -1
@@ -182,7 +182,16 @@ void __static_call_update(struct static_
 			}
 
 			if (!kernel_text_address((unsigned long)site_addr)) {
-				WARN_ONCE(1, "can't patch static call site at %pS",
+				/*
+				 * This skips patching built-in __exit, which
+				 * is part of init_section_contains() but is
+				 * not part of kernel_text_address().
+				 *
+				 * Skipping built-in __exit is fine since it
+				 * will never be executed.
+				 */
+				WARN_ONCE(!static_call_is_init(site),
+					  "can't patch static call site at %pS",
 					  site_addr);
 				continue;
 			}
author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 154/157 efi: use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t literals

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

commit fb98cc0b3af2ba4d87301dff2b381b12eee35d7d upstream.

Commit 494c704f9af0 ("efi: Use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t") updated the type definition of efi_guid_t to ensure that it always appears sufficiently aligned (the UEFI spec is ambiguous about this, but given the fact that its EFI_GUID type is defined in terms of a struct carrying a uint32_t, the natural alignment is definitely >= 32 bits).

However, we missed the EFI_GUID() macro which is used to instantiate efi_guid_t literals: that macro is still based on the guid_t type, which does not have a minimum alignment at all. This results in warnings such as

In file included from drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c:35:
include/linux/efi.h:1093:34: warning: passing 1-byte aligned argument to
4-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'get_var' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Walign-mismatch]
status = get_var(L"SecureBoot", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size,
^
include/linux/efi.h:1101:24: warning: passing 1-byte aligned argument to
4-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'get_var' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Walign-mismatch]
get_var(L"SetupMode", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size, &setupmode);

The distinction only matters on CPUs that do not support misaligned loads fully, but 32-bit ARM's load-multiple instructions fall into that category, and these are likely to be emitted by the compiler that built the firmware for loading word-aligned 128-bit GUIDs from memory

So re-implement the initializer in terms of our own efi_guid_t type, so that the alignment becomes a property of the literal's type.

---
 include/linux/efi.h |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/efi.h +4 -2
@@ -72,8 +72,10 @@ typedef void *efi_handle_t;
  */
 typedef guid_t efi_guid_t __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
 
-#define EFI_GUID(a,b,c,d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7) \
-	GUID_INIT(a, b, c, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7)
+#define EFI_GUID(a, b, c, d...) (efi_guid_t){ {					\
+	(a) & 0xff, ((a) >> 8) & 0xff, ((a) >> 16) & 0xff, ((a) >> 24) & 0xff,	\
+	(b) & 0xff, ((b) >> 8) & 0xff,						\
+	(c) & 0xff, ((c) >> 8) & 0xff, d } }
 
 /*
  * Generic EFI table header
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 155/157 firmware/efi: Fix a use after bug in efi_mem_reserve_persistent

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lv Yunlong <[email protected]>

commit 9ceee7d0841a8f7d7644021ba7d4cc1fbc7966e3 upstream.

In the for loop in efi_mem_reserve_persistent(), prsv = rsv->next use the unmapped rsv. Use the unmapped pages will cause segment fault.

Fixes 18df7577adae6 ("efi/memreserve: deal with memreserve entries in unmapped memory")
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +2 -1
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int __ref efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phy
 	}
 
 	/* first try to find a slot in an existing linked list entry */
-	for (prsv = efi_memreserve_root->next; prsv; prsv = rsv->next) {
+	for (prsv = efi_memreserve_root->next; prsv; ) {
 		rsv = memremap(prsv, sizeof(*rsv), MEMREMAP_WB);
 		index = atomic_fetch_add_unless(&rsv->count, 1, rsv->size);
 		if (index < rsv->size) {
@@ -937,6 +937,7 @@ int __ref efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phy
 			memunmap(rsv);
 			return efi_mem_reserve_iomem(addr, size);
 		}
+		prsv = rsv->next;
 		memunmap(rsv);
 	}
 
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 156/157 genirq: Disable interrupts for force threaded handlers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

commit 81e2073c175b887398e5bca6c004efa89983f58d upstream.

With interrupt force threading all device interrupt handlers are invoked from kernel threads. Contrary to hard interrupt context the invocation only disables bottom halfs, but not interrupts. This was an oversight back then because any code like this will have an issue:

thread(irq_A)
irq_handler(A)

    spin_lock(&foo->lock);

interrupt(irq_B)
irq_handler(B)

    spin_lock(&foo->lock);

This has been triggered with networking (NAPI vs. hrtimers) and console drivers where printk() happens from an interrupt which interrupted the force threaded handler.

Now people noticed and started to change the spin_lock() in the handler to spin_lock_irqsave() which affects performance or add IRQF_NOTHREAD to the interrupt request which in turn breaks RT.

Fix the root cause and not the symptom and disable interrupts before invoking the force threaded handler which preserves the regular semantics and the usefulness of the interrupt force threading as a general debugging tool.

For not RT this is not changing much, except that during the execution of the threaded handler interrupts are delayed until the handler returns. Vs. scheduling and softirq processing there is no difference.

For RT kernels there is no issue.

---
 kernel/irq/manage.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
kernel/irq/manage.c +4 -0
@@ -1072,11 +1072,15 @@ irq_forced_thread_fn(struct irq_desc *de
 	irqreturn_t ret;
 
 	local_bh_disable();
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT))
+		local_irq_disable();
 	ret = action->thread_fn(action->irq, action->dev_id);
 	if (ret == IRQ_HANDLED)
 		atomic_inc(&desc->threads_handled);
 
 	irq_finalize_oneshot(desc, action);
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT))
+		local_irq_enable();
 	local_bh_enable();
 	return ret;
 }
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 157/157 x86/apic/of: Fix CPU devicetree-node lookups

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit dd926880da8dbbe409e709c1d3c1620729a94732 upstream.

Architectures that describe the CPU topology in devicetree and do not have an identity mapping between physical and logical CPU ids must override the default implementation of arch_match_cpu_phys_id().

Failing to do so breaks CPU devicetree-node lookups using of_get_cpu_node() and of_cpu_device_node_get() which several drivers rely on. It also causes the CPU struct devices exported through sysfs to point to the wrong devicetree nodes.

On x86, CPUs are described in devicetree using their APIC ids and those do not generally coincide with the logical ids, even if CPU0 typically uses APIC id 0.

Add the missing implementation of arch_match_cpu_phys_id() so that CPU-node lookups work also with SMP.

Apart from fixing the broken sysfs devicetree-node links this likely does not affect current users of mainline kernels on x86.

Fixes 4e07db9c8db8 ("x86/devicetree: Use CPU description from Device Tree")
---
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +5 -0
@@ -2317,6 +2317,11 @@ static int cpuid_to_apicid[] = {
 	[0 ... NR_CPUS - 1] = -1,
 };
 
+bool arch_match_cpu_phys_id(int cpu, u64 phys_id)
+{
+	return phys_id == cpuid_to_apicid[cpu];
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 /**
  * apic_id_is_primary_thread - Check whether APIC ID belongs to a primary thread
#167 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.26 release. There are 157 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 24 Mar 2021 12:19:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.26-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

mipc tinyconfig and allnoconfig builds failed on stable-rc 5.10 branch

make --silent --keep-going --jobs=8 O=/home/tuxbuild/.cache/tuxmake/builds/1/tmp ARCH=mips CROSS_COMPILE=mips-linux-gnu- 'CC=sccache mips-linux-gnu-gcc' 'HOSTCC=sccache gcc'
WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(.text+0x6a88): Section mismatch in reference from the function reserve_exception_space() to the function .meminit.text:memblock_reserve()
The function reserve_exception_space() references
the function __meminit memblock_reserve().
This is often because reserve_exception_space lacks a __meminit annotation or the annotation of memblock_reserve is wrong.

FATAL: modpost: Section mismatches detected. Set CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY=y to allow them. make[2]: *** [/builds/linux/scripts/Makefile.modpost:59:
vmlinux.symvers] Error 1

Here is the list of build failed,
- gcc-8-allnoconfig
- gcc-8-tinyconfig
- gcc-9-allnoconfig
- gcc-9-tinyconfig
- gcc-10-allnoconfig
- gcc-10-tinyconfig
- clang-10-tinyconfig
- clang-10-allnoconfig
- clang-11-allnoconfig
- clang-11-tinyconfig
- clang-12-tinyconfig
- clang-12-allnoconfig

link:
https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc/-/jobs/1117167411#L142

steps to reproduce:
---------------------------
# TuxMake is a command line tool and Python library that provides

# portable and repeatable Linux kernel builds across a variety of
# architectures, toolchains, kernel configurations, and make targets.
#
# TuxMake supports the concept of runtimes.
# See https://docs.tuxmake.org/runtimes/, for that to work it requires
# that you install podman or docker on your system.
#
# To install tuxmake on your system globally:
# sudo pip3 install -U tuxmake
#
# See https://docs.tuxmake.org/ for complete documentation.

tuxmake --runtime podman --target-arch mips --toolchain gcc-10 --kconfig tinyconfig

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#168 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.26 release. There are 157 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 24 Mar 2021 12:19:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.26-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.10:

    12 builds:	12 pass, 0 fail
    28 boots:	28 pass, 0 fail
    74 tests:	74 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.10.26-rc1-g67dd333971dd
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000,
                tegra20-ventana, tegra210-p2371-2180,
                tegra210-p3450-0000, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon