Skip to contentSkip to conversation

PKS Add Protection Key Supervisor support

PATCH Superseded [email protected] 2 participants 16 messages Mar 22, 2021 – Mar 30, 2021

Subsystems (9)

v4 of 10 Superseded Latest is v10 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v4 cover PKS Add Protection Key Supervisor support

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

Introduce a new page protection mechanism for supervisor pages, Protection Key Supervisor (PKS).

Generally PKS enables protections on 'domains' of supervisor pages to limit supervisor mode access to pages beyond the normal paging protections. PKS works in a similar fashion to user space pkeys, PKU. As with PKU, supervisor pkeys are checked in addition to normal paging protections and Access or Writes can be disabled via a MSR update without TLB flushes when permissions change.

Also like PKU, a page mapping is assigned to a domain by setting pkey bits in the page table entry for that mapping.

Access is controlled through a PKRS register which is updated via WRMSR/RDMSR.

XSAVE is not supported for the PKRS MSR. Therefore the implementation saves/restores the MSR across context switches and during exceptions. Nested exceptions are supported by each exception getting a new PKS state.

For consistent behavior with current paging protections, pkey 0 is reserved and configured to allow full access via the pkey mechanism, thus preserving the default paging protections on mappings with the default pkey value of 0.

Other keys, (1-15) are allocated by an allocator which prepares us for key contention from day one. Kernel users should be prepared for the allocator to fail either because of key exhaustion or due to PKS not being supported on the CPU instance.

The following are key attributes of PKS.

1) Fast switching of permissions
1a) Prevents access without page table manipulations 1b) No TLB flushes required
2) Works on a per thread basis

PKS is available with 4 and 5 level paging. Like PKRU it consumes 4 bits from the PTE to store the pkey within the entry.

All code to support PKS is configured via ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS which is designed to only be turned on when a user is configured on in the kernel. Those users must depend on ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS to properly work with other architectures which do not yet support PKS.

Originally this series was submitted as part of a large patch set which converted the kmap call sites.[1]

Many follow on discussions revealed a few problems. The first of which was that some callers leak a kmap mapping across threads rather than containing it to a critical section. Attempts were made to see if these 'global kmaps' could be supported.[2] However, supporting global kmaps had many problems. Work is being done in parallel on converting as many kmap calls to the new kmap_local_page().[3]

Changes from V3 [4]
Add ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS config which is selected by kernel users to add the functionality to the core. However, they should only select this if ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS is available. Clean up test code for context switching
Adjust for extended_pt_regs
Reduce output unless --debug is specified
Address internal review comments from Dan Williams and Dave Hansen
Help with macros and assembly coding
Change names of various functions
Clean up documentation
Move all #ifdefery into header files.
Clean up cover letter.
Make extended_pt_regs handling a macro rather than coding
around every call to C
Add macross for PKS shift/mask
New patch : x86/pks: Add additional PKEY helper macros
Preserve pkrs_cache as static when PKS_TEST is not configured Remove unnecessary pr_* prints
Clarify pks_key_alloc flags parameter
Change CONFIG_PKS_TESTING to CONFIG_PKS_TEST Clean up test code separation from main code in fault.c Remove module boilerplate from test code
Clean up all commit messages
Address comments from Thomas Gleixner
Provide a warning and fallback to no protection if a global mapping is requested.
Fix context switch. Fix where pks_sched_in() is called. Fix test to actually do a context switch
Remove unecessary noinstr's
From Andy Lutomirski
Use extended_pt_regs idea to stash pks values on the stack Drop patches 5/10 and 7/10
And use extended_pt_regs to print pkey info on fault
Adjust tests
Comments from Randy Dunlap:
Fix gramatical errors in doc
Clean up kernel docs
Rebase to 5.12

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

</proposed cover letter>

Fenghua Yu (1):
x86/pks: Add PKS kernel API

Ira Weiny (9):
x86/pkeys: Create pkeys_common.h
x86/fpu: Refactor arch_set_user_pkey_access() for PKS support x86/pks: Add additional PKEY helper macros
x86/pks: Add PKS defines and Kconfig options x86/pks: Add PKS setup code
x86/fault: Adjust WARN_ON for PKey fault
x86/pks: Preserve the PKRS MSR on context switch x86/entry: Preserve PKRS MSR across exceptions x86/pks: Add PKS test code

 Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst  | 111 +++-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                            |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                    |  26 +
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                     |  58 ++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                   |  22 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S            |   6 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h    |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h            |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h              |  10 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h        |  12 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h                |   4 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h         |  34 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h                  |  54 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h      |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h            |  43 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                |  22 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S                   |   7 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                   |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                |   2 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                         |  27 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                         | 218 +++++-
 include/linux/pgtable.h                     |   4 +
 include/linux/pkeys.h                       |  34 +
 kernel/entry/common.c                       |  14 +-
 lib/Kconfig.debug                           |  11 +
 lib/Makefile                                |   3 +
 lib/pks/Makefile                            |   3 +
 lib/pks/pks_test.c                          | 693 ++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/Kconfig                                  |   5 +
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile        |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c      | 150 +++++
 34 files changed, 1519 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h
 create mode 100644 lib/pks/Makefile
 create mode 100644 lib/pks/pks_test.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/10 x86/pkeys: Create pkeys_common.h

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

Protection Keys User (PKU) and Protection Keys Supervisor (PKS) work in similar fashions and can share common defines. Specifically PKS and PKU each have:

1. A single control register
2. The same number of keys
3. The same number of bits in the register per key
4. Access and Write disable in the same bit locations

Given the above, share all the macros that synthesize and manipulate register values between the two features. Unlike PKU the PKS definitions are needed in both pgtable.h and pkeys.h. Create a common header for those 2 headers to share. The alternative, including pgtable.h in pkeys.h, triggers complex header dependencies.

Share these defines by moving them into a new header, change their names to reflect the common use, and include the header where needed.

---
NOTE: The initialization of init_pkru_value cause checkpatch errors because of the space after the '(' in the macros. We leave this as is because it is more readable in this format. And it was existing code.

---
Changes from V3:
From Dan Williams
Fix guard macro names
Reword commit message.

Changes from RFC V3
Per Dave Hansen
Update commit message
Add comment to PKR_AD_KEY macro

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h      | 13 ++++++-------
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h        |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c        |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                 | 14 ++++++--------
 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +6 -7
index a02c67291cfc..bfbfb951fe65 100644
@@ -1360,9 +1360,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_swp_clear_uffd_wp(pmd_t pmd)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP */
 
-#define PKRU_AD_BIT 0x1
-#define PKRU_WD_BIT 0x2
-#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#include <asm/pkeys_common.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 extern u32 init_pkru_value;
@@ -1372,18 +1370,19 @@ extern u32 init_pkru_value;
 
 static inline bool __pkru_allows_read(u32 pkru, u16 pkey)
 {
-	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY;
-	return !(pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT << pkru_pkey_bits));
+	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+
+	return !(pkru & (PKR_AD_BIT << pkru_pkey_bits));
 }
 
 static inline bool __pkru_allows_write(u32 pkru, u16 pkey)
 {
-	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY;
 	/*
 	 * Access-disable disables writes too so we need to check
 	 * both bits here.
 	 */
-	return !(pkru & ((PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT) << pkru_pkey_bits));
+	return !(pkru & ((PKR_AD_BIT|PKR_WD_BIT) << pkru_pkey_bits));
 }
 
 static inline u16 pte_flags_pkey(unsigned long pte_flags)
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h +2 -0
index 2ff9b98812b7..f9feba80894b 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
 #define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
 
+#include <asm/pkeys_common.h>
+
 #define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY	0
 
 /*
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h new file +15 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e40b0ced733f
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_COMMON_H
+#define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_COMMON_H
+
+#define PKR_AD_BIT 0x1
+#define PKR_WD_BIT 0x2
+#define PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+
+/*
+ * Generate an Access-Disable mask for the given pkey.  Several of these can be
+ * OR'd together to generate pkey register values.
+ */
+#define PKR_AD_KEY(pkey)	(PKR_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY))
+
+#endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_COMMON_H */
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +4 -4
index 683749b80ae2..face29dab0e3 100644
@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 		unsigned long init_val)
 {
 	u32 old_pkru;
-	int pkey_shift = (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY);
+	int pkey_shift = (pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY);
 	u32 new_pkru_bits = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -1014,16 +1014,16 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 
 	/* Set the bits we need in PKRU:  */
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
-		new_pkru_bits |= PKRU_AD_BIT;
+		new_pkru_bits |= PKR_AD_BIT;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
-		new_pkru_bits |= PKRU_WD_BIT;
+		new_pkru_bits |= PKR_WD_BIT;
 
 	/* Shift the bits in to the correct place in PKRU for pkey: */
 	new_pkru_bits <<= pkey_shift;
 
 	/* Get old PKRU and mask off any old bits in place: */
 	old_pkru = read_pkru();
-	old_pkru &= ~((PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT) << pkey_shift);
+	old_pkru &= ~((PKR_AD_BIT|PKR_WD_BIT) << pkey_shift);
 
 	/* Write old part along with new part: */
 	write_pkru(old_pkru | new_pkru_bits);
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +6 -8
index 8873ed1438a9..f5efb4007e74 100644
@@ -111,19 +111,17 @@ int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey
 	return vma_pkey(vma);
 }
 
-#define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey)	(PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY))
-
 /*
  * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive
  * as possible.  This ensures that any threads clone()'d early
  * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access
  * to data which is pkey-protected later on.
  */
-u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) |
-		      PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) |
-		      PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) |
-		      PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) |
-		      PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15);
+u32 init_pkru_value = PKR_AD_KEY( 1) | PKR_AD_KEY( 2) | PKR_AD_KEY( 3) |
+		      PKR_AD_KEY( 4) | PKR_AD_KEY( 5) | PKR_AD_KEY( 6) |
+		      PKR_AD_KEY( 7) | PKR_AD_KEY( 8) | PKR_AD_KEY( 9) |
+		      PKR_AD_KEY(10) | PKR_AD_KEY(11) | PKR_AD_KEY(12) |
+		      PKR_AD_KEY(13) | PKR_AD_KEY(14) | PKR_AD_KEY(15);
 
 /*
  * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU
@@ -173,7 +171,7 @@ static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file,
 	 * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access
 	 * or writes to pkey 0.
 	 */
-	if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT))
+	if (new_init_pkru & (PKR_AD_BIT|PKR_WD_BIT))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#2 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/10 x86/fpu: Refactor arch_set_user_pkey_access() for PKS support

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

Define a helper, update_pkey_val(), which will be used to support both Protection Key User (PKU) and the new Protection Key for Supervisor (PKS) in subsequent patches.

---
Changes from RFC V3:
Per Dave Hansen
Update and add comments per Dave's review
Per Peter
Correct attribution

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 22 ++++------------------
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c          | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h +2 -0
index f9feba80894b..4526245b03e5 100644
@@ -136,4 +136,6 @@ static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	return (vma->vm_flags & vma_pkey_mask) >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT;
 }
 
+u32 update_pkey_val(u32 pk_reg, int pkey, unsigned int flags);
+
 #endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_H */
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +4 -18
index face29dab0e3..00251bdf759b 100644
@@ -994,9 +994,7 @@ const void *get_xsave_field_ptr(int xfeature_nr)
 int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 		unsigned long init_val)
 {
-	u32 old_pkru;
-	int pkey_shift = (pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY);
-	u32 new_pkru_bits = 0;
+	u32 pkru;
 
 	/*
 	 * This check implies XSAVE support.  OSPKE only gets
@@ -1012,21 +1010,9 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 	 */
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(pkey >= arch_max_pkey());
 
-	/* Set the bits we need in PKRU:  */
-	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
-		new_pkru_bits |= PKR_AD_BIT;
-	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
-		new_pkru_bits |= PKR_WD_BIT;
-
-	/* Shift the bits in to the correct place in PKRU for pkey: */
-	new_pkru_bits <<= pkey_shift;
-
-	/* Get old PKRU and mask off any old bits in place: */
-	old_pkru = read_pkru();
-	old_pkru &= ~((PKR_AD_BIT|PKR_WD_BIT) << pkey_shift);
-
-	/* Write old part along with new part: */
-	write_pkru(old_pkru | new_pkru_bits);
+	pkru = read_pkru();
+	pkru = update_pkey_val(pkru, pkey, init_val);
+	write_pkru(pkru);
 
 	return 0;
 }
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +23 -0
index f5efb4007e74..d1dfe743e79f 100644
@@ -208,3 +208,26 @@ static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt)
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru);
+
+/*
+ * Replace disable bits for @pkey with values from @flags
+ *
+ * Kernel users use the same flags as user space:
+ *     PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
+ *     PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+ */
+u32 update_pkey_val(u32 pk_reg, int pkey, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	int pkey_shift = pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+
+	/*  Mask out old bit values */
+	pk_reg &= ~(((1 << PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY) - 1) << pkey_shift);
+
+	/*  Or in new values */
+	if (flags & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
+		pk_reg |= PKR_AD_BIT << pkey_shift;
+	if (flags & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
+		pk_reg |= PKR_WD_BIT << pkey_shift;
+
+	return pk_reg;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#3 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/10 x86/pks: Add additional PKEY helper macros

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

Avoid open coding shift and mask operations by defining and using helper macros for PKey operations.

---
Changes from V3:
new patch suggested by Dan Williams to use macros better.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h      |  7 ++-----
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h | 11 ++++++++---
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                 |  8 +++-----
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +2 -5
index bfbfb951fe65..b1529b44a996 100644
@@ -1370,19 +1370,16 @@ extern u32 init_pkru_value;
 
 static inline bool __pkru_allows_read(u32 pkru, u16 pkey)
 {
-	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY;
-
-	return !(pkru & (PKR_AD_BIT << pkru_pkey_bits));
+	return !(pkru & PKR_AD_KEY(pkey));
 }
 
 static inline bool __pkru_allows_write(u32 pkru, u16 pkey)
 {
-	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY;
 	/*
 	 * Access-disable disables writes too so we need to check
 	 * both bits here.
 	 */
-	return !(pkru & ((PKR_AD_BIT|PKR_WD_BIT) << pkru_pkey_bits));
+	return !(pkru & (PKR_AD_KEY(pkey) | PKR_WD_KEY(pkey)));
 }
 
 static inline u16 pte_flags_pkey(unsigned long pte_flags)
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h +8 -3
index e40b0ced733f..0681522974ba 100644
@@ -6,10 +6,15 @@
 #define PKR_WD_BIT 0x2
 #define PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
 
+#define PKR_PKEY_SHIFT(pkey) (pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY)
+#define PKR_PKEY_MASK(pkey)  (((1 << PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY) - 1) << PKR_PKEY_SHIFT(pkey))
+
 /*
- * Generate an Access-Disable mask for the given pkey.  Several of these can be
- * OR'd together to generate pkey register values.
+ * Generate an Access-Disable and Write-Disable mask for the given pkey.
+ * Several of the AD's are OR'd together to generate a default pkey register
+ * value.
  */
-#define PKR_AD_KEY(pkey)	(PKR_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY))
+#define PKR_AD_KEY(pkey)     (PKR_AD_BIT << PKR_PKEY_SHIFT(pkey))
+#define PKR_WD_KEY(pkey)     (PKR_WD_BIT << PKR_PKEY_SHIFT(pkey))
 
 #endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_COMMON_H */
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +3 -5
index d1dfe743e79f..fc8c7e2bb21b 100644
@@ -218,16 +218,14 @@ __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru);
  */
 u32 update_pkey_val(u32 pk_reg, int pkey, unsigned int flags)
 {
-	int pkey_shift = pkey * PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY;
-
 	/*  Mask out old bit values */
-	pk_reg &= ~(((1 << PKR_BITS_PER_PKEY) - 1) << pkey_shift);
+	pk_reg &= ~PKR_PKEY_MASK(pkey);
 
 	/*  Or in new values */
 	if (flags & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
-		pk_reg |= PKR_AD_BIT << pkey_shift;
+		pk_reg |= PKR_AD_KEY(pkey);
 	if (flags & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
-		pk_reg |= PKR_WD_BIT << pkey_shift;
+		pk_reg |= PKR_WD_KEY(pkey);
 
 	return pk_reg;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#4 lore raw

PATCH v4 4/10 x86/pks: Add PKS defines and Kconfig options

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

Protection Keys for Supervisor pages (PKS) enables fast, hardware thread specific, manipulation of permission restrictions on supervisor page mappings. It uses the same mechanism of Protection Keys as those on User mappings but applies that mechanism to supervisor mappings using a supervisor specific MSR.

Kernel users can define domains of page mappings which have an extra level of protection beyond those specified in the supervisor page table entries.

Define the PKS CPU feature bits.

Add the Kconfig ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS to indicate to consumers that an architecture supports pkeys.

Introduce ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS to allow kernel users to specify to the arch that they wish to use the supervisor key support if ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS is available. ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS remains off until the first use case sets it.

---
Changes from V3:
From Dan
Clean up commit message
Add ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS option so we don't have the overhead of PKS unless there is a user
Clean up commit message grammar

Changes from V2
New patch for V3: Split this off from the enable patch to be able to create cleaner bisectability

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                            | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h    | 8 +++++++-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++
 mm/Kconfig                                  | 4 ++++
 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index 2792879d398e..5e3a7c2bc342 100644
@@ -1870,6 +1870,7 @@ config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 	depends on X86_64 && (CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_AMD)
 	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
 	select ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
+	select ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
 	help
 	  Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing
 	  page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
index cc96e26d69f7..83ed73407417 100644
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B		(16*32+28) /* MOVDIR64B instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD		(16*32+29) /* ENQCMD and ENQCMDS instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC		(16*32+30) /* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PKS			(16*32+31) /* Protection Keys for Supervisor pages */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV	(17*32+ 0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
index b7dd944dc867..fd09ae852c04 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@
 # define DISABLE_OSPKE		(1<<(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE & 31))
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+# define DISABLE_PKS		0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_PKS		(1<<(X86_FEATURE_PKS & 31))
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
 # define DISABLE_LA57	0
 #else
@@ -88,7 +94,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK14	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK15	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK16	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \
-			 DISABLE_ENQCMD)
+			 DISABLE_ENQCMD|DISABLE_PKS)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK19	0
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h +2 -0
index bcba3c643e63..191c574b2390 100644
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@
 #define X86_CR4_SMAP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)
 #define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT		22 /* enable Protection Keys support */
 #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_PKS_BIT		24 /* enable Protection Keys for Supervisor */
+#define X86_CR4_PKS		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKS_BIT)
 
 /*
  * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
mm/Kconfig +4 -0
index 24c045b24b95..c7d1fc780358 100644
@@ -808,6 +808,10 @@ config ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
 	bool
 config ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 	bool
+config ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+	bool
+config ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+	bool
 
 config PERCPU_STATS
 	bool "Collect percpu memory statistics"
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#5 lore raw

PATCH v4 5/10 x86/pks: Add PKS setup code

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

Protection Keys for Supervisor pages (PKS) enables fast, hardware thread specific, manipulation of permission restrictions on supervisor page mappings. It uses the same mechanism of Protection Keys as those on User mappings but applies that mechanism to supervisor mappings using a supervisor specific MSR.

Add setup code and the lowest level of PKS MSR write support. The write value is cached per-cpu to avoid the overhead of the MSR write if the value has not changed.

That said, it should be noted that the underlying WRMSR(MSR_IA32_PKRS) is not serializing but still maintains ordering properties similar to WRPKRU. The current SDM section on PKRS needs updating but should be the same as that of WRPKRU. So to quote from the WRPKRU text:

WRPKRU will never execute transiently. Memory accesses affected by PKRU register will not execute (even transiently) until all prior executions of WRPKRU have completed execution and updated the PKRU register.

write_pkrs() contributed by Peter Zijlstra.

Introduce asm/pks.h to declare setup_pks() as an internal function call. Later patches will also need this new header as a place to declare internal structures and functions.

---
Changes from V3:
From Dan Williams:
Update commit message
Add pks.h to hold ifdefery out of *.c files s/ARCH_HAS.../SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
move setup_pks to pkeys.c (remove more ifdefery) Remove 'domain' language from commit message Clarify comment in fault handler
Move the removal of the WARN_ON_ONCE in the fault path to this patch. Previously it was in:
[07/10] x86/fault: Report the PKRS state on fault

Changes from V2
From Thomas: Make this patch last so PKS is not enabled until all the PKS mechanisms are in place. Specifically:
1) Modify setup_pks() to call write_pkrs() to properly set up the initial value when enabled.

2) Split this patch into two. 1) a precursor patch with the required defines/config options and 2) this patch which actually enables feature on CPUs which support it.

Changes since RFC V3
Per Dave Hansen
Update comment
Add X86_FEATURE_PKS to disabled-features.h
Rebase based on latest TIP tree

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h   | 15 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c          | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h
arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h new file +15 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d7067ada8fb
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_PKS_H
+#define _ASM_X86_PKS_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+
+void setup_pks(void);
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
+
+static inline void setup_pks(void) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_PKS_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +2 -0
index ab640abe26b6..de49d0c0f4e0 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
+#include <asm/pks.h>
 
 #include "cpu.h"
 
@@ -1594,6 +1595,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	x86_init_rdrand(c);
 	setup_pku(c);
+	setup_pks();
 
 	/*
 	 * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +48 -0

51 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#6 lore raw

PATCH v4 6/10 x86/fault: Adjust WARN_ON for PKey fault

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

PKey faults may now happen on kernel mappings if the feature is enabled. Remove the warning in the fault path if PKS is enabled.

---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +5 -4
index a73347e2cdfc..731ec90ed413 100644
@@ -1141,11 +1141,12 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
 		   unsigned long address)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Protection keys exceptions only happen on user pages.  We
-	 * have no user pages in the kernel portion of the address
-	 * space, so do not expect them here.
+	 * PF_PK is expected on kernel addresses when supervisor pkeys are
+	 * enabled.
 	 */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS))
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);
+
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V4 06/10] x86/fault: Adjust WARN_ON for PKey fault

Quoted 4 lines · On Sun, Mar 21, 2021, [email protected] wrote:

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

PKey faults may now happen on kernel mappings if the feature is enabled. Remove the warning in the fault path if PKS is enabled.

When/why can they happen? I read through all the changelogs, as well as the cover letters for v1 and the RFC, and didn't see any explicit statement about why pkey faults on supervisor accesses are now "legal". Explaining what happens later in the page fault handler would also be helpful, e.g. is the flag simply ignored? Does it lead directly to OOPS?

Documenting what happens on a PKS #PF in the API patch would be nice to have, too.

Quoted 11 lines
---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +0 -0
index a73347e2cdfc..731ec90ed413 100644

arch/x86/mm/fault.c do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code, · line 1144

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +1 -3
@@ -1141,11 +1141,12 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
 		   unsigned long address)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Protection keys exceptions only happen on user pages.  We
-	 * have no user pages in the kernel portion of the address
-	 * space, so do not expect them here.
+	 * PF_PK is expected on kernel addresses when supervisor pkeys are

"is expected" can be misinterpreted as "PF is expected on all kernel addresses...".

This ties in with the lack of an explanation in the changelog.

arch/x86/mm/fault.c do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code, · line 1145

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +1 -0
+	 * enabled.

It'd be helpful to spell out "Protection keys exceptions" so that random readers don't need to search for PF_PK to understand what's up. Maybe even use it as an opportunity to introduce "pkeys", e.g.

	/* Protection keys (pkeys) exceptions are ... */

arch/x86/mm/fault.c do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code, · line 1148

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +2 -1
 	 */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS))
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);

Does this generate the same code if the whole thing is thrown in the WARN? E.g.

	WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS) &&
		     (hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK));
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +1 -0
+
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
author
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V4 06/10] x86/fault: Adjust WARN_ON for PKey fault

Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 4 lines · On Sun, Mar 21, 2021, [email protected] wrote:

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

PKey faults may now happen on kernel mappings if the feature is enabled. Remove the warning in the fault path if PKS is enabled.

When/why can they happen? I read through all the changelogs, as well as the cover letters for v1 and the RFC, and didn't see any explicit statement about why pkey faults on supervisor accesses are now "legal".

Ok, I have to admit I did not think about documenting this detail... I'll update the commit message a bit more.

Prior to this series pkeys were only supported on user page mappings. Therefore seeing a X86_PF_PK error in this path was completely unexpected and warranted the extra WARN_ON to indicate that something went very wrong.

Quoted 3 lines

Explaining what happens
later in the page fault handler would also be helpful, e.g. is the flag simply ignored?

Ok I'll do this. But the behavior does not change. The fault is unhandled and results in an Ooops. The only difference is that if PKS is enabled and configured on a kernel mapping the oops is to be expected.

Quoted 1 line

Does it lead directly to OOPS?

Yes, the series concludes with it being an ooops unless the test code is running. The behavior does not change from before. I'll more clearly document that...

Quoted 2 lines

Documenting what happens on a PKS #PF in the API patch would be nice to have, too.

Ok, yes, good idea.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Quoted 14 lines

arch/x86/mm/fault.c do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code, · line 1144

Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +1 -3
index a73347e2cdfc..731ec90ed413 100644
@@ -1141,11 +1141,12 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
 		   unsigned long address)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Protection keys exceptions only happen on user pages.  We
-	 * have no user pages in the kernel portion of the address
-	 * space, so do not expect them here.
+	 * PF_PK is expected on kernel addresses when supervisor pkeys are

"is expected" can be misinterpreted as "PF is expected on all kernel addresses...".

Yes the commit message was more clear by using 'may'.

Quoted 10 lines

This ties in with the lack of an explanation in the changelog.

arch/x86/mm/fault.c do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code, · line 1145

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +1 -0
+	 * enabled.

It'd be helpful to spell out "Protection keys exceptions" so that random readers don't need to search for PF_PK to understand what's up. Maybe even use it as an opportunity to introduce "pkeys", e.g.

	/* Protection keys (pkeys) exceptions are ... */

Fair enough. Will do. I've changed this to:

/*
* X86_PF_PK (Protection key exceptions) may occur on kernel addresses
* when PKS (PKeys Supervisor) are enabled.
*
* If PKS is not enabled an exception should only happen on user pages.
* Because, we have no user pages in the kernel portion of the address
* space something must have gone very wrong and we should WARN. */

Quoted 10 lines

arch/x86/mm/fault.c do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code, · line 1148

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +2 -1
 	 */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS))
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);

Does this generate the same code if the whole thing is thrown in the WARN? E.g.

	WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS) &&
		     (hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK));

I don't know in the general case. But if CONFIG_BUG=n this would be better.

I've changed it.

Thanks!
Ira

#9 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 x86/fault: Adjust WARN_ON for PKey fault

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

Previously if a Protection key fault occurred it indicated something very wrong because user page mappings are not supposed to be in the kernel address space.

Now PKey faults may happen on kernel mappings if the feature is enabled.

Remove the warning in the fault path and allow the oops to occur without extra debugging if PKS is enabled.

Cc Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>

---
Changes from V4:
From Sean Christopherson
Clean up commit message and comment Change cpu_feature_enabled to be in WARN_ON check

---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +8 -4
index a73347e2cdfc..c32d01803e26 100644
@@ -1141,11 +1141,15 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
 		   unsigned long address)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Protection keys exceptions only happen on user pages.  We
-	 * have no user pages in the kernel portion of the address
-	 * space, so do not expect them here.
+	 * X86_PF_PK (Protection key exceptions) may occur on kernel addresses
+	 * when PKS (PKeys Supervisor) are enabled.
+	 *
+	 * If PKS is not enabled an exception should only happen on user pages.
+	 * Because, we have no user pages in the kernel portion of the address
+	 * space something must have gone very wrong and we should WARN.
 	 */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS) &&
+		     (hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK));
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#10 lore raw

PATCH v4 7/10 x86/pks: Preserve the PKRS MSR on context switch

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

The PKRS MSR is defined as a per-logical-processor register. This isolates memory access by logical CPU. Unfortunately, the MSR is not managed by XSAVE. Therefore, tasks must save/restore the MSR value on context switch.

Define a saved PKRS value in the task struct, as well as a cached per-logical-processor MSR value which mirrors the MSR value of the current CPU. Initialize all tasks with the default MSR value. Then, on schedule in, call write_pkrs() which automatically avoids the overhead of the MSR write if possible.

---
Changes from V3
From Dan Williams
make pks_init_task() and pks_sched_in() macros To avoid Supervisor PKey '#ifdefery' in process.c and process_64.c
Use ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
Split write_pkrs() to an earlier patch to be used in setup_pks()
Move Peter's authorship to that patch.
Remove kernel doc comment from write_pkrs
From Thomas Gleixner
Fix where pks_sched_in() is called from.
Should be called from __switch_to()
NOTE: PKS requires x86_64 so there is no need to update process_32.c
Make pkrs_cache static
Remove unnecessary pkrs_cache declaration Clean up formatting

Changes from V2
Adjust for PKS enable being final patch.

Changes from V1
Rebase to latest tip/master
Resolve conflicts with INIT_THREAD changes

Changes since RFC V3
Per Dave Hansen
Update commit message
move saved_pkrs to be in a nicer place
Per Peter Zijlstra
Add Comment from Peter
Clean up white space
Update authorship

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h    |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h | 14 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h    | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c           |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c        |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -0
index 546d6ecf0a35..c15a049bf6ac 100644
@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@
 
 #define MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE		0x000006E0
 
+#define MSR_IA32_PKRS			0x000006E1
 
 #define MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT		0x0000010F
 
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h +14 -0
index 0681522974ba..6917f1a27479 100644
@@ -17,4 +17,18 @@
 #define PKR_AD_KEY(pkey)     (PKR_AD_BIT << PKR_PKEY_SHIFT(pkey))
 #define PKR_WD_KEY(pkey)     (PKR_WD_BIT << PKR_PKEY_SHIFT(pkey))
 
+/*
+ * Define a default PKRS value for each task.
+ *
+ * Key 0 has no restriction.  All other keys are set to the most restrictive
+ * value which is access disabled (AD=1).
+ *
+ * NOTE: This needs to be a macro to be used as part of the INIT_THREAD macro.
+ */
+#define INIT_PKRS_VALUE (PKR_AD_KEY(1) | PKR_AD_KEY(2) | PKR_AD_KEY(3) | \
+			 PKR_AD_KEY(4) | PKR_AD_KEY(5) | PKR_AD_KEY(6) | \
+			 PKR_AD_KEY(7) | PKR_AD_KEY(8) | PKR_AD_KEY(9) | \
+			 PKR_AD_KEY(10) | PKR_AD_KEY(11) | PKR_AD_KEY(12) | \
+			 PKR_AD_KEY(13) | PKR_AD_KEY(14) | PKR_AD_KEY(15))
+
 #endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_COMMON_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +42 -1

61 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/process.c +3 -0
index 9c214d7085a4..89f8454a8541 100644
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
 #include <asm/proto.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
 
 #include "process.h"
 
@@ -195,6 +196,8 @@ void flush_thread(void)
 	memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
 
 	fpu__clear_all(&tsk->thread.fpu);
+
+	pks_init_task(tsk);
 }
 
 void disable_TSC(void)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +2 -0
index d08307df69ad..e590ecac1650 100644
@@ -632,6 +632,8 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
 	/* Load the Intel cache allocation PQR MSR. */
 	resctrl_sched_in();
 
+	pks_sched_in();
+
 	return prev_p;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
author
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V4 07/10] x86/pks: Preserve the PKRS MSR on context switch

[snip]

<self review>

The test bot reported build errors on i386 yesterday. Not sure why they were not caught before...

Anyway that caused me to look at this patch again and I've found a couple of issues noted below. Combined with Sean's review I'll be re-spinning a new v5.

arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h line 768

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -0
index 546d6ecf0a35..c15a049bf6ac 100644
@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@
 
 #define MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE		0x000006E0
 
+#define MSR_IA32_PKRS			0x000006E1

This belongs in patch 5 where it is 'used'. Note that nothing is really used until the final test patch... But in review this define does not make any sense here...

Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +0 -0
 #define MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT		0x0000010F
 
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h +3 -0
index 0681522974ba..6917f1a27479 100644
@@ -17,4 +17,18 @@
 #define PKR_AD_KEY(pkey)     (PKR_AD_BIT << PKR_PKEY_SHIFT(pkey))
 #define PKR_WD_KEY(pkey)     (PKR_WD_BIT << PKR_PKEY_SHIFT(pkey))
 
+/*
+ * Define a default PKRS value for each task.
+ *

arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h line 32

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h +10 -0
+ * Key 0 has no restriction.  All other keys are set to the most restrictive
+ * value which is access disabled (AD=1).
+ *
+ * NOTE: This needs to be a macro to be used as part of the INIT_THREAD macro.
+ */
+#define INIT_PKRS_VALUE (PKR_AD_KEY(1) | PKR_AD_KEY(2) | PKR_AD_KEY(3) | \
+			 PKR_AD_KEY(4) | PKR_AD_KEY(5) | PKR_AD_KEY(6) | \
+			 PKR_AD_KEY(7) | PKR_AD_KEY(8) | PKR_AD_KEY(9) | \
+			 PKR_AD_KEY(10) | PKR_AD_KEY(11) | PKR_AD_KEY(12) | \
+			 PKR_AD_KEY(13) | PKR_AD_KEY(14) | PKR_AD_KEY(15))

The same is true for this macro. While it is used in this patch it is used first in patch 5. So it should be there.

I'm letting 0-day crank on these changes but there should be a v5 out very soon.

Sorry for the noise,
Ira

#12 lore raw

PATCH v4 8/10 x86/entry: Preserve PKRS MSR across exceptions

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

The PKRS MSR is not managed by XSAVE. It is preserved through a context switch but this support leaves exception handling code open to memory accesses during exceptions.

2 possible places for preserving this state were considered, irqentry_state_t or pt_regs.[1] pt_regs was much more complicated and was potentially fraught with unintended consequences.[2] However, Andy came up with a way to hide additional values on the stack which could be accessed as "extended_pt_regs".[3] This method allows for; any place which has struct pt_regs can get access to the extra information; no extra information is added to irq_state; and pt_regs is left intact for compatibility with outside tools like BPF.

To simplify, the assembly code only adds space on the stack. The setting or use of any needed values are left to the C code. While some entry points may not use this space it is still added where ever pt_regs is passed to the C code for consistency.

Each nested exception gets another copy of this extended space allowing for any number of levels of exception handling.

In the assembly, a macro is defined to allow a central place to add space for other uses should the need arise.

Finally export pkrs_{save_set|restore}_irq to the common code to allow it to preserve the current task's PKRS in the new extended pt_regs if enabled.

Peter, Thomas, Andy, Dave, and Dan all suggested parts of the patch or aided in the development of the patch..

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALCETrVe1i5JdyzD_BcctxQJn+ZE3T38EFPgjxN1F577M36g+w@mail.gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/#t
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALCETrUHwZPic89oExMMe-WyDY8-O3W68NcZvse3=PGW+iW5=w@mail.gmail.com/

---
Changes from V3:
Fix 0-day issues
Move all extended regs stuff to pks.h
From Dan Williams
Move show_extended_regs_oops ifdefery to pks.h Remove a bad comment s/irq_save_set_pkrs/pkrs_save_set_irq s/irq_restore_pkrs/pkrs_restore_irq s/ARCH_HAS/ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
From Dave Hansen:
remove extra macro parameter for most calls clarify with comments
Add BUILD check for extend regs size
use subq/addq vs push/pop
Guidance on where to find each of the pt_regs being passed to C code
From Dan Williams and Dave Hansen:
Use a macro call to wrap the c function calls with push/pop extended_pt_regs
From Thomas Gleixner:
Remove unnecessary noinstr's
From Andy Lutomirski:
Convert to using the extended pt_regs
Add in showing pks on fault through the extended pt_regs

Changes from V1
remove redundant irq_state->pkrs
This value is only needed for the global tracking. So it should be included in that patch and not in this one.

Changes from RFC V3
Standardize on 'irq_state' variable name
Per Dave Hansen
irq_save_pkrs() -> irq_save_set_pkrs()
Rebased based on clean up patch by Thomas Gleixner
This includes moving irq_[save_set|restore]_pkrs() to the core as well.

---
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h               | 26 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S              | 22 +++++-----
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S       |  6 +--
 arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h             | 16 +++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S              |  7 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                    |  3 ++
 include/linux/pkeys.h                  | 17 ++++++++
 kernel/entry/common.c                  | 14 ++++++-
 10 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/calling.h +26 -0
index 07a9331d55e7..ec85f8f675be 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,32 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 
 #define SIZEOF_PTREGS	21*8
 
+/*
+ * __call_ext_ptregs - Helper macro to call into C with extended pt_regs
+ * @cfunc:		C function to be called
+ *
+ * This will ensure that extended_ptregs is added and removed as needed during
+ * a call into C code.
+ */
+.macro __call_ext_ptregs cfunc annotate_retpoline_safe:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+	/* add space for extended_pt_regs */
+	subq    $EXTENDED_PT_REGS_SIZE, %rsp
+#endif
+	.if \annotate_retpoline_safe == 1
+		ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+	.endif
+	call	\cfunc
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+	/* remove space for extended_pt_regs */
+	addq    $EXTENDED_PT_REGS_SIZE, %rsp
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro call_ext_ptregs cfunc
+	__call_ext_ptregs \cfunc, annotate_retpoline_safe=0
+.endm
+
 .macro PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=%rdx rax=%rax save_ret=0
 	.if \save_ret
 	pushq	%rsi		/* pt_regs->si */
arch/x86/entry/common.c +58 -0

82 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +12 -10
index 400908dff42e..d65952a18ad7 100644
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
 		movq	$-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp)	/* no syscall to restart */
 	.endif
 
-	call	\cfunc
+	call_ext_ptregs \cfunc
 
 	jmp	error_return
 .endm
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi		/* pt_regs pointer */
 
-	call	\cfunc
+	call_ext_ptregs \cfunc
 
 	jmp	paranoid_exit
 
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
 	 * stack.
 	 */
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi		/* pt_regs pointer */
-	call	vc_switch_off_ist
+	call_ext_ptregs vc_switch_off_ist
 	movq	%rax, %rsp		/* Switch to new stack */
 
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi		/* pt_regs pointer */
 
-	call	\cfunc
+	call_ext_ptregs \cfunc
 
 	/*
 	 * No need to switch back to the IST stack. The current stack is either
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi		/* pt_regs pointer into first argument */
 	movq	ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi	/* get error code into 2nd argument*/
 	movq	$-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp)	/* no syscall to restart */
-	call	\cfunc
+	call_ext_ptregs \cfunc
 
 	jmp	paranoid_exit
 
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(exc_xen_hypervisor_callback)
 	movq	%rdi, %rsp			/* we don't return, adjust the stack frame */
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
 
-	call	xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall
+	call_ext_ptregs xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall
 
 	jmp	error_return
 SYM_CODE_END(exc_xen_hypervisor_callback)
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
 	/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
 	popq	%r12				/* save return addr in %12 */
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi			/* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
-	call	sync_regs
+	call_ext_ptregs sync_regs
 	movq	%rax, %rsp			/* switch stack */
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 	pushq	%r12
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
 	 * as if we faulted immediately after IRET.
 	 */
 	mov	%rsp, %rdi
-	call	fixup_bad_iret
+	call_ext_ptregs fixup_bad_iret
 	mov	%rax, %rsp
 	jmp	.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs
 SYM_CODE_END(error_entry)
@@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	movq	$-1, %rsi
-	call	exc_nmi
+	call_ext_ptregs exc_nmi
 
 	/*
 	 * Return back to user mode.  We must *not* do the normal exit
@@ -1183,6 +1183,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
 	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
 	 * | pt_regs                                                 |
 	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | (Optionally) extended_pt_regs                           |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
 	 *
 	 * The "original" frame is used by hardware.  Before re-enabling
 	 * NMIs, we need to be done with it, and we need to leave enough
@@ -1359,7 +1361,7 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	movq	$-1, %rsi
-	call	exc_nmi
+	call_ext_ptregs exc_nmi
 
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +3 -3
index 541fdaf64045..75a3a800a43c 100644
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 .Lsysenter_flags_fixed:
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
-	call	do_SYSENTER_32
+	call_ext_ptregs do_SYSENTER_32
 	/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
 	ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \
 		    "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
-	call	do_fast_syscall_32
+	call_ext_ptregs do_fast_syscall_32
 	/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
 	ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \
 		    "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
@@ -408,6 +408,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat)
 	cld
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
-	call	do_int80_syscall_32
+	call_ext_ptregs do_int80_syscall_32
 	jmp	swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
 SYM_CODE_END(entry_INT80_compat)
arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h +16 -0
index 5d7067ada8fb..bfa638e17620 100644
@@ -4,11 +4,27 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
 
+struct extended_pt_regs {
+	u32 thread_pkrs;
+	/* Keep stack 8 byte aligned */
+	u32 pad;
+	struct pt_regs pt_regs;
+};
+
 void setup_pks(void);
 
+static inline struct extended_pt_regs *extended_pt_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	return container_of(regs, struct extended_pt_regs, pt_regs);
+}
+
+void show_extended_regs_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned error_code);
+
 #else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
 
 static inline void setup_pks(void) { }
+static inline void show_extended_regs_oops(struct pt_regs *regs,
+					   unsigned error_code) { }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
 
arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h +2 -0
index 02c2cbda4a74..4a41fc4cf028 100644
@@ -53,4 +53,6 @@
 # define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT	11
 #endif
 
+#define EXTENDED_PT_REGS_SIZE 8
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_FLAGS_H */
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +3 -4
index 04bddaaba8e2..80531526b0d2 100644
@@ -319,8 +319,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_boot_ghcb)
 	movq    %rsp, %rdi
 	movq	ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
 	movq	initial_vc_handler(%rip), %rax
-	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
-	call	*%rax
+	__call_ext_ptregs *%rax, annotate_retpoline_safe=1
 
 	/* Unwind pt_regs */
 	POP_REGS
@@ -397,7 +396,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common)
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
 
 	movq %rsp,%rdi		/* RDI = pt_regs; RSI is already trapnr */
-	call do_early_exception
+	call_ext_ptregs do_early_exception
 
 	decl early_recursion_flag(%rip)
 	jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb)
 	/* Call C handler */
 	movq    %rsp, %rdi
 	movq	ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
-	call    do_vc_no_ghcb
+	call_ext_ptregs do_vc_no_ghcb
 
 	/* Unwind pt_regs */
 	POP_REGS
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +3 -0
index 731ec90ed413..0c36ce2f6abf 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable_areas.h>		/* VMALLOC_START, ...		*/
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>		/* kvm_handle_async_pf		*/
 #include <asm/vdso.h>			/* fixup_vdso_exception()	*/
+#include <asm/pks.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
@@ -547,6 +548,8 @@ show_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long ad
 		 (error_code & X86_PF_PK)    ? "protection keys violation" :
 					       "permissions violation");
 
+	show_extended_regs_oops(regs, error_code);
+
 	if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER) && user_mode(regs)) {
 		struct desc_ptr idt, gdt;
 		u16 ldtr, tr;
include/linux/pkeys.h +17 -0
index 2955ba976048..a3d17a8e4e81 100644
@@ -50,4 +50,21 @@ static inline void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
 
 #endif /* ! CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
 
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+
+void pkrs_save_set_irq(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 val);
+void pkrs_restore_irq(struct pt_regs *regs);
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
+
+#ifndef INIT_PKRS_VALUE
+#define INIT_PKRS_VALUE 0
+#endif
+
+static inline void pkrs_save_set_irq(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 val) { }
+static inline void pkrs_restore_irq(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_PKEYS_H */
kernel/entry/common.c +12 -2
index 8442e5c9cfa2..b50bcc2d3ea5 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
 
@@ -363,7 +364,7 @@ noinstr irqentry_state_t irqentry_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		instrumentation_end();
 
 		ret.exit_rcu = true;
-		return ret;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -378,6 +379,8 @@ noinstr irqentry_state_t irqentry_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
 	instrumentation_end();
 
+done:
+	pkrs_save_set_irq(regs, INIT_PKRS_VALUE);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -403,7 +406,12 @@ noinstr void irqentry_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t state)
 	/* Check whether this returns to user mode */
 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
 		irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
-	} else if (!regs_irqs_disabled(regs)) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pkrs_restore_irq(regs);
+
+	if (!regs_irqs_disabled(regs)) {
 		/*
 		 * If RCU was not watching on entry this needs to be done
 		 * carefully and needs the same ordering of lockdep/tracing
@@ -457,11 +465,13 @@ irqentry_state_t noinstr irqentry_nmi_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	ftrace_nmi_enter();
 	instrumentation_end();
 
+	pkrs_save_set_irq(regs, INIT_PKRS_VALUE);
 	return irq_state;
 }
 
 void noinstr irqentry_nmi_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t irq_state)
 {
+	pkrs_restore_irq(regs);
 	instrumentation_begin();
 	ftrace_nmi_exit();
 	if (irq_state.lockdep) {
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#13 lore raw

PATCH v4 9/10 x86/pks: Add PKS kernel API

In reply to [email protected]

From: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>

PKS allows kernel users to define domains of page mappings which have additional protections beyond the paging protections.

Add an API to allocate, use, and free a protection key which identifies such a domain. Export 5 new symbols pks_key_alloc(), pks_mk_noaccess(), pks_mk_readonly(), pks_mk_readwrite(), and pks_key_free(). Add 2 new macros; PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(key) and _PAGE_PKEY(pkey).

Update the protection key documentation to cover pkeys on supervisor pages.

---
Changes from V3:
From Dan Williams
Remove flags from pks_key_alloc()
Convert to ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS remove export of update_pkey_val()
Update documentation
change __clear_bit to clear_bit_unlock remove cpu_feature_enabled from pks_key_free remove pr_err stubs when CONFIG_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS=n clarify pks_key_alloc flags parameter with enum
Update documentation for ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS No need to export write_pkrs
Correct Kernel Doc for API functions
From Randy Dunlap:
Fix grammatical errors in doc

Changes from V2
From Greg KH
Replace all WARN_ON_ONCE() uses with pr_err()
From Dan Williams
Add __must_check to pks_key_alloc() to help ensure users are using the API correctly

Changes from V1
Per Dave Hansen
Add flags to pks_key_alloc() to help future proof the interface if/when the key space is exhausted.

Changes from RFC V3
Per Dave Hansen
Put WARN_ON_ONCE in pks_key_free() s/pks_mknoaccess/pks_mk_noaccess/ s/pks_mkread/pks_mk_readonly/ s/pks_mkrdwr/pks_mk_readwrite/
Change return pks_key_alloc() to EOPNOTSUPP when not
supported or configured
Per Peter Zijlstra
Remove unneeded preempt disable/enable

---
 Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst | 108 +++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h       |  12 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h                 |   4 +
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                        | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/pgtable.h                    |   4 +
 include/linux/pkeys.h                      |  17 +++
 6 files changed, 263 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst +90 -18
index ec575e72d0b2..6d6c4f25080c 100644
@@ -4,25 +4,30 @@
 Memory Protection Keys
 ======================
 
-Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a feature
-which is found on Intel's Skylake (and later) "Scalable Processor"
-Server CPUs. It will be available in future non-server Intel parts
-and future AMD processors.
+Memory Protection Keys provide a mechanism for enforcing page-based
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
+when an application changes protection domains.
 
-For anyone wishing to test or use this feature, it is available in
-Amazon's EC2 C5 instances and is known to work there using an Ubuntu
-17.04 image.
+PKeys Userspace (PKU) is a feature which is found on Intel's Skylake "Scalable
+Processor" Server CPUs and later.  And it will be available in future
+non-server Intel parts and future AMD processors.
 
-Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
-protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
-when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
-dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
-"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+Protection Keys for Supervisor pages (PKS) is available in the SDM since May
+2020.
+
+pkeys work by dedicating 4 previously Reserved bits in each page table entry to
+a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys.  User and Supervisor pages are
+treated separately.
 
-There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
-bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
-register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
-thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+Protections for each page are controlled with per-CPU registers for each type
+of page User and Supervisor.  Each of these 32-bit register stores two separate
+bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.
+
+For Userspace the register is user-accessible (rdpkru/wrpkru).  For
+Supervisor, the register (MSR_IA32_PKRS) is accessible only to the kernel.
+
+Being a CPU register, pkeys are inherently thread-local, potentially giving
+each thread an independent set of protections from every other thread.
 
 There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
 to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
@@ -30,8 +35,11 @@ even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
 permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
 instruction fetches.
 
-Syscalls
-========
+For kernel space rdmsr/wrmsr are used to access the kernel MSRs.
+
+
+Syscalls for user space keys
+============================
 
 There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys::
 
@@ -98,3 +106,67 @@ with a read()::
 The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
 to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
 the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
+
+
+Kernel API for PKS support
+==========================
+
+Similar to user space pkeys, supervisor pkeys allow additional protections to
+be defined for a supervisor mappings.
+
+The following interface is used to allocate, use, and free a pkey which defines
+a 'protection domain' within the kernel.  Setting a pkey value in a supervisor
+PTE adds this additional protection to the page.
+
+Kernel users intending to use PKS support should check (depend on)
+ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS and add their config to ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+to turn on this support within the core.
+
+        int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user);
+        #define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey)
+        #define _PAGE_KEY(pkey)
+        void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey);
+        void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey);
+        void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey);
+        void pks_key_free(int pkey);
+
+pks_key_alloc() allocates keys dynamically to allow better use of the limited
+key space.
+
+Callers of pks_key_alloc() _must_ be prepared for it to fail and take
+appropriate action.  This is due mainly to the fact that PKS may not be
+available on all arch's.  Failure to check the return of pks_key_alloc() and
+using any of the rest of the API is undefined.
+
+Keys are allocated with 'No Access' permissions.  If other permissions are
+required before the pkey is used, the pks_mk*() family of calls, documented
+below, can be used prior to setting the pkey within the page table entries.
+
+Kernel users must set the pkey in the page table entries for the mappings they
+want to protect.  This can be done with PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY() or _PAGE_KEY().
+
+The pks_mk*() family of calls allows kernel users to change the protections for
+the domain identified by the pkey parameter.  3 states are available:
+pks_mk_noaccess(), pks_mk_readonly(), and pks_mk_readwrite() which set the
+access to none, read, and read/write respectively.
+
+Finally, pks_key_free() allows a user to return the key to the allocator for
+use by others.
+
+The interface maintains pks_mk_noaccess() (Access Disabled (AD=1)) for all keys
+not currently allocated.  Therefore, the user can depend on access being
+disabled when pks_key_alloc() returns a key and the user should remove mappings
+from the domain (remove the pkey from the PTE) prior to calling pks_key_free().
+
+It should be noted that the underlying WRMSR(MSR_IA32_PKRS) is not serializing
+but still maintains ordering properties similar to WRPKRU.  Thus it is safe to
+immediately use a mapping when the pks_mk*() functions return.
+
+Older versions of the SDM on PKRS may be wrong with regard to this
+serialization.  The text should be the same as that of WRPKRU.  From the WRPKRU
+text:
+
+	WRPKRU will never execute transiently. Memory accesses
+	affected by PKRU register will not execute (even transiently)
+	until all prior executions of WRPKRU have completed execution
+	and updated the PKRU register.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +12 -0
index f24d7ef8fffa..a3cb274351d9 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@
 			 _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 | \
 			 _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+#define _PAGE_PKEY(pkey)	(_AT(pteval_t, pkey) << _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0)
+#else
+#define _PAGE_PKEY(pkey)	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#endif
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) || defined(CONFIG_X86_PAE)
 #define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
 #else
@@ -228,6 +234,12 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 #define PAGE_KERNEL_IO		__pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO)
 #define PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE	__pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey)	__pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PKEY(pkey))
+#else
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey) PAGE_KERNEL
+#endif
+
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 /*         xwr */
arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h +4 -0
index bfa638e17620..4891c9aa8fc7 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
 
+/*  PKS supports 16 keys. Key 0 is reserved for the kernel. */
+#define        PKS_KERN_DEFAULT_KEY    0
+#define        PKS_NUM_KEYS            16
+
 struct extended_pt_regs {
 	u32 thread_pkrs;
 	/* Keep stack 8 byte aligned */
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +136 -1

152 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/pgtable.h +4 -0
index cdfc4e9f253e..1e5f4a253e82 100644
@@ -1460,6 +1460,10 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 # define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC PAGE_KERNEL
 #endif
 
+#ifndef PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey) PAGE_KERNEL
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Page Table Modification bits for pgtbl_mod_mask.
  *
include/linux/pkeys.h +17 -0
index a3d17a8e4e81..6659404af876 100644
@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ static inline void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
 void pkrs_save_set_irq(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 val);
 void pkrs_restore_irq(struct pt_regs *regs);
 
+__must_check int pks_key_alloc(const char *const pkey_user);
+void pks_key_free(int pkey);
+
+void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey);
+void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey);
+void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey);
+
 #else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
 
 #ifndef INIT_PKRS_VALUE
@@ -65,6 +72,16 @@ void pkrs_restore_irq(struct pt_regs *regs);
 static inline void pkrs_save_set_irq(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 val) { }
 static inline void pkrs_restore_irq(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
 
+static inline __must_check int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void pks_key_free(int pkey) {}
+static inline void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey) {}
+static inline void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey) {}
+static inline void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey) {}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_PKEYS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#14 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 x86/pks: Add PKS kernel API

From: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>

PKS allows kernel users to define domains of page mappings which have additional protections beyond the paging protections. Violating those protections results in an oops.

Add an API to allocate, use, and free a protection key which identifies such a domain. Export 5 new symbols pks_key_alloc(), pks_mk_noaccess(), pks_mk_readonly(), pks_mk_readwrite(), and pks_key_free(). Add 2 new macros; PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(key) and _PAGE_PKEY(pkey).

Update the protection key documentation to cover pkeys on supervisor pages.

---
Changes from V4:
From Sean Christopers
Add what happens if the pkey is violated in the commit message as well as the documentation

Changes from V3:
From Dan Williams
Remove flags from pks_key_alloc()
Convert to ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
Update documentation for ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS No need to export write_pkrs
Correct Kernel Doc for API functions
From Dan Williams
remove export of update_pkey_val()
Update documentation
change __clear_bit to clear_bit_unlock remove cpu_feature_enabled from pks_key_free remove pr_err stubs when CONFIG_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS=n clarify pks_key_alloc flags parameter with enum
From Randy Dunlap:
Fix grammatical errors in doc

Changes from V2
From Greg KH
Replace all WARN_ON_ONCE() uses with pr_err()
From Dan Williams
Add __must_check to pks_key_alloc() to help ensure users are using the API correctly

Changes from V1
Per Dave Hansen
Add flags to pks_key_alloc() to help future proof the interface if/when the key space is exhausted.

Changes from RFC V3
Per Dave Hansen
Put WARN_ON_ONCE in pks_key_free() s/pks_mknoaccess/pks_mk_noaccess/ s/pks_mkread/pks_mk_readonly/ s/pks_mkrdwr/pks_mk_readwrite/
Change return pks_key_alloc() to EOPNOTSUPP when not
supported or configured
Per Peter Zijlstra
Remove unneeded preempt disable/enable

---
 Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst | 109 +++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h       |  12 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h                 |   4 +
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                        | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/pgtable.h                    |   4 +
 include/linux/pkeys.h                      |  17 +++
 6 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst +91 -18
index ec575e72d0b2..5b1b90d8bdab 100644
@@ -4,25 +4,30 @@
 Memory Protection Keys
 ======================
 
-Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a feature
-which is found on Intel's Skylake (and later) "Scalable Processor"
-Server CPUs. It will be available in future non-server Intel parts
-and future AMD processors.
+Memory Protection Keys provide a mechanism for enforcing page-based
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
+when an application changes protection domains.
 
-For anyone wishing to test or use this feature, it is available in
-Amazon's EC2 C5 instances and is known to work there using an Ubuntu
-17.04 image.
+PKeys Userspace (PKU) is a feature which is found on Intel's Skylake "Scalable
+Processor" Server CPUs and later.  And it will be available in future
+non-server Intel parts and future AMD processors.
 
-Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
-protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
-when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
-dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
-"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+Protection Keys for Supervisor pages (PKS) is available in the SDM since May
+2020.
+
+pkeys work by dedicating 4 previously Reserved bits in each page table entry to
+a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys.  User and Supervisor pages are
+treated separately.
 
-There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
-bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
-register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
-thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+Protections for each page are controlled with per-CPU registers for each type
+of page User and Supervisor.  Each of these 32-bit register stores two separate
+bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.
+
+For Userspace the register is user-accessible (rdpkru/wrpkru).  For
+Supervisor, the register (MSR_IA32_PKRS) is accessible only to the kernel.
+
+Being a CPU register, pkeys are inherently thread-local, potentially giving
+each thread an independent set of protections from every other thread.
 
 There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
 to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
@@ -30,8 +35,11 @@ even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
 permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
 instruction fetches.
 
-Syscalls
-========
+For kernel space rdmsr/wrmsr are used to access the kernel MSRs.
+
+
+Syscalls for user space keys
+============================
 
 There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys::
 
@@ -98,3 +106,68 @@ with a read()::
 The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
 to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
 the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
+
+
+Kernel API for PKS support
+==========================
+
+Similar to user space pkeys, supervisor pkeys allow additional protections to
+be defined for a supervisor mappings.  Unlike user space pkeys, Violations of
+these protections result in a a kernel oops.
+
+The following interface is used to allocate, use, and free a pkey which defines
+a 'protection domain' within the kernel.  Setting a pkey value in a supervisor
+PTE adds this additional protection to the page.
+
+Kernel users intending to use PKS support should check (depend on)
+ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS and add their config to ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+to turn on this support within the core.
+
+        int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user);
+        #define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey)
+        #define _PAGE_KEY(pkey)
+        void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey);
+        void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey);
+        void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey);
+        void pks_key_free(int pkey);
+
+pks_key_alloc() allocates keys dynamically to allow better use of the limited
+key space.
+
+Callers of pks_key_alloc() _must_ be prepared for it to fail and take
+appropriate action.  This is due mainly to the fact that PKS may not be
+available on all arch's.  Failure to check the return of pks_key_alloc() and
+using any of the rest of the API is undefined.
+
+Keys are allocated with 'No Access' permissions.  If other permissions are
+required before the pkey is used, the pks_mk*() family of calls, documented
+below, can be used prior to setting the pkey within the page table entries.
+
+Kernel users must set the pkey in the page table entries for the mappings they
+want to protect.  This can be done with PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY() or _PAGE_KEY().
+
+The pks_mk*() family of calls allows kernel users to change the protections for
+the domain identified by the pkey parameter.  3 states are available:
+pks_mk_noaccess(), pks_mk_readonly(), and pks_mk_readwrite() which set the
+access to none, read, and read/write respectively.
+
+Finally, pks_key_free() allows a user to return the key to the allocator for
+use by others.
+
+The interface maintains pks_mk_noaccess() (Access Disabled (AD=1)) for all keys
+not currently allocated.  Therefore, the user can depend on access being
+disabled when pks_key_alloc() returns a key and the user should remove mappings
+from the domain (remove the pkey from the PTE) prior to calling pks_key_free().
+
+It should be noted that the underlying WRMSR(MSR_IA32_PKRS) is not serializing
+but still maintains ordering properties similar to WRPKRU.  Thus it is safe to
+immediately use a mapping when the pks_mk*() functions return.
+
+Older versions of the SDM on PKRS may be wrong with regard to this
+serialization.  The text should be the same as that of WRPKRU.  From the WRPKRU
+text:
+
+	WRPKRU will never execute transiently. Memory accesses
+	affected by PKRU register will not execute (even transiently)
+	until all prior executions of WRPKRU have completed execution
+	and updated the PKRU register.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +12 -0
index f24d7ef8fffa..a3cb274351d9 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@
 			 _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 | \
 			 _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+#define _PAGE_PKEY(pkey)	(_AT(pteval_t, pkey) << _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0)
+#else
+#define _PAGE_PKEY(pkey)	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#endif
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) || defined(CONFIG_X86_PAE)
 #define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
 #else
@@ -228,6 +234,12 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 #define PAGE_KERNEL_IO		__pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO)
 #define PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE	__pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey)	__pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PKEY(pkey))
+#else
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey) PAGE_KERNEL
+#endif
+
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 /*         xwr */
arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h +4 -0
index bfa638e17620..4891c9aa8fc7 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
 
+/*  PKS supports 16 keys. Key 0 is reserved for the kernel. */
+#define        PKS_KERN_DEFAULT_KEY    0
+#define        PKS_NUM_KEYS            16
+
 struct extended_pt_regs {
 	u32 thread_pkrs;
 	/* Keep stack 8 byte aligned */
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +136 -1

152 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/pgtable.h +4 -0
index 5e772392a379..e189e9ab6904 100644
@@ -1464,6 +1464,10 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 # define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC PAGE_KERNEL
 #endif
 
+#ifndef PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey) PAGE_KERNEL
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Page Table Modification bits for pgtbl_mod_mask.
  *
include/linux/pkeys.h +17 -0
index a3d17a8e4e81..6659404af876 100644
@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ static inline void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
 void pkrs_save_set_irq(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 val);
 void pkrs_restore_irq(struct pt_regs *regs);
 
+__must_check int pks_key_alloc(const char *const pkey_user);
+void pks_key_free(int pkey);
+
+void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey);
+void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey);
+void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey);
+
 #else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
 
 #ifndef INIT_PKRS_VALUE
@@ -65,6 +72,16 @@ void pkrs_restore_irq(struct pt_regs *regs);
 static inline void pkrs_save_set_irq(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 val) { }
 static inline void pkrs_restore_irq(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
 
+static inline __must_check int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void pks_key_free(int pkey) {}
+static inline void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey) {}
+static inline void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey) {}
+static inline void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey) {}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_PKEYS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
#15 lore raw

PATCH v4 10/10 x86/pks: Add PKS test code

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

The core PKS functionality provides an interface for kernel users to reserve keys to their domains set up the page tables with those keys and control access to those domains when needed.

Define test code which exercises the core functionality of PKS via a debugfs entry. Basic checks can be triggered on boot with a kernel command line option while both basic and preemption checks can be triggered with separate debugfs values.

debugfs controls are:

'0' -- Run access tests with a single pkey
'1' -- Set up the pkey register with no access for the pkey allocated to
this fd
'2' -- Check that the pkey register updated in '1' is still the same.
(To be used after a forced context switch.)
'3' -- Allocate all pkeys possible and run tests on each pkey allocated.
DEFAULT when run at boot.

Closing the fd will cleanup and release the pkey, therefore to exercise context switch testing a user space program is provided in:

	.../tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c

---
Changes from V3
Add test into ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
Fix allocate context error handling
Callback must now take pt_regs instead of irq_state Use pipes to ensure code switches contexts
Add more verbose output
Add --debug opt to trigger more kernel debug output
Reduce kernel output by default
Use #defines for the various options
Add ability to chose cpu for testing
Work out how to make pkrs_cache global when CONFIG_PKS_TEST=y Comments from Dan Williams:
Remove walk_table in favor of follow_pte Adjust for new MASK and SHIFT macros Remove unneeded pkey.h header Handle_pks_testing -> handle_pks_test Retain static pkrs_cache when not test s/PKS_TESTING/PKS_TEST/
Put pks_test_callback declaration in pks_common.h Don't export pks_test_callback
Add comment explaining context creation Remove module boilerplate

Changes for V2
Fix compilation errors

Changes for V1
Update for new pks_key_alloc()

Changes from RFC V3
Comments from Dave Hansen
clean up whitespace dmanage
Clean up Kconfig help
Clean up user test error output
s/pks_mknoaccess/pks_mk_noaccess/
s/pks_mkread/pks_mk_readonly/
s/pks_mkrdwr/pks_mk_readwrite/
Comments from Jing Han
Remove duplicate stdio.h

---
 Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst |   5 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h                 |  19 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                        |  15 +
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                        |   2 +-
 lib/Kconfig.debug                          |  11 +
 lib/Makefile                               |   3 +
 lib/pks/Makefile                           |   3 +
 lib/pks/pks_test.c                         | 693 +++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/Kconfig                                 |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile       |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c     | 150 +++++
 11 files changed, 903 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 lib/pks/Makefile
 create mode 100644 lib/pks/pks_test.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c
Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst +4 -1
index 6d6c4f25080c..2bcbb991231b 100644
@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ PTE adds this additional protection to the page.
 
 Kernel users intending to use PKS support should check (depend on)
 ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS and add their config to ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
-to turn on this support within the core.
+to turn on this support within the core.  See the test configuration option
+'PKS_TEST' for an example.
 
         int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user);
         #define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey)
@@ -170,3 +171,5 @@ text:
 	affected by PKRU register will not execute (even transiently)
 	until all prior executions of WRPKRU have completed execution
 	and updated the PKRU register.
+
+Example code can be found in lib/pks/pks_test.c
arch/x86/include/asm/pks.h +19 -0
index 4891c9aa8fc7..9e71322b0cf2 100644
@@ -32,4 +32,23 @@ static inline void show_extended_regs_oops(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
 
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PKS_TEST
+
+#define __static_or_pks_test
+
+bool handle_pks_test(unsigned long hw_error_code, struct pt_regs *regs);
+bool pks_test_callback(struct pt_regs *regs);
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_PKS_TEST */
+
+#define __static_or_pks_test static
+
+static inline bool handle_pks_test(unsigned long hw_error_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_PKS_TEST */
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PKS_H */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +15 -0
index 0c36ce2f6abf..764d2fbb6c72 100644
@@ -1134,6 +1134,19 @@ bool fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address)
 	return address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PKS_TEST
+bool handle_pks_test(unsigned long hw_error_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If we get a protection key exception it could be because we
+	 * are running the PKS test.  If so, pks_test_callback() will
+	 * clear the protection mechanism and return true to indicate
+	 * the fault was handled.
+	 */
+	return (hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK) && pks_test_callback(regs);
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Called for all faults where 'address' is part of the kernel address
  * space.  Might get called for faults that originate from *code* that
@@ -1150,6 +1163,8 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS))
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);
 
+	if (handle_pks_test(hw_error_code, regs))
+		return;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +1 -1
index 47d29707ac39..2dd1feeff9f6 100644
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ u32 update_pkey_val(u32 pk_reg, int pkey, unsigned int flags)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
 
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, pkrs_cache);
+__static_or_pks_test DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, pkrs_cache);
 
 /*
  * write_pkrs() optimizes MSR writes by maintaining a per cpu cache which can
lib/Kconfig.debug +11 -0
index 2779c29d9981..b7728ed139f9 100644
@@ -2535,6 +2535,17 @@ config HYPERV_TESTING
 	help
 	  Select this option to enable Hyper-V vmbus testing.
 
+config PKS_TEST
+	bool "PKey (S)upervisor testing"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+	help
+	  Select this option to enable testing of PKS core software and
+	  hardware.  The PKS core provides a mechanism to allocate keys as well
+	  as maintain the protection settings across context switches.
+	  Answer N if you don't know what supervisor keys are.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 endmenu # "Kernel Testing and Coverage"
 
 source "Documentation/Kconfig"
lib/Makefile +3 -0
index b5307d3eec1a..3606b97e12e0 100644
@@ -354,3 +354,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BITS_TEST) += test_bits.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CMDLINE_KUNIT_TEST) += cmdline_kunit.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED) += devmem_is_allowed.o
+
+# PKS test
+obj-y += pks/
lib/pks/Makefile new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9daccba4f7c4
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKS_TEST) += pks_test.o
lib/pks/pks_test.c new file +693 -0

693 lines not on this page · raw message

mm/Kconfig +2 -1
index c7d1fc780358..463e95ea0df1 100644
@@ -811,7 +811,8 @@ config ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 config ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
 	bool
 config ARCH_ENABLE_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
-	bool
+	def_bool y
+	depends on PKS_TEST
 
 config PERCPU_STATS
 	bool "Collect percpu memory statistics"
tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile +2 -1
index 333980375bc7..32fe0414c6af 100644
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ CAN_BUILD_WITH_NOPIE := $(shell ./check_cc.sh $(CC) trivial_program.c -no-pie)
 TARGETS_C_BOTHBITS := single_step_syscall sysret_ss_attrs syscall_nt test_mremap_vdso \
 			check_initial_reg_state sigreturn iopl ioperm \
 			test_vsyscall mov_ss_trap \
-			syscall_arg_fault fsgsbase_restore
+			syscall_arg_fault fsgsbase_restore test_pks
+
 TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \
 			test_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \
 			vdso_restorer
tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c new file +150 -0

150 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9