perf/binfmt/mm: remove in-tree usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE
Subsystems (6)
cover perf/binfmt/mm: remove in-tree usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE
Stumbling over the history of MAP_EXECUTABLE, I noticed that we still have some in-tree users that we can get rid of.
A good fit for the whole series could be Andrew's tree.
David Hildenbrand (3):
perf: MAP_EXECUTABLE does not indicate VM_MAYEXEC
binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE
mm: ignore MAP_EXECUTABLE in ksys_mmap_pgoff()
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 4 ++-- fs/binfmt_aout.c | 4 ++-- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +- fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 11 ++--------- fs/binfmt_flat.c | 2 +- include/linux/mman.h | 2 ++ kernel/events/core.c | 2 -- mm/mmap.c | 2 +- mm/nommu.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH 1/3 perf: MAP_EXECUTABLE does not indicate VM_MAYEXEC
Before commit e9714acf8c43 ("mm: kill vma flag VM_EXECUTABLE and mm->num_exe_file_vmas"), VM_EXECUTABLE indicated MAP_EXECUTABLE. MAP_EXECUTABLE is nowadays essentially ignored by the kernel and does not relate to VM_MAYEXEC.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +0 -2
@@ -8186,8 +8186,6 @@ static void perf_event_mmap_event(struct perf_mmap_event *mmap_event)if (vma->vm_flags &VM_DENYWRITE ) flags |=MAP_DENYWRITE ; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_MAYEXEC ) - flags |=MAP_EXECUTABLE ;if (vma->vm_flags &VM_LOCKED ) flags |=MAP_LOCKED ;if (is_vm_hugetlb_page (vma))
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH 2/3 binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE
In reply to David HildenbrandEver since commit e9714acf8c43 ("mm: kill vma flag VM_EXECUTABLE and mm->num_exe_file_vmas"), VM_EXECUTABLE is gone and MAP_EXECUTABLE is essentially completely ignored. Let's remove all usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE.
--- arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 4 ++-- fs/binfmt_aout.c | 4 ++-- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +- fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 11 ++--------- fs/binfmt_flat.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c +2 -2
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) error =vm_mmap (bprm->file,N_TXTADDR (ex), ex.a_text,PROT_READ |PROT_EXEC ,MAP_FIXED |MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE | -MAP_EXECUTABLE |MAP_32BIT , +MAP_32BIT , fd_offset);if (error !=N_TXTADDR (ex))
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) error =vm_mmap (bprm->file,N_DATADDR (ex), ex.a_data,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC ,MAP_FIXED |MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE | -MAP_EXECUTABLE |MAP_32BIT , +MAP_32BIT , fd_offset + ex.a_text);if (error !=N_DATADDR (ex))return error;
fs/binfmt_aout.c +2 -2
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm) error =vm_mmap (bprm->file,N_TXTADDR (ex), ex.a_text,PROT_READ |PROT_EXEC , -MAP_FIXED |MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE |MAP_EXECUTABLE , + MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE; fd_offset);if (error !=N_TXTADDR (ex))
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm) error =vm_mmap (bprm->file,N_DATADDR (ex), ex.a_data,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC , -MAP_FIXED |MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE |MAP_EXECUTABLE , + MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE; fd_offset + ex.a_text);if (error !=N_DATADDR (ex))return error;
fs/binfmt_elf.c +1 -1
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) elf_prot =make_prot (elf_ppnt->p_flags, &arch_state, !!interpreter, false); - elf_flags =MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE |MAP_EXECUTABLE ; + elf_flags =MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE ; vaddr = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr;/*
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +2 -9
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ static int elf_fdpic_map_file_constdisp_on_uclinux( {struct elf32_fdpic_loadseg *seg;struct elf32_phdr *phdr; -unsigned long load_addr, base =ULONG_MAX , top =0 , maddr =0 , mflags; +unsigned long load_addr, base =ULONG_MAX , top =0 , maddr =0 ;int loop, ret; load_addr = params->load_addr;
@@ -948,12 +948,8 @@ static int elf_fdpic_map_file_constdisp_on_uclinux( }/* allocate one big anon block for everything */ - mflags =MAP_PRIVATE ; -if (params->flags &ELF_FDPIC_FLAG_EXECUTABLE ) - mflags |=MAP_EXECUTABLE ; - maddr =vm_mmap (NULL , load_addr, top - base, -PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC , mflags,0 ); +PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC ,MAP_PRIVATE ,0 );if (IS_ERR_VALUE (maddr))return (int ) maddr;
@@ -1046,9 +1042,6 @@ static int elf_fdpic_map_file_by_direct_mmap(struct elf_fdpic_params *params,if (phdr->p_flags &PF_X ) prot |=PROT_EXEC ; flags =MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE ; -if (params->flags &ELF_FDPIC_FLAG_EXECUTABLE ) - flags |=MAP_EXECUTABLE ; - maddr =0 ;switch (params->flags &ELF_FDPIC_FLAG_ARRANGEMENT ) {
fs/binfmt_flat.c +1 -1
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,pr_debug ("ROM mapping of file (we hope)\n" ); textpos =vm_mmap (bprm->file,0 , text_len,PROT_READ |PROT_EXEC , -MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_EXECUTABLE ,0 ); +MAP_PRIVATE ,0 );if (!textpos ||IS_ERR_VALUE (textpos)) { ret = textpos;if (!textpos)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Re: [PATCH v1 2/3] binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE
Quoted 6 lines · David Hildenbrand
Ever since commit
e9714acf8c43("mm: kill vma flagVM_EXECUTABLEandmm->num_exe_file_vmas"),VM_EXECUTABLEis gone andMAP_EXECUTABLEis essentially completely ignored. Let's remove all usage ofMAP_EXECUTABLE.Signed-off-by David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
[...]
fs/binfmt_aout.c static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm) · line 225
Quoted 7 lines
+++
b/fs/binfmt_aout.cfs/binfmt_aout.c +1
-1@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm) error =vm_mmap (bprm->file,N_TXTADDR (ex), ex.a_text,PROT_READ |PROT_EXEC , - MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE, + MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE;
As reported by kernel test robot, this line should end with a ","
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm) · line 234
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c +1
-1fd_offset);if (error !=N_TXTADDR (ex))@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm) error =vm_mmap (bprm->file,N_DATADDR (ex), ex.a_data,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC , -MAP_FIXED |MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE |MAP_EXECUTABLE , + MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE; fd_offset + ex.a_text);
dito
@Andrew, I think this resides your tree. Can you fix that up or shall I resend the series, or only this individual patch?
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
PATCH 3/3 mm: ignore MAP_EXECUTABLE in ksys_mmap_pgoff()
In reply to David HildenbrandLet's also remove masking off MAP_EXECUTABLE from ksys_mmap_pgoff():
the last in-tree occurrence of MAP_EXECUTABLE is now in LEGACY_MAP_MASK, which accepts the flag e.g., for MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE; however, the flag is ignored throughout the kernel now.
Add a comment to LEGACY_MAP_MASK stating that MAP_EXECUTABLE is ignored.
--- include/linux/mman.h | 2 ++ mm/mmap.c | 2 +- mm/nommu.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/mman.h +2 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@/* * The historical set of flags that all mmap implementations implicitly * support when a ->mmap_validate() op is not provided in file_operations. +* +* MAP_EXECUTABLE is completely ignored throughout the kernel. */ #define LEGACY_MAP_MASK (MAP_SHARED \ | MAP_PRIVATE \
mm/mmap.c +1 -1
@@ -1627,7 +1627,7 @@ unsigned long ksys_mmap_pgoff(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,return PTR_ERR (file); } - flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE |MAP_DENYWRITE ); + flags &= ~MAP_DENYWRITE ; retval =vm_mmap_pgoff (file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff); out_fput:
mm/nommu.c +1 -1
@@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@ unsigned long ksys_mmap_pgoff(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, goto out; } - flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE |MAP_DENYWRITE ); + flags &= ~MAP_DENYWRITE ; retval =vm_mmap_pgoff (file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Quoted 4 lines · David Hildenbrand
Stumbling over the history of
MAP_EXECUTABLE, I noticed that we still have some in-tree users that we can get rid of.A good fit for the whole series could be Andrew's tree.
In general this looks like a good cleanup.
As far as I can see we can go after MAP_DENYWRITE the same way. Today deny_write_access in open_exec is what causes -ETXTBSY when attempting to write to file that is current executing.
Do you have any plans to look at that?
Eric
Quoted 40 lines
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>Cc Greg Ungerer <[email protected]>Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Kevin Brodsky <[email protected]>Cc Michal Hocko <[email protected]>Cc Feng Tang <[email protected]>Cc Don Zickus <[email protected]>David Hildenbrand (3):
perf:MAP_EXECUTABLEdoes not indicateVM_MAYEXEC
binfmt: remove in-tree usage ofMAP_EXECUTABLE
mm: ignoreMAP_EXECUTABLEinksys_mmap_pgoff()arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 4 ++-- fs/binfmt_aout.c | 4 ++-- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +- fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 11 ++--------- fs/binfmt_flat.c | 2 +- include/linux/mman.h | 2 ++ kernel/events/core.c | 2 -- mm/mmap.c | 2 +- mm/nommu.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Kees Cook
Reviewed-byQuoted 10 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 4 lines · David Hildenbrand
Stumbling over the history of
MAP_EXECUTABLE, I noticed that we still have some in-tree users that we can get rid of.A good fit for the whole series could be Andrew's tree.
In general this looks like a good cleanup.
Yeah, the PROT_EXEC parts are the only piece with meaning in the exec allocations.
Quoted 3 lines
As far as I can see we can go after
MAP_DENYWRITEthe same way. Todaydeny_write_accessinopen_execis what causes-ETXTBSYwhen attempting to write to file that is current executing.
Oh, interesting point. I didn't realize MAP_DENYWRITE was separate from deny_write_access().
-Kees
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 9 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 4 lines · David Hildenbrand
Stumbling over the history of
MAP_EXECUTABLE, I noticed that we still have some in-tree users that we can get rid of.A good fit for the whole series could be Andrew's tree.
In general this looks like a good cleanup.
Quoted 7 lines
As far as I can see we can go after
MAP_DENYWRITEthe same way. Todaydeny_write_accessinopen_execis what causes-ETXTBSYwhen attempting to write to file that is current executing.Do you have any plans to look at that?
I did have a look and thought about ripping out MAP_DENYWRITE; I'm still in the process of connecting the pieces.
Some VM_DENYWRITE e.g., in mm/khugepaged.c still gives me a headache , and I'll have to double-check whether it would be okay to just fallback on checking the actual vm->file.
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb