staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning
PATCH v2 1/1 staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
gcc gets confused by some of the type casts and produces an apparently senseless warning about an out-of-bound memcpy to an unrelated array in the same structure:
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c: In function 'rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption':
cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] In file included from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/drv_types.h:32,
from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c:10:
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [184, 4264] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4
98 | u32 dot11AuthAlgrthm; /* 802.11 auth, could be open, shared, 8021x and authswitch */
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [264, 4344] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4
This is a known gcc bug, and the patch here is only a workaround, but the approach of using a temporary variable to hold a pointer to the key also improves readability in addition to avoiding the warning, so overall this should still help.
---
v2: revert unrelated changes in the patch, pointed out by
Dan Carpenter
--- .../staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c | 23 +++++++++++-------- .../staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 21 +++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c +13 -10
@@ -523,6 +523,9 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pastruct mlme_priv *pmlmepriv = &padapter->mlmepriv;struct security_priv *psecuritypriv = &(padapter->securitypriv);struct sta_priv *pstapriv = &padapter->stapriv; +char *grpkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; +char *txkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; +char *rxkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; param->u.crypt.err =0 ; param->u.crypt.alg[IEEE_CRYPT_ALG_NAME_LEN -1 ] ='\0' ;
@@ -605,7 +608,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa {if (strcmp (param->u.crypt.alg,"WEP" ) ==0 ) { -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_;if (param->u.crypt.key_len ==13 )
@@ -618,12 +621,12 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));/* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16 ]),8 ); -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24 ]),8 ); +memcpy (txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16 ]),8 ); +memcpy (rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24 ]),8 ); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true;
@@ -632,7 +635,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else {
@@ -709,7 +712,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa {if (strcmp (param->u.crypt.alg,"WEP" ) ==0 ) { -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_;if (param->u.crypt.key_len ==13 )
@@ -721,12 +724,12 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));/* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16 ]),8 ); -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24 ]),8 ); +memcpy (txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16 ]),8 ); +memcpy (rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24 ]),8 ); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true;
@@ -735,7 +738,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else {
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +12 -9
@@ -2963,6 +2963,9 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,struct mlme_priv *pmlmepriv = &padapter->mlmepriv;struct security_priv *psecuritypriv = &(padapter->securitypriv);struct sta_priv *pstapriv = &padapter->stapriv; +char *txkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; +char *rxkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; +char *grpkey = psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; param->u.crypt.err =0 ; param->u.crypt.alg[IEEE_CRYPT_ALG_NAME_LEN -1 ] ='\0' ;
@@ -3064,7 +3067,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,if (!psta &&check_fwstate (pmlmepriv,WIFI_AP_STATE )) {/* group key */ if (param->u.crypt.set_tx ==1 ) {if (strcmp (param->u.crypt.alg,"WEP" ) ==0 ) { -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_;if (param->u.crypt.key_len ==13 )
@@ -3073,11 +3076,11 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, }else if (strcmp (param->u.crypt.alg,"TKIP" ) ==0 ) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));/* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16 ]),8 ); +memcpy (txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16 ]),8 );memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24 ]),8 ); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true;
@@ -3086,7 +3089,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,else if (strcmp (param->u.crypt.alg,"CCMP" ) ==0 ) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); }else { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _NO_PRIVACY_; }
@@ -3142,7 +3145,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, }else {/* group key??? */ if (strcmp (param->u.crypt.alg,"WEP" ) ==0 ) { -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_;if (param->u.crypt.key_len ==13 )
@@ -3150,19 +3153,19 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, }else if (strcmp (param->u.crypt.alg,"TKIP" ) ==0 ) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));/* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16 ]),8 ); -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24 ]),8 ); +memcpy (txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16 ]),8 ); +memcpy (rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24 ]),8 ); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; }else if (strcmp (param->u.crypt.alg,"CCMP" ) ==0 ) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; -memcpy (psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); +memcpy (grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len >16 ?16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); }else { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _NO_PRIVACY_; }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Arnd Bergmann
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
gcc gets confused by some of the type casts and produces an apparently senseless warning about an out-of-bound memcpy to an unrelated array in the same structure:
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c: In function 'rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption':
cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] In file included fromdrivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/drv_types.h:32,from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c:10: drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [184, 4264] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4 98 | u32 dot11AuthAlgrthm; /* 802.11 auth, could be open, shared, 8021x and authswitch */ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Quoted 7 lines
cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [264, 4344] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4This is a known gcc bug, and the patch here is only a workaround, but the approach of using a temporary variable to hold a pointer to the key also improves readability in addition to avoiding the warning, so overall this should still help.
What version of gcc causes this? Should this go into 5.13-final and be backported? Or is this only showing up on "unreleased" versions of gcc and it is safe to wait until 5.14?
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 18 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 16 lines · Arnd Bergmann
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
gcc gets confused by some of the type casts and produces an apparently senseless warning about an out-of-bound memcpy to an unrelated array in the same structure:
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c: In function 'rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption':
cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] In file included fromdrivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/drv_types.h:32,from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c:10: drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [184, 4264] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4 98 | u32 dot11AuthAlgrthm; /* 802.11 auth, could be open, shared, 8021x and authswitch */ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [264, 4344] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
This is a known gcc bug, and the patch here is only a workaround, but the approach of using a temporary variable to hold a pointer to the key also improves readability in addition to avoiding the warning, so overall this should still help.
What version of gcc causes this? Should this go into 5.13-final and be backported? Or is this only showing up on "unreleased" versions of gcc and it is safe to wait until 5.14?
As I understand, this is related to
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99673
gcc-11.1.0 has now been released and it produces this warning.
Arnd
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 25 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 23 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 20 lines · Arnd Bergmann
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
gcc gets confused by some of the type casts and produces an apparently senseless warning about an out-of-bound memcpy to an unrelated array in the same structure:
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c: In function 'rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption':
cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] In file included fromdrivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/drv_types.h:32,from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c:10: drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [184, 4264] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4 98 | u32 dot11AuthAlgrthm; /* 802.11 auth, could be open, shared, 8021x and authswitch */ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [264, 4344] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4This is a known gcc bug, and the patch here is only a workaround, but the approach of using a temporary variable to hold a pointer to the key also improves readability in addition to avoiding the warning, so overall this should still help.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
What version of gcc causes this? Should this go into 5.13-final and be backported? Or is this only showing up on "unreleased" versions of gcc and it is safe to wait until 5.14?
As I understand, this is related to
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99673gcc-11.1.0 has now been released and it produces this warning.
What's the odds we can get gcc to fix their bug, as it's not a kernel issue? :)
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
What version of gcc causes this? Should this go into 5.13-final and be backported? Or is this only showing up on "unreleased" versions of gcc and it is safe to wait until 5.14?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As I understand, this is related to
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99673gcc-11.1.0 has now been released and it produces this warning.
What's the odds we can get gcc to fix their bug, as it's not a kernel issue? :)
I think there is a high chance it will get fixed in gcc-11.2 or 12.1, but anyone using gcc-11.1 will still have the problem.
Arnd
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 12 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 11 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
What version of gcc causes this? Should this go into 5.13-final and be backported? Or is this only showing up on "unreleased" versions of gcc and it is safe to wait until 5.14?
As I understand, this is related to
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99673
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
gcc-11.1.0 has now been released and it produces this warning.
What's the odds we can get gcc to fix their bug, as it's not a kernel issue? :)
I think there is a high chance it will get fixed in gcc-11.2 or 12.1, but anyone using gcc-11.1 will still have the problem.
Ugh, ok, I'll queue it up for 5.13-final.
thanks,
greg k-h