dnsproxy: Check the length of buffers before memcpy
PATCH 1/1 dnsproxy: Check the length of buffers before memcpy
From: Valery Kashcheev <[email protected]>
Fix using a stack-based buffer overflow attack by checking the length of the ptr and uptr buffers.
Fix debug message output.
Fixes CVE-2021-33833
--- src/dnsproxy.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
src/dnsproxy.c +11 -9
@@ -1788,17 +1788,15 @@ static char *uncompress(int16_t field_count, char *start, char *end,* tmp buffer. */ -debug ("pos %d ulen %d left %d name %s" , pos, ulen, - (int )(uncomp_len - (uptr - uncompressed)), uptr); - - ulen =strlen (name); -if ((uptr + ulen +1 ) > uncomp_end) { + ulen =strlen (name) +1 ; +if ((uptr + ulen) > uncomp_end) goto out; - } -strncpy (uptr, name, uncomp_len - (uptr - uncompressed)); +strncpy (uptr, name, ulen); + +debug ("pos %d ulen %d left %d name %s" , pos, ulen, + (int )(uncomp_end - (uptr + ulen)), uptr); uptr += ulen; - *uptr++ ='\0' ; ptr += pos;
@@ -1841,7 +1839,7 @@ static char *uncompress(int16_t field_count, char *start, char *end, }else if (dns_type == ns_t_a || dns_type == ns_t_aaaa) { dlen = uptr[-2 ] <<8 | uptr[-1 ]; -if (ptr + dlen > end) { +if ((ptr + dlen) > end || (uptr + dlen) > uncomp_end) {debug ("data len %d too long" , dlen); goto out; }
@@ -1880,6 +1878,10 @@ static char *uncompress(int16_t field_count, char *start, char *end,* refresh interval, retry interval, expiration * limit and minimum ttl). They are 20 bytes long. */ +if ((uptr +20 ) > uncomp_end || (ptr +20 ) > end) { +debug ("soa record too long" ); + goto out; + }memcpy (uptr, ptr,20 ); uptr +=20 ; ptr +=20 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Hi,
Quoted 8 lines · Daniel Wagner
From: Valery Kashcheev <[email protected]>
Fix using a stack-based buffer overflow attack by checking the length of the ptr and uptr buffers.
Fix debug message output.
Fixes CVE-2021-33833
Patch applied.
Thanks,
Daniel