perf: Require CAP_KILL if sigtrap is requested
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 perf: Require CAP_KILL if sigtrap is requested
If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability.
Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.
Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not supposed to supersede the ptrace_may_access() check. At a high level we now have:
capable of CAP_PERFMON and (CAP_KILL if sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access() // also checks for same thread-group and uid
---
v2:
* Drop kill_capable() and just check CAP_KILL (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).
* Use ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL) to check for capability in target task's ns (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).
--- kernel/events/core.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/core.c +14 -1
@@ -12152,10 +12152,23 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (task) { +bool is_capable; + err =down_read_interruptible (&task->signal->exec_update_lock);if (err) goto err_file; + is_capable =perfmon_capable (); +if (attr.sigtrap) { +/* +* perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other +* task. Require the current task to have CAP_KILL. +*/ +rcu_read_lock (); + is_capable &=ns_capable (__task_cred (task)->user_ns,CAP_KILL ); +rcu_read_unlock (); + } +/* * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. *
@@ -12165,7 +12178,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). */ err = -EACCES ; -if (!perfmon_capable () && !ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) +if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) goto err_cred; }
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog
Quoted 9 lines · Marco Elver
If
perf_event_open()is called with another task as target andperf_event_attr::sigtrapis set, and the target task's user does not match the calling user, also require theCAP_KILLcapability.Otherwise, with the
CAP_PERFMONcapability alone it would be possible for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.
Quoted 7 lines
Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not supposed to supersede the
ptrace_may_access()check. At a high level we now have:capable of
CAP_PERFMONand (CAP_KILLif sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access()// also checks for same thread-group and uid
Is there anyway we could have a comment that makes the required capability checks clear?
Basically I see an inlined version of kill_ok_by_cred being implemented without the comments on why the various pieces make sense.
Certainly ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) should not be a check to allow writing/changing a task. It needs to be PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS, like /proc/self/mem uses.
Now in practice I think your patch probably has the proper checks in place for sending a signal but it is far from clear.
Eric
Quoted 49 lines
Fixes 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")Cc <[email protected]> # 5.13+Reported-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Marco Elver <[email protected]>---
v2:
* Dropkill_capable()and just checkCAP_KILL(reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).
* Usens_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL)to check for capability in target task's ns (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).--- kernel/events/core.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/events/core.c +14
-1@@ -12152,10 +12152,23 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (task) { +bool is_capable; + err =down_read_interruptible (&task->signal->exec_update_lock);if (err) goto err_file; + is_capable =perfmon_capable (); +if (attr.sigtrap) { +/* +* perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other +* task. Require the current task to have CAP_KILL. +*/ +rcu_read_lock (); + is_capable &=ns_capable (__task_cred (task)->user_ns,CAP_KILL ); +rcu_read_unlock (); + } +/* * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. * @@ -12165,7 +12178,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). */ err = -EACCES ; -if (!perfmon_capable () && !ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) +if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) goto err_cred; }
Quoted 20 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 9 lines · Marco Elver
If
perf_event_open()is called with another task as target andperf_event_attr::sigtrapis set, and the target task's user does not match the calling user, also require theCAP_KILLcapability.Otherwise, with the
CAP_PERFMONcapability alone it would be possible for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.Quoted 7 lines
Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not supposed to supersede the
ptrace_may_access()check. At a high level we now have:capable of
CAP_PERFMONand (CAP_KILLif sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access()// also checks for same thread-group and uid
Quoted 5 lines
Is there anyway we could have a comment that makes the required capability checks clear?
Basically I see an inlined version of
kill_ok_by_credbeing implemented without the comments on why the various pieces make sense.
I'll add more comments. It probably also makes sense to factor the code here into its own helper.
Quoted 3 lines
Certainly
ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)should not be a check to allow writing/changing a task. It needs to bePTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS, like/proc/self/memuses.
So if attr.sigtrap the checked ptrace mode needs to switch to PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS. Otherwise, it is possible to send a signal if only read-ptrace permissions are granted.
Is my assumption here correct?
Quoted 2 lines
Now in practice I think your patch probably has the proper checks in place for sending a signal but it is far from clear.
Thanks,
-- Marco