Skip to contentSkip to conversation

perf: Fix required permissions if sigtrap is requested

PATCH Applied Marco Elver 4 participants 8 messages Jul 5, 2021 – Jul 27, 2021

Subsystems (3)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/2 perf: Fix required permissions if sigtrap is requested

If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability or PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH permissions.

Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.

Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not supposed to supersede the ptrace_may_access() check. At a high level we now have:

capable of CAP_PERFMON and (CAP_KILL if sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access(...) // also checks for same thread-group and uid

Fixes 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Cc <[email protected]> # 5.13+

---
v3:
* Upgrade ptrace mode check to ATTACH if attr.sigtrap, otherwise it's possible to change the target task (send signal) even if only read ptrace permissions were granted (reported by Eric W. Biederman).

v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
* Drop kill_capable() and just check CAP_KILL (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).
* Use ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL) to check for capability in target task's ns (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).

v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/core.c +24 -1
index fe88d6eea3c2..f79ee82e644a 100644
@@ -12152,10 +12152,33 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (task) {
+		unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
+		bool is_capable;
+
 		err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
 		if (err)
 			goto err_file;
 
+		is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+		if (attr.sigtrap) {
+			/*
+			 * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
+			 * task. Require the current task to also have
+			 * CAP_KILL.
+			 */
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+
+			/*
+			 * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
+			 * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
+			 * sending signals can effectively change the target
+			 * task.
+			 */
+			ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
+		}
+
 		/*
 		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
 		 *
@@ -12165,7 +12188,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/2 perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission()

Refactor the permission check in perf_event_open() into a helper perf_check_permission(). This makes the permission check logic more readable (because we no longer have a negated disjunction). Add a comment mentioning the ptrace check also checks the uid.

No functional change intended.

---
v3:
* Introduce this patch to refactor the permissions checking logic to make it more readable (reported by Eric W. Biederman).

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +32 -26
index f79ee82e644a..3008b986994b 100644
@@ -11912,6 +11912,37 @@ __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(struct perf_event *group_leader,
 	return gctx;
 }
 
+static bool
+perf_check_permission(struct perf_event_attr *attr, struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
+	bool is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+
+	if (attr->sigtrap) {
+		/*
+		 * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other task.
+		 * Require the current task to also have CAP_KILL.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		/*
+		 * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks for
+		 * ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since sending signals
+		 * can effectively change the target task.
+		 */
+		ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. The
+	 * ptrace check also includes checks that the current task and other
+	 * task have matching uids, and is therefore not done here explicitly.
+	 */
+	return is_capable || ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode);
+}
+
 /**
  * sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
  *
@@ -12152,43 +12183,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (task) {
-		unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
-		bool is_capable;
-
 		err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
 		if (err)
 			goto err_file;
 
-		is_capable = perfmon_capable();
-		if (attr.sigtrap) {
-			/*
-			 * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
-			 * task. Require the current task to also have
-			 * CAP_KILL.
-			 */
-			rcu_read_lock();
-			is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-
-			/*
-			 * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
-			 * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
-			 * sending signals can effectively change the target
-			 * task.
-			 */
-			ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
-		}
-
 		/*
-		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
-		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_lock across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
 		 * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
+		if (!perf_check_permission(&attr, task))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog
Reviewed-by on v3 2/2
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission()

Quoted 9 lines · Marco Elver

Refactor the permission check in perf_event_open() into a helper perf_check_permission(). This makes the permission check logic more readable (because we no longer have a negated disjunction). Add a comment mentioning the ptrace check also checks the uid.

No functional change intended.

Quoted 98 lines

---
v3:
* Introduce this patch to refactor the permissions checking logic to make it more readable (reported by Eric W. Biederman).

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +32 -27
index f79ee82e644a..3008b986994b 100644
@@ -11912,6 +11912,37 @@ __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(struct perf_event *group_leader,
        return gctx;
 }
 
+static bool
+perf_check_permission(struct perf_event_attr *attr, struct task_struct *task)
+{
+       unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
+       bool is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+
+       if (attr->sigtrap) {
+               /*
+                * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other task.
+                * Require the current task to also have CAP_KILL.
+                */
+               rcu_read_lock();
+               is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
+               rcu_read_unlock();
+
+               /*
+                * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks for
+                * ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since sending signals
+                * can effectively change the target task.
+                */
+               ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
+       }
+
+       /*
+        * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. The
+        * ptrace check also includes checks that the current task and other
+        * task have matching uids, and is therefore not done here explicitly.
+        */
+       return is_capable || ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode);
+}
+
 /**
  * sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
  *
@@ -12152,43 +12183,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
        }
 
        if (task) {
-               unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
-               bool is_capable;
-
                err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
                if (err)
                        goto err_file;
 
-               is_capable = perfmon_capable();
-               if (attr.sigtrap) {
-                       /*
-                        * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
-                        * task. Require the current task to also have
-                        * CAP_KILL.
-                        */
-                       rcu_read_lock();
-                       is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
-                       rcu_read_unlock();
-
-                       /*
-                        * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
-                        * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
-                        * sending signals can effectively change the target
-                        * task.
-                        */
-                       ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
-               }
-
                /*
-                * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
-                *
                 * We must hold exec_update_lock across this and any potential
                 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
                 * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
                 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
                 */
                err = -EACCES;
-               if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
+               if (!perf_check_permission(&attr, task))
                        goto err_cred;
        }
 
--

2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog

merge bot Applied
#3 lore raw

[tip: perf/urgent] perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission()

In reply to Marco Elver
The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:

The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     b068fc04de10fff8974f6ef32b861ad134d94ba4
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/b068fc04de10fff8974f6ef32b861ad134d94ba4
Author:        Marco Elver <[email protected]>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 05 Jul 2021 10:44:53 +02:00
Committer:     Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
CommitterDate: Fri, 16 Jul 2021 18:46:38 +02:00

perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission()

Refactor the permission check in perf_event_open() into a helper perf_check_permission(). This makes the permission check logic more readable (because we no longer have a negated disjunction). Add a comment mentioning the ptrace check also checks the uid.

No functional change intended.

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +32 -26
index c13730b..1cb1f9b 100644
@@ -11917,6 +11917,37 @@ again:
 	return gctx;
 }
 
+static bool
+perf_check_permission(struct perf_event_attr *attr, struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
+	bool is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+
+	if (attr->sigtrap) {
+		/*
+		 * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other task.
+		 * Require the current task to also have CAP_KILL.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		/*
+		 * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks for
+		 * ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since sending signals
+		 * can effectively change the target task.
+		 */
+		ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. The
+	 * ptrace check also includes checks that the current task and other
+	 * task have matching uids, and is therefore not done here explicitly.
+	 */
+	return is_capable || ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode);
+}
+
 /**
  * sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
  *
@@ -12158,43 +12189,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (task) {
-		unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
-		bool is_capable;
-
 		err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
 		if (err)
 			goto err_file;
 
-		is_capable = perfmon_capable();
-		if (attr.sigtrap) {
-			/*
-			 * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
-			 * task. Require the current task to also have
-			 * CAP_KILL.
-			 */
-			rcu_read_lock();
-			is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-
-			/*
-			 * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
-			 * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
-			 * sending signals can effectively change the target
-			 * task.
-			 */
-			ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
-		}
-
 		/*
-		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
-		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_lock across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
 		 * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
+		if (!perf_check_permission(&attr, task))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 
Acked-by on v3 1/2
#4 lore raw
In reply to Marco Elver
Quoted 15 lines · Marco Elver

If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability or PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH permissions.

Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.

Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not supposed to supersede the ptrace_may_access() check. At a high level we now have:

Quoted 8 lines

capable of CAP_PERFMON and (CAP_KILL if sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access(...) // also checks for same thread-group and uid

Fixes 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Cc <[email protected]> # 5.13+
Quoted 66 lines

---
v3:
* Upgrade ptrace mode check to ATTACH if attr.sigtrap, otherwise it's possible to change the target task (send signal) even if only read ptrace permissions were granted (reported by Eric W. Biederman).

v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
* Drop kill_capable() and just check CAP_KILL (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).
* Use ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL) to check for capability in target task's ns (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).

v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/core.c +24 -2
index fe88d6eea3c2..f79ee82e644a 100644
@@ -12152,10 +12152,33 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
        }
 
        if (task) {
+               unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
+               bool is_capable;
+
                err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
                if (err)
                        goto err_file;
 
+               is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+               if (attr.sigtrap) {
+                       /*
+                        * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
+                        * task. Require the current task to also have
+                        * CAP_KILL.
+                        */
+                       rcu_read_lock();
+                       is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
+                       rcu_read_unlock();
+
+                       /*
+                        * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
+                        * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
+                        * sending signals can effectively change the target
+                        * task.
+                        */
+                       ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
+               }
+
                /*
                 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
                 *
@@ -12165,7 +12188,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
                 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
                 */
                err = -EACCES;
-               if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+               if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
                        goto err_cred;
        }
 
--

2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog

#5 lore raw
In reply to Marco Elver

It'd be good to get this sorted -- please take another look.

Many thanks,
-- Marco

Quoted 88 lines · Marco Elver

If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability or PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH permissions.

Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.

Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not supposed to supersede the ptrace_may_access() check. At a high level we now have:

capable of CAP_PERFMON and (CAP_KILL if sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access(...) // also checks for same thread-group and uid

Fixes 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Cc <[email protected]> # 5.13+

---
v3:
* Upgrade ptrace mode check to ATTACH if attr.sigtrap, otherwise it's possible to change the target task (send signal) even if only read ptrace permissions were granted (reported by Eric W. Biederman).

v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
* Drop kill_capable() and just check CAP_KILL (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).
* Use ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL) to check for capability in target task's ns (reported by Ondrej Mosnacek).

v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/core.c +24 -2
index fe88d6eea3c2..f79ee82e644a 100644
@@ -12152,10 +12152,33 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
        }
 
        if (task) {
+               unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
+               bool is_capable;
+
                err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
                if (err)
                        goto err_file;
 
+               is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+               if (attr.sigtrap) {
+                       /*
+                        * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
+                        * task. Require the current task to also have
+                        * CAP_KILL.
+                        */
+                       rcu_read_lock();
+                       is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
+                       rcu_read_unlock();
+
+                       /*
+                        * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
+                        * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
+                        * sending signals can effectively change the target
+                        * task.
+                        */
+                       ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
+               }
+
                /*
                 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
                 *
@@ -12165,7 +12188,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
                 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
                 */
                err = -EACCES;
-               if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+               if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
                        goto err_cred;
        }
 
--

2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog

maintainer
#6 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · Marco Elver

It'd be good to get this sorted -- please take another look.

Thanks!

I'll queue them into perf/urgent.

merge bot Applied
#7 lore raw
In reply to Marco Elver
The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:

The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     9d7a6c95f62bc335b62aaf9d50590122bd03a796
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/9d7a6c95f62bc335b62aaf9d50590122bd03a796
Author:        Marco Elver <[email protected]>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 05 Jul 2021 10:44:52 +02:00
Committer:     Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
CommitterDate: Fri, 16 Jul 2021 18:46:38 +02:00

perf: Fix required permissions if sigtrap is requested

If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability or PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH permissions.

Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.

Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not supposed to supersede the ptrace_may_access() check. At a high level we now have:

capable of CAP_PERFMON and (CAP_KILL if sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access(...) // also checks for same thread-group and uid

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/core.c +24 -1
index 4649170..c13730b 100644
@@ -12158,10 +12158,33 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (task) {
+		unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
+		bool is_capable;
+
 		err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
 		if (err)
 			goto err_file;
 
+		is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+		if (attr.sigtrap) {
+			/*
+			 * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
+			 * task. Require the current task to also have
+			 * CAP_KILL.
+			 */
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+
+			/*
+			 * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
+			 * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
+			 * sending signals can effectively change the target
+			 * task.
+			 */
+			ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
+		}
+
 		/*
 		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
 		 *
@@ -12171,7 +12194,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}