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ipv6: tcp: drop silly ICMPv6 packet too big messages

PATCH Superseded Eric Dumazet 4 participants 5 messages Jul 8, 2021

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 ipv6: tcp: drop silly ICMPv6 packet too big messages

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

While TCP stack scales reasonably well, there is still one part that can be used to DDOS it.

IPv6 Packet too big messages have to lookup/insert a new route, and if abused by attackers, can easily put hosts under high stress, with many cpus contending on a spinlock while one is stuck in fib6_run_gc()

ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu()
icmpv6_rcv()
icmpv6_notify()
tcp_v6_err()

    tcp_v6_mtu_reduced()
     inet6_csk_update_pmtu()
      ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
       __ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
        ip6_rt_cache_alloc()
         ip6_dst_alloc()
          dst_alloc()
           ip6_dst_gc()
            fib6_run_gc()
             spin_lock_bh() ...

Some of our servers have been hit by malicious ICMPv6 packets trying to _increase_ the MTU/MSS of TCP flows.

We believe these ICMPv6 packets are a result of a bug in one ISP stack, since they were blindly sent back for _every_ (small) packet sent to them.

These packets are for one TCP flow:
09:24:36.266491 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240 09:24:36.266509 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240 09:24:36.316688 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240 09:24:36.316704 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240 09:24:36.608151 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240

TCP stack can filter some silly requests :

1) MTU below IPV6_MIN_MTU can be filtered early in tcp_v6_err()
2) tcp_v6_mtu_reduced() can drop requests trying to increase current MSS.

This tests happen before the IPv6 routing stack is entered, thus removing the potential contention and route exhaustion.

Note that IPv6 stack was performing these checks, but too late (ie : after the route has been added, and after the potential garbage collect war)

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>

---
v2: fix typo caught by Martin, thanks !

 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +17 -2
index 593c32fe57ed13a218492fd6056f2593e601ec79..323989927a0a6a2274bcbc1cd0ac72e9d49b24ad 100644
@@ -348,11 +348,20 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 static void tcp_v6_mtu_reduced(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
+	u32 mtu;
 
 	if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE))
 		return;
 
-	dst = inet6_csk_update_pmtu(sk, READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->mtu_info));
+	mtu = READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->mtu_info);
+
+	/* Drop requests trying to increase our current mss.
+	 * Check done in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() is too late.
+	 */
+	if (tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, mtu) >= tcp_sk(sk)->mss_cache)
+		return;
+
+	dst = inet6_csk_update_pmtu(sk, mtu);
 	if (!dst)
 		return;
 
@@ -433,6 +442,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
 	}
 
 	if (type == ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG) {
+		u32 mtu = ntohl(info);
+
 		/* We are not interested in TCP_LISTEN and open_requests
 		 * (SYN-ACKs send out by Linux are always <576bytes so
 		 * they should go through unfragmented).
@@ -443,7 +454,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
 		if (!ip6_sk_accept_pmtu(sk))
 			goto out;
 
-		WRITE_ONCE(tp->mtu_info, ntohl(info));
+		if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+			goto out;
+
+		WRITE_ONCE(tp->mtu_info, mtu);
+
 		if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
 			tcp_v6_mtu_reduced(sk);
 		else if (!test_and_set_bit(TCP_MTU_REDUCED_DEFERRED,
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog
#1 lore raw
Quoted 109 lines · Eric Dumazet

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

While TCP stack scales reasonably well, there is still one part that can be used to DDOS it.

IPv6 Packet too big messages have to lookup/insert a new route, and if abused by attackers, can easily put hosts under high stress, with many cpus contending on a spinlock while one is stuck in fib6_run_gc()

ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu()
icmpv6_rcv()
icmpv6_notify()
tcp_v6_err()

    tcp_v6_mtu_reduced()
     inet6_csk_update_pmtu()
      ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
       __ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
        ip6_rt_cache_alloc()
         ip6_dst_alloc()
          dst_alloc()
           ip6_dst_gc()
            fib6_run_gc()
             spin_lock_bh() ...

Some of our servers have been hit by malicious ICMPv6 packets trying to _increase_ the MTU/MSS of TCP flows.

We believe these ICMPv6 packets are a result of a bug in one ISP stack, since they were blindly sent back for _every_ (small) packet sent to them.

These packets are for one TCP flow:
09:24:36.266491 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240 09:24:36.266509 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240 09:24:36.316688 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240 09:24:36.316704 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240 09:24:36.608151 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240

TCP stack can filter some silly requests :

1) MTU below IPV6_MIN_MTU can be filtered early in tcp_v6_err()
2) tcp_v6_mtu_reduced() can drop requests trying to increase current MSS.

This tests happen before the IPv6 routing stack is entered, thus removing the potential contention and route exhaustion.

Note that IPv6 stack was performing these checks, but too late (ie : after the route has been added, and after the potential garbage collect war)

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>

---
v2: fix typo caught by Martin, thanks !

 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +17 -3
index 593c32fe57ed13a218492fd6056f2593e601ec79..323989927a0a6a2274bcbc1cd0ac72e9d49b24ad 100644
@@ -348,11 +348,20 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 static void tcp_v6_mtu_reduced(struct sock *sk)
 {
        struct dst_entry *dst;
+       u32 mtu;
 
        if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE))
                return;
 
-       dst = inet6_csk_update_pmtu(sk, READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->mtu_info));
+       mtu = READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->mtu_info);
+
+       /* Drop requests trying to increase our current mss.
+        * Check done in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() is too late.
+        */
+       if (tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, mtu) >= tcp_sk(sk)->mss_cache)
+               return;
+
+       dst = inet6_csk_update_pmtu(sk, mtu);
        if (!dst)
                return;
 
@@ -433,6 +442,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
        }
 
        if (type == ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG) {
+               u32 mtu = ntohl(info);
+
                /* We are not interested in TCP_LISTEN and open_requests
                 * (SYN-ACKs send out by Linux are always <576bytes so
                 * they should go through unfragmented).
@@ -443,7 +454,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
                if (!ip6_sk_accept_pmtu(sk))
                        goto out;
 
-               WRITE_ONCE(tp->mtu_info, ntohl(info));
+               if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+                       goto out;
+
+               WRITE_ONCE(tp->mtu_info, mtu);
+
                if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
                        tcp_v6_mtu_reduced(sk);
                else if (!test_and_set_bit(TCP_MTU_REDUCED_DEFERRED,
--
Quoted 1 line

2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog

(this looks fine)

btw. is there a need/desire for a similar change for ipv4?

#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

On Wed, Jul 7, 2021 at 11:50 PM Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> wrote:

(this looks fine)

btw. is there a need/desire for a similar change for ipv4?

My understanding is that in IPv4, the relevant check is done before the FIB lookup, we should be fine.

#4 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · David Miller

tcp_mtu_to_mss needs to be exported

Arg, right you are.

Thanks !