ARM64: Provide the ARM64_TBI option
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 ARM64: Provide the ARM64_TBI option
The ARM64 provides the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) early on, so the kernel turns TBI on by default, but, it does not provide any option to turn the feature off.
In ARMv8.3, the Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced, and if TBI is turned off, the PA will be able to use the top byte, resulting longer pointer authentication codes, which is more secure.
This patch changes the default support for the TBI to an option that can be turned off.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 6 +++++- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h | 5 +++++ lib/Kconfig.kasan | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -357,6 +357,10 @@ source "arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms" menu "Kernel Features" +config ARM64_TBI + bool "Enable support for Top Byte Ignore (TBI)" + default y + menu "ARM errata workarounds via the alternatives framework" config ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
@@ -1212,6 +1216,7 @@ config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN config ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI bool "Enable the tagged user addresses syscall ABI" default y + depends on ARM64_TBI help When this option is enabled, user applications can opt in to a relaxed ABI via prctl() allowing tagged addresses to be passed
@@ -1649,6 +1654,7 @@ config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE config ARM64_MTE bool "Memory Tagging Extension support" default y + depends on ARM64_TBI depends on ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE && ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI depends on AS_HAS_ARMV8_5 depends on AS_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +5 -1
@@ -215,8 +215,12 @@ static inline unsigned long kaslr_offset(void)* up with a tagged userland pointer. Clear the tag to get a sane pointer to * pass on to access_ok(), for instance. */ -#define __untagged_addr (addr) \ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TBI +#define __untagged_addr (addr) \ ((__force __typeof__(addr))sign_extend64((__force u64)(addr), 55)) +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_TBI */ +#define __untagged_addr (addr) (addr) +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_TBI */ #define untagged_addr (addr) ({ \ u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr); \
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h +5 -0
@@ -264,8 +264,13 @@#define TCR_IPS_MASK (UL(7) << TCR_IPS_SHIFT)#define TCR_A1 (UL(1) << 22)#define TCR_ASID16 (UL(1) << 36) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TBI #define TCR_TBI0 (UL(1) << 37)#define TCR_TBI1 (UL(1) << 38) +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_TBI */ +#define TCR_TBI0 (UL(0) << 37) +#define TCR_TBI1 (UL(0) << 38) +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_TBI */ #define TCR_HA (UL(1) << 39)#define TCR_HD (UL(1) << 40)#define TCR_TBID1 (UL(1) << 52)
lib/Kconfig.kasan +2 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ config KASAN_GENERIC config KASAN_SW_TAGS bool "Software tag-based mode" + depends on ARM64_TBI depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB select CONSTRUCTORS
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ config KASAN_SW_TAGS config KASAN_HW_TAGS bool "Hardware tag-based mode" + depends on ARM64_TBI depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS depends on SLUB help
Signature · 7 lines
2.17.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Quoted 9 lines · Yuan Li
The ARM64 provides the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) early on, so the kernel turns TBI on by default, but, it does not provide any option to turn the feature off.
In ARMv8.3, the Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced, and if TBI is turned off, the PA will be able to use the top byte, resulting longer pointer authentication codes, which is more secure.
This patch changes the default support for the TBI to an option that can be turned off.
This would have to be something that processes explicitly opt in to. See Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst - silently disabling TBI0 *will* break existing userspace software.
Robin.
Quoted 89 lines
Signed-off-by Yuan Li <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 6 +++++- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h | 5 +++++ lib/Kconfig.kasan | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/arm64/Kconfig +6
-0@@ -357,6 +357,10 @@ source "arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms" menu "Kernel Features" +config ARM64_TBI + bool "Enable support for Top Byte Ignore (TBI)" + default y + menu "ARM errata workarounds via the alternatives framework" config ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE@@ -1212,6 +1216,7 @@ config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN config ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI bool "Enable the tagged user addresses syscall ABI" default y + depends on ARM64_TBI help When this option is enabled, user applications can opt in to a relaxed ABI via prctl() allowing tagged addresses to be passed@@ -1649,6 +1654,7 @@ config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE config ARM64_MTE bool "Memory Tagging Extension support" default y + depends on ARM64_TBI depends on ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE && ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI depends on AS_HAS_ARMV8_5 depends on AS_HAS_LSE_ATOMICSarch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +5
-1@@ -215,8 +215,12 @@ static inline unsigned long kaslr_offset(void)* up with a tagged userland pointer. Clear the tag to get a sane pointer to * pass on to access_ok(), for instance. */ -#define __untagged_addr (addr) \ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TBI +#define __untagged_addr (addr) \ ((__force __typeof__(addr))sign_extend64((__force u64)(addr), 55)) +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_TBI */ +#define __untagged_addr (addr) (addr) +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_TBI */ #define untagged_addr (addr) ({ \ u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr); \arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h +5
-0@@ -264,8 +264,13 @@#define TCR_IPS_MASK (UL(7) << TCR_IPS_SHIFT)#define TCR_A1 (UL(1) << 22)#define TCR_ASID16 (UL(1) << 36) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TBI #define TCR_TBI0 (UL(1) << 37)#define TCR_TBI1 (UL(1) << 38) +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_TBI */ +#define TCR_TBI0 (UL(0) << 37) +#define TCR_TBI1 (UL(0) << 38) +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_TBI */ #define TCR_HA (UL(1) << 39)#define TCR_HD (UL(1) << 40)#define TCR_TBID1 (UL(1) << 52)lib/Kconfig.kasan +1
-0@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ config KASAN_GENERIC config KASAN_SW_TAGS bool "Software tag-based mode" + depends on ARM64_TBI depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB select CONSTRUCTORS
lib/Kconfig.kasan config KASAN_SW_TAGS · line 115
Quoted 7 lines
lib/Kconfig.kasan +1
-0@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ config KASAN_SW_TAGS config KASAN_HW_TAGS bool "Hardware tag-based mode" + depends on ARM64_TBI depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS depends on SLUB help
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Will Deacon
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 7 lines · Yuan Li
The ARM64 provides the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) early on, so the kernel turns TBI on by default, but, it does not provide any option to turn the feature off.
In ARMv8.3, the Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced, and if TBI is turned off, the PA will be able to use the top byte, resulting longer pointer authentication codes, which is more secure.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This patch changes the default support for the TBI to an option that can be turned off.
This would have to be something that processes explicitly opt in to. See
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst- silently disabling TBI0 *will* break existing userspace software.
Maybe the patch from Peter:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
is a better starting point?
Will
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Quoted 16 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 8 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 7 lines · Yuan Li
The ARM64 provides the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) early on, so the kernel turns TBI on by default, but, it does not provide any option to turn the feature off.
In ARMv8.3, the Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced, and if TBI is turned off, the PA will be able to use the top byte, resulting longer pointer authentication codes, which is more secure.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This patch changes the default support for the TBI to an option that can be turned off.
This would have to be something that processes explicitly opt in to. See
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst- silently disabling TBI0 *will* break existing userspace software.
Quoted 5 lines
Maybe the patch from Peter:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
is a better starting point?
Yeah, a command-line opt-in is certainly a more reasonable approach. However it still seems to me that it would make most sense as a per-process thing like the tagged address syscall ABI, since it's of no automatic benefit to existing software built without pointer auth, and AFAICS it's really up to individual programs whether they care more about stronger signing than tagged pointers. It was bad enough when we changed the VA_BITS default to 48 and discovered just how many things were using the Mozilla JIT, so I'm not sure I relish the thought of going through the same process with TBI0 ;)
Come to think of it I guess any option should probably disable the tagged address syscall ABI, as that doesn't make much sense without TBI0. Are we likely to want a signed pointer syscall ABI as well?
Robin.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Quoted 35 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 16 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 8 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 7 lines · Yuan Li
The ARM64 provides the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) early on, so the kernel turns TBI on by default, but, it does not provide any option to turn the feature off.
In ARMv8.3, the Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced, and if TBI is turned off, the PA will be able to use the top byte, resulting longer pointer authentication codes, which is more secure.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This patch changes the default support for the TBI to an option that can be turned off.
This would have to be something that processes explicitly opt in to. See
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst- silently disabling TBI0 *will* break existing userspace software.Quoted 5 lines
Maybe the patch from Peter:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
is a better starting point?
Yeah, a command-line opt-in is certainly a more reasonable approach. However it still seems to me that it would make most sense as a per-process thing like the tagged address syscall ABI, since it's of no automatic benefit to existing software built without pointer auth, and AFAICS it's really up to individual programs whether they care more about stronger signing than tagged pointers. It was bad enough when we changed the
VA_BITSdefault to 48 and discovered just how many things were using the Mozilla JIT, so I'm not sure I relish the thought of going through the same process with TBI0 ;)
Quoted 5 lines
Come to think of it I guess any option should probably disable the tagged address syscall ABI, as that doesn't make much sense without TBI0. Are we likely to want a signed pointer syscall ABI as well?
Robin.
Bear in mind that disabling TBI0 disables the ability to use MTE. At least from our perspective, MTE is considered a more valuable mitigation than PAC. That's why we're only intending to disable TBI for code pointers, not for data pointers (via TBID0).
As Catalin wrote in [1], having this be a per-process option would be more expensive, and may even be infeasible with the current architecture. That's why we decided to go with a command line option.
Peter
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Quoted 42 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 35 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 16 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 8 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 7 lines · Yuan Li
The ARM64 provides the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) early on, so the kernel turns TBI on by default, but, it does not provide any option to turn the feature off.
In ARMv8.3, the Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced, and if TBI is turned off, the PA will be able to use the top byte, resulting longer pointer authentication codes, which is more secure.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This patch changes the default support for the TBI to an option that can be turned off.
This would have to be something that processes explicitly opt in to. See
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst- silently disabling TBI0 *will* break existing userspace software.Quoted 5 lines
Maybe the patch from Peter:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
is a better starting point?
Yeah, a command-line opt-in is certainly a more reasonable approach. However it still seems to me that it would make most sense as a per-process thing like the tagged address syscall ABI, since it's of no automatic benefit to existing software built without pointer auth, and AFAICS it's really up to individual programs whether they care more about stronger signing than tagged pointers. It was bad enough when we changed the
VA_BITSdefault to 48 and discovered just how many things were using the Mozilla JIT, so I'm not sure I relish the thought of going through the same process with TBI0 ;)Quoted 5 lines
Come to think of it I guess any option should probably disable the tagged address syscall ABI, as that doesn't make much sense without TBI0. Are we likely to want a signed pointer syscall ABI as well?
Robin.
Quoted 8 lines
Bear in mind that disabling TBI0 disables the ability to use MTE. At least from our perspective, MTE is considered a more valuable mitigation than PAC. That's why we're only intending to disable TBI for code pointers, not for data pointers (via TBID0).
As Catalin wrote in [1], having this be a per-process option would be more expensive, and may even be infeasible with the current architecture. That's why we decided to go with a command line option.
Ah, now it starts to make more sense, thanks for the prod. TBH I'm not sure I'd even noticed that PAuth added that subtlety, and I definitely failed to read your patch closely enough :)
Quoted 1 line
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
No argument with the reasoning on that thread from me - looks like you're at least as wary as I am. Sorry for the confusion!
Cheers,
Robin.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
MTE is indeed strong mitigation, but I'm curious that when will commercial chips featuring MTE be carried out :)
Or we would have to depend on other mitigations like PAC for a while.
Thanks.
Wende
Quoted 42 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 31 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 11 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 10 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 9 lines · Yuan Li
The ARM64 provides the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) early on, so the kernel turns TBI on by default, but, it does not provide any option to turn the feature off.
In ARMv8.3, the Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced, and if TBI is turned off, the PA will be able to use the top byte, resulting longer pointer authentication codes, which is more secure.
This patch changes the default support for the TBI to an option that can be turned off.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
This would have to be something that processes explicitly opt in to. See
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst- silently disabling TBI0 *will* break existing userspace software.Maybe the patch from Peter:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
is a better starting point?
Yeah, a command-line opt-in is certainly a more reasonable approach. However it still seems to me that it would make most sense as a per-process thing like the tagged address syscall ABI, since it's of no automatic benefit to existing software built without pointer auth, and AFAICS it's really up to individual programs whether they care more about stronger signing than tagged pointers. It was bad enough when we changed the
VA_BITSdefault to 48 and discovered just how many things were using the Mozilla JIT, so I'm not sure I relish the thought of going through the same process with TBI0 ;)Quoted 5 lines
Come to think of it I guess any option should probably disable the tagged address syscall ABI, as that doesn't make much sense without TBI0. Are we likely to want a signed pointer syscall ABI as well?
Robin.
Bear in mind that disabling TBI0 disables the ability to use MTE. At least from our perspective, MTE is considered a more valuable mitigation than PAC. That's why we're only intending to disable TBI for code pointers, not for data pointers (via TBID0).
Quoted 7 lines
As Catalin wrote in [1], having this be a per-process option would be more expensive, and may even be infeasible with the current architecture. That's why we decided to go with a command line option.
Peter
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel