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rtw88: Fix out-of-bounds write

PATCH In review Len Baker 3 participants 6 messages Jul 16, 2021 – Jul 18, 2021

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Len Baker

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 rtw88: Fix out-of-bounds write

In the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function the "if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal to GENMASK(11, 0) or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However the rx_ring->buf has a size of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM (defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed the rx_ring->buff size.

However, this overflow never happens due to the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring is only ever called with a fixed constant of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.

Cc: [email protected]
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1461515 ("Out-of-bounds write")

Fixes e3037485c68ec ("rtw88: new Realtek 802.11ac driver")

---
Changelog v1 -> v2
- Remove the macro ARRAY_SIZE from the for loop (Pkshih, Brian Norris).
- Add a new check for the len variable (Pkshih, Brian Norris).

 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +5 -0
index e7d17ab8f113..53dc90276693 100644
@@ -273,6 +273,11 @@ static int rtw_pci_init_rx_ring(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (len > ARRAY_SIZE(rx_ring->buf)) {
+		rtw_err(rtwdev, "len %d exceeds maximum RX ring buffer\n", len);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	head = dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev, ring_sz, &dma, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!head) {
 		rtw_err(rtwdev, "failed to allocate rx ring\n");

--
2.25.1

Reviewed-by on v2 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Len Baker

In the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function the "if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal to GENMASK(11, 0) or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However the rx_ring->buf has a size of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM (defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed the rx_ring->buff size.

Quoted 7 lines

However, this overflow never happens due to the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring is only ever called with a fixed constant of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.

This kinda seems excessive, considering we absolutely know this is not currently a bug. But then, LWN nicely highlighted this thread, which reminds me that even without the Cc stable, this is likely to unnecessarily get picked up:

https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/

And I guess silencing Coverity is a desirable goal in many cases, even if Coverity is being a bit trigger-happy.

So, *shrug*.

Quoted 7 lines

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1461515 ("Out-of-bounds write")

Fixes e3037485c68ec ("rtw88: new Realtek 802.11ac driver")

---
Changelog v1 -> v2
- Remove the macro ARRAY_SIZE from the for loop (Pkshih, Brian Norris).
- Add a new check for the len variable (Pkshih, Brian Norris).

Thanks.

maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Len Baker
Quoted 7 lines · Len Baker

In the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function the "if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal to GENMASK(11, 0) or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However the rx_ring->buf has a size of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM (defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed the rx_ring->buff size.

Quoted 5 lines

However, this overflow never happens due to the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring is only ever called with a fixed constant of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.

If this can never happen, then no, this is not needed. Why would you check twice for the same thing?

thanks,

greg k-h

author
#3 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 7 lines · Len Baker

In the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function the "if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal to GENMASK(11, 0) or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However the rx_ring->buf has a size of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM (defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed the rx_ring->buff size.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

However, this overflow never happens due to the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring is only ever called with a fixed constant of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.

If this can never happen, then no, this is not needed.

Then, if this can never happen, the current check would not be necessary either.

Quoted 1 line

Why would you check twice for the same thing?

Ok, it makes no sense to double check the "len" variable twice. So, I propose to modify the current check as follows:

drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +2 -2
index e7d17ab8f113..0fd140523868 100644
@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@ static int rtw_pci_init_rx_ring(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev,
        int i, allocated;
        int ret = 0;
 
-       if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK) {
-               rtw_err(rtwdev, "len %d exceeds maximum RX entries\n", len);
+       if (len > ARRAY_SIZE(rx_ring->buf)) {
+               rtw_err(rtwdev, "len %d exceeds maximum RX ring buffer\n", len);
                return -EINVAL;
        }
 

This way the overflow can never happen with the current call to rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function or with a future call with a "len" parameter greater than 512. What do you think?

If there are no objections I will send a v3 for review.

Another question: If this can never happen should I include the "Fixes" tag, "Addresses-Coverity-ID" tag and Cc to stable?

Thanks,
Len

Quoted 4 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 44 lines · Len Baker
Quoted 8 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 7 lines · Len Baker

In the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function the "if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal to GENMASK(11, 0) or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However the rx_ring->buf has a size of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM (defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed the rx_ring->buff size.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

However, this overflow never happens due to the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring is only ever called with a fixed constant of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.

If this can never happen, then no, this is not needed.

Then, if this can never happen, the current check would not be necessary either.

Quoted 1 line

Why would you check twice for the same thing?

Ok, it makes no sense to double check the "len" variable twice. So, I propose to modify the current check as follows:

drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +2 -2
index e7d17ab8f113..0fd140523868 100644
@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@ static int rtw_pci_init_rx_ring(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev,
        int i, allocated;
        int ret = 0;
 
-       if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK) {
-               rtw_err(rtwdev, "len %d exceeds maximum RX entries\n", len);
+       if (len > ARRAY_SIZE(rx_ring->buf)) {
+               rtw_err(rtwdev, "len %d exceeds maximum RX ring buffer\n", len);
                return -EINVAL;
        }
 

This way the overflow can never happen with the current call to rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function or with a future call with a "len" parameter greater than 512. What do you think?

Quoted 4 lines

If there are no objections I will send a v3 for review.

Another question: If this can never happen should I include the "Fixes" tag, "Addresses-Coverity-ID" tag and Cc to stable?

If it can never happen, why have this check at all?

Looks like a Coverity false positive?

thanks,

greg k-h

author
#5 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 2 lines · Len Baker

Another question: If this can never happen should I include the "Fixes" tag, "Addresses-Coverity-ID" tag and Cc to stable?

If it can never happen, why have this check at all?

Looks like a Coverity false positive?

Ok, then I will remove the check and I will send a patch for review.

Quoted 4 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

Regards,
Len