rtw88: Fix out-of-bounds write
PATCH v2 1/1 rtw88: Fix out-of-bounds write
In the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function the "if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal to GENMASK(11, 0) or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However the rx_ring->buf has a size of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM (defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed the rx_ring->buff size.
However, this overflow never happens due to the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring is only ever called with a fixed constant of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.
Cc: [email protected]
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1461515 ("Out-of-bounds write")
---
Changelog v1 -> v2
- Remove the macro ARRAY_SIZE from the for loop (Pkshih, Brian Norris).
- Add a new check for the len variable (Pkshih, Brian Norris).
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +5 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,11 @@ static int rtw_pci_init_rx_ring(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev,return -EINVAL ; } +if (len >ARRAY_SIZE (rx_ring->buf)) { +rtw_err (rtwdev,"len %d exceeds maximum RX ring buffer\n" , len); +return -EINVAL ; + } + head =dma_alloc_coherent (&pdev->dev, ring_sz, &dma,GFP_KERNEL );if (!head) {rtw_err (rtwdev,"failed to allocate rx ring\n" );
--
2.25.1
Quoted 8 lines · Len Baker
In the
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringfunction the "if (len >TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal toGENMASK(11, 0)or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However therx_ring->bufhas a size ofRTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM(defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed therx_ring->buffsize.
Quoted 7 lines
However, this overflow never happens due to the
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringis only ever called with a fixed constant ofRTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.
This kinda seems excessive, considering we absolutely know this is not currently a bug. But then, LWN nicely highlighted this thread, which reminds me that even without the Cc stable, this is likely to unnecessarily get picked up:
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
And I guess silencing Coverity is a desirable goal in many cases, even if Coverity is being a bit trigger-happy.
So, *shrug*.
Quoted 7 lines
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1461515 ("Out-of-bounds write")
Fixes e3037485c68ec ("rtw88: new Realtek 802.11ac driver")Signed-off-by Len Baker <[email protected]>---
Changelog v1 -> v2
- Remove the macroARRAY_SIZEfrom the for loop (Pkshih, Brian Norris).
- Add a new check for the len variable (Pkshih, Brian Norris).
Thanks.
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Len Baker
In the
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringfunction the "if (len >TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal toGENMASK(11, 0)or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However therx_ring->bufhas a size ofRTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM(defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed therx_ring->buffsize.
Quoted 5 lines
However, this overflow never happens due to the
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringis only ever called with a fixed constant ofRTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.
If this can never happen, then no, this is not needed. Why would you check twice for the same thing?
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 8 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 7 lines · Len Baker
In the
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringfunction the "if (len >TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal toGENMASK(11, 0)or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However therx_ring->bufhas a size ofRTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM(defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed therx_ring->buffsize.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
However, this overflow never happens due to the
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringis only ever called with a fixed constant ofRTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.If this can never happen, then no, this is not needed.
Then, if this can never happen, the current check would not be necessary either.
Quoted 1 line
Why would you check twice for the same thing?
Ok, it makes no sense to double check the "len" variable twice. So, I propose to modify the current check as follows:
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +2 -2
@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@ static int rtw_pci_init_rx_ring(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev,int i, allocated;int ret =0 ; -if (len >TRX_BD_IDX_MASK ) { -rtw_err (rtwdev,"len %d exceeds maximum RX entries\n" , len); +if (len >ARRAY_SIZE (rx_ring->buf)) { +rtw_err (rtwdev,"len %d exceeds maximum RX ring buffer\n" , len);return -EINVAL ; }
This way the overflow can never happen with the current call to rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function or with a future call with a "len" parameter greater than 512. What do you think?
If there are no objections I will send a v3 for review.
Another question: If this can never happen should I include the "Fixes" tag, "Addresses-Coverity-ID" tag and Cc to stable?
Thanks,
Len
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 44 lines · Len Baker
Quoted 8 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 7 lines · Len Baker
In the
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringfunction the "if (len >TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)" statement guarantees that len is less than or equal toGENMASK(11, 0)or in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However therx_ring->bufhas a size ofRTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM(defined as 512). This way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to the i variable can exceed therx_ring->buffsize.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
However, this overflow never happens due to the
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringis only ever called with a fixed constant ofRTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM. But it is better to be defensive in this case and add a new check to avoid overflows if this function is called in a future with a value greater than 512.If this can never happen, then no, this is not needed.
Then, if this can never happen, the current check would not be necessary either.
Quoted 1 line
Why would you check twice for the same thing?
Ok, it makes no sense to double check the "len" variable twice. So, I propose to modify the current check as follows:
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +2
-2@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@ static int rtw_pci_init_rx_ring(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev,int i, allocated;int ret =0 ; -if (len >TRX_BD_IDX_MASK ) { -rtw_err (rtwdev,"len %d exceeds maximum RX entries\n" , len); +if (len >ARRAY_SIZE (rx_ring->buf)) { +rtw_err (rtwdev,"len %d exceeds maximum RX ring buffer\n" , len);return -EINVAL ; }This way the overflow can never happen with the current call to
rtw_pci_init_rx_ringfunction or with a future call with a "len" parameter greater than 512. What do you think?
Quoted 4 lines
If there are no objections I will send a v3 for review.
Another question: If this can never happen should I include the "Fixes" tag, "Addresses-Coverity-ID" tag and Cc to stable?
If it can never happen, why have this check at all?
Looks like a Coverity false positive?
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 7 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 2 lines · Len Baker
Another question: If this can never happen should I include the "Fixes" tag, "Addresses-Coverity-ID" tag and Cc to stable?
If it can never happen, why have this check at all?
Looks like a Coverity false positive?
Ok, then I will remove the check and I will send a patch for review.
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
Regards,
Len