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admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst

PATCH Applied Fabio M. De Francesco 3 participants 3 messages Jul 21, 2021 – Jul 25, 2021

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PATCH 1/1 admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst

Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted".

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +5 -4
index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644
@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
 --------------------------------------------------------
 1. For MDS
 ~~~~~~~~~~
-Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
-user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
-which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
-attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
+Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in
+user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks
+which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it
+cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any
+combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
 
 2. For L1TF
 ~~~~~~~~~~~
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
Reviewed-by Joel Fernandes (Google) on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Fabio M. De Francesco

Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted".

thanks,

- Joel

Quoted 27 lines
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +5 -5
index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644
@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
 --------------------------------------------------------
 1. For MDS
 ~~~~~~~~~~
-Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
-user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
-which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
-attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
+Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in
+user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks
+which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it
+cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any
+combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
 
 2. For L1TF
 ~~~~~~~~~~~
--

2.32.0

maintainer Applied
#2 lore raw
In reply to Fabio M. De Francesco
Quoted 17 lines · Fabio M. De Francesco

Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted".

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +0 -0
index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644
@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
 --------------------------------------------------------
 1. For MDS

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve · line 188

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +5 -4
 ~~~~~~~~~~
-Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
-user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
-which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
-attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
+Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in
+user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks
+which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it
+cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any
+combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).

Applied, thanks. I took the liberty of reflowing that paragraph to keep the line lengths reasonable...

jon