admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted".
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +5 -4
@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve -------------------------------------------------------- 1. For MDS ~~~~~~~~~~ -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in +user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks +which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it +cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any +combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). 2. For L1TF ~~~~~~~~~~~
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
Quoted 7 lines · Fabio M. De Francesco
Rephrase the "For MDS" section in
core-scheduling.rstfor the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted".Suggested-by Vineeth Pillai <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fabio M. De Francesco <[email protected]>
thanks,
- Joel
Quoted 27 lines
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +5
-5@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve -------------------------------------------------------- 1. For MDS ~~~~~~~~~~ -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in +user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks +which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it +cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any +combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). 2. For L1TF ~~~~~~~~~~~ --2.32.0
Quoted 17 lines · Fabio M. De Francesco
Rephrase the "For MDS" section in
core-scheduling.rstfor the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted".Suggested-by Vineeth Pillai <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fabio M. De Francesco <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +0
-0@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve -------------------------------------------------------- 1. For MDS
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve · line 188
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +5
-4~~~~~~~~~~ -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in +user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks +which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it +cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any +combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
Applied, thanks. I took the liberty of reflowing that paragraph to keep the line lengths reasonable...
jon