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bpf: expand bpf_d_path helper allowlist

PATCH In review Hengqi Chen 4 participants 7 messages Jul 27, 2021 – Aug 5, 2021

Subsystems (4)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v5 cover bpf: expand bpf_d_path helper allowlist

This patch set adds more functions to bpf_d_path allowlist.

Patch 1 is prep work which updates resolve_btfids to emit warnings on missing symbols instead of aborting kernel build process.

Patch 2 expands bpf_d_path allowlist.

Changes since v4: [4]
- Addressed Andrii's comments. Update warning message.

Changes since v3: [3]
- Addressed Yonghong's comments. Sort allowlist and add security_bprm_*

Changes since v2: [2]
- Andrii suggested that we should first address an issue of .BTF_ids before adding more symbols to .BTF_ids. Fixed that.
- Yaniv proposed adding security_sb_mount and security_bprm_check. Added them.

Changes since v1: [1]
- Alexei and Yonghong suggested that bpf_d_path helper could also apply to vfs_* and security_file_* kernel functions. Added them.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/

Hengqi Chen (2):
tools/resolve_btfids: emit warnings and patch zero id for missing
symbols
bpf: expose bpf_d_path helper to vfs_* and security_* functions

 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c        | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c | 13 +++----
 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/2 tools/resolve_btfids: emit warnings and patch zero id for missing symbols

Kernel functions referenced by .BTF_ids may be changed from global to static and get inlined or get renamed/removed, and thus disappears from BTF. This causes kernel build failure when resolve_btfids do id patch for symbols in .BTF_ids in vmlinux. Update resolve_btfids to emit warning messages and patch zero id for missing symbols instead of aborting kernel build process.

---
 tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c | 13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c +7 -6
index 3ad9301b0f00..de6365b53c9c 100644
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static int compressed_section_fix(Elf *elf, Elf_Scn *scn, GElf_Shdr *sh)
 	sh->sh_addralign = expected;
 
 	if (gelf_update_shdr(scn, sh) == 0) {
-		printf("FAILED cannot update section header: %s\n",
+		pr_err("FAILED cannot update section header: %s\n",
 			elf_errmsg(-1));
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static int elf_collect(struct object *obj)
 
 	elf = elf_begin(fd, ELF_C_RDWR_MMAP, NULL);
 	if (!elf) {
+		close(fd);
 		pr_err("FAILED cannot create ELF descriptor: %s\n",
 			elf_errmsg(-1));
 		return -1;
@@ -484,7 +485,7 @@ static int symbols_resolve(struct object *obj)
 	err = libbpf_get_error(btf);
 	if (err) {
 		pr_err("FAILED: load BTF from %s: %s\n",
-			obj->path, strerror(-err));
+			obj->btf ?: obj->path, strerror(-err));
 		return -1;
 	}
 
@@ -555,8 +556,7 @@ static int id_patch(struct object *obj, struct btf_id *id)
 	int i;
 
 	if (!id->id) {
-		pr_err("FAILED unresolved symbol %s\n", id->name);
-		return -EINVAL;
+		pr_err("WARN: resolve_btfids: unresolved symbol %s\n", id->name);
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < id->addr_cnt; i++) {
@@ -734,8 +734,9 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
 
 	err = 0;
 out:
-	if (obj.efile.elf)
+	if (obj.efile.elf) {
 		elf_end(obj.efile.elf);
-	close(obj.efile.fd);
+		close(obj.efile.fd);
+	}
 	return err;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/2 bpf: expose bpf_d_path helper to vfs_* and security_* functions

In reply to Hengqi Chen

Add vfs_* and security_* to bpf_d_path allowlist, so that we can use bpf_d_path helper to extract full file path from these functions' arguments. This will help tools like BCC's filetop[1]/filelife to get full file path.

[1] https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/issues/3527

---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +56 -4
index c5e0b6a64091..e7b24abcf3bf 100644
@@ -849,18 +849,70 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz)
 
 BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_check)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committed_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committing_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_for_exec)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_from_file)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_alloc)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_fcntl)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_free)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_ioctl)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
 BTF_ID(func, security_file_permission)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_receive)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_set_fowner)
 BTF_ID(func, security_inode_getattr)
-BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
+BTF_ID(func, security_sb_mount)
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chmod)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chown)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chroot)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_link)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_mkdir)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_mknod)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_notify)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_rename)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_rmdir)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_symlink)
 BTF_ID(func, security_path_truncate)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_unlink)
 #endif
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
 BTF_ID(func, dentry_open)
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
 BTF_ID(func, filp_close)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_cancel_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_clone_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_copy_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_dedupe_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_dedupe_file_range_one)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fadvise)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fchmod)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fchown)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fsync)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fsync_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr_nosec)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iocb_iter_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iocb_iter_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_ioctl)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iter_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iter_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_llseek)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_lock_file)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_open)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_readv)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_setlease)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_setpos)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_statfs)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_test_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_utimes)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_writev)
 BTF_SET_END(btf_allowlist_d_path)
 
 static bool bpf_d_path_allowed(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/2] bpf: expose bpf_d_path helper to vfs_* and security_* functions

Quoted 17 lines · Hengqi Chen

Add vfs_* and security_* to bpf_d_path allowlist, so that we can use bpf_d_path helper to extract full file path from these functions' arguments. This will help tools like BCC's filetop[1]/filelife to get full file path.

[1] https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/issues/3527

---
  kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
  1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +0 -0
index c5e0b6a64091..e7b24abcf3bf 100644

kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz) · line 857

Quoted 9 lines
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +6 -0
@@ -849,18 +849,70 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz)
 
  BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path)
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_check)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committed_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committing_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_for_exec)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_from_file)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_alloc)

Did you actually try these out, e.g. attaching BPF progs invoking bpf_d_path() to all these, then generate some workload like kernel build for testing?

I presume not, since something like security_file_alloc() would crash the kernel. Right before it's called in __alloc_file() we fetch a struct file from kmemcache, and only populate f->f_cred there. Most LSMs, for example, only populate their secblob through the callback. If you call bpf_d_path(&file->f_path, ...) with it, you'll crash in d_path() when path->dentry->d_op is checked.. given f->f_path is all zeroed structure at that point.

Please do your due diligence and invest each of them manually, maybe the best way is to hack up small selftests for each enabled function that our CI can test run? Bit of a one-time effort, but at least it ensures that those additions are sane & checked.

Quoted 66 lines
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +50 -4
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_fcntl)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_free)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_ioctl)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
  BTF_ID(func, security_file_permission)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_receive)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_set_fowner)
  BTF_ID(func, security_inode_getattr)
-BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
+BTF_ID(func, security_sb_mount)
  #endif
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chmod)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chown)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chroot)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_link)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_mkdir)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_mknod)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_notify)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_rename)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_rmdir)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_symlink)
  BTF_ID(func, security_path_truncate)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_unlink)
  #endif
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
  BTF_ID(func, dentry_open)
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
  BTF_ID(func, filp_close)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_cancel_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_clone_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_copy_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_dedupe_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_dedupe_file_range_one)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fadvise)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fchmod)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fchown)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fsync)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fsync_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr_nosec)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iocb_iter_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iocb_iter_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_ioctl)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iter_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iter_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_llseek)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_lock_file)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_open)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_readv)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_setlease)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_setpos)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_statfs)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_test_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_utimes)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_writev)
  BTF_SET_END(btf_allowlist_d_path)
 
  static bool bpf_d_path_allowed(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/2] bpf: expose bpf_d_path helper to vfs_* and security_* functions

Quoted 39 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Quoted 17 lines · Hengqi Chen

Add vfs_* and security_* to bpf_d_path allowlist, so that we can use bpf_d_path helper to extract full file path from these functions' arguments. This will help tools like BCC's filetop[1]/filelife to get full file path.

[1] https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/issues/3527

---
  kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
  1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +0 -0
index c5e0b6a64091..e7b24abcf3bf 100644

kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz) · line 857

Quoted 9 lines
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +6 -0
@@ -849,18 +849,70 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz)
 
  BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path)
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_check)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committed_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committing_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_for_exec)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_from_file)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_alloc)

Did you actually try these out, e.g. attaching BPF progs invoking bpf_d_path() to all these, then generate some workload like kernel build for testing?

I presume not, since something like security_file_alloc() would crash the kernel. Right before it's called in __alloc_file() we fetch a struct file from kmemcache, and only populate f->f_cred there. Most LSMs, for example, only populate their secblob through the callback. If you call bpf_d_path(&file->f_path, ...) with it, you'll crash in d_path() when path->dentry->d_op is checked.. given f->f_path is all zeroed structure at that point.

Quoted 3 lines

Please do your due diligence and invest each of them manually, maybe the best way is to hack up small selftests for each enabled function that our CI can test run? Bit of a one-time effort, but at least it ensures that those additions are sane & checked.

I think it's actually a pretty fun exercise and a good selftest to have. We can have a selftest which will attach a simple BPF program just to grab a contents of btf_allowlist_d_path (with typeless ksyms, for instance). Then for each BTF ID in there, as a subtest, attach another BPF object with fentry BPF program doing something with d_path.

Hengqi, you'd need to have few variants for each possible position of file or path struct (e.g., file as first arg; as second arg; etc, same for hooks working with path directly), but I don't think that's going to be a lot of them.

So as Daniel said, a bit of a work, but we'll have a much better confidence that we are not accidentally opening a big kernel crashing loophole.

Quoted 68 lines
Quoted 67 lines
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +50 -4
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_fcntl)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_free)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_ioctl)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
  BTF_ID(func, security_file_permission)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_receive)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_set_fowner)
  BTF_ID(func, security_inode_getattr)
-BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
+BTF_ID(func, security_sb_mount)
  #endif
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chmod)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chown)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chroot)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_link)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_mkdir)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_mknod)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_notify)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_rename)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_rmdir)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_symlink)
  BTF_ID(func, security_path_truncate)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_unlink)
  #endif
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
  BTF_ID(func, dentry_open)
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
  BTF_ID(func, filp_close)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_cancel_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_clone_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_copy_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_dedupe_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_dedupe_file_range_one)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fadvise)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fchmod)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fchown)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fsync)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fsync_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr_nosec)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iocb_iter_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iocb_iter_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_ioctl)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iter_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iter_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_llseek)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_lock_file)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_open)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_readv)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_setlease)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_setpos)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_statfs)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_test_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_utimes)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_writev)
  BTF_SET_END(btf_allowlist_d_path)
 
  static bool bpf_d_path_allowed(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/2] bpf: expose bpf_d_path helper to vfs_* and security_* functions

Quoted 51 lines · Andrii Nakryiko
Quoted 39 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Quoted 17 lines · Hengqi Chen

Add vfs_* and security_* to bpf_d_path allowlist, so that we can use bpf_d_path helper to extract full file path from these functions' arguments. This will help tools like BCC's filetop[1]/filelife to get full file path.

[1] https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/issues/3527

---
  kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
  1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +0 -0
index c5e0b6a64091..e7b24abcf3bf 100644

kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz) · line 857

Quoted 9 lines
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +6 -0
@@ -849,18 +849,70 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz)
 
  BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path)
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_check)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committed_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committing_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_for_exec)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_from_file)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_alloc)

Did you actually try these out, e.g. attaching BPF progs invoking bpf_d_path() to all these, then generate some workload like kernel build for testing?

I presume not, since something like security_file_alloc() would crash the kernel. Right before it's called in __alloc_file() we fetch a struct file from kmemcache, and only populate f->f_cred there. Most LSMs, for example, only populate their secblob through the callback. If you call bpf_d_path(&file->f_path, ...) with it, you'll crash in d_path() when path->dentry->d_op is checked.. given f->f_path is all zeroed structure at that point.

Quoted 3 lines

Please do your due diligence and invest each of them manually, maybe the best way is to hack up small selftests for each enabled function that our CI can test run? Bit of a one-time effort, but at least it ensures that those additions are sane & checked.

I think it's actually a pretty fun exercise and a good selftest to have. We can have a selftest which will attach a simple BPF program just to grab a contents of btf_allowlist_d_path (with typeless ksyms, for instance). Then for each BTF ID in there, as a subtest, attach another BPF object with fentry BPF program doing something with d_path.

Quoted 9 lines

Hengqi, you'd need to have few variants for each possible position of file or path struct (e.g., file as first arg; as second arg; etc, same for hooks working with path directly), but I don't think that's going to be a lot of them.

So as Daniel said, a bit of a work, but we'll have a much better confidence that we are not accidentally opening a big kernel crashing loophole.

Thanks for the review and suggestions.

Will test them locally and add selftest for these changes.

Quoted 68 lines
Quoted 68 lines
Quoted 67 lines
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +50 -4
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_fcntl)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_free)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_ioctl)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
  BTF_ID(func, security_file_permission)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_receive)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_set_fowner)
  BTF_ID(func, security_inode_getattr)
-BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
+BTF_ID(func, security_sb_mount)
  #endif
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chmod)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chown)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_chroot)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_link)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_mkdir)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_mknod)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_notify)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_rename)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_rmdir)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_symlink)
  BTF_ID(func, security_path_truncate)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_unlink)
  #endif
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
  BTF_ID(func, dentry_open)
-BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
  BTF_ID(func, filp_close)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_cancel_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_clone_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_copy_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_dedupe_file_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_dedupe_file_range_one)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fadvise)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fchmod)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fchown)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fsync)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_fsync_range)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr_nosec)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iocb_iter_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iocb_iter_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_ioctl)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iter_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_iter_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_llseek)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_lock_file)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_open)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_read)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_readv)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_setlease)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_setpos)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_statfs)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_test_lock)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_utimes)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_write)
+BTF_ID(func, vfs_writev)
  BTF_SET_END(btf_allowlist_d_path)
 
  static bool bpf_d_path_allowed(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/2] bpf: expose bpf_d_path helper to vfs_* and security_* functions

Quoted 25 lines · Hengqi Chen
Quoted 21 lines · Andrii Nakryiko
Quoted 20 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Quoted 18 lines · Hengqi Chen

Add vfs_* and security_* to bpf_d_path allowlist, so that we can use bpf_d_path helper to extract full file path from these functions' arguments. This will help tools like BCC's filetop[1]/filelife to get full file path.

[1] https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/issues/3527

---
  kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
  1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +0 -0
index c5e0b6a64091..e7b24abcf3bf 100644
@@ -849,18 +849,70 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz)
 
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kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz) · line 857

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kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +6 -0
  BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path)
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_check)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committed_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_committing_creds)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_for_exec)
+BTF_ID(func, security_bprm_creds_from_file)
+BTF_ID(func, security_file_alloc)

You can also look at the set of LSM hooks that are allow listed for bpf_d_path:

https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c

you could refactor this set so that it also adds the corresponding security_* functions for tracing programs.

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Did you actually try these out, e.g. attaching BPF progs invoking bpf_d_path() to all these, then generate some workload like kernel build for testing?

I presume not, since something like security_file_alloc() would crash the kernel. Right before it's called in __alloc_file() we fetch a struct file from kmemcache, and only populate f->f_cred there. Most LSMs, for example, only populate their secblob through the callback. If you call bpf_d_path(&file->f_path, ...) with it, you'll crash in d_path() when path->dentry->d_op is checked.. given f->f_path is all zeroed structure at that point.

Please do your due diligence and invest each of them manually, maybe the best way is to hack up small selftests for each enabled function that our CI can test run? Bit of a one-time effort, but at least it ensures that those additions are sane & checked.

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I think it's actually a pretty fun exercise and a good selftest to have. We can have a selftest which will attach a simple BPF program just to grab a contents of btf_allowlist_d_path (with typeless ksyms, for instance). Then for each BTF ID in there, as a subtest, attach another BPF object with fentry BPF program doing something with d_path.

+1 Good idea!

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Hengqi, you'd need to have few variants for each possible position of file or path struct (e.g., file as first arg; as second arg; etc, same for hooks working with path directly), but I don't think that's going to be a lot of them.

So as Daniel said, a bit of a work, but we'll have a much better confidence that we are not accidentally opening a big kernel crashing loophole.

Thanks for the review and suggestions.

[...]

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