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xfs: prevent spoofing of rtbitmap blocks when recovering buffers

PATCH In review Darrick J. Wong 3 participants 3 messages Jul 27, 2021 – Jul 28, 2021 XFS filesystem

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PATCH 1/1 xfs: prevent spoofing of rtbitmap blocks when recovering buffers

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

While reviewing the buffer item recovery code, the thought occurred to
me: in V5 filesystems we use log sequence number (LSN) tracking to avoid replaying older metadata updates against newer log items. However, we use the magic number of the ondisk buffer to find the LSN of the ondisk metadata, which means that if an attacker can control the layout of the realtime device precisely enough that the start of an rt bitmap block matches the magic and UUID of some other kind of block, they can control the purported LSN of that spoofed block and thereby break log replay.

Since realtime bitmap and summary blocks don't have headers at all, we have no way to tell if a block really should be replayed. The best we can do is replay unconditionally and hope for the best.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c +12 -2
index 05fd816edf59..4775485b4062 100644
@@ -698,7 +698,8 @@ xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer(
 static xfs_lsn_t
 xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp,
-	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp,
+	struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f)
 {
 	uint32_t		magic32;
 	uint16_t		magic16;
@@ -706,11 +707,20 @@ xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(
 	void			*blk = bp->b_addr;
 	uuid_t			*uuid;
 	xfs_lsn_t		lsn = -1;
+	uint16_t		blft;
 
 	/* v4 filesystems always recover immediately */
 	if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
 		goto recover_immediately;
 
+	/*
+	 * realtime bitmap and summary file blocks do not have magic numbers or
+	 * UUIDs, so we must recover them immediately.
+	 */
+	blft = xfs_blft_from_flags(buf_f);
+	if (blft == XFS_BLFT_RTBITMAP_BUF || blft == XFS_BLFT_RTSUMMARY_BUF)
+		goto recover_immediately;
+
 	magic32 = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)blk);
 	switch (magic32) {
 	case XFS_ABTB_CRC_MAGIC:
@@ -920,7 +930,7 @@ xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2(
 	 * the verifier will be reset to match whatever recover turns that
 	 * buffer into.
 	 */
-	lsn = xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(mp, bp);
+	lsn = xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(mp, bp, buf_f);
 	if (lsn && lsn != -1 && XFS_LSN_CMP(lsn, current_lsn) >= 0) {
 		trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_skip(log, buf_f);
 		xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f, NULLCOMMITLSN);
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Darrick J. Wong

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

While reviewing the buffer item recovery code, the thought occurred to
me: in V5 filesystems we use log sequence number (LSN) tracking to avoid replaying older metadata updates against newer log items. However, we use the magic number of the ondisk buffer to find the LSN of the ondisk metadata, which means that if an attacker can control the layout of the realtime device precisely enough that the start of an rt bitmap block matches the magic and UUID of some other kind of block, they can control the purported LSN of that spoofed block and thereby break log replay.

Quoted 8 lines

Since realtime bitmap and summary blocks don't have headers at all, we have no way to tell if a block really should be replayed. The best we can do is replay unconditionally and hope for the best.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Looks good now.

Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner
[email protected]
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 11 lines · Darrick J. Wong

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

While reviewing the buffer item recovery code, the thought occurred to
me: in V5 filesystems we use log sequence number (LSN) tracking to avoid replaying older metadata updates against newer log items. However, we use the magic number of the ondisk buffer to find the LSN of the ondisk metadata, which means that if an attacker can control the layout of the realtime device precisely enough that the start of an rt bitmap block matches the magic and UUID of some other kind of block, they can control the purported LSN of that spoofed block and thereby break log replay.

Quoted 5 lines

Since realtime bitmap and summary blocks don't have headers at all, we have no way to tell if a block really should be replayed. The best we can do is replay unconditionally and hope for the best.

Quoted 49 lines
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c +12 -2
index 05fd816edf59..4775485b4062 100644
@@ -698,7 +698,8 @@ xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer(
 static xfs_lsn_t
 xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp,
-	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp,
+	struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f)
 {
 	uint32_t		magic32;
 	uint16_t		magic16;
@@ -706,11 +707,20 @@ xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(
 	void			*blk = bp->b_addr;
 	uuid_t			*uuid;
 	xfs_lsn_t		lsn = -1;
+	uint16_t		blft;
 
 	/* v4 filesystems always recover immediately */
 	if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
 		goto recover_immediately;
 
+	/*
+	 * realtime bitmap and summary file blocks do not have magic numbers or
+	 * UUIDs, so we must recover them immediately.
+	 */
+	blft = xfs_blft_from_flags(buf_f);
+	if (blft == XFS_BLFT_RTBITMAP_BUF || blft == XFS_BLFT_RTSUMMARY_BUF)
+		goto recover_immediately;
+
 	magic32 = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)blk);
 	switch (magic32) {
 	case XFS_ABTB_CRC_MAGIC:
@@ -920,7 +930,7 @@ xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2(
 	 * the verifier will be reset to match whatever recover turns that
 	 * buffer into.
 	 */
-	lsn = xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(mp, bp);
+	lsn = xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(mp, bp, buf_f);
 	if (lsn && lsn != -1 && XFS_LSN_CMP(lsn, current_lsn) >= 0) {
 		trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_skip(log, buf_f);
 		xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f, NULLCOMMITLSN);
Signature · 1 line
Carlos