5.13.7-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.13.7 release. There are 22 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 31 Jul 2021 13:51:22 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.13.7-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.13.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 5.13.7-rc1

Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
ipv6: ip6_finish_output2: set sk into newly allocated nskb

Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: versatile: Fix up interrupt controller node names

Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
iomap: remove the length variable in iomap_seek_hole

Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
iomap: remove the length variable in iomap_seek_data

Hyunchul Lee <[email protected]>
cifs: fix the out of range assignment to bit fields in parse_server_interfaces

Cristian Marussi <[email protected]>
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix range check for the maximum number of pending messages

Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix possible scmi_linux_errmap buffer overflow

Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: add lock nesting notation to hfs_find_init

Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: fix high memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read

Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: add missing clean-up in hfs_fill_super

Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
drm/ttm: add a check against null pointer dereference

Casey Chen <[email protected]>
nvme-pci: fix multiple races in nvme_setup_io_queues

Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
ipv6: allocate enough headroom in ip6_finish_output2()

Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
rcu-tasks: Don't delete holdouts within trc_wait_for_one_reader()

Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
rcu-tasks: Don't delete holdouts within trc_inspect_reader()

Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net: annotate data race around sk_ll_usec

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
net/802/garp: fix memleak in garp_request_join()

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
net/802/mrp: fix memleak in mrp_request_join()

Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
cgroup1: fix leaked context root causing sporadic NULL deref in LTP

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
workqueue: fix UAF in pwq_unbound_release_workfn()

Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                |  4 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts      |  5 +--
 arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts      |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c      | 12 +++---
 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_range_manager.c |  3 ++
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c                 | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c                       |  4 +-
 fs/hfs/bfind.c                          | 14 ++++++-
 fs/hfs/bnode.c                          | 25 ++++++++++---
 fs/hfs/btree.h                          |  7 ++++
 fs/hfs/super.c                          | 10 ++---
 fs/internal.h                           |  1 -
 fs/iomap/seek.c                         | 25 +++++--------
 include/linux/fs_context.h              |  1 +
 include/net/busy_poll.h                 |  2 +-
 include/net/sctp/constants.h            |  4 +-
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c               |  4 +-
 kernel/rcu/tasks.h                      |  6 +--
 kernel/workqueue.c                      | 20 ++++++----
 net/802/garp.c                          | 14 +++++++
 net/802/mrp.c                           | 14 +++++++
 net/core/sock.c                         |  2 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c                   | 28 ++++++++++++++
 net/sctp/protocol.c                     |  3 +-
 net/unix/af_unix.c                      | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 25 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)

From: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>

commit cbcf01128d0a92e131bd09f1688fe032480b65ca upstream.

unix_gc() assumes that candidate sockets can never gain an external reference (i.e. be installed into an fd) while the unix_gc_lock is held. Except for MSG_PEEK this is guaranteed by modifying inflight count under the unix_gc_lock.

MSG_PEEK does not touch any variable protected by unix_gc_lock (file count is not), yet it needs to be serialized with garbage collection. Do this by locking/unlocking unix_gc_lock:

1) increment file count

2) lock/unlock barrier to make sure incremented file count is visible to garbage collection

3) install file into fd

This is a lock barrier (unlike smp_mb()) that ensures that garbage collection is run completely before or completely after the barrier.

---
 net/unix/af_unix.c |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1522,6 +1522,53 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static void unix_peek_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+
+	/*
+	 * Garbage collection of unix sockets starts by selecting a set of
+	 * candidate sockets which have reference only from being in flight
+	 * (total_refs == inflight_refs).  This condition is checked once during
+	 * the candidate collection phase, and candidates are marked as such, so
+	 * that non-candidates can later be ignored.  While inflight_refs is
+	 * protected by unix_gc_lock, total_refs (file count) is not, hence this
+	 * is an instantaneous decision.
+	 *
+	 * Once a candidate, however, the socket must not be reinstalled into a
+	 * file descriptor while the garbage collection is in progress.
+	 *
+	 * If the above conditions are met, then the directed graph of
+	 * candidates (*) does not change while unix_gc_lock is held.
+	 *
+	 * Any operations that changes the file count through file descriptors
+	 * (dup, close, sendmsg) does not change the graph since candidates are
+	 * not installed in fds.
+	 *
+	 * Dequeing a candidate via recvmsg would install it into an fd, but
+	 * that takes unix_gc_lock to decrement the inflight count, so it's
+	 * serialized with garbage collection.
+	 *
+	 * MSG_PEEK is special in that it does not change the inflight count,
+	 * yet does install the socket into an fd.  The following lock/unlock
+	 * pair is to ensure serialization with garbage collection.  It must be
+	 * done between incrementing the file count and installing the file into
+	 * an fd.
+	 *
+	 * If garbage collection starts after the barrier provided by the
+	 * lock/unlock, then it will see the elevated refcount and not mark this
+	 * as a candidate.  If a garbage collection is already in progress
+	 * before the file count was incremented, then the lock/unlock pair will
+	 * ensure that garbage collection is finished before progressing to
+	 * installing the fd.
+	 *
+	 * (*) A -> B where B is on the queue of A or B is on the queue of C
+	 * which is on the queue of listening socket A.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+}
+
 static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
 {
 	int err = 0;

@@ -2171,7 +2218,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct soc
 		sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, size);
 
 		if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
-			scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+			unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb);
 	}
 	err = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len - skip : size;
 

@@ -2414,7 +2461,7 @@ unlock:
 			/* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
 			 */
 			if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
-				scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+				unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb);
 
 			sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk);
 

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

commit b42b0bddcbc87b4c66f6497f66fc72d52b712aa7 upstream.

I got a UAF report when doing fuzz test:

[  152.880091][ T8030] ==================================================================
[  152.881240][ T8030] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.882442][ T8030] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810d31bd00 by task kworker/3:2/8030
[  152.883578][ T8030]
[  152.883932][ T8030] CPU: 3 PID: 8030 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #249
[  152.885014][ T8030] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  152.886442][ T8030] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn
[  152.887358][ T8030] Call Trace:
[  152.887837][ T8030]  dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0x9b
[  152.888525][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.889371][ T8030]  print_address_description.constprop.10+0x48/0x70
[  152.890326][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.891163][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.891999][ T8030]  kasan_report.cold.15+0x82/0xdb
[  152.892740][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.893594][ T8030]  __asan_load4+0x69/0x90
[  152.894243][ T8030]  pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.895057][ T8030]  process_one_work+0x47b/0x890
[  152.895778][ T8030]  worker_thread+0x5c/0x790
[  152.896439][ T8030]  ? process_one_work+0x890/0x890
[  152.897163][ T8030]  kthread+0x223/0x250
[  152.897747][ T8030]  ? set_kthread_struct+0xb0/0xb0
[  152.898471][ T8030]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  152.899114][ T8030]
[  152.899446][ T8030] Allocated by task 8884:
[  152.900084][ T8030]  kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[  152.900769][ T8030]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[  152.901416][ T8030]  __kmalloc+0x29c/0x460
[  152.902014][ T8030]  alloc_workqueue+0x111/0x8e0
[  152.902690][ T8030]  __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[  152.903459][ T8030]  btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[  152.904198][ T8030]  scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[  152.904929][ T8030]  btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[  152.905599][ T8030]  btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[  152.906247][ T8030]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[  152.906916][ T8030]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[  152.907535][ T8030]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  152.908365][ T8030]
[  152.908688][ T8030] Freed by task 8884:
[  152.909243][ T8030]  kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[  152.909893][ T8030]  kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
[  152.910541][ T8030]  kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
[  152.911265][ T8030]  __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140
[  152.911964][ T8030]  kfree+0x9e/0x3d0
[  152.912501][ T8030]  alloc_workqueue+0x7d7/0x8e0
[  152.913182][ T8030]  __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[  152.913949][ T8030]  btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[  152.914703][ T8030]  scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[  152.915402][ T8030]  btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[  152.916077][ T8030]  btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[  152.916729][ T8030]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[  152.917414][ T8030]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[  152.918034][ T8030]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  152.918872][ T8030]
[  152.919203][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d31bc00
[  152.919203][ T8030]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[  152.921155][ T8030] The buggy address is located 256 bytes inside of
[  152.921155][ T8030]  512-byte region [ffff88810d31bc00, ffff88810d31be00)
[  152.922993][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  152.923800][ T8030] page:ffffea000434c600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d318
[  152.925249][ T8030] head:ffffea000434c600 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[  152.926399][ T8030] flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[  152.927515][ T8030] raw: 057ff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888009c42c80
[  152.928716][ T8030] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  152.929890][ T8030] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  152.930759][ T8030]
[  152.931076][ T8030] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  152.931851][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.932967][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.934068][ T8030] >ffff88810d31bd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.935189][ T8030]                    ^
[  152.935763][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.936847][ T8030]  ffff88810d31be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  152.937940][ T8030] ==================================================================

If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq() which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'. The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF.

CPU0 CPU1
alloc_workqueue()
alloc_and_link_pwqs()
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails
apply_wqattrs_cleanup()
schedule_work(&pwq->unbound_release_work)
kfree(wq)
worker_thread() pwq_unbound_release_workfn() <- trigger uaf here

If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker, so add check pwq if linked to fix this.

---
 kernel/workqueue.c |   20 +++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -3676,15 +3676,21 @@ static void pwq_unbound_release_workfn(s
 						  unbound_release_work);
 	struct workqueue_struct *wq = pwq->wq;
 	struct worker_pool *pool = pwq->pool;
-	bool is_last;
+	bool is_last = false;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(wq->flags & WQ_UNBOUND)))
-		return;
+	/*
+	 * when @pwq is not linked, it doesn't hold any reference to the
+	 * @wq, and @wq is invalid to access.
+	 */
+	if (!list_empty(&pwq->pwqs_node)) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(wq->flags & WQ_UNBOUND)))
+			return;
 
-	mutex_lock(&wq->mutex);
-	list_del_rcu(&pwq->pwqs_node);
-	is_last = list_empty(&wq->pwqs);
-	mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex);
+		mutex_lock(&wq->mutex);
+		list_del_rcu(&pwq->pwqs_node);
+		is_last = list_empty(&wq->pwqs);
+		mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex);
+	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&wq_pool_mutex);
 	put_unbound_pool(pool);

From: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>

commit 1e7107c5ef44431bc1ebbd4c353f1d7c22e5f2ec upstream.

Richard reported sporadic (roughly one in 10 or so) null dereferences and other strange behaviour for a set of automated LTP tests. Things like:

   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
   #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
   #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
   PGD 0 P4D 0
   Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
   CPU: 0 PID: 1516 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.10.0-yocto-standard #1
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
   RIP: 0010:kernfs_sop_show_path+0x1b/0x60

...or these others:

   RIP: 0010:do_mkdirat+0x6a/0xf0
   RIP: 0010:d_alloc_parallel+0x98/0x510
   RIP: 0010:do_readlinkat+0x86/0x120

There were other less common instances of some kind of a general scribble but the common theme was mount and cgroup and a dubious dentry triggering the NULL dereference. I was only able to reproduce it under qemu by replicating Richard's setup as closely as possible - I never did get it to happen on bare metal, even while keeping everything else the same.

In commit 71d883c37e8d ("cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions") we see this as a part of the overall change:

--------------

           struct cgroup_subsys *ss;

- struct dentry *dentry;

[...]

- dentry = cgroup_do_mount(&cgroup_fs_type, fc->sb_flags, root,
- CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, ns);

[...]

- if (percpu_ref_is_dying(&root->cgrp.self.refcnt)) {
- struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
- dput(dentry);
+ ret = cgroup_do_mount(fc, CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, ns);
+ if (!ret && percpu_ref_is_dying(&root->cgrp.self.refcnt)) {
+ struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;

   +               dput(fc->root);
                   deactivate_locked_super(sb);
                   msleep(10);
                   return restart_syscall();
           }

--------------

In changing from the local "*dentry" variable to using fc->root, we now export/leave that dentry pointer in the file context after doing the dput()
in the unlikely "is_dying" case. With LTP doing a crazy amount of back to
back mount/unmount [testcases/bin/cgroup_regression_5_1.sh] the unlikely becomes slightly likely and then bad things happen.

A fix would be to not leave the stale reference in fc->root as follows:

   --------------
                  dput(fc->root);
  +               fc->root = NULL;
                  deactivate_locked_super(sb);
   --------------

...but then we are just open-coding a duplicate of fc_drop_locked() so we simply use that instead.

---
 fs/internal.h              |    1 -
 include/linux/fs_context.h |    1 +
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c  |    4 +---
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ extern void __init chrdev_init(void);
  */
 extern const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops;
 extern int parse_monolithic_mount_data(struct fs_context *, void *);
-extern void fc_drop_locked(struct fs_context *);
 extern void vfs_clean_context(struct fs_context *fc);
 extern int finish_clean_context(struct fs_context *fc);
 

@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ extern int vfs_parse_fs_string(struct fs
 extern int generic_parse_monolithic(struct fs_context *fc, void *data);
 extern int vfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
 extern void put_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc);
+extern void fc_drop_locked(struct fs_context *fc);
 
 /*
  * sget() wrappers to be called from the ->get_tree() op.

@@ -1225,9 +1225,7 @@ int cgroup1_get_tree(struct fs_context *
 		ret = cgroup_do_get_tree(fc);
 
 	if (!ret && percpu_ref_is_dying(&ctx->root->cgrp.self.refcnt)) {
-		struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
-		dput(fc->root);
-		deactivate_locked_super(sb);
+		fc_drop_locked(fc);
 		ret = 1;
 	}
 

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 996af62167d0e0ec69b938a3561e96f84ffff1aa ]

I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:

BUG: memory leak

unreferenced object 0xffff88810c239500 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor940", pid 882, jiffies 4294712870 (age 14.631s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................ backtrace:

[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2972 [inline]
[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2980 [inline]
[<00000000a323afa4>] __kmalloc+0x167/0x340 mm/slub.c:4130
[<000000005034ca11>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:595 [inline]
[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_attr_create net/802/mrp.c:276 [inline]
[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_request_join+0x265/0x550 net/802/mrp.c:530
[<00000000fcfd81f3>] vlan_mvrp_request_join+0x145/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_mvrp.c:40
[<000000009258546e>] vlan_dev_open+0x477/0x890 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:292
[<0000000059acd82b>] __dev_open+0x281/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1609
[<000000004e6dc695>] __dev_change_flags+0x424/0x560 net/core/dev.c:8767
[<00000000471a09af>] rtnl_configure_link+0xd9/0x210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3122
[<0000000037a4672b>] __rtnl_newlink+0xe08/0x13e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3448
[<000000008d5d0fda>] rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3488
[<000000004882fe39>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x369/0xa10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5552
[<00000000907e6c54>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
[<00000000e0645d50>] netlink_sendmsg+0x78e/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674
[<00000000fc210bc2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350
[<00000000be4577b5>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404

Calling mrp_request_leave() after mrp_request_join(), the attr->state is set to MRP_APPLICANT_VO, mrp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last TX event in mrp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning from mrp_uninit_applicant().

---
 net/802/mrp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

index bea6e43d45a0..35e04cc5390c 100644
@@ -292,6 +292,19 @@ static void mrp_attr_destroy(struct mrp_applicant *app, struct mrp_attr *attr)
 	kfree(attr);
 }
 
+static void mrp_attr_destroy_all(struct mrp_applicant *app)
+{
+	struct rb_node *node, *next;
+	struct mrp_attr *attr;
+
+	for (node = rb_first(&app->mad);
+	     next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL;
+	     node = next) {
+		attr = rb_entry(node, struct mrp_attr, node);
+		mrp_attr_destroy(app, attr);
+	}
+}
+
 static int mrp_pdu_init(struct mrp_applicant *app)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;

@@ -895,6 +908,7 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
 	mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_TX);
+	mrp_attr_destroy_all(app);
 	mrp_pdu_queue(app);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
 

2.30.2

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 42ca63f980842918560b25f0244307fd83b4777c ]

I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810c909b80 (size 64):
  comm "syz", pid 957, jiffies 4295220394 (age 399.090s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 02 00 04  ................
  backtrace:
    [<00000000ca1f2e2e>] garp_request_join+0x285/0x3d0
    [<00000000bf153351>] vlan_gvrp_request_join+0x15b/0x190
    [<0000000024005e72>] vlan_dev_open+0x706/0x980
    [<00000000dc20c4d4>] __dev_open+0x2bb/0x460
    [<0000000066573004>] __dev_change_flags+0x501/0x650
    [<0000000035b42f83>] rtnl_configure_link+0xee/0x280
    [<00000000a5e69de0>] __rtnl_newlink+0xed5/0x1550
    [<00000000a5258f4a>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90
    [<00000000506568ee>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x439/0xbd0
    [<00000000b7eaeae1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x420
    [<00000000c373ce66>] netlink_unicast+0x550/0x750
    [<00000000ec74ce74>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xda0
    [<00000000381ff246>] sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120
    [<000000008f6a2db3>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x820
    [<000000008d9c1735>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x145/0x1c0
    [<00000000aa39dd8b>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfe/0x1d0

Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant().

---
 net/802/garp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

index 400bd857e5f5..f6012f8e59f0 100644
@@ -203,6 +203,19 @@ static void garp_attr_destroy(struct garp_applicant *app, struct garp_attr *attr
 	kfree(attr);
 }
 
+static void garp_attr_destroy_all(struct garp_applicant *app)
+{
+	struct rb_node *node, *next;
+	struct garp_attr *attr;
+
+	for (node = rb_first(&app->gid);
+	     next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL;
+	     node = next) {
+		attr = rb_entry(node, struct garp_attr, node);
+		garp_attr_destroy(app, attr);
+	}
+}
+
 static int garp_pdu_init(struct garp_applicant *app)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;

@@ -609,6 +622,7 @@ void garp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct garp_application *appl
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
 	garp_gid_event(app, GARP_EVENT_TRANSMIT_PDU);
+	garp_attr_destroy_all(app);
 	garp_pdu_queue(app);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
 

2.30.2

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0dbffbb5335a1e3aa6855e4ee317e25e669dd302 ]

sk_ll_usec is read locklessly from sk_can_busy_loop() while another thread can change its value in sock_setsockopt()

This is correct but needs annotations.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_datagram / sock_setsockopt

write to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14011 on cpu 0:

 sock_setsockopt+0x1287/0x2090 net/core/sock.c:1175
 __sys_setsockopt+0x14f/0x200 net/socket.c:2100
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2115 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2112 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2112
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14001 on cpu 1:

 sk_can_busy_loop include/net/busy_poll.h:41 [inline]
 __skb_try_recv_datagram+0x14f/0x320 net/core/datagram.c:273
 unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x14c/0x870 net/unix/af_unix.c:2101
 unix_seqpacket_recvmsg+0x5a/0x70 net/unix/af_unix.c:2067
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x15d/0x310 include/linux/uio.h:244
 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2598 [inline]
 do_recvmmsg+0x35c/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2692
 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2794 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2787 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xcf/0x150 net/socket.c:2787
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000101

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:

CPU: 1 PID: 14001 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

---
 include/net/busy_poll.h | 2 +-
 net/core/sock.c         | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 73af4a64a599..40296ed976a9 100644
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline bool net_busy_loop_on(void)
 
 static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(const struct sock *sk)
 {
-	return sk->sk_ll_usec && !signal_pending(current);
+	return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec) && !signal_pending(current);
 }
 
 bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time);

index 2003c5ebb4c2..37d732fe3fcf 100644
@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ set_sndbuf:
 			if (val < 0)
 				ret = -EINVAL;
 			else
-				sk->sk_ll_usec = val;
+				WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec, val);
 		}
 		break;
 	case SO_PREFER_BUSY_POLL:

2.30.2

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ]

The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be allowed to use in SCTP.

As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope.

---
 include/net/sctp/constants.h | 4 +---
 net/sctp/protocol.c          | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 14a0d22c9113..bf23a2ed92da 100644
@@ -342,8 +342,7 @@ enum {
 #define SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_MAX	SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_LINK
 
 /* Based on IPv4 scoping <draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00.txt>,
- * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.18.0.0/24,
- * 192.88.99.0/24.
+ * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 192.88.99.0/24.
  * Also, RFC 8.4, non-unicast addresses are not considered valid SCTP
  * addresses.
  */

@@ -351,7 +350,6 @@ enum {
 	((htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST) == a) ||  \
 	 ipv4_is_multicast(a) ||	    \
 	 ipv4_is_zeronet(a) ||		    \
-	 ipv4_is_test_198(a) ||		    \
 	 ipv4_is_anycast_6to4(a))
 
 /* Flags used for the bind address copy functions.  */

index 25192b378e2e..9b444df5e53e 100644
@@ -398,7 +398,8 @@ static enum sctp_scope sctp_v4_scope(union sctp_addr *addr)
 		retval = SCTP_SCOPE_LINK;
 	} else if (ipv4_is_private_10(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
 		   ipv4_is_private_172(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
-		   ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) {
+		   ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
+		   ipv4_is_test_198(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) {
 		retval = SCTP_SCOPE_PRIVATE;
 	} else {
 		retval = SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL;

2.30.2

From: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1d10bf55d85d34eb73dd8263635f43fd72135d2d ]

As Yanfei pointed out, although invoking trc_del_holdout() is safe from the viewpoint of the integrity of the holdout list itself, the put_task_struct() invoked by trc_del_holdout() can result in use-after-free errors due to later accesses to this task_struct structure by the RCU Tasks Trace grace-period kthread.

This commit therefore removes this call to trc_del_holdout() from trc_inspect_reader() in favor of the grace-period thread's existing call to trc_del_holdout(), thus eliminating that particular class of use-after-free errors.

---
 kernel/rcu/tasks.h | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 350ebf5051f9..71e9d625371a 100644
@@ -908,10 +908,9 @@ static bool trc_inspect_reader(struct task_struct *t, void *arg)
 		in_qs = likely(!t->trc_reader_nesting);
 	}
 
-	// Mark as checked.  Because this is called from the grace-period
-	// kthread, also remove the task from the holdout list.
+	// Mark as checked so that the grace-period kthread will
+	// remove it from the holdout list.
 	t->trc_reader_checked = true;
-	trc_del_holdout(t);
 
 	if (in_qs)
 		return true;  // Already in quiescent state, done!!!

2.30.2

From: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a9ab9cce9367a2cc02a3c7eb57a004dc0b8f380d ]

Invoking trc_del_holdout() from within trc_wait_for_one_reader() is only a performance optimization because the RCU Tasks Trace grace-period kthread will eventually do this within check_all_holdout_tasks_trace(). But it is not a particularly important performance optimization because it only applies to the grace-period kthread, of which there is but one. This commit therefore removes this invocation of trc_del_holdout() in favor of the one in check_all_holdout_tasks_trace() in the grace-period kthread.

---
 kernel/rcu/tasks.h | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

index 71e9d625371a..fcef5f0c60b8 100644
@@ -937,7 +937,6 @@ static void trc_wait_for_one_reader(struct task_struct *t,
 	// The current task had better be in a quiescent state.
 	if (t == current) {
 		t->trc_reader_checked = true;
-		trc_del_holdout(t);
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(t->trc_reader_nesting);
 		return;
 	}

2.30.2

From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5796015fa968a3349027a27dcd04c71d95c53ba5 ]

When TEE target mirrors traffic to another interface, sk_buff may not have enough headroom to be processed correctly. ip_finish_output2() detect this situation for ipv4 and allocates new skb with enogh headroom. However ipv6 lacks this logic in ip_finish_output2 and it leads to skb_under_panic:

skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffffc0866ad4 len:96 put:24 head:ffff97be85e31800 data:ffff97be85e317f8 tail:0x58 end:0xc0 dev:gre0

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 2 PID: 393 Comm: kworker/2:2 Tainted: G           OE     5.13.0 #13
 Hardware name: Virtuozzo KVM, BIOS 1.11.0-2.vz7.4 04/01/2014
 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x48/0x4a
 Call Trace:
  skb_push.cold.111+0x10/0x10
  ipgre_header+0x24/0xf0 [ip_gre]
  neigh_connected_output+0xae/0xf0
  ip6_finish_output2+0x1a8/0x5a0
  ip6_output+0x5c/0x110
  nf_dup_ipv6+0x158/0x1000 [nf_dup_ipv6]
  tee_tg6+0x2e/0x40 [xt_TEE]
  ip6t_do_table+0x294/0x470 [ip6_tables]
  nf_hook_slow+0x44/0xc0
  nf_hook.constprop.34+0x72/0xe0
  ndisc_send_skb+0x20d/0x2e0
  ndisc_send_ns+0xd1/0x210
  addrconf_dad_work+0x3c8/0x540
  process_one_work+0x1d1/0x370
  worker_thread+0x30/0x390
  kthread+0x116/0x130
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

index b7ffb4f227a4..b05f3f0da3a6 100644
@@ -60,10 +60,38 @@ static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
 	struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
+	unsigned int hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
+	int delta = hh_len - skb_headroom(skb);
 	const struct in6_addr *nexthop;
 	struct neighbour *neigh;
 	int ret;
 
+	/* Be paranoid, rather than too clever. */
+	if (unlikely(delta > 0) && dev->header_ops) {
+		/* pskb_expand_head() might crash, if skb is shared */
+		if (skb_shared(skb)) {
+			struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+			if (likely(nskb)) {
+				if (skb->sk)
+					skb_set_owner_w(skb, skb->sk);
+				consume_skb(skb);
+			} else {
+				kfree_skb(skb);
+			}
+			skb = nskb;
+		}
+		if (skb &&
+		    pskb_expand_head(skb, SKB_DATA_ALIGN(delta), 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			skb = NULL;
+		}
+		if (!skb) {
+			IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {
 		struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
 

2.30.2

From: Casey Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e4b9852a0f4afe40604afb442e3af4452722050a ]

Below two paths could overlap each other if we power off a drive quickly after powering it on. There are multiple races in nvme_setup_io_queues() because of shutdown_lock missing and improper use of NVMEQ_ENABLED bit.

nvme_reset_work() nvme_remove()
nvme_setup_io_queues() nvme_dev_disable()
... ...

A1  clear NVMEQ_ENABLED bit for admin queue          lock
    retry:                                       B1  nvme_suspend_io_queues()
A2    pci_free_irq() admin queue                 B2  nvme_suspend_queue() admin queue
A3    pci_free_irq_vectors()                         nvme_pci_disable()

A4 nvme_setup_irqs(); B3 pci_free_irq_vectors()
... unlock
A5 queue_request_irq() for admin queue
set NVMEQ_ENABLED bit
...
nvme_create_io_queues()
A6 result = queue_request_irq();
set NVMEQ_ENABLED bit
...
fail to allocate enough IO queues:
A7 nvme_suspend_io_queues()
goto retry

If B3 runs in between A1 and A2, it will crash if irqaction haven't been freed by A2. B2 is supposed to free admin queue IRQ but it simply can't fulfill the job as A1 has cleared NVMEQ_ENABLED bit.

Fix: combine A1 A2 so IRQ get freed as soon as the NVMEQ_ENABLED bit gets cleared.

After solved #1, A2 could race with B3 if A2 is freeing IRQ while B3 is checking irqaction. A3 also could race with B2 if B2 is freeing IRQ while A3 is checking irqaction.

Fix: A2 and A3 take lock for mutual exclusion.

A3 could race with B3 since they could run free_msi_irqs() in parallel.

Fix: A3 takes lock for mutual exclusion.

A4 could fail to allocate all needed IRQ vectors if A3 and A4 are interrupted by B3.

Fix: A4 takes lock for mutual exclusion.

If A5/A6 happened after B2/B1, B3 will crash since irqaction is not NULL. They are just allocated by A5/A6.

Fix: Lock queue_request_irq() and setting of NVMEQ_ENABLED bit.

A7 could get chance to pci_free_irq() for certain IO queue while B3 is checking irqaction.

Fix: A7 takes lock.

nvme_dev->online_queues need to be protected by shutdown_lock. Since it is not atomic, both paths could modify it using its own copy.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

index fb1c5ae0da39..d963f25fc7ae 100644
@@ -1562,6 +1562,28 @@ static void nvme_init_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, u16 qid)
 	wmb(); /* ensure the first interrupt sees the initialization */
 }
 
+/*
+ * Try getting shutdown_lock while setting up IO queues.
+ */
+static int nvme_setup_io_queues_trylock(struct nvme_dev *dev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Give up if the lock is being held by nvme_dev_disable.
+	 */
+	if (!mutex_trylock(&dev->shutdown_lock))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	/*
+	 * Controller is in wrong state, fail early.
+	 */
+	if (dev->ctrl.state != NVME_CTRL_CONNECTING) {
+		mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int nvme_create_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, int qid, bool polled)
 {
 	struct nvme_dev *dev = nvmeq->dev;

@@ -1590,8 +1612,11 @@ static int nvme_create_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, int qid, bool polled)
 		goto release_cq;
 
 	nvmeq->cq_vector = vector;
-	nvme_init_queue(nvmeq, qid);
 
+	result = nvme_setup_io_queues_trylock(dev);
+	if (result)
+		return result;
+	nvme_init_queue(nvmeq, qid);
 	if (!polled) {
 		result = queue_request_irq(nvmeq);
 		if (result < 0)

@@ -1599,10 +1624,12 @@ static int nvme_create_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, int qid, bool polled)
 	}
 
 	set_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &nvmeq->flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
 	return result;
 
 release_sq:
 	dev->online_queues--;
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
 	adapter_delete_sq(dev, qid);
 release_cq:
 	adapter_delete_cq(dev, qid);

@@ -2176,7 +2203,18 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
 	if (nr_io_queues == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	clear_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &adminq->flags);
+	/*
+	 * Free IRQ resources as soon as NVMEQ_ENABLED bit transitions
+	 * from set to unset. If there is a window to it is truely freed,
+	 * pci_free_irq_vectors() jumping into this window will crash.
+	 * And take lock to avoid racing with pci_free_irq_vectors() in
+	 * nvme_dev_disable() path.
+	 */
+	result = nvme_setup_io_queues_trylock(dev);
+	if (result)
+		return result;
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &adminq->flags))
+		pci_free_irq(pdev, 0, adminq);
 
 	if (dev->cmb_use_sqes) {
 		result = nvme_cmb_qdepth(dev, nr_io_queues,

@@ -2192,14 +2230,17 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
 		result = nvme_remap_bar(dev, size);
 		if (!result)
 			break;
-		if (!--nr_io_queues)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (!--nr_io_queues) {
+			result = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
 	} while (1);
 	adminq->q_db = dev->dbs;
 
  retry:
 	/* Deregister the admin queue's interrupt */
-	pci_free_irq(pdev, 0, adminq);
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &adminq->flags))
+		pci_free_irq(pdev, 0, adminq);
 
 	/*
 	 * If we enable msix early due to not intx, disable it again before

@@ -2208,8 +2249,10 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
 	pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
 
 	result = nvme_setup_irqs(dev, nr_io_queues);
-	if (result <= 0)
-		return -EIO;
+	if (result <= 0) {
+		result = -EIO;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	dev->num_vecs = result;
 	result = max(result - 1, 1);

@@ -2223,8 +2266,9 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
 	 */
 	result = queue_request_irq(adminq);
 	if (result)
-		return result;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	set_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &adminq->flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
 
 	result = nvme_create_io_queues(dev);
 	if (result || dev->online_queues < 2)

@@ -2233,6 +2277,9 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
 	if (dev->online_queues - 1 < dev->max_qid) {
 		nr_io_queues = dev->online_queues - 1;
 		nvme_disable_io_queues(dev);
+		result = nvme_setup_io_queues_trylock(dev);
+		if (result)
+			return result;
 		nvme_suspend_io_queues(dev);
 		goto retry;
 	}

@@ -2241,6 +2288,9 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
 					dev->io_queues[HCTX_TYPE_READ],
 					dev->io_queues[HCTX_TYPE_POLL]);
 	return 0;
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
+	return result;
 }
 
 static void nvme_del_queue_end(struct request *req, blk_status_t error)

2.30.2

From: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9e5c772954406829e928dbe59891d08938ead04b ]

When calling ttm_range_man_fini(), 'man' may be uninitialized, which may cause a null pointer dereference bug.

Fix this by checking if it is a null pointer.

This log reveals it:

[    7.902580 ] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
[    7.905721 ] RIP: 0010:ttm_range_man_fini+0x40/0x160
[    7.911826 ] Call Trace:
[    7.911826 ]  radeon_ttm_fini+0x167/0x210
[    7.911826 ]  radeon_bo_fini+0x15/0x40
[    7.913767 ]  rs400_fini+0x55/0x80
[    7.914358 ]  radeon_device_fini+0x3c/0x140
[    7.914358 ]  radeon_driver_unload_kms+0x5c/0xe0
[    7.914358 ]  radeon_driver_load_kms+0x13a/0x200
[    7.914358 ]  ? radeon_driver_unload_kms+0xe0/0xe0
[    7.914358 ]  drm_dev_register+0x1db/0x290
[    7.914358 ]  radeon_pci_probe+0x16a/0x230
[    7.914358 ]  local_pci_probe+0x4a/0xb0

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_range_manager.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

index 707e5c152896..ed053fd15c90 100644
@@ -146,6 +146,9 @@ int ttm_range_man_fini(struct ttm_device *bdev,
 	struct drm_mm *mm = &rman->mm;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!man)
+		return 0;
+
 	ttm_resource_manager_set_used(man, false);
 
 	ret = ttm_resource_manager_evict_all(bdev, man);

2.30.2

From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 16ee572eaf0d09daa4c8a755fdb71e40dbf8562d ]

Patch series "hfs: fix various errors", v2.

This series ultimately aims to address a lockdep warning in hfs_find_init reported by Syzbot [1].

The work done for this led to the discovery of another bug, and the Syzkaller repro test also reveals an invalid memory access error after clearing the lockdep warning. Hence, this series is broken up into three patches:

1. Add a missing call to hfs_find_exit for an error path in hfs_fill_super

2. Fix memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read by fixing calls to kmap

3. Add lock nesting notation to tell lockdep that the observed locking hierarchy is safe

This patch (of 3):

Before exiting hfs_fill_super, the struct hfs_find_data used in hfs_find_init should be passed to hfs_find_exit to be cleaned up, and to release the lock held on the btree.

The call to hfs_find_exit is missing from an error path. We add it back in by consolidating calls to hfs_find_exit for error paths.

---
 fs/hfs/super.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index 44d07c9e3a7f..12d9bae39363 100644
@@ -420,14 +420,12 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (!res) {
 		if (fd.entrylength > sizeof(rec) || fd.entrylength < 0) {
 			res =  -EIO;
-			goto bail;
+			goto bail_hfs_find;
 		}
 		hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset, fd.entrylength);
 	}
-	if (res) {
-		hfs_find_exit(&fd);
-		goto bail_no_root;
-	}
+	if (res)
+		goto bail_hfs_find;
 	res = -EINVAL;
 	root_inode = hfs_iget(sb, &fd.search_key->cat, &rec);
 	hfs_find_exit(&fd);

@@ -443,6 +441,8 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	/* everything's okay */
 	return 0;
 
+bail_hfs_find:
+	hfs_find_exit(&fd);
 bail_no_root:
 	pr_err("get root inode failed\n");
 bail:

2.30.2

From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54a5ead6f5e2b47131a7385d0c0af18e7b89cb02 ]

Pages that we read in hfs_bnode_read need to be kmapped into kernel address space. However, currently only the 0th page is kmapped. If the given offset + length exceeds this 0th page, then we have an invalid memory access.

To fix this, we kmap relevant pages one by one and copy their relevant portions of data.

An example of invalid memory access occurring without this fix can be seen in the following crash report:

==================================================================

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
  Read of size 2 at addr ffff888125fdcffe by task syz-executor5/4634

  CPU: 0 PID: 4634 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
   dump_stack+0x195/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:233
   __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
   kasan_report.cold+0x7b/0xd4 mm/kasan/report.c:436
   check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x154/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:186
   memcpy+0x24/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65
   memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
   hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
   hfs_bnode_read_u16 fs/hfs/bnode.c:34 [inline]
   hfs_bnode_find+0x880/0xcc0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:365
   hfs_brec_find+0x2d8/0x540 fs/hfs/bfind.c:126
   hfs_brec_read+0x27/0x120 fs/hfs/bfind.c:165
   hfs_cat_find_brec+0x19a/0x3b0 fs/hfs/catalog.c:194
   hfs_fill_super+0xc13/0x1460 fs/hfs/super.c:419
   mount_bdev+0x331/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1368
   hfs_mount+0x35/0x40 fs/hfs/super.c:457
   legacy_get_tree+0x10c/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
   vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 fs/super.c:1498
   do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2905 [inline]
   path_mount+0x13f5/0x20e0 fs/namespace.c:3235
   do_mount fs/namespace.c:3248 [inline]
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3456 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3433 [inline]
   __x64_sys_mount+0x2b8/0x340 fs/namespace.c:3433
   do_syscall_64+0x37/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  RIP: 0033:0x45e63a
  Code: 48 c7 c2 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d2 e8 88 04 00 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007f9404d410d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000248 RCX: 000000000045e63a
  RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f9404d41120
  RBP: 00007f9404d41120 R08: 00000000200002c0 R09: 0000000020000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
  R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000004ad5d8 R15: 0000000000000000

  The buggy address belongs to the page:
  page:00000000dadbcf3e refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x125fdc
  flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff)
  raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffffea000497f748 ffffea000497f6c8 0000000000000000
  raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff888125fdce80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
   ffff888125fdcf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  >ffff888125fdcf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                                                                  ^
   ffff888125fdd000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
   ffff888125fdd080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  ==================================================================

---
 fs/hfs/bnode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index b63a4df7327b..c0a73a6ffb28 100644
@@ -15,16 +15,31 @@
 
 #include "btree.h"
 
-void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf,
-		int off, int len)
+void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len)
 {
 	struct page *page;
+	int pagenum;
+	int bytes_read;
+	int bytes_to_read;
+	void *vaddr;
 
 	off += node->page_offset;
-	page = node->page[0];
+	pagenum = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	off &= ~PAGE_MASK; /* compute page offset for the first page */
 
-	memcpy(buf, kmap(page) + off, len);
-	kunmap(page);
+	for (bytes_read = 0; bytes_read < len; bytes_read += bytes_to_read) {
+		if (pagenum >= node->tree->pages_per_bnode)
+			break;
+		page = node->page[pagenum];
+		bytes_to_read = min_t(int, len - bytes_read, PAGE_SIZE - off);
+
+		vaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
+		memcpy(buf + bytes_read, vaddr + off, bytes_to_read);
+		kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
+
+		pagenum++;
+		off = 0; /* page offset only applies to the first page */
+	}
 }
 
 u16 hfs_bnode_read_u16(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off)

2.30.2

From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b3b2177a2d795e35dc11597b2609eb1e7e57e570 ]

Syzbot reports a possible recursive lock in [1].

This happens due to missing lock nesting information. From the logs, we see that a call to hfs_fill_super is made to mount the hfs filesystem. While searching for the root inode, the lock on the catalog btree is grabbed. Then, when the parent of the root isn't found, a call to __hfs_bnode_create is made to create the parent of the root. This eventually leads to a call to hfs_ext_read_extent which grabs a lock on the extents btree.

Since the order of locking is catalog btree -> extents btree, this lock hierarchy does not lead to a deadlock.

To tell lockdep that this locking is safe, we add nesting notation to distinguish between catalog btrees, extents btrees, and attributes btrees (for HFS+). This has already been done in hfsplus.

---
 fs/hfs/bfind.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 fs/hfs/btree.h |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 4af318fbda77..ef9498a6e88a 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,19 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd)
 	fd->key = ptr + tree->max_key_len + 2;
 	hfs_dbg(BNODE_REFS, "find_init: %d (%p)\n",
 		tree->cnid, __builtin_return_address(0));
-	mutex_lock(&tree->tree_lock);
+	switch (tree->cnid) {
+	case HFS_CAT_CNID:
+		mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX);
+		break;
+	case HFS_EXT_CNID:
+		mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX);
+		break;
+	case HFS_ATTR_CNID:
+		mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 

index 4ba45caf5939..0e6baee93245 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ typedef int (*btree_keycmp)(const btree_key *, const btree_key *);
 
 #define NODE_HASH_SIZE  256
 
+/* B-tree mutex nested subclasses */
+enum hfs_btree_mutex_classes {
+	CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX,
+	EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX,
+	ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX,
+};
+
 /* A HFS BTree held in memory */
 struct hfs_btree {
 	struct super_block *sb;

2.30.2

From: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7a691f16ccad05d770f813d9c4b4337a30c6d63f ]

The scmi_linux_errmap buffer access index is supposed to depend on the array size to prevent element out of bounds access. It uses SCMI_ERR_MAX to check bounds but that can mismatch with the array size. It also changes the success into -EIO though scmi_linux_errmap is never used in case of success, it is expected to work for success case too.

It is slightly confusing code as the negative of the error code is used as index to the buffer. Fix it by negating it at the start and make it more readable.

---
 drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 74986bf96656..6bff4cceb3c3 100644
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ enum scmi_error_codes {
 	SCMI_ERR_GENERIC = -8,	/* Generic Error */
 	SCMI_ERR_HARDWARE = -9,	/* Hardware Error */
 	SCMI_ERR_PROTOCOL = -10,/* Protocol Error */
-	SCMI_ERR_MAX
 };
 
 /* List of all SCMI devices active in system */

@@ -166,8 +165,10 @@ static const int scmi_linux_errmap[] = {
 
 static inline int scmi_to_linux_errno(int errno)
 {
-	if (errno < SCMI_SUCCESS && errno > SCMI_ERR_MAX)
-		return scmi_linux_errmap[-errno];
+	int err_idx = -errno;
+
+	if (err_idx >= SCMI_SUCCESS && err_idx < ARRAY_SIZE(scmi_linux_errmap))
+		return scmi_linux_errmap[err_idx];
 	return -EIO;
 }
 

2.30.2

From: Cristian Marussi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bdb8742dc6f7c599c3d61959234fe4c23638727b ]

SCMI message headers carry a sequence number and such field is sized to allow for MSG_TOKEN_MAX distinct numbers; moreover zero is not really an acceptable maximum number of pending in-flight messages.

Fix accordingly the checks performed on the value exported by transports in scmi_desc.max_msg

---
 drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 6bff4cceb3c3..c9fda6261c6b 100644
@@ -1030,8 +1030,9 @@ static int __scmi_xfer_info_init(struct scmi_info *sinfo,
 	const struct scmi_desc *desc = sinfo->desc;
 
 	/* Pre-allocated messages, no more than what hdr.seq can support */
-	if (WARN_ON(desc->max_msg >= MSG_TOKEN_MAX)) {
-		dev_err(dev, "Maximum message of %d exceeds supported %ld\n",
+	if (WARN_ON(!desc->max_msg || desc->max_msg > MSG_TOKEN_MAX)) {
+		dev_err(dev,
+			"Invalid maximum messages %d, not in range [1 - %lu]\n",
 			desc->max_msg, MSG_TOKEN_MAX);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}

2.30.2

From: Hyunchul Lee <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c9c9c6815f9004ee1ec87401ed0796853bd70f1b ]

Because the out of range assignment to bit fields are compiler-dependant, the fields could have wrong value.

---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 64cad843ce72..398c941e3897 100644
@@ -555,8 +555,8 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_interface_info_ioctl_rsp *buf,
 	p = buf;
 	while (bytes_left >= sizeof(*p)) {
 		info->speed = le64_to_cpu(p->LinkSpeed);
-		info->rdma_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RDMA_CAPABLE);
-		info->rss_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RSS_CAPABLE);
+		info->rdma_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RDMA_CAPABLE) ? 1 : 0;
+		info->rss_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RSS_CAPABLE) ? 1 : 0;
 
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: adding iface %zu\n", __func__, *iface_count);
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: speed %zu bps\n", __func__, info->speed);

2.30.2

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3ac1d426510f97ace05093ae9f2f710d9cbe6215 ]

The length variable is rather pointless given that it can be trivially deduced from offset and size. Also the initial calculation can lead to KASAN warnings.

---
 fs/iomap/seek.c | 16 ++++++----------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

index dab1b02eba5b..50b8f1418f26 100644
@@ -83,27 +83,23 @@ loff_t
 iomap_seek_data(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, const struct iomap_ops *ops)
 {
 	loff_t size = i_size_read(inode);
-	loff_t length = size - offset;
 	loff_t ret;
 
 	/* Nothing to be found before or beyond the end of the file. */
 	if (offset < 0 || offset >= size)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
-	while (length > 0) {
-		ret = iomap_apply(inode, offset, length, IOMAP_REPORT, ops,
-				  &offset, iomap_seek_data_actor);
+	while (offset < size) {
+		ret = iomap_apply(inode, offset, size - offset, IOMAP_REPORT,
+				  ops, &offset, iomap_seek_data_actor);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 		if (ret == 0)
-			break;
-
+			return offset;
 		offset += ret;
-		length -= ret;
 	}
 
-	if (length <= 0)
-		return -ENXIO;
-	return offset;
+	/* We've reached the end of the file without finding data */
+	return -ENXIO;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iomap_seek_data);

2.30.2

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 49694d14ff68fa4b5f86019dbcfb44a8bd213e58 ]

The length variable is rather pointless given that it can be trivially deduced from offset and size. Also the initial calculation can lead to KASAN warnings.

---
 fs/iomap/seek.c | 9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

index 50b8f1418f26..ce6fb810854f 100644
@@ -35,23 +35,20 @@ loff_t
 iomap_seek_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, const struct iomap_ops *ops)
 {
 	loff_t size = i_size_read(inode);
-	loff_t length = size - offset;
 	loff_t ret;
 
 	/* Nothing to be found before or beyond the end of the file. */
 	if (offset < 0 || offset >= size)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
-	while (length > 0) {
-		ret = iomap_apply(inode, offset, length, IOMAP_REPORT, ops,
-				  &offset, iomap_seek_hole_actor);
+	while (offset < size) {
+		ret = iomap_apply(inode, offset, size - offset, IOMAP_REPORT,
+				  ops, &offset, iomap_seek_hole_actor);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 		if (ret == 0)
 			break;
-
 		offset += ret;
-		length -= ret;
 	}
 
 	return offset;

2.30.2

From: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 82a1c67554dff610d6be4e1982c425717b3c6a23 ]

Once the new schema interrupt-controller/arm,vic.yaml is added, we get the below warnings:

        arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml:
        intc@10140000: $nodename:0: 'intc@10140000' does not match
        '^interrupt-controller(@[0-9a-f,]+)*$'

	arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml:
	intc@10140000: 'clear-mask' does not match any of the regexes

Fix the node names for the interrupt controller to conform to the standard node name interrupt-controller@.. Also drop invalid clear-mask property.

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts | 5 ++---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 37bd41ff8dff..151c0220047d 100644
@@ -195,16 +195,15 @@
 		#size-cells = <1>;
 		ranges;
 
-		vic: intc@10140000 {
+		vic: interrupt-controller@10140000 {
 			compatible = "arm,versatile-vic";
 			interrupt-controller;
 			#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 			reg = <0x10140000 0x1000>;
-			clear-mask = <0xffffffff>;
 			valid-mask = <0xffffffff>;
 		};
 
-		sic: intc@10003000 {
+		sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 {
 			compatible = "arm,versatile-sic";
 			interrupt-controller;
 			#interrupt-cells = <1>;

index 06a0fdf24026..e7e751a858d8 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 	amba {
 		/* The Versatile PB is using more SIC IRQ lines than the AB */
-		sic: intc@10003000 {
+		sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 {
 			clear-mask = <0xffffffff>;
 			/*
 			 * Valid interrupt lines mask according to

2.30.2

From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2d85a1b31dde84038ea07ad825c3d8d3e71f4344 ]

skb_set_owner_w() should set sk not to old skb but to new nskb.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index b05f3f0da3a6..6062ad1d5b51 100644
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *
 
 			if (likely(nskb)) {
 				if (skb->sk)
-					skb_set_owner_w(skb, skb->sk);
+					skb_set_owner_w(nskb, skb->sk);
 				consume_skb(skb);
 			} else {
 				kfree_skb(skb);

2.30.2

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.13:

    10 builds:	10 pass, 0 fail
    28 boots:	28 pass, 0 fail
    110 tests:	110 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.13.7-rc1-ga572733cda32
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000,
                tegra20-ventana, tegra210-p2371-2180,
                tegra210-p3450-0000, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels:

Florian

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

## Build
* kernel: 5.13.7-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git branch: linux-5.13.y
* git commit: a572733cda320244f6671ae091728a755de1b031
* git describe: v5.13.6-23-ga572733cda32
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.13.y/build/v5.13.6-23-ga572733cda32

## No regressions (compared to v5.13.5-225-g692072e7b7fa)

## No fixes (compared to v5.13.5-225-g692072e7b7fa)

## Test result summary
total: 85331, pass: 70359, fail: 1666, skip: 12268, xfail: 1038,

## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 193 total, 193 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 27 total, 27 passed, 0 failed
* dragonboard-410c: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* hi6220-hikey: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 26 total, 26 passed, 0 failed
* juno-r2: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 45 total, 45 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 9 total, 9 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 27 total, 27 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 21 total, 21 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 18 total, 18 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 18 total, 18 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 9 total, 9 passed, 0 failed
* x15: 1 total, 0 passed, 1 failed
* x86: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 27 total, 27 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-lkdtm
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native-
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none-
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Tested rc1 against the Fedora build system (aarch64, armv7, ppc64le, s390x, x86_64), and boot tested x86_64. No regressions noted.

Build results:

	total: 154 pass: 154 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 470 pass: 470 fail: 0

Guenter

5.13.7-rc1 Successfully Compiled and booted on my Raspberry PI 4b (8g) (bcm2711)