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curl: Fix CVE-2021-22924 and CVE-2021-22925

PATCH Superseded Mike Crowe 2 participants 4 messages Aug 4, 2021

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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Mike Crowe

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PATCH 1/1 curl: Fix CVE-2021-22924 and CVE-2021-22925

curl v7.78 contained fixes for five CVEs:

CVE-2021-22922 and CVE-2021-22923 are only present when support for metalink is enabled. EXTRA_OECONF contains "--without-libmetalink" so these fixes are unnecessary.

CVE-2021-22926 only affects builds for MacOS.

CVE-2021-22924 and CVE-2021-22925 are both applicable. Take the patches from Ubuntu 20.04 curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6 package which is close enough that the patch for CVE-2021-22924 applies without conflicts. The CVE-2021-22925 patch required only a small tweak to apply.

---
 .../curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch            | 224 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch            |  41 ++++
 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb      |   2 +
 3 files changed, 267 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch new file +224 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f0b53842f
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+Subject: [PATCH] vtls: fix connection reuse checks for issuer cert and
+ case sensitivity CVE-2021-22924
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22924.html
+Upstream-Status: backport from Ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6
+---
+ lib/url.c          |  5 +++--
+ lib/urldata.h      |  2 +-
+ lib/vtls/gtls.c    | 10 +++++-----
+ lib/vtls/nss.c     |  4 ++--
+ lib/vtls/openssl.c | 12 ++++++------
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c    | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 47fc66aed..eebad8d32 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -3555,6 +3555,9 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CApath = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.primary.CAfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CAfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_PROXY];
++  data->set.ssl.primary.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_ORIG];
++  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.issuercert =
++    data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.primary.random_file = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.random_file =
+     data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE];
+@@ -3575,8 +3578,6 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ 
+   data->set.ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY];
+-  data->set.ssl.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_ORIG];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert_type = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE_ORIG];
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index fbb8b645e..615fbf369 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ struct ssl_primary_config {
+   long version_max;      /* max supported version the client wants to use*/
+   char *CApath;          /* certificate dir (doesn't work on windows) */
+   char *CAfile;          /* certificate to verify peer against */
++  char *issuercert;      /* optional issuer certificate filename */
+   char *clientcert;
+   char *random_file;     /* path to file containing "random" data */
+   char *egdsocket;       /* path to file containing the EGD daemon socket */
+@@ -240,7 +241,6 @@ struct ssl_config_data {
+   struct ssl_primary_config primary;
+   long certverifyresult; /* result from the certificate verification */
+   char *CRLfile;   /* CRL to check certificate revocation */
+-  char *issuercert;/* optional issuer certificate filename */
+   curl_ssl_ctx_callback fsslctx; /* function to initialize ssl ctx */
+   void *fsslctxp;        /* parameter for call back */
+   char *cert; /* client certificate file name */
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+index 46e149c7d..8c051024f 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+   if(!chainp) {
+     if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) ||
+        SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost) ||
+-       SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++       SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+       if(SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
+          && SSL_SET_OPTION(username) != NULL
+@@ -1241,21 +1241,21 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+        gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
+     gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ 
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+     gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
+-    issuerp = load_file(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++    issuerp = load_file(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+     gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+     rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert, x509_issuer);
+     gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_issuer);
+     unload_file(issuerp);
+     if(rc <= 0) {
+       failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
+-            SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)?SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert):"none");
++            SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)?SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert):"none");
+       gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
+       return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+     }
+     infof(data, "\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
+-          SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)?SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert):"none");
++          SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)?SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert):"none");
+   }
+ 
+   size = sizeof(certbuf);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+index ef51b0d91..375c78b1b 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+@@ -2151,9 +2151,9 @@ static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+   if(result)
+     goto error;
+ 
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+     SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
+-    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+     if(nickname) {
+       /* we support only nicknames in case of issuercert for now */
+       ret = check_issuer_cert(BACKEND->handle, nickname);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+index 64f43605a..7e81fd3a0 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+@@ -3547,7 +3547,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+        deallocating the certificate. */
+ 
+     /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
+-    if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++    if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+       fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+       if(fp == NULL) {
+         failf(data,
+@@ -3560,10 +3560,10 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+         return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+       }
+ 
+-      if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) <= 0) {
++      if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) <= 0) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+         BACKEND->server_cert = NULL;
+@@ -3574,7 +3574,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(!issuer) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(issuer);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+@@ -3585,7 +3585,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(X509_check_issued(issuer, BACKEND->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(issuer);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+@@ -3594,7 +3594,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       }
+ 
+       infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
+-            SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++            SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+       BIO_free(fp);
+       X509_free(issuer);
+     }
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index aaf73ef8f..8c681da14 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@
+   else                                       \
+     dest->var = NULL;
+ 
++static bool safecmp(char *a, char *b)
++{
++  if(a && b)
++    return !strcmp(a, b);
++  else if(!a && !b)
++    return TRUE; /* match */
++  return FALSE; /* no match */
++}
++
++
+ bool
+ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+                         struct ssl_primary_config* needle)
+@@ -91,11 +101,12 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+      (data->verifypeer == needle->verifypeer) &&
+      (data->verifyhost == needle->verifyhost) &&
+      (data->verifystatus == needle->verifystatus) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CApath, needle->CApath) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CAfile, needle->CAfile) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&
++     safecmp(data->CApath, needle->CApath) &&
++     safecmp(data->CAfile, needle->CAfile) &&
++     safecmp(data->issuercert, needle->issuercert) &&
++     safecmp(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
++     safecmp(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
++     safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list, needle->cipher_list) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list13, needle->cipher_list13) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->pinned_key, needle->pinned_key))
+@@ -117,6 +128,7 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source,
+ 
+   CLONE_STRING(CApath);
+   CLONE_STRING(CAfile);
++  CLONE_STRING(issuercert);
+   CLONE_STRING(clientcert);
+   CLONE_STRING(random_file);
+   CLONE_STRING(egdsocket);
+@@ -131,6 +143,7 @@ void Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config* sslc)
+ {
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->CApath);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->CAfile);
++  Curl_safefree(sslc->issuercert);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->clientcert);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->random_file);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->egdsocket);
+-- 
+2.30.2
+
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch new file +41 -0

41 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb +2 -0
index 13ab29cf69..0a79feec52 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2020-8286.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-22876.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-22890.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22924.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22925.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Mike Crowe via lists.openembedded.org

curl v7.78 contained fixes for five CVEs:

CVE-2021-22922 and CVE-2021-22923 are only present when support for metalink is enabled. EXTRA_OECONF contains "--without-libmetalink" so these fixes are unnecessary.

Quoted 6 lines

CVE-2021-22926 only affects builds for MacOS.

CVE-2021-22924 and CVE-2021-22925 are both applicable. Take the patches from Ubuntu 20.04 curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6 package which is close enough that the patch for CVE-2021-22924 applies without conflicts. The CVE-2021-22925 patch required only a small tweak to apply.

Being curious why none of these are showing up in the reports I checked the CPE database and it seems none of them are present! So that explains why.

Do you know why they are missing? Perhaps a status of RESERVED? See:

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22923

Since they seem to be real issues though I can take the patch once you send a V2 with the issue below fixed.

It might make sense to whitelist the CVE's that don't apply to us so that once the entries hit the database we will already have dealt with them.

Steve

Quoted 15 lines
---
 .../curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch            | 224 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch            |  41 ++++
 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb      |   2 +
 3 files changed, 267 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f0b53842f

meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch line 6

Quoted 6 lines
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+Subject: [PATCH] vtls: fix connection reuse checks for issuer cert and
+ case sensitivity CVE-2021-22924
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22924.html
+Upstream-Status: backport from Ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6

Need to have a CVE tag and your signed-off-by in both patch files.

See the "Patch name convention and commit message" section at:
https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Security

Quoted 284 lines
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch new file +218 -0
+---
+ lib/url.c          |  5 +++--
+ lib/urldata.h      |  2 +-
+ lib/vtls/gtls.c    | 10 +++++-----
+ lib/vtls/nss.c     |  4 ++--
+ lib/vtls/openssl.c | 12 ++++++------
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c    | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 47fc66aed..eebad8d32 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -3555,6 +3555,9 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CApath = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.primary.CAfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CAfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_PROXY];
++  data->set.ssl.primary.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_ORIG];
++  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.issuercert =
++    data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.primary.random_file = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.random_file =
+     data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE];
+@@ -3575,8 +3578,6 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+
+   data->set.ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY];
+-  data->set.ssl.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_ORIG];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert_type = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE_ORIG];
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index fbb8b645e..615fbf369 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ struct ssl_primary_config {
+   long version_max;      /* max supported version the client wants to use*/
+   char *CApath;          /* certificate dir (doesn't work on windows) */
+   char *CAfile;          /* certificate to verify peer against */
++  char *issuercert;      /* optional issuer certificate filename */
+   char *clientcert;
+   char *random_file;     /* path to file containing "random" data */
+   char *egdsocket;       /* path to file containing the EGD daemon socket */
+@@ -240,7 +241,6 @@ struct ssl_config_data {
+   struct ssl_primary_config primary;
+   long certverifyresult; /* result from the certificate verification */
+   char *CRLfile;   /* CRL to check certificate revocation */
+-  char *issuercert;/* optional issuer certificate filename */
+   curl_ssl_ctx_callback fsslctx; /* function to initialize ssl ctx */
+   void *fsslctxp;        /* parameter for call back */
+   char *cert; /* client certificate file name */
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+index 46e149c7d..8c051024f 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+   if(!chainp) {
+     if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) ||
+        SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost) ||
+-       SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++       SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+       if(SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
+          && SSL_SET_OPTION(username) != NULL
+@@ -1241,21 +1241,21 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+        gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
+     gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+     gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
+-    issuerp = load_file(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++    issuerp = load_file(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+     gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+     rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert, x509_issuer);
+     gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_issuer);
+     unload_file(issuerp);
+     if(rc <= 0) {
+       failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
+-            SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)?SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert):"none");
++            SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)?SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert):"none");
+       gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
+       return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+     }
+     infof(data, "\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
+-          SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)?SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert):"none");
++          SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)?SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert):"none");
+   }
+
+   size = sizeof(certbuf);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+index ef51b0d91..375c78b1b 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+@@ -2151,9 +2151,9 @@ static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+   if(result)
+     goto error;
+
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+     SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
+-    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+     if(nickname) {
+       /* we support only nicknames in case of issuercert for now */
+       ret = check_issuer_cert(BACKEND->handle, nickname);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+index 64f43605a..7e81fd3a0 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+@@ -3547,7 +3547,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+        deallocating the certificate. */
+
+     /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
+-    if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++    if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+       fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+       if(fp == NULL) {
+         failf(data,
+@@ -3560,10 +3560,10 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+         return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+       }
+
+-      if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) <= 0) {
++      if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) <= 0) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+         BACKEND->server_cert = NULL;
+@@ -3574,7 +3574,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(!issuer) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(issuer);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+@@ -3585,7 +3585,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(X509_check_issued(issuer, BACKEND->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(issuer);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+@@ -3594,7 +3594,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       }
+
+       infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
+-            SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++            SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+       BIO_free(fp);
+       X509_free(issuer);
+     }
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index aaf73ef8f..8c681da14 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@
+   else                                       \
+     dest->var = NULL;
+
++static bool safecmp(char *a, char *b)
++{
++  if(a && b)
++    return !strcmp(a, b);
++  else if(!a && !b)
++    return TRUE; /* match */
++  return FALSE; /* no match */
++}
++
++
+ bool
+ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+                         struct ssl_primary_config* needle)
+@@ -91,11 +101,12 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+      (data->verifypeer == needle->verifypeer) &&
+      (data->verifyhost == needle->verifyhost) &&
+      (data->verifystatus == needle->verifystatus) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CApath, needle->CApath) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CAfile, needle->CAfile) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&
++     safecmp(data->CApath, needle->CApath) &&
++     safecmp(data->CAfile, needle->CAfile) &&
++     safecmp(data->issuercert, needle->issuercert) &&
++     safecmp(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
++     safecmp(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
++     safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list, needle->cipher_list) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list13, needle->cipher_list13) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->pinned_key, needle->pinned_key))
+@@ -117,6 +128,7 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source,
+
+   CLONE_STRING(CApath);
+   CLONE_STRING(CAfile);
++  CLONE_STRING(issuercert);
+   CLONE_STRING(clientcert);
+   CLONE_STRING(random_file);
+   CLONE_STRING(egdsocket);
+@@ -131,6 +143,7 @@ void Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config* sslc)
+ {
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->CApath);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->CAfile);
++  Curl_safefree(sslc->issuercert);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->clientcert);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->random_file);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->egdsocket);
+--
+2.30.2
+
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch new file +41 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3b13f30f5
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+Subject: [PATCH] telnet: fix option parser to not send uninitialized
+ contents CVE-2021-22925
+
+Reported-by: Red Hat Product Security
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22925.html
+Upstream-Status: backport from Ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6
+---
+ lib/telnet.c | 17 +++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/telnet.c b/lib/telnet.c
+index 4bf4c652c..3347ad6d1 100644
+--- a/lib/telnet.c
++++ b/lib/telnet.c
+@@ -967,12 +967,17 @@ static void suboption(struct connectdata *conn)
+         size_t tmplen = (strlen(v->data) + 1);
+         /* Add the variable only if it fits */
+         if(len + tmplen < (int)sizeof(temp)-6) {
+-          if(sscanf(v->data, "%127[^,],%127s", varname, varval)) {
+-            msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
+-                      "%c%s%c%s", CURL_NEW_ENV_VAR, varname,
+-                      CURL_NEW_ENV_VALUE, varval);
+-            len += tmplen;
+-          }
++          int rv;
++          char sep[2] = "";
++          varval[0] = 0;
++          rv = sscanf(v->data, "%127[^,]%1[,]%127s", varname, sep, varval);
++          if(rv == 1)
++            len += msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
++                             "%c%s", CURL_NEW_ENV_VAR, varname);
++          else if(rv >= 2)
++            len += msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
++                             "%c%s%c%s", CURL_NEW_ENV_VAR, varname,
++                             CURL_NEW_ENV_VALUE, varval);
+         }
+       }
+       msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
+--
+2.30.2
+
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb +2 -1
index 13ab29cf69..0a79feec52 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2020-8286.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-22876.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-22890.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22924.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22925.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"
--

2.30.2

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 16 lines · Steve Sakoman
Quoted 7 lines · Mike Crowe via lists.openembedded.org

curl v7.78 contained fixes for five CVEs:

CVE-2021-22922 and CVE-2021-22923 are only present when support for metalink is enabled. EXTRA_OECONF contains "--without-libmetalink" so these fixes are unnecessary.

Quoted 6 lines

CVE-2021-22926 only affects builds for MacOS.

CVE-2021-22924 and CVE-2021-22925 are both applicable. Take the patches from Ubuntu 20.04 curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6 package which is close enough that the patch for CVE-2021-22924 applies without conflicts. The CVE-2021-22925 patch required only a small tweak to apply.

Quoted 7 lines

Being curious why none of these are showing up in the reports I checked the CPE database and it seems none of them are present! So that explains why.

Do you know why they are missing? Perhaps a status of RESERVED? See:

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22923

I'm afraid that I have no idea. :( I just watch curl release announcements to assess the security impact on our products and spotted these.

Quoted 4 lines

Since they seem to be real issues though I can take the patch once you send a V2 with the issue below fixed.

[ Need to have a CVE tag and your signed-off-by in both patch files. ]

v2 should have arrived. I must have sneaked my previous CVE fixes through without them somehow. :)

Quoted 3 lines

It might make sense to whitelist the CVE's that don't apply to us so that once the entries hit the database we will already have dealt with them.

Hopefully done.

Thanks.

Mike.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 29 lines · Mike Crowe
Quoted 16 lines · Steve Sakoman
Quoted 7 lines · Mike Crowe via lists.openembedded.org

curl v7.78 contained fixes for five CVEs:

CVE-2021-22922 and CVE-2021-22923 are only present when support for metalink is enabled. EXTRA_OECONF contains "--without-libmetalink" so these fixes are unnecessary.

Quoted 6 lines

CVE-2021-22926 only affects builds for MacOS.

CVE-2021-22924 and CVE-2021-22925 are both applicable. Take the patches from Ubuntu 20.04 curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6 package which is close enough that the patch for CVE-2021-22924 applies without conflicts. The CVE-2021-22925 patch required only a small tweak to apply.

Quoted 7 lines

Being curious why none of these are showing up in the reports I checked the CPE database and it seems none of them are present! So that explains why.

Do you know why they are missing? Perhaps a status of RESERVED? See:

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22923

I'm afraid that I have no idea. :( I just watch curl release announcements to assess the security impact on our products and spotted these.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Since they seem to be real issues though I can take the patch once you send a V2 with the issue below fixed.

[ Need to have a CVE tag and your signed-off-by in both patch files. ]

v2 should have arrived. I must have sneaked my previous CVE fixes through without them somehow. :)

My bad then :-) I'm trying to be better about making sure that we have the tag, status, and sign-off-by in the CVE patches!

Steve

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

It might make sense to whitelist the CVE's that don't apply to us so that once the entries hit the database we will already have dealt with them.

Hopefully done.

Thanks.

Mike.