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ceph: correctly release memory from capsnap

PATCH Superseded [email protected] 2 participants 3 messages Aug 17, 2021 Ceph client

v1 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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PATCH 1/1 ceph: correctly release memory from capsnap

From: Xiubo Li <[email protected]>

When force umounting, it will try to remove all the session caps. If there has any capsnap is in the flushing list, the remove session caps callback will try to release the capsnap->flush_cap memory to "ceph_cap_flush_cachep" slab cache, while which is allocated from kmalloc-256 slab cache.

URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/52283

---
 fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9 -1
index 00b3b0a0beb8..cb517753bb17 100644
@@ -1264,10 +1264,18 @@ static int remove_session_caps_cb(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_cap *cap,
 	spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
 	while (!list_empty(&to_remove)) {
 		struct ceph_cap_flush *cf;
+		struct ceph_cap_snap *capsnap;
 		cf = list_first_entry(&to_remove,
 				      struct ceph_cap_flush, i_list);
 		list_del(&cf->i_list);
-		ceph_free_cap_flush(cf);
+		if (cf->caps) {
+			ceph_free_cap_flush(cf);
+		} else if (READ_ONCE(fsc->mount_state) == CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN) {
+			capsnap = container_of(cf, struct ceph_cap_snap, cap_flush);
+			list_del(&capsnap->ci_item);
+			ceph_put_snap_context(capsnap->context);
+			ceph_put_cap_snap(capsnap);
+		}
 	}
 
 	wake_up_all(&ci->i_cap_wq);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 9:58 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Xiubo Li <[email protected]>

When force umounting, it will try to remove all the session caps. If there has any capsnap is in the flushing list, the remove session caps callback will try to release the capsnap->flush_cap memory to "ceph_cap_flush_cachep" slab cache, while which is allocated from kmalloc-256 slab cache.

URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/52283

---
 fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +0 -0
index 00b3b0a0beb8..cb517753bb17 100644

fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int remove_session_caps_cb(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_cap *cap, · line 1267

Quoted 4 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +1 -0
@@ -1264,10 +1264,18 @@ static int remove_session_caps_cb(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_cap *cap,
        spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
        while (!list_empty(&to_remove)) {
                struct ceph_cap_flush *cf;
+               struct ceph_cap_snap *capsnap;

Hi Xiubo,

Add an empty line here.

fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int remove_session_caps_cb(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_cap *cap, · line 1273

Quoted 7 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +3 -1
                cf = list_first_entry(&to_remove,
                                      struct ceph_cap_flush, i_list);
                list_del(&cf->i_list);
-               ceph_free_cap_flush(cf);
+               if (cf->caps) {
+                       ceph_free_cap_flush(cf);
+               } else if (READ_ONCE(fsc->mount_state) == CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN) {

What does this condition guard against? Are there other cases of ceph_cap_flush being embedded that need to be handled differently on !SHUTDOWN?

Should capsnaps be on to_remove list in the first place?

This sounds like stable material to me.

Thanks,

Ilya

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Quoted 19 lines · On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 9:58 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Xiubo Li <[email protected]>

When force umounting, it will try to remove all the session caps. If there has any capsnap is in the flushing list, the remove session caps callback will try to release the capsnap->flush_cap memory to "ceph_cap_flush_cachep" slab cache, while which is allocated from kmalloc-256 slab cache.

URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/52283

---
  fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 +++++++++-
  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +0 -0
index 00b3b0a0beb8..cb517753bb17 100644

fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int remove_session_caps_cb(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_cap *cap, · line 1267

Quoted 4 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +1 -0
@@ -1264,10 +1264,18 @@ static int remove_session_caps_cb(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_cap *cap,
         spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
         while (!list_empty(&to_remove)) {
                 struct ceph_cap_flush *cf;
+               struct ceph_cap_snap *capsnap;

Hi Xiubo,

Quoted 1 line

Add an empty line here.

Sure.

Quoted 10 lines

fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int remove_session_caps_cb(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_cap *cap, · line 1273

Quoted 7 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +3 -1
                 cf = list_first_entry(&to_remove,
                                       struct ceph_cap_flush, i_list);
                 list_del(&cf->i_list);
-               ceph_free_cap_flush(cf);
+               if (cf->caps) {
+                       ceph_free_cap_flush(cf);
+               } else if (READ_ONCE(fsc->mount_state) == CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN) {

What does this condition guard against? Are there other cases of ceph_cap_flush being embedded that need to be handled differently on !SHUTDOWN?

From my test this issue could only be reproduced when doing force umount. When doing the session close it will also do this.

Checked it again, without this it can works well too. I am not very sure whether will this code is needed.

Since removing this won't block my tests, I will remove this logic from this patch temporarily and will keep this patch simple to resolve the crash issue only.

For the force unmount, there have some other issues, like:

<3>[  324.020531] =============================================================================
<3>[  324.020541] BUG ceph_inode_info (Tainted: G E    --------- -  -): Objects remaining in ceph_inode_info on __kmem_cache_shutdown() <3>[  324.020544] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
<3>[  324.020544]
<4>[  324.020549] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
<3>[  324.020553] INFO: Slab 0x000000007ac655b7 objects=20 used=1 fp=0x00000000ab658885 flags=0x17ffffc0008100 <4>[  324.020559] CPU: 30 PID: 5124 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B       E    --------- -  - 4.18.0+ #10 <4>[  324.020561] Hardware name: Red Hat RHEV Hypervisor, BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
<4>[  324.020563] Call Trace:
<4>[  324.020745]  dump_stack+0x5c/0x80
<4>[  324.020829]  slab_err+0xb0/0xd4
<4>[  324.020872]  ? ksm_migrate_page+0x60/0x60
<4>[  324.020876]  ? __kmalloc+0x16f/0x210
<4>[  324.020879]  ? __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x238/0x290
<4>[  324.020883]  __kmem_cache_shutdown.cold.102+0x1c/0x10d
<4>[  324.020897]  shutdown_cache+0x15/0x200
<4>[  324.020928]  kmem_cache_destroy+0x21f/0x250
<4>[  324.020957]  destroy_caches+0x16/0x52 [ceph]
<4>[  324.021008]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x139/0x270
<4>[  324.021075]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
<4>[  324.021143]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
<4>[  324.021174] RIP: 0033:0x148c0b2c2a8b

I will fix all the memleak issues in a separate patch later.

Quoted 9 lines

Should capsnaps be on to_remove list in the first place?

This sounds like stable material to me.

Thanks,

Ilya