package/botan: add upstream security fix for CVE-2021-40529
PATCH 1/1 package/botan: add upstream security fix for CVE-2021-40529
Fixes the following security issue:
- CVE-2021-40529: The ElGamal implementation in Botan through 2.18.1, as used in Thunderbird and other products, allows plaintext recovery because, during interaction between two cryptographic libraries, a certain dangerous combination of the prime defined by the receiver's public key, the generator defined by the receiver's public key, and the sender's ephemeral exponents can lead to a cross-configuration attack against OpenPGP
For more details, see the upstream bug and issue writeup:
- https://github.com/randombit/botan/pull/2790
- https://ibm.github.io/system-security-research-updates/2021/07/20/insecurity-elgamal-pt1
--- ...d-using-short-exponents-with-ElGamal.patch | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ package/botan/botan.mk | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/botan/0001-Avoid-using-short-exponents-with-ElGamal.patch
package/botan/0001-Avoid-using-short-exponents-with-ElGamal.patch new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 9a23e4e3bc3966340531f2ff608fa9d33b5185a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 3 Aug 2021 18:20:29 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid using short exponents with ElGamal + +Some off-brand PGP implementation generates keys where p - 1 is +smooth, as a result short exponents can leak enough information about +k to allow decryption. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> +[Peter: Drop tests, CVE-2021-40529] +--- + src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp | 8 +++- + 1 file changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp b/src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp +index b3ec6df2c..0e33c2ca5 100644 +--- a/src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp ++++ b/src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp +@@ -113,8 +113,12 @@ ElGamal_Encryption_Operation::raw_encrypt(const uint8_t msg[], size_t msg_len, + if(m >= m_group.get_p()) + throw Invalid_Argument("ElGamal encryption: Input is too large"); + +- const size_t k_bits = m_group.exponent_bits(); +- const BigInt k(rng, k_bits); ++ /* ++ Some ElGamal implementations foolishly use prime fields where p - 1 is ++ smooth, as a result it is unsafe to use short exponents. ++ */ ++ const size_t k_bits = m_group.p_bits() - 1; ++ const BigInt k(rng, k_bits, false); + + const BigInt a = m_group.power_g_p(k, k_bits); + const BigInt b = m_group.multiply_mod_p(m, monty_execute(*m_monty_y_p, k, k_bits)); +- +-- +2.20.1 +
package/botan/botan.mk +3 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ BOTAN_LICENSE = BSD-2-Clause BOTAN_LICENSE_FILES = license.txt BOTAN_CPE_ID_VENDOR = botan_project +# 0001-Avoid-using-short-exponents-with-ElGamal.patch +BOTAN_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-40529 + BOTAN_INSTALL_STAGING = YES BOTAN_CONF_OPTS = \
Signature · 6 lines
2.20.1 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Yann E. MORIN
AppliedPeter, All,
On 2021-09-18 18:42 +0200, Peter Korsgaard spake thusly:
Quoted 10 lines
Fixes the following security issue:
- CVE-2021-40529: The ElGamal implementation in Botan through 2.18.1, as used in Thunderbird and other products, allows plaintext recovery because, during interaction between two cryptographic libraries, a certain dangerous combination of the prime defined by the receiver's public key, the generator defined by the receiver's public key, and the sender's ephemeral exponents can lead to a cross-configuration attack against OpenPGP
Quoted 5 lines
For more details, see the upstream bug and issue writeup:
- https://github.com/randombit/botan/pull/2790
- https://ibm.github.io/system-security-research-updates/2021/07/20/insecurity-elgamal-pt1Signed-off-by Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>
Applied to master, thanks.
Note: I haven't received the mail for the erlang patch yet, so I can't reply to it; consider it applied to master anyway, thanks.
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
Quoted 71 lines
--- ...d-using-short-exponents-with-ElGamal.patch | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ package/botan/botan.mk | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/botan/0001-Avoid-using-short-exponents-with-ElGamal.patchpackage/botan/0001-Avoid-using-short-exponents-with-ElGamal.patch new file +38
-0@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 9a23e4e3bc3966340531f2ff608fa9d33b5185a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 3 Aug 2021 18:20:29 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid using short exponents with ElGamal + +Some off-brand PGP implementation generates keys where p - 1 is +smooth, as a result short exponents can leak enough information about +k to allow decryption. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> +[Peter: Drop tests, CVE-2021-40529] +--- + src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp | 8 +++- + 1 file changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp b/src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp +index b3ec6df2c..0e33c2ca5 100644 +--- a/src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp ++++ b/src/lib/pubkey/elgamal/elgamal.cpp +@@ -113,8 +113,12 @@ ElGamal_Encryption_Operation::raw_encrypt(const uint8_t msg[], size_t msg_len, + if(m >= m_group.get_p()) + throw Invalid_Argument("ElGamal encryption: Input is too large"); + +- const size_t k_bits = m_group.exponent_bits(); +- const BigInt k(rng, k_bits); ++ /* ++ Some ElGamal implementations foolishly use prime fields where p - 1 is ++ smooth, as a result it is unsafe to use short exponents. ++ */ ++ const size_t k_bits = m_group.p_bits() - 1; ++ const BigInt k(rng, k_bits, false); + + const BigInt a = m_group.power_g_p(k, k_bits); + const BigInt b = m_group.multiply_mod_p(m, monty_execute(*m_monty_y_p, k, k_bits)); +- +-- +2.20.1 +package/botan/botan.mk +3
-0@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ BOTAN_LICENSE = BSD-2-Clause BOTAN_LICENSE_FILES = license.txt BOTAN_CPE_ID_VENDOR = botan_project +# 0001-Avoid-using-short-exponents-with-ElGamal.patch +BOTAN_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-40529 + BOTAN_INSTALL_STAGING = YES BOTAN_CONF_OPTS = \Signature · 6 lines
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"Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> writes:
Fixes the following security issue:
- CVE-2021-40529: The ElGamal implementation in Botan through 2.18.1, as used in Thunderbird and other products, allows plaintext recovery because, during interaction between two cryptographic libraries, a certain dangerous combination of the prime defined by the receiver's public key, the generator defined by the receiver's public key, and the sender's ephemeral exponents can lead to a cross-configuration attack against OpenPGP
Quoted 5 lines
For more details, see the upstream bug and issue writeup:
- https://github.com/randombit/botan/pull/2790
- https://ibm.github.io/system-security-research-updates/2021/07/20/insecurity-elgamal-pt1Signed-off-by Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>
Committed to 2021.02.x, 2021.05.x and 2021.08.x, thanks.
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot