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block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT

PATCH Applied Alistair Delva 4 participants 4 messages Nov 15, 2021

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT

Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following SELinux denial:

avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0

Init is PID 0 running as root, so it already has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. For better compatibility with older SEPolicy, check ADMIN before NICE.

Fixes 9d3a39a5f1e4 ("block: grant IOPRIO_CLASS_RT to CAP_SYS_NICE")
Cc Khazhismel Kumykov <[email protected]>
Cc Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc [email protected] # v5.14+

---
v2: added comment requested by Jens

 block/ioprio.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
block/ioprio.c +8 -1
index 0e4ff245f2bf..313c14a70bbd 100644
@@ -69,7 +69,14 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)
 
 	switch (class) {
 		case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
-			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			/*
+			 * Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+			 * which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security
+			 * modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check
+			 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for
+			 * possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission.
+			 */
+			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
 				return -EPERM;
 			fallthrough;
 			/* rt has prio field too */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.0.rc1.387.gb447b232ab-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 38 lines · Alistair Delva

Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following SELinux denial:

avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0

Init is PID 0 running as root, so it already has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. For better compatibility with older SEPolicy, check ADMIN before NICE.

Fixes 9d3a39a5f1e4 ("block: grant IOPRIO_CLASS_RT to CAP_SYS_NICE")
Cc Khazhismel Kumykov <[email protected]>
Cc Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc [email protected] # v5.14+

---
v2: added comment requested by Jens

  block/ioprio.c | 9 ++++++++-
  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
block/ioprio.c +1 -1
index 0e4ff245f2bf..313c14a70bbd 100644
@@ -69,7 +69,14 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)
 
  	switch (class) {
  		case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
-			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			/*

block/ioprio.c int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio) · line 82

Quoted 10 lines
block/ioprio.c +7 -0
+			 * Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+			 * which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security
+			 * modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check
+			 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for
+			 * possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission.
+			 */
+			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
  				return -EPERM;
  			fallthrough;
  			/* rt has prio field too */

Are there any other SELinux policies (Fedora?) that need to be verified?

Anyway:

maintainer Acked-by on v2 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Alistair Delva
Quoted 7 lines · Alistair Delva

Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following SELinux denial:

avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0

Quoted 8 lines

Init is PID 0 running as root, so it already has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. For better compatibility with older SEPolicy, check ADMIN before NICE.

Fixes 9d3a39a5f1e4 ("block: grant IOPRIO_CLASS_RT to CAP_SYS_NICE")
Cc Khazhismel Kumykov <[email protected]>
Cc Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>

This won't harm anything, so

but questions below.

Quoted 17 lines

---
v2: added comment requested by Jens

 block/ioprio.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
block/ioprio.c +0 -0
index 0e4ff245f2bf..313c14a70bbd 100644

block/ioprio.c int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio) · line 74

Quoted 7 lines
block/ioprio.c +3 -1
@@ -69,7 +69,14 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)
 
 	switch (class) {
 		case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
-			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			/*
+			 * Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+			 * which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security

What do you mean, implicitly allowed for pid 0? Can you point to where that happens?

block/ioprio.c int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio) · line 80

Quoted 6 lines
block/ioprio.c +5 -0
+			 * modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check
+			 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for
+			 * possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission.
+			 */
+			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
 				return -EPERM;

But whichever one comes first can cause an avc denial message. It seems like we need a new capable() primitive which supports multiple bits, when more than one can authorize an action, and which emits an audit message only if all bits are missing.

Quoted 4 lines
block/ioprio.c +0 -0
 			fallthrough;
 			/* rt has prio field too */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.0.rc1.387.gb447b232ab-goog
maintainer Applied
#3 lore raw
In reply to Alistair Delva
Quoted 8 lines · Alistair Delva

Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following SELinux denial:

avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT

      commit: 94c4b4fd25e6c3763941bdec3ad54f2204afa992

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe