Bluetooth: refactor malicious adv data check
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 Bluetooth: refactor malicious adv data check
Check for out-of-bound read was being performed at the end of while num_reports loop, and would fill journal with false positives. Added check to beginning of loop processing so that it doesn't get checked after ptr has been advanced.
Signed-off-by Brian Gix <[email protected]>
--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +5 -5
@@ -5920,6 +5920,11 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr;s8 rssi; +if (ptr > (void *)skb_tail_pointer (skb) -sizeof (*ev)) { +bt_dev_err (hdev,"Malicious advertising data." ); +break ; + } +if (ev->length <=HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH && ev->data + ev->length <=skb_tail_pointer (skb)) { rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
@@ -5931,11 +5936,6 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) } ptr +=sizeof (*ev) + ev->length +1 ; - -if (ptr > (void *)skb_tail_pointer (skb) -sizeof (*ev)) { -bt_dev_err (hdev,"Malicious advertising data. Stopping processing" ); -break ; - } }hci_dev_unlock (hdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1