random: reseed in RNDRESEEDCRNG for the !crng_ready() case
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH 1/1 random: reseed in RNDRESEEDCRNG for the !crng_ready() case
Userspace often wants to seed the RNG from disk, without knowing how much entropy is really in that file. In that case, userspace says there's no entropy, so none is credited. If this happens in the crng_init==1 state -- common at early boot time when such seed files are used -- then that seed file will be written into the pool, but it won't actually help the quality of /dev/urandom reads. Instead, it'll sit around until something does credit sufficient amounts of entropy, at which point, the RNG is seeded and initialized.
Rather than let those seed file bits sit around unused until "sometime later", userspaces that call RNDRESEEDCRNG can expect, with this commit, for those seed bits to be put to use *somehow*. This is accomplished by extracting from the input pool on RNDRESEEDCRNG, xoring 32 bytes into the current crng state.
---
Jann - this is the change I think you were requesting when we discussed this. Please let me know if it matches what you had in mind.
drivers/char/random.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +10 -1
@@ -1961,8 +1961,17 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case RNDRESEEDCRNG :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; -if (crng_init <2 ) +if (!crng_ready ()) { +unsigned long flags, i; +u32 new_key[8 ]; +_extract_entropy (&input_pool, new_key,sizeof (new_key),0 ); +spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (new_key); ++i) + primary_crng.state[4 + i] ^= new_key[i]; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +memzero_explicit (new_key,sizeof (new_key));return -ENODATA ; + }crng_reseed (&primary_crng, &input_pool);WRITE_ONCE (crng_global_init_time, jiffies -1 );return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 15 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Userspace often wants to seed the RNG from disk, without knowing how much entropy is really in that file. In that case, userspace says there's no entropy, so none is credited. If this happens in the crng_init==1 state -- common at early boot time when such seed files are used -- then that seed file will be written into the pool, but it won't actually help the quality of
/dev/urandomreads. Instead, it'll sit around until something does credit sufficient amounts of entropy, at which point, the RNG is seeded and initialized.Rather than let those seed file bits sit around unused until "sometime later", userspaces that call RNDRESEEDCRNG can expect, with this commit, for those seed bits to be put to use *somehow*. This is accomplished by extracting from the input pool on RNDRESEEDCRNG, xoring 32 bytes into the current crng state.
Quoted 5 lines
Suggested-by Jann Horn <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>---
Jann - this is the change I think you were requesting when we discussed this. Please let me know if it matches what you had in mind.
Yeah, this looks good.
drivers/char/random.c static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) · line 1964
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/char/random.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/char/random.c +1
-1@@ -1961,8 +1961,17 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case RNDRESEEDCRNG :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; -if (crng_init <2 ) +if (!crng_ready ()) {
Non-actionable review note: We can race with crng_ready() becoming true in parallel, but that's probably fine - after all, that'll also do the CRNG reseeding stuff on its own.
drivers/char/random.c static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) · line 1971
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/char/random.c +7
-0+unsigned long flags, i; +u32 new_key[8 ]; +_extract_entropy (&input_pool, new_key,sizeof (new_key),0 ); +spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (new_key); ++i) + primary_crng.state[4 + i] ^= new_key[i]; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags);
Non-actionable review note: This doesn't need the same crng_global_init_time bump as below because at this point, no NUMA pools exist yet, only the single shared primary_crng.
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/char/random.c +2
-1+memzero_explicit (new_key,sizeof (new_key));return -ENODATA ; + }crng_reseed (&primary_crng, &input_pool);WRITE_ONCE (crng_global_init_time, jiffies -1 );return 0 ; --2.34.1
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRelated discussion: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/21983
As of now, I'm not totally convinced this makes sense to apply, but we'll see where this exploration goes.
Jason
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Userspace often wants to seed the RNG from disk, without knowing how much entropy is really in that file. In that case, userspace says there's no entropy, so none is credited. If this happens in the crng_init==1 state -- common at early boot time when such seed files are used -- then that seed file will be written into the pool, but it won't actually help the quality of
/dev/urandomreads. Instead, it'll sit around until something does credit sufficient amounts of entropy, at which point, the RNG is seeded and initialized.
Quoted 5 lines
Rather than let those seed file bits sit around unused until "sometime later", userspaces that call RNDRESEEDCRNG can expect, with this commit, for those seed bits to be put to use *somehow*. This is accomplished by extracting from the input pool on RNDRESEEDCRNG, xoring 32 bytes into the current crng state.
I think this is fine, but the RNDRESEEDRNG ioctl is rarely used by userspace. From a Google search I see that jitterentropy uses it, but in most setups it won't be called.
So something we could do to improve things is to add some code to random_write() so that in the case where crng_init is 1, we take half of the bytes or CHACHA_KEY_SIZE bytes, whichever is less, and pass those bytes to crng_fast_load(). (We'll have to copy it to a bounce buffer since the passed in pointer is __user, and memzero_explicit it after calling crng_fast_load.)
This will divert some part of the seed file to partially initialize the CRNG. It won't fully initialize the CRNG, but that's fine, since it's possible that the seed file has been compromised --- or is a fixed value if the seed file is from coming a VM image file. So having at least half of the entropy used to initialize CRNG up to crng_init=1 is coming from interrupt timing seems like a good thing.
- Ted
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerQuoted 28 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 9 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Userspace often wants to seed the RNG from disk, without knowing how much entropy is really in that file. In that case, userspace says there's no entropy, so none is credited. If this happens in the crng_init==1 state -- common at early boot time when such seed files are used -- then that seed file will be written into the pool, but it won't actually help the quality of
/dev/urandomreads. Instead, it'll sit around until something does credit sufficient amounts of entropy, at which point, the RNG is seeded and initialized.Quoted 5 lines
Rather than let those seed file bits sit around unused until "sometime later", userspaces that call RNDRESEEDCRNG can expect, with this commit, for those seed bits to be put to use *somehow*. This is accomplished by extracting from the input pool on RNDRESEEDCRNG, xoring 32 bytes into the current crng state.
I think this is fine, but the RNDRESEEDRNG ioctl is rarely used by userspace. From a Google search I see that jitterentropy uses it, but in most setups it won't be called.
So something we could do to improve things is to add some code to
random_write()so that in the case wherecrng_initis 1, we take half of the bytes orCHACHA_KEY_SIZEbytes, whichever is less, and pass those bytes tocrng_fast_load(). (We'll have to copy it to a bounce buffer since the passed in pointer is__user, andmemzero_explicitit after callingcrng_fast_load.)
Quoted 6 lines
This will divert some part of the seed file to partially initialize the CRNG. It won't fully initialize the CRNG, but that's fine, since it's possible that the seed file has been compromised --- or is a fixed value if the seed file is from coming a VM image file. So having at least half of the entropy used to initialize CRNG up to crng_init=1 is coming from interrupt timing seems like a good thing.
Yea, doing things in RNDADDENTROPY or random_write is a possibility, and then userspace doesn't need to adopt new strange things. In looking at this, though, and combined with the attitude of the crng_init_cnt=0 commit from last hour, I'm beginning to think that trying to cater toward crng_init<2 usage is an exercise in madness. We provide getrandom(..., 0)'s blocking mode for users who want things to be real. If you're not doing this (or can't due to old kernels), you should probably Know What You're Doing and adjust accordingly. To that end, I'm not convinced this patch or similar ideas of making crng_init=1 mode more useful really has much of a future.
However, it does seem like userspaces who know what they're doing *can* take necessary countermeasures for the seeding use case that Jann originally identified as being potentially problematic. To that end, I submitted a PR to systemd:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/21986 . We'll see what they think.
Jason