pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2022-01-06
Subsystems (3)
Steffen Klassert
maintainer1) Fix some clang_analyzer warnings about never read variables. From luo penghao.
2) Check for pols[0] only once in xfrm_expand_policies(). From Jean Sacren.
3) The SA curlft.use_time was updated only on SA cration time. Update whenever the SA is used. From Antony Antony
4) Add support for SM3 secure hash.
From Xu Jia.
5) Add support for SM4 symmetric cipher algorithm. From Xu Jia.
6) Add a rate limit for SA mapping change messages. From Antony Antony.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
Thanks!
The following changes since commit bb8cecf8ba127abca8ccd102207a59c55fdae515:
Merge branch 'lan78xx-napi' (2021-11-18 12:11:51 +0000)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next.git master
for you to fetch changes up to 4e484b3e969b52effd95c17f7a86f39208b2ccf4:
xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space (2021-12-23 09:32:51 +0100)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Antony Antony (2):
xfrm: update SA curlft.use_time
xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space
Jean Sacren (1):
net: xfrm: drop check of pols[0] for the second time
Xu Jia (2):
xfrm: Add support for SM3 secure hash
xfrm: Add support for SM4 symmetric cipher algorithm
luo penghao (2):
ipv6/esp6: Remove structure variables and alignment statements
xfrm: Remove duplicate assignment
include/net/xfrm.h | 5 +++++ include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h | 1 + net/ipv6/esp6.c | 3 +-- net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 6 ++++-- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 3 +-- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 11 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 1/7 ipv6/esp6: Remove structure variables and alignment statements
From: luo penghao <[email protected]>
The definition of this variable is just to find the length of the structure after aligning the structure. The PTR alignment function is to optimize the size of the structure. In fact, it doesn't seem to be of much use, because both members of the structure are of type u32.
So I think that the definition of the variable and the corresponding alignment can be deleted, the value of extralen can be directly passed in the size of the structure.
The clang_analyzer complains as follows:
net/ipv6/esp6.c:117:27 warning:
Value stored to 'extra' during its initialization is never read
--- net/ipv6/esp6.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/esp6.c +1 -2
@@ -114,7 +114,6 @@ static inline struct scatterlist *esp_req_sg(struct crypto_aead *aead,static void esp_ssg_unref (struct xfrm_state *x,void *tmp) { -struct esp_output_extra *extra =esp_tmp_extra (tmp);struct crypto_aead *aead = x->data;int extralen =0 ;u8 *iv;
@@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp)struct scatterlist *sg;if (x->props.flags &XFRM_STATE_ESN ) - extralen +=sizeof (*extra); + extralen +=sizeof (struct esp_output_extra ); iv =esp_tmp_iv (aead, tmp, extralen); req =esp_tmp_req (aead, iv);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 1/7] ipv6/esp6: Remove structure variables and alignment statements
This series was applied to netdev/net-next.git (master) by Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This series was applied to netdev/net-next.git (master) by Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>:
Quoted 11 lines · On Thu, 6 Jan 2022 10:13:44 +0100 you wrote:
From: luo penghao <[email protected]>
The definition of this variable is just to find the length of the structure after aligning the structure. The PTR alignment function is to optimize the size of the structure. In fact, it doesn't seem to be of much use, because both members of the structure are of type u32.
So I think that the definition of the variable and the corresponding alignment can be deleted, the value of extralen can be directly passed in the size of the structure.
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [1/7] ipv6/esp6: Remove structure variables and alignment statements
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/c6e7871894a3 - [2/7] xfrm: Remove duplicate assignment https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/2e1809208a4a - [3/7] net: xfrm: drop check of pols[0] for the second time https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/ac1077e92825 - [4/7] xfrm: update SA curlft.use_time https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/af734a26a1a9 - [5/7] xfrm: Add support for SM3 secure hash https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/e6911affa416 - [6/7] xfrm: Add support for SM4 symmetric cipher algorithm https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/23b6a6df94c6 - [7/7] xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/4e484b3e969b
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot. https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 2/7 xfrm: Remove duplicate assignment
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: luo penghao <[email protected]>
The statement in the switch is repeated with the statement at the beginning of the while loop, so this statement is meaningless.
The clang_analyzer complains as follows:
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3392:2 warning:
Value stored to 'exthdr' is never read
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +0 -1
@@ -3392,7 +3392,6 @@ decode_session6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, bool reverse)case NEXTHDR_DEST : offset +=ipv6_optlen (exthdr); nexthdr = exthdr->nexthdr; - exthdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(nh + offset);break ;case IPPROTO_UDP :case IPPROTO_UDPLITE :
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 3/7 net: xfrm: drop check of pols[0] for the second time
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Jean Sacren <[email protected]>
!pols[0] is checked earlier. If we don't return, pols[0] is always true. We should drop the check of pols[0] for the second time and the binary is also smaller.
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
48395 957 240 49592 c1b8 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.o
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
48379 957 240 49576 c1a8 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.o
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +1 -1
@@ -2680,7 +2680,7 @@ static int xfrm_expand_policies(const struct flowi *fl, u16 family, *num_xfrms = pols[0 ]->xfrm_nr;#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY -if (pols[0 ] && pols[0 ]->action ==XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW && +if (pols[0 ]->action ==XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW && pols[0 ]->type !=XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN ) { pols[1] = xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(xp_net(pols[0]), XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 4/7 xfrm: update SA curlft.use_time
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Antony Antony <[email protected]>
SA use_time was only updated once, for the first packet. with this fix update the use_time for every packet.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +1 -0
@@ -669,6 +669,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type) x->curlft.bytes += skb->len; x->curlft.packets++; + x->curlft.use_time =ktime_get_real_seconds ();spin_unlock (&x->lock);
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c +1 -0
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static int xfrm_output_one(struct sk_buff *skb, int err) x->curlft.bytes += skb->len; x->curlft.packets++; + x->curlft.use_time =ktime_get_real_seconds ();spin_unlock_bh (&x->lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 5/7 xfrm: Add support for SM3 secure hash
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Xu Jia <[email protected]>
This patch allows IPsec to use SM3 HMAC authentication algorithm.
--- include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h +1 -0
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ struct sadb_x_filter {#define SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512HMAC 7#define SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC 8#define SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC 9 +#define SADB_X_AALG_SM3_256HMAC 10#define SADB_X_AALG_NULL 251/* kame */ #define SADB_AALG_MAX 251
net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c +20 -0
@@ -341,6 +341,26 @@ static struct xfrm_algo_desc aalg_list[] = { .pfkey_supported = 0, }, +{ + .name = "hmac(sm3)", + .compat = "sm3", + + .uinfo = { + .auth = { + .icv_truncbits = 256, + .icv_fullbits = 256, + } + }, + + .pfkey_supported = 1, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_AALG_SM3_256HMAC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 256, + .sadb_alg_maxbits =256 + } +}, };static struct xfrm_algo_desc ealg_list[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 6/7 xfrm: Add support for SM4 symmetric cipher algorithm
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Xu Jia <[email protected]>
This patch adds SM4 encryption algorithm entry to ealg_list.
--- include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h +1 -0
@@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ struct sadb_x_filter {#define SADB_X_EALG_AES_GCM_ICV16 20#define SADB_X_EALG_CAMELLIACBC 22#define SADB_X_EALG_NULL_AES_GMAC 23 +#define SADB_X_EALG_SM4CBC 24#define SADB_EALG_MAX 253/* last EALG */ /* private allocations should use 249-255 (RFC2407) */ #define SADB_X_EALG_SERPENTCBC 252/* draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-cbc-00 */
net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c +21 -0
@@ -572,6 +572,27 @@ static struct xfrm_algo_desc ealg_list[] = { .sadb_alg_maxbits = 288 } }, +{ + .name = "cbc(sm4)", + .compat = "sm4", + + .uinfo = { + .encr = { + .geniv = "echainiv", + .blockbits = 128, + .defkeybits = 128, + } + }, + + .pfkey_supported = 1, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_EALG_SM4CBC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 16, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 128, + .sadb_alg_maxbits =256 + } +}, };static struct xfrm_algo_desc calg_list[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 7/7 xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Antony Antony <[email protected]>
Kernel generates mapping change message, XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, when a source port chage is detected on a input state with UDP encapsulation set. Kernel generates a message for each IPsec packet with new source port. For a high speed flow per packet mapping change message can be excessive, and can overload the user space listener.
Introduce rate limiting for XFRM_MSG_MAPPING message to the user space.
The rate limiting is configurable via netlink, when adding a new SA or updating it. Use the new attribute XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH in seconds.
v1->v2 change:
update xfrm_sa_len()
v2->v3 changes:
use u32 insted unsigned long to reduce size of struct xfrm_state fix xfrm_ompat size Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> accept XFRM_MSG_MAPPING only when XFRMA_ENCAP is present
--- include/net/xfrm.h | 5 +++++ include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 6 ++++-- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +5 -0
@@ -200,6 +200,11 @@ struct xfrm_state {struct xfrm_algo_aead *aead;const char *geniv; +/* mapping change rate limiting */ +__be16 new_mapping_sport; +u32 new_mapping;/* seconds */ +u32 mapping_maxage;/* seconds for input SA */ +/* Data for encapsulator */ struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap;struct sock __rcu *encap_sk;
include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h +1 -0
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ enum xfrm_attr_type_t {XFRMA_SET_MARK ,/* __u32 */ XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK ,/* __u32 */ XFRMA_IF_ID ,/* __u32 */ +XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH ,/* __u32 in seconds for input SA */ __XFRMA_MAX#define XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK XFRMA_SET_MARK/* Compatibility */
net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c +4 -2
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_SET_MARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_IF_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, }; static struct nlmsghdr *xfrm_nlmsg_put_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -274,9 +275,10 @@ static int xfrm_xlate64_attr(struct sk_buff *dst, const struct nlattr *src)case XFRMA_SET_MARK :case XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK :case XFRMA_IF_ID : +case XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH :return xfrm_nla_cpy (dst, src,nla_len (src));default : -BUILD_BUG_ON (XFRMA_MAX !=XFRMA_IF_ID ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (XFRMA_MAX !=XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH );pr_warn_once ("unsupported nla_type %d\n" , src->nla_type);return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ static int xfrm_xlate32_attr(void *dst, const struct nlattr *nla,int err;if (type >XFRMA_MAX ) { -BUILD_BUG_ON (XFRMA_MAX !=XFRMA_IF_ID ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (XFRMA_MAX !=XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH );NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"Bad attribute" );return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +22 -1
@@ -1593,6 +1593,9 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_clone(struct xfrm_state *orig, x->km.seq = orig->km.seq; x->replay = orig->replay; x->preplay = orig->preplay; + x->mapping_maxage = orig->mapping_maxage; + x->new_mapping =0 ; + x->new_mapping_sport =0 ;return x;
@@ -2242,7 +2245,7 @@ int km_query(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *t, struct xfrm_policy *pol) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (km_query); -int km_new_mapping (struct xfrm_state *x,xfrm_address_t *ipaddr,__be16 sport) +static int __km_new_mapping (struct xfrm_state *x,xfrm_address_t *ipaddr,__be16 sport) {int err = -EINVAL ;struct xfrm_mgr *km;
@@ -2257,6 +2260,24 @@ int km_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, __be16 sport)rcu_read_unlock ();return err; } + +int km_new_mapping (struct xfrm_state *x,xfrm_address_t *ipaddr,__be16 sport) +{ +int ret =0 ; + +if (x->mapping_maxage) { +if ((jiffies /HZ - x->new_mapping) > x->mapping_maxage || + x->new_mapping_sport != sport) { + x->new_mapping_sport = sport; + x->new_mapping = jiffies /HZ ; + ret =__km_new_mapping (x, ipaddr, sport); + } + }else { + ret =__km_new_mapping (x, ipaddr, sport); + } + +return ret; +}EXPORT_SYMBOL (km_new_mapping);void km_policy_expired (struct xfrm_policy *pol,int dir,int hard,u32 portid)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +17 -1
@@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p, err =0 ; +if (attrs[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH ]) +if (!attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP ]) + err = -EINVAL ; + out:return err; }
@@ -521,6 +525,7 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs,struct nlattr *lt = attrs[XFRMA_LTIME_VAL ];struct nlattr *et = attrs[XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH ];struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH ]; +struct nlattr *mt = attrs[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH ];if (re) {struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn;
@@ -552,6 +557,9 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs,if (rt) x->replay_maxdiff =nla_get_u32 (rt); + +if (mt) + x->mapping_maxage =nla_get_u32 (mt); }static void xfrm_smark_init (struct nlattr **attrs,struct xfrm_mark *m)
@@ -1024,8 +1032,13 @@ static int copy_to_user_state_extra(struct xfrm_state *x,if (ret) goto out; } -if (x->security) +if (x->security) { ret =copy_sec_ctx (x->security, skb); +if (ret) + goto out; + } +if (x->mapping_maxage) + ret =nla_put_u32 (skb,XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH , x->mapping_maxage); out:return ret; }
@@ -3069,6 +3082,9 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_sa_len(struct xfrm_state *x)/* Must count x->lastused as it may become non-zero behind our back. */ l +=nla_total_size_64bit (sizeof (u64)); +if (x->mapping_maxage) + l +=nla_total_size (sizeof (x->mapping_maxage)); +return l; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
This pull request was applied to netdev/net.git (master) by David S. Miller <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This pull request was applied to netdev/net.git (master) by David S. Miller <[email protected]>:
Quoted 10 lines · On Thu, 6 Jan 2022 10:13:43 +0100 you wrote:
1) Fix some
clang_analyzerwarnings about never read variables. From luo penghao.2) Check for pols[0] only once in
xfrm_expand_policies(). From Jean Sacren.3) The SA curlft.use_time was updated only on SA cration time. Update whenever the SA is used. From Antony Antony
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2022-01-06
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/c4251db3b9d2
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot. https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html