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KVM: x86/pt: Ignore all unknown Intel PT capabilities

PATCH Superseded Like Xu 3 participants 6 messages Jan 10, 2022 – Jan 11, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 KVM: x86/pt: Ignore all unknown Intel PT capabilities

From: Like Xu <[email protected]>

Some of the new Intel PT capabilities (e.g. SDM Vol3, 32.2.4 Event Tracing, it exposes details about the asynchronous events, when they are generated, and when their corresponding software event handler completes execution) cannot be safely and fully emulated by the KVM, especially emulating the simultaneous writing of guest PT packets generated by the KVM to the guest PT buffer.

For KVM, it's better to advertise currently supported features based on the "static struct pt_cap_desc" implemented in the host PT driver and ignore _all_ unknown features before they have been investigated one by one and supported in a safe manner, leaving the rest as system-wide-only tracing capabilities.

---
v1 -> v2 Changelog:
- Be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. (Paolo)

Previous:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/

 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -0
index 0b920e12bb6d..439b93359848 100644
@@ -901,6 +901,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 			break;
 		}
 
+		/* It's better to be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. */
+		entry->ebx &= GENMASK(5, 0);
 		for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
 			if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
 				goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.33.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · Like Xu

From: Like Xu <[email protected]>

Some of the new Intel PT capabilities (e.g. SDM Vol3, 32.2.4 Event Tracing, it exposes details about the asynchronous events, when they are generated, and when their corresponding software event handler completes execution) cannot be safely and fully emulated by the KVM, especially emulating the simultaneous writing of guest PT packets generated by the KVM to the guest PT buffer.

For KVM, it's better to advertise currently supported features based on the "static struct pt_cap_desc" implemented in the host PT driver and ignore _all_ unknown features before they have been investigated one by one and supported in a safe manner, leaving the rest as system-wide-only tracing capabilities.

---
v1 -> v2 Changelog:
- Be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. (Paolo)

Previous:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/

 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0 -0
index 0b920e12bb6d..439b93359848 100644

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) · line 904

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -0
@@ -901,6 +901,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 			break;
 		}
 
+		/* It's better to be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. */

No need to justify why unknown capabilities are hidden as that's very much (supposed to be) standard KVM behavior.

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) · line 905

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -0
+		entry->ebx &= GENMASK(5, 0);

Please add a #define somewhere so that this is self-documenting, e.g. see KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0.

And why just EBX? ECX appears to enumerate features too, and EDX is presumably reserved to enumerate yet more features when EBX/ECX run out of bits.

And is there any possibility of a malicious user/guest using features to cause problems in the host? I.e. does KVM need to enforce that the guest can't enable any unsupported features?

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0 -0
 		for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
 			if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
 				goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.33.1
author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 41 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 32 lines · Like Xu

From: Like Xu <[email protected]>

Some of the new Intel PT capabilities (e.g. SDM Vol3, 32.2.4 Event Tracing, it exposes details about the asynchronous events, when they are generated, and when their corresponding software event handler completes execution) cannot be safely and fully emulated by the KVM, especially emulating the simultaneous writing of guest PT packets generated by the KVM to the guest PT buffer.

For KVM, it's better to advertise currently supported features based on the "static struct pt_cap_desc" implemented in the host PT driver and ignore _all_ unknown features before they have been investigated one by one and supported in a safe manner, leaving the rest as system-wide-only tracing capabilities.

---
v1 -> v2 Changelog:
- Be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. (Paolo)

Previous:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/

  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0 -0
index 0b920e12bb6d..439b93359848 100644

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) · line 904

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -0
@@ -901,6 +901,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
  			break;
  		}
 
+		/* It's better to be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. */

No need to justify why unknown capabilities are hidden as that's very much (supposed to be) standard KVM behavior.

Quoted 4 lines

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) · line 905

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -0
+		entry->ebx &= GENMASK(5, 0);

Please add a #define somewhere so that this is self-documenting, e.g. see KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0.

How about we define this macro in the <asm/intel_pt.h> so that the next PT capability enabler can update the mask with minimal effort, considering that many pure kernel developers don't care about KVM code ?

Quoted 3 lines

And why just EBX? ECX appears to enumerate features too, and EDX is presumably reserved to enumerate yet more features when EBX/ECX run out of bits.

Yes, how about this version:

arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pt.h +6 -0
index ebe8d2ea44fe..da94d0eeb9df 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ enum pt_capabilities {
 	PT_CAP_psb_periods,
 };
 
+#define GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_EBX	\
+	(BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(5))
+
+#define GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_ECX	\
+	(BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(31))
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL)
 void cpu_emergency_stop_pt(void);
 extern u32 intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(enum pt_capabilities cap);
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +5 -1
index 0b920e12bb6d..be8c9170f98e 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <asm/user.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
 #include "cpuid.h"
 #include "lapic.h"
 #include "mmu.h"
@@ -900,7 +901,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
 			break;
 		}
-
+		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 1u);
+		entry->ebx &= GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_EBX;
+		entry->ecx &= GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_ECX;
+		entry->edx = 0;
 		for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
 			if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
 				goto out;
Quoted 4 lines

And is there any possibility of a malicious user/guest using features to cause problems in the host? I.e. does KVM need to enforce that the guest can't enable any unsupported features?

If a user space is set up with features not supported by KVM, it owns the risk itself.

AFAI, the guest Intel PT introduces a great attack interface for the host and we only use the guest supported PT features in a highly trusted environment.

I agree that more uncertainty and fixes can be triggered in the security motive, not expecting too much from this patch. :D

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0 -0
  		for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
  			if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
  				goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.33.1
author
#3 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Like Xu
Quoted 3 lines

And is there any possibility of a malicious user/guest using features to cause problems in the host?  I.e. does KVM need to enforce that the guest can't enable any unsupported features?

If a user space is set up with features not supported by KVM, it owns the risk itself.

I seem to have misunderstood it. KVM should prevent and stop any malicious guest from destroying other parts on the host, is this the right direction ?

Quoted 6 lines

AFAI, the guest Intel PT introduces a great attack interface for the host and we only use the guest supported PT features in a highly trusted environment.

I agree that more uncertainty and fixes can be triggered in the security motive, not expecting too much from this patch. :D

#4 lore raw
In reply to Like Xu
Quoted 63 lines · Like Xu
Quoted 42 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 36 lines · Like Xu

From: Like Xu <[email protected]>

Some of the new Intel PT capabilities (e.g. SDM Vol3, 32.2.4 Event Tracing, it exposes details about the asynchronous events, when they are generated, and when their corresponding software event handler completes execution) cannot be safely and fully emulated by the KVM, especially emulating the simultaneous writing of guest PT packets generated by the KVM to the guest PT buffer.

For KVM, it's better to advertise currently supported features based on the "static struct pt_cap_desc" implemented in the host PT driver and ignore _all_ unknown features before they have been investigated one by one and supported in a safe manner, leaving the rest as system-wide-only tracing capabilities.

---
v1 -> v2 Changelog:
- Be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. (Paolo)

Previous:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/

  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++

  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -0
index 0b920e12bb6d..439b93359848 100644
@@ -901,6 +901,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct 
 kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
               break;
           }
+        /* It's better to be safe and ignore _all_ unknown 
Quoted 1 line

capabilities. */

No need to justify why unknown capabilities are hidden as that's very much (supposed to be) standard KVM behavior.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

+        entry->ebx &= GENMASK(5, 0);

Please add a #define somewhere so that this is self-documenting, e.g. see KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0.

How about we define this macro in the <asm/intel_pt.h> so that the next PT capability enabler can update the mask with minimal effort, considering that many pure kernel developers don't care about KVM code ?

Quoted 3 lines

And why just EBX?  ECX appears to enumerate features too, and EDX is presumably reserved to enumerate yet more features when EBX/ECX run out of bits.

Yes, how about this version:

arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pt.h +0 -0
index ebe8d2ea44fe..da94d0eeb9df 100644

arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pt.h enum pt_capabilities { · line 32

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pt.h +6 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ enum pt_capabilities {
      PT_CAP_psb_periods,
  };
 
+#define GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_EBX    \
+    (BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(5))
+
+#define GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_ECX    \
+    (BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(31))
+

I doubt BIT(3) of CPUID_14_ECX can be exposed to guest directly.

It means "output to Trace Transport Subsystem Supported". If I understand correctly, it at least needs passthrough of the said Transport Subsystem or emulation of it.

Quoted 28 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pt.h +0 -0
  #if defined(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL)
  void cpu_emergency_stop_pt(void);
  extern u32 intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(enum pt_capabilities cap);
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +5 -1
index 0b920e12bb6d..be8c9170f98e 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
  #include <asm/user.h>
  #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
  #include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
  #include "cpuid.h"
  #include "lapic.h"
  #include "mmu.h"
@@ -900,7 +901,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct 
 kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
              entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
              break;
          }
-
+        entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 1u);
+        entry->ebx &= GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_EBX;
+        entry->ecx &= GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_ECX;
+        entry->edx = 0;
          for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
              if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))

                 goto out;

author
#5 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Xiaoyao Li

arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pt.h enum pt_capabilities { · line 32

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pt.h +6 -0
+#define GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_EBX    \
+    (BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(5))
+
+#define GUEST_SUPPORTED_CPUID_14_ECX    \
+    (BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(31))
+

I doubt BIT(3) of CPUID_14_ECX can be exposed to guest directly.

It means "output to Trace Transport Subsystem Supported". If I understand correctly, it at least needs passthrough of the said Transport Subsystem or emulation of it.

I'm not surprised that we can route Intel Guest PT output to a platform-specific trace endpoint (e.g., physical or emulated JTAG) as an MMIO debug port.