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KVM: x86: Fix the #GP(0) and #UD conditions for XSETBV emulation

PATCH In review Like Xu 3 participants 8 messages Jan 17, 2022 – Jan 20, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 KVM: x86: Fix the #GP(0) and #UD conditions for XSETBV emulation

From: Like Xu <[email protected]>

According to Intel SDM "XSETBV—Set Extended Control Register", the #UD exception is raised if CPUID.01H:ECX.XSAVE[bit 26] = 0 or if CR4.OSXSAVE[bit 18] = 0, and the #GP(0) exception for the reason "if the current privilege level is not 0" is only valid in the protected mode. Translate them into KVM terms.

Fixes 92f9895c146d ("Move XSETBV emulation to common code")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5 -1
index 76b4803dd3bd..7d8622e592bb 100644
@@ -1024,7 +1024,11 @@ static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
 
 int kvm_emulate_xsetbv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0 ||
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) ||
+	    !kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE))
+		return kvm_handle_invalid_op(vcpu);
+
+	if ((is_protmode(vcpu) && static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0) ||
 	    __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu))) {
 		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
 		return 1;
Signature · 1 line
2.33.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr) · line 1029

Quoted 12 lines · Like Xu
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -1
index 76b4803dd3bd..7d8622e592bb 100644
@@ -1024,7 +1024,11 @@ static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
 
  int kvm_emulate_xsetbv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
  {
-	if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0 ||
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) ||
+	    !kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE))
+		return kvm_handle_invalid_op(vcpu);

There's no need to check XSAVE, because it XSAVE=0 will prevent setting CR4.OSXSAVE.

Likewise, CPL and SS.DPL are also defined in real mode so there's no need to check is_protmode. The Intel manuals sometimes still act as the descriptor caches don't exist, even though VMX effectively made them part of the architecture.

Also, the "Fixes" tag is not really correct as the behavior was the same before. Rather, it fixes commit 02d4160fbd76 ("x86: KVM: add xsetbv to the emulator", 2019-08-22). Checking OSXSAVE is a bug in the emulator path, even though it's not needed in the XSETBV vmexit case.

Thanks,

Paolo

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
+	if ((is_protmode(vcpu) && static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0) ||
  	    __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu))) {
  		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
  		return 1;
author
#2 lore raw

Uh, thanks for your prompt response.

Quoted 15 lines · Paolo Bonzini

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 · line 1029

Quoted 12 lines · Like Xu
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -1
index 76b4803dd3bd..7d8622e592bb 100644
@@ -1024,7 +1024,11 @@ static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 
 index, u64 xcr)
   int kvm_emulate_xsetbv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
   {
-    if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0 ||
+    if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) ||
+        !kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE))
+        return kvm_handle_invalid_op(vcpu);

There's no need to check XSAVE, because it XSAVE=0 will prevent setting CR4.OSXSAVE.

So we just need to check X86_CR4_OSXSAVE for #UD here ?

Quoted 2 lines

Likewise, CPL and SS.DPL are also defined in real mode so there's no need to check is_protmode.  The Intel manuals sometimes still act as the descriptor caches don't exist, even though VMX effectively made them part of the architecture.

OK, make sense to drop is_protmode().

Quoted 2 lines

Also, the "Fixes" tag is not really correct as the behavior was the same before.  Rather, it fixes commit 02d4160fbd76 ("x86: KVM: add xsetbv to the

It seems the original code comes from 81dd35d42c9a ("KVM: SVM: Add xsetbv intercept"). 2acf923e38 ("KVM: VMX: Enable XSAVE/XRSTOR for guest") and 92f9895c146d.

Quoted 1 line

emulator", 2019-08-22).  Checking OSXSAVE is a bug in the emulator path, even though it's not needed in the XSETBV vmexit case.

The kvm_emulate_xsetbv() has been removed from the emulator path. I'm not really sure why it's not needed in the XSETBV vmexit case. More details ?

Quoted 11 lines

Thanks,

Paolo

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
+    if ((is_protmode(vcpu) && static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0) ||
           __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu))) {
           kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
           return 1;
maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Like Xu
Quoted 1 line

Also, the "Fixes" tag is not really correct as the behavior was the same before.  Rather, it fixes commit 02d4160fbd76 ("x86: KVM: add xsetbv to the

It seems the original code comes from 81dd35d42c9a ("KVM: SVM: Add xsetbv intercept"). 2acf923e38 ("KVM: VMX: Enable XSAVE/XRSTOR for guest") and 92f9895c146d.

Quoted 1 line

emulator", 2019-08-22).  Checking OSXSAVE is a bug in the emulator path, even though it's not needed in the XSETBV vmexit case.

The kvm_emulate_xsetbv() has been removed from the emulator path. I'm not really sure why it's not needed in the XSETBV vmexit case. More details ?

Nevermind, I confused AMD (where #UD is generated before checking for exceptions) with Intel where it's unconditional.

So the bug should be there since 2acf923e38 by executing XSETBV with CR4.XSAVE=0. If so, please include a testcase.

Paolo

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 12 lines

Thanks,

Paolo

Quoted 5 lines

+    if ((is_protmode(vcpu) && static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) !=
0) ||
          __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu))) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
          return 1;

author
#4 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 5 lines · Like Xu
Quoted 1 line

Also, the "Fixes" tag is not really correct as the behavior was the same before.  Rather, it fixes commit 02d4160fbd76 ("x86: KVM: add xsetbv to the

It seems the original code comes from 81dd35d42c9a ("KVM: SVM: Add xsetbv intercept"). 2acf923e38 ("KVM: VMX: Enable XSAVE/XRSTOR for guest") and 92f9895c146d.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

emulator", 2019-08-22).  Checking OSXSAVE is a bug in the emulator path, even though it's not needed in the XSETBV vmexit case.

The kvm_emulate_xsetbv() has been removed from the emulator path. I'm not really sure why it's not needed in the XSETBV vmexit case. More details ?

Nevermind, I confused AMD (where #UD is generated before checking for exceptions) with Intel where it's unconditional.

So the bug should be there since 2acf923e38 by executing XSETBV with CR4.XSAVE=0.  If so, please include a testcase.

In the testcase "executing XSETBV with CR4.XSAVE=0",

- on the VMX, #UD delivery does not require vm-exit;
- on the SVM, #UD is trapped but goes to the ud_interception() path;

There is no room to run this pointless patch.
Thank you and sorry for the noise.

Quoted 17 lines

Paolo

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines

Thanks,

Paolo

Quoted 4 lines

+    if ((is_protmode(vcpu) && static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0) || __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu))) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
          return 1;

maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Like Xu

In the testcase "executing XSETBV with CR4.XSAVE=0",

- on the VMX, #UD delivery does not require vm-exit;

Not your fault, it would be nicer if the Intel manual told the truth; it says: "The following instructions cause VM exits when they are executed in VMX non-root operation: CPUID, GETSEC[1], INVD, and XSETBV."

Footnote [1] says "An execution of GETSEC causes an invalid-opcode exception (#UD) if CR4.SMXE[Bit 14] = 0", and there is no such footnote for XSETBV. Nevertheless, when tracing xsave.flat, I see that there's a #UD vmexit and not an XSETBV vmexit:

        qemu-kvm-1637698 [019] 758186.750321: kvm_entry:            vcpu 0, rip 0x4028b7
        qemu-kvm-1637698 [019] 758186.750322: kvm_exit:             vcpu 0 reason EXCEPTION_NMI rip 0x40048d info1 0x0000000000000000 info2 0x0000000000000000 intr_info 0x80000306 error_code 0x00000000
        qemu-kvm-1637698 [019] 758186.750324: kvm_emulate_insn:     0:40048d:0f 01 d1 (prot64)
        qemu-kvm-1637698 [019] 758186.750325: kvm_inj_exception:    #UD (0x0)

So while my gut feeling that #UD would not cause a vmexit was correct, technically I was reading the SDM incorrectly.

Jun, can you have this fixed?

Paolo

Quoted 1 line

- on the SVM, #UD is trapped but goes to the ud_interception() path;

#6 lore raw
Quoted 24 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 4 lines · Like Xu

In the testcase "executing XSETBV with CR4.XSAVE=0",

- on the VMX, #UD delivery does not require vm-exit;

Not your fault, it would be nicer if the Intel manual told the truth; it says: "The following instructions cause VM exits when they are executed in VMX non-root operation: CPUID, GETSEC[1], INVD, and XSETBV."

Footnote [1] says "An execution of GETSEC causes an invalid-opcode exception (#UD) if CR4.SMXE[Bit 14] = 0", and there is no such footnote for XSETBV.  Nevertheless, when tracing xsave.flat, I see that there's a #UD vmexit and not an XSETBV vmexit:

        qemu-kvm-1637698 [019] 758186.750321: kvm_entry:
vcpu 0, rip 0x4028b7
        qemu-kvm-1637698 [019] 758186.750322: kvm_exit:
vcpu 0 reason EXCEPTION_NMI rip 0x40048d info1 0x0000000000000000 info2 0x0000000000000000 intr_info 0x80000306 error_code 0x00000000
        qemu-kvm-1637698 [019] 758186.750324: kvm_emulate_insn:
0:40048d:0f 01 d1 (prot64)
        qemu-kvm-1637698 [019] 758186.750325: kvm_inj_exception:    #UD
(0x0)

Quoted 2 lines

So while my gut feeling that #UD would not cause a vmexit was correct, technically I was reading the SDM incorrectly.

SDM also states

Certain exceptions have priority over VM exits. These include invalid-opcode exception, faults based on privilege level, and general-protection exceptions that are based on checking I/O permission bits in the task-state segment(TSS)

in "Relative Priority of Faults and VM Exits"

So my understanding is that the architectural check always takes the higher priority than VM exit.

Quoted 6 lines

Jun, can you have this fixed?

Paolo

Quoted 1 line

- on the SVM, #UD is trapped but goes to the ud_interception() path;

maintainer
#7 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 3 lines

So while my gut feeling that #UD would not cause a vmexit was correct, technically I was reading the SDM incorrectly.

SDM also states

Quoted 8 lines

  Certain exceptions have priority over VM exits. These include invalid-opcode exception, faults based on privilege level, and general-protection exceptions that are based on checking I/O permission bits in the task-state segment(TSS)

in "Relative Priority of Faults and VM Exits"

So my understanding is that the architectural check always takes the higher priority than VM exit.

Good point! It's right above in 25.1.1. I was confused by the specific mention of GETSEC, but the reason for the footnote is because undefined GETSEC leaves cause a vmexit instead of #UD, and GETSEC vmexits also override #GP faults based on privilege level.

Thanks,

Paolo