KVM: x86/cpuid: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures for vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0
PATCH 1/1 KVM: x86/cpuid: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures for vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
A malicious user space can bypass xstate_get_guest_group_perm() in the KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID mechanism and obtain unpermitted xfeatures, since the validity check of xcr0 depends only on guest_supported_xcr0.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -1
@@ -266,7 +266,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 =0 ; else vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = - (best->eax | ((u64 )best->edx <<32 )) & supported_xcr0; + (best->eax | ((u64 )best->edx <<32 )) & + (supported_xcr0 &xstate_get_guest_group_perm ());/* * Bits 127:0 of the allowed SECS.ATTRIBUTES (CPUID.0x12.0x1) enumerate
Signature · 1 line
2.33.1
Quoted 8 lines
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, January 23, 2022 1:50 PMFrom: Like Xu <[email protected]>
A malicious user space can bypass
xstate_get_guest_group_perm()in theKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDmechanism and obtain unpermitted xfeatures, since the validity check of xcr0 depends only onguest_supported_xcr0.
Unpermitted xfeatures cannot pass kvm_check_cpuid()...
Quoted 27 lines
Fixes 445ecdf79be0 ("kvm: x86: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures at
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID")Signed-off-by Like Xu <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2
-1@@ -266,7 +266,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = 0; else vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = - (best->eax | ((u64 )best->edx <<32 )) & supported_xcr0; + (best->eax | ((u64 )best->edx <<32 )) & + (supported_xcr0 &xstate_get_guest_group_perm ());arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0
-0/* * Bits 127:0 of the allowed SECS.ATTRIBUTES (CPUID.0x12.0x1) enumerate
--
2.33.1
Quoted 10 lines · Kevin
Quoted 8 lines
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, January 23, 2022 1:50 PMFrom: Like Xu <[email protected]>
A malicious user space can bypass
xstate_get_guest_group_perm()in theKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDmechanism and obtain unpermitted xfeatures, since the validity check of xcr0 depends only onguest_supported_xcr0.Unpermitted xfeatures cannot pass
kvm_check_cpuid()...
Indeed, 5ab2f45bba4894a0db4af8567da3efd6228dd010.
This part of logic is pretty fragile and fragmented due to semantic inconsistencies between supported_xcr0 and guest_supported_xcr0 in other three places:
- __do_cpuid_func
- kvm_mpx_supported
- kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave
Have you identified all their areas of use ?
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 28 lines
Fixes 445ecdf79be0 ("kvm: x86: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures at
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID")Signed-off-by Like Xu <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2
-1@@ -266,7 +266,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = 0; else vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = - (best->eax | ((u64 )best->edx <<32 )) & supported_xcr0; + (best->eax | ((u64 )best->edx <<32 )) & + (supported_xcr0 &xstate_get_guest_group_perm ());/*
* Bits 127:0 of the allowed SECS.ATTRIBUTES (CPUID.0x12.0x1)
enumerate
--
2.33.1
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Like Xu
Quoted 9 lines · Kevin
Quoted 8 lines
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, January 23, 2022 1:50 PMFrom: Like Xu <[email protected]>
A malicious user space can bypass
xstate_get_guest_group_perm()in theKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDmechanism and obtain unpermitted xfeatures, since the validity check of xcr0 depends only onguest_supported_xcr0.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Unpermitted xfeatures cannot pass
kvm_check_cpuid()...Indeed,
5ab2f45bba4894a0db4af8567da3efd6228dd010.This part of logic is pretty fragile and fragmented due to semantic inconsistencies between
supported_xcr0andguest_supported_xcr0in other three places:
There are no inconsistencies, at least not in the examples below, as the examples are intended to work in host context. guest_supported_xcr0 is about what the guest is/isn't allowed to access, it has no bearing on what host userspace can/can't do. Or are you talking about a different type of inconsistency?
Quoted 1 line
-
__do_cpuid_func
Reporting what KVM supports to host userspace.
Quoted 1 line
-
kvm_mpx_supported
This is a check on host support.
Quoted 1 line
-
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave
"write" from host userspace.
Quoted 1 line
Have you identified all their areas of use ?
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 14 lines · Like Xu
Quoted 10 lines · Kevin
Quoted 8 lines
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, January 23, 2022 1:50 PMFrom: Like Xu <[email protected]>
A malicious user space can bypass
xstate_get_guest_group_perm()in theKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDmechanism and obtain unpermitted xfeatures, since the validity check of xcr0 depends only onguest_supported_xcr0.Unpermitted xfeatures cannot pass
kvm_check_cpuid()...Indeed,
5ab2f45bba4894a0db4af8567da3efd6228dd010.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
This part of logic is pretty fragile and fragmented due to semantic inconsistencies between
supported_xcr0andguest_supported_xcr0in other three places:There are no inconsistencies, at least not in the examples below, as the examples are intended to work in host context.
guest_supported_xcr0is about what the guest is/isn't allowed to access, it has no bearing on what host userspace can/can't do. Or are you talking about a different type of inconsistency?
The extra complication is that arch_prctl(ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM) changes what host userspace can/can't do. It would be easier if we could just say that KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID returns "the most" that userspace can do, but we already have the contract that userspace can take KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and pass it straight to KVM_SET_CPUID2.
Therefore, KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID must limit its returned values to what has already been enabled.
While reviewing the QEMU part of AMX support (this morning), I also noticed that there is no equivalent for guest permissions of ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP. This needs to know KVM's supported_xcr0, so it's probably best realized as a new KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION rather than as an arch_prctl.
Paolo
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 1 line
-
__do_cpuid_funcReporting what KVM supports to host userspace.
Quoted 1 line
-
kvm_mpx_supportedThis is a check on host support.
Quoted 1 line
-
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave"write" from host userspace.
Quoted 1 line
Have you identified all their areas of use ?
Quoted 39 lines
From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2022 12:30 AMQuoted 8 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 7 lines · Like Xu
Quoted 6 lines · Kevin
Quoted 6 lines
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, January 23, 2022 1:50 PMFrom: Like Xu <[email protected]>
A malicious user space can bypass
xstate_get_guest_group_perm()inthe
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KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDmechanism and obtain unpermittedxfeatures,
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 9 lines
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since the validity check of xcr0 depends only on
guest_supported_xcr0.Unpermitted xfeatures cannot pass
kvm_check_cpuid()...Indeed,
5ab2f45bba4894a0db4af8567da3efd6228dd010.This part of logic is pretty fragile and fragmented due to semantic inconsistencies between
supported_xcr0andguest_supported_xcr0in other three places:There are no inconsistencies, at least not in the examples below, as the
examples
Quoted 1 line
are intended to work in host context.
guest_supported_xcr0is about whatthe guest
Quoted 1 line
is/isn't allowed to access, it has no bearing on what host userspace
can/can't do.
Quoted 1 line
Or are you talking about a different type of inconsistency?
The extra complication is that
arch_prctl(ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM)changes what host userspace can/can't do. It would be easier if we could just say thatKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDreturns "the most" that userspace can do, but we already have the contract that userspace can takeKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDand pass it straight toKVM_SET_CPUID2.
Quoted 9 lines
Therefore,
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDmust limit its returned values to what has already been enabled.While reviewing the QEMU part of AMX support (this morning), I also noticed that there is no equivalent for guest permissions of
ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP. This needs to know KVM'ssupported_xcr0, so it's probably best realized as a newKVM_CHECK_EXTENSIONrather than as anarch_prctl.
Would that lead to a weird situation where although KVM says no support of guest permissions while the user can still request them via prctl()?
I wonder whether it's cleaner to do it still via prctl() if we really want to enhance this part. But as you said then it needs a mechanism to know KVM's supported_xcr0 (and if KVM is not loaded then no guest permission support at all)...
Thanks
Kevin
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Kevin
Quoted 9 lines
The extra complication is that
arch_prctl(ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM)changes what host userspace can/can't do. It would be easier if we could just say thatKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDreturns "the most" that userspace can do, but we already have the contract that userspace can takeKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDand pass it straight toKVM_SET_CPUID2.Therefore,
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDmust limit its returned values to what has already been enabled.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
While reviewing the QEMU part of AMX support (this morning), I also noticed that there is no equivalent for guest permissions of
ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP. This needs to know KVM'ssupported_xcr0, so it's probably best realized as a newKVM_CHECK_EXTENSIONrather than as anarch_prctl.Would that lead to a weird situation where although KVM says no support of guest permissions while the user can still request them via
prctl()?
This is already the case for the current implementation of KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
Paolo
Quoted 4 lines
I wonder whether it's cleaner to do it still via
prctl()if we really want to enhance this part. But as you said then it needs a mechanism to know KVM'ssupported_xcr0(and if KVM is not loaded then no guest permission support at all)...
Quoted 21 lines
From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2022 4:28 PMQuoted 1 line · Kevin
Quoted 1 line
The extra complication is that
arch_prctl(ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM)Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
changes what host userspace can/can't do. It would be easier if we could just say that
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDreturns "the most" that userspace can do, but we already have the contract that userspace can takeKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDand pass it straight to
KVM_SET_CPUID2.Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Therefore,
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUIDmust limit its returned valuesto
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what has already been enabled.
While reviewing the QEMU part of AMX support (this morning), I also noticed that there is no equivalent for guest permissions of
ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP. This needs to know KVM'ssupported_xcr0, soit's
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
probably best realized as a new
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSIONrather than as
Quoted 9 lines
an
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
arch_prctl.Would that lead to a weird situation where although KVM says no support of guest permissions while the user can still request them via
prctl()?This is already the case for the current implementation of
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
fair enough.