kasan, vmalloc, arm64: add vmalloc tagging support for SW/HW_TAGS
Subsystems (16)
v6 cover kasan, vmalloc, arm64: add vmalloc tagging support for SW/HW_TAGS
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Hi,
This patchset adds vmalloc tagging support for SW_TAGS and HW_TAGS KASAN modes.
The tree with patches is available here:
https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-kasan-vmalloc-tags-v6
About half of patches are cleanups I went for along the way. None of them seem to be important enough to go through stable, so I decided not to split them out into separate patches/series.
The patchset is partially based on an early version of the HW_TAGS patchset by Vincenzo that had vmalloc support. Thus, I added a Co-developed-by tag into a few patches.
SW_TAGS vmalloc tagging support is straightforward. It reuses all of the generic KASAN machinery, but uses shadow memory to store tags instead of magic values. Naturally, vmalloc tagging requires adding a few kasan_reset_tag() annotations to the vmalloc code.
HW_TAGS vmalloc tagging support stands out. HW_TAGS KASAN is based on Arm MTE, which can only assigns tags to physical memory. As a result, HW_TAGS KASAN only tags vmalloc() allocations, which are backed by page_alloc memory. It ignores vmap() and others.
Thanks!
Changes in v5->v6:
- Rebased onto mainline/5.17-rc1.
- Drop unnecessary explicit checks for software KASAN modes from should_skip_init().
Changes in v4->v5:
- Rebase onto fresh mm.
- Mention optimization intention in the comment for __GFP_ZEROTAGS.
- Replace "kasan: simplify kasan_init_hw_tags" with "kasan: clean up feature flags for HW_TAGS mode".
- Use true as kasan_flag_vmalloc static key default.
- Cosmetic changes to __def_gfpflag_names_kasan and __GFP_BITS_SHIFT.
Changes in v3->v4:
- Rebase onto fresh mm.
- Rename KASAN_VMALLOC_NOEXEC to KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL.
- Compare prot with PAGE_KERNEL instead of using pgprot_nx() to indentify normal non-executable mappings.
- Rename arch_vmalloc_pgprot_modify() to arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged().
- Move checks from arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged() to __vmalloc_node_range() as the same condition is used for other things in subsequent patches.
- Use proper kasan_hw_tags_enabled() checks instead of IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS).
- Set __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON and __GFP_SKIP_ZERO flags instead of resetting.
- Only define KASAN GFP flags when when HW_TAGS KASAN is enabled.
- Move setting KASAN GFP flags to __vmalloc_node_range() and do it only for normal non-executable mapping when HW_TAGS KASAN is enabled.
- Add new GFP flags to include/trace/events/mmflags.h.
- Don't forget to save tagged addr to vm_struct->addr for VM_ALLOC so that find_vm_area(addr)->addr == addr for vmalloc().
- Reset pointer tag in change_memory_common().
- Add test checks for set_memory_*() on vmalloc() allocations.
- Minor patch descriptions and comments fixes.
Changes in v2->v3:
- Rebase onto mm.
- New patch: "kasan, arm64: reset pointer tags of vmapped stacks".
- New patch: "kasan, vmalloc: don't tag executable vmalloc allocations".
- New patch: "kasan, arm64: don't tag executable vmalloc allocations".
- Allowing enabling KASAN_VMALLOC with SW/HW_TAGS is moved to "kasan: allow enabling KASAN_VMALLOC and SW/HW_TAGS", as this can only be done once executable allocations are no longer tagged.
- Minor fixes, see patches for lists of changes.
Changes in v1->v2:
- Move memory init for vmalloc() into vmalloc code for HW_TAGS KASAN.
- Minor fixes and code reshuffling, see patches for lists of changes.
Andrey Konovalov (39):
kasan, page_alloc: deduplicate should_skip_kasan_poison kasan, page_alloc: move tag_clear_highpage out of
kernel_init_free_pages
kasan, page_alloc: merge kasan_free_pages into free_pages_prepare kasan, page_alloc: simplify kasan_poison_pages call site kasan, page_alloc: init memory of skipped pages on free
kasan: drop skip_kasan_poison variable in free_pages_prepare
mm: clarify __GFP_ZEROTAGS comment
kasan: only apply __GFP_ZEROTAGS when memory is zeroed kasan, page_alloc: refactor init checks in post_alloc_hook kasan, page_alloc: merge kasan_alloc_pages into post_alloc_hook kasan, page_alloc: combine tag_clear_highpage calls in post_alloc_hook kasan, page_alloc: move SetPageSkipKASanPoison in post_alloc_hook kasan, page_alloc: move kernel_init_free_pages in post_alloc_hook kasan, page_alloc: rework kasan_unpoison_pages call site
kasan: clean up metadata byte definitions
kasan: define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID for SW_TAGS
kasan, x86, arm64, s390: rename functions for modules shadow kasan, vmalloc: drop outdated VM_KASAN comment
kasan: reorder vmalloc hooks
kasan: add wrappers for vmalloc hooks
kasan, vmalloc: reset tags in vmalloc functions
kasan, fork: reset pointer tags of vmapped stacks
kasan, arm64: reset pointer tags of vmapped stacks
kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS
kasan, vmalloc, arm64: mark vmalloc mappings as pgprot_tagged kasan, vmalloc: unpoison VM_ALLOC pages after mapping kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping unpoisoning for HW_TAGS kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping memory init for HW_TAGS kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for HW_TAGS
kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
kasan, arm64: don't tag executable vmalloc allocations
kasan: mark kasan_arg_stacktrace as __initdata
kasan: clean up feature flags for HW_TAGS mode
kasan: add kasan.vmalloc command line flag
kasan: allow enabling KASAN_VMALLOC and SW/HW_TAGS
arm64: select KASAN_VMALLOC for SW/HW_TAGS modes
kasan: documentation updates
kasan: improve vmalloc tests
Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 17 ++- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/vmap_stack.h | 5 +- arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 5 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 3 +- arch/s390/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 2 +- include/linux/gfp.h | 35 +++-- include/linux/kasan.h | 97 +++++++++----- include/linux/vmalloc.h | 18 +-- include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 14 +- kernel/fork.c | 1 + kernel/scs.c | 4 +- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 20 +-- lib/test_kasan.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/common.c | 4 +- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 18 ++- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 63 +++++---- mm/page_alloc.c | 152 +++++++++++++++------- mm/vmalloc.c | 99 +++++++++++--- 23 files changed, 731 insertions(+), 220 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 1/39 kasan, page_alloc: deduplicate should_skip_kasan_poison
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Currently, should_skip_kasan_poison() has two definitions: one for when CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled, one for when it's not.
Instead of duplicating the checks, add a deferred_pages_enabled() helper and use it in a single should_skip_kasan_poison() definition.
Also move should_skip_kasan_poison() closer to its caller and clarify all conditions in the comment.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +33 -22
@@ -378,25 +378,9 @@ int page_group_by_mobility_disabled __read_mostly;*/ static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (deferred_pages); -/* -* Calling kasan_poison_pages() only after deferred memory initialization -* has completed. Poisoning pages during deferred memory init will greatly -* lengthen the process and cause problem in large memory systems as the -* deferred pages initialization is done with interrupt disabled. -* -* Assuming that there will be no reference to those newly initialized -* pages before they are ever allocated, this should have no effect on -* KASAN memory tracking as the poison will be properly inserted at page -* allocation time. The only corner case is when pages are allocated by -* on-demand allocation and then freed again before the deferred pages -* initialization is done, but this is not likely to happen. -*/ -static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison (struct page *page,fpi_t fpi_flags) +static inline bool deferred_pages_enabled (void ) { -return static_branch_unlikely (&deferred_pages) || - (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (fpi_flags &FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON )) || -PageSkipKASanPoison (page); +return static_branch_unlikely (&deferred_pages); }/* Returns true if the struct page for the pfn is uninitialised */
@@ -447,11 +431,9 @@ defer_init(int nid, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long end_pfn) return false; }#else -static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison (struct page *page,fpi_t fpi_flags) +static inline bool deferred_pages_enabled (void ) { -return (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (fpi_flags &FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON )) || -PageSkipKASanPoison (page); +return false; }static inline bool early_page_uninitialised (unsigned long pfn)
@@ -1271,6 +1253,35 @@ static int free_tail_pages_check(struct page *head_page, struct page *page)return ret; } +/* +* Skip KASAN memory poisoning when either: +* +* 1. Deferred memory initialization has not yet completed, +* see the explanation below. +* 2. Skipping poisoning is requested via FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, +* see the comment next to it. +* 3. Skipping poisoning is requested via __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, +* see the comment next to it. +* +* Poisoning pages during deferred memory init will greatly lengthen the +* process and cause problem in large memory systems as the deferred pages +* initialization is done with interrupt disabled. +* +* Assuming that there will be no reference to those newly initialized +* pages before they are ever allocated, this should have no effect on +* KASAN memory tracking as the poison will be properly inserted at page +* allocation time. The only corner case is when pages are allocated by +* on-demand allocation and then freed again before the deferred pages +* initialization is done, but this is not likely to happen. +*/ +static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison (struct page *page,fpi_t fpi_flags) +{ +return deferred_pages_enabled () || + (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && + (fpi_flags &FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON )) || +PageSkipKASanPoison (page); +} +static void kernel_init_free_pages (struct page *page,int numpages,bool zero_tags) {int i;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 2/39 kasan, page_alloc: move tag_clear_highpage out of kernel_init_free_pages
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Currently, kernel_init_free_pages() serves two purposes: it either only zeroes memory or zeroes both memory and memory tags via a different code path. As this function has only two callers, each using only one code path, this behaviour is confusing.
Pull the code that zeroes both memory and tags out of kernel_init_free_pages().
As a result of this change, the code in free_pages_prepare() starts to look complicated, but this is improved in the few following patches. Those improvements are not integrated into this patch to make diffs easier to read.
This patch does no functional changes.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +13 -11
@@ -1282,16 +1282,10 @@ static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison(struct page *page, fpi_t fpi_flags)PageSkipKASanPoison (page); } -static void kernel_init_free_pages (struct page *page,int numpages,bool zero_tags) +static void kernel_init_free_pages (struct page *page,int numpages) {int i; -if (zero_tags) { -for (i =0 ; i < numpages; i++) -tag_clear_highpage (page + i); -return ; - } -/* s390's use of memset() could override KASAN redzones. */ kasan_disable_current ();for (i =0 ; i < numpages; i++) {
@@ -1387,7 +1381,7 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,bool init =want_init_on_free ();if (init) -kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order, false); +kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order);if (!skip_kasan_poison)kasan_poison_pages (page, order, init); }
@@ -2430,9 +2424,17 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,bool init = !want_init_on_free () &&want_init_on_alloc (gfp_flags);kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); -if (init) -kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order, - gfp_flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS); + +if (init) { +if (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS) { +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <1 << order; i++) +tag_clear_highpage (page + i); + }else { +kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); + } + } }set_page_owner (page, order, gfp_flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 3/39 kasan, page_alloc: merge kasan_free_pages into free_pages_prepare
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Currently, the code responsible for initializing and poisoning memory in free_pages_prepare() is scattered across two locations:kasan_free_pages() for HW_TAGS KASAN and free_pages_prepare() itself. This is confusing.
This and a few following patches combine the code from these two locations. Along the way, these patches also simplify the performed checks to make them easier to follow.
Replaces the only caller of kasan_free_pages() with its implementation.
As kasan_has_integrated_init() is only true when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled, moving the code does no functional changes.
This patch is not useful by itself but makes the simplifications in the following patches easier to follow.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 8 -------- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 11 ----------- mm/page_alloc.c | 6 ++++-- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -8
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_hw_tags_enabled(void) }void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order,gfp_t flags); -void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
@@ -117,13 +116,6 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, BUILD_BUG(); } -static __always_inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, -unsigned int order) -{ -/* Only available for integrated init. */ -BUILD_BUG (); -} -#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ static inline bool kasan_has_integrated_init (void )
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ static inline bool ____kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) }/* -* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages() or +* The object will be poisoned by kasan_poison_pages() or * kasan_slab_free_mempool(). */
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -11
@@ -213,17 +213,6 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t flags) } } -void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) -{ -/* -* This condition should match the one in free_pages_prepare() in -* page_alloc.c. -*/ -bool init =want_init_on_free (); - -kasan_poison_pages (page, order, init); -} -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST )void kasan_enable_tagging_sync (void )
mm/page_alloc.c +4 -2
@@ -1368,15 +1368,17 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,/* * As memory initialization might be integrated into KASAN, -* kasan_free_pages and kernel_init_free_pages must be +* KASAN poisoning and memory initialization code must be * kept together to avoid discrepancies in behavior. * * With hardware tag-based KASAN, memory tags must be set before the * page becomes unavailable via debug_pagealloc or arch_free_page. */ if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) { +bool init =want_init_on_free (); +if (!skip_kasan_poison) -kasan_free_pages (page, order); +kasan_poison_pages (page, order, init); }else {bool init =want_init_on_free ();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 4/39 kasan, page_alloc: simplify kasan_poison_pages call site
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Simplify the code around calling kasan_poison_pages() in free_pages_prepare().
This patch does no functional changes.
---
Changes v1->v2:
- Don't reorder kasan_poison_pages() and free_pages_prepare().
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 18 +++++------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +5 -13
@@ -1302,6 +1302,7 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, {int bad =0 ;bool skip_kasan_poison =should_skip_kasan_poison (page, fpi_flags); +bool init =want_init_on_free ();VM_BUG_ON_PAGE (PageTail (page), page);
@@ -1374,19 +1375,10 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,* With hardware tag-based KASAN, memory tags must be set before the * page becomes unavailable via debug_pagealloc or arch_free_page. */ -if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) { -bool init =want_init_on_free (); - -if (!skip_kasan_poison) -kasan_poison_pages (page, order, init); - }else { -bool init =want_init_on_free (); - -if (init) -kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); -if (!skip_kasan_poison) -kasan_poison_pages (page, order, init); - } +if (init && !kasan_has_integrated_init ()) +kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); +if (!skip_kasan_poison) +kasan_poison_pages (page, order, init);/* * arch_free_page() can make the page's contents inaccessible. s390
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 5/39 kasan, page_alloc: init memory of skipped pages on free
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Since commit 7a3b83537188 ("kasan: use separate (un)poison implementation for integrated init"), when all init, kasan_has_integrated_init(), and skip_kasan_poison are true, free_pages_prepare() doesn't initialize the page. This is wrong.
Fix it by remembering whether kasan_poison_pages() performed initialization, and call kernel_init_free_pages() if it didn't.
Reordering kasan_poison_pages() and kernel_init_free_pages() is OK, since kernel_init_free_pages() can handle poisoned memory.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Drop Fixes tag, as the patch won't cleanly apply to older kernels anyway. The commit is mentioned in the patch description.
Changes v1->v2:
- Reorder kasan_poison_pages() and free_pages_prepare() in this patch instead of doing it in the previous one.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +8 -3
@@ -1375,11 +1375,16 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,* With hardware tag-based KASAN, memory tags must be set before the * page becomes unavailable via debug_pagealloc or arch_free_page. */ -if (init && !kasan_has_integrated_init ()) -kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); -if (!skip_kasan_poison) +if (!skip_kasan_poison) {kasan_poison_pages (page, order, init); +/* Memory is already initialized if KASAN did it internally. */ +if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) + init = false; + } +if (init) +kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); +/* * arch_free_page() can make the page's contents inaccessible. s390 * does this. So nothing which can access the page's contents should
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 6/39 kasan: drop skip_kasan_poison variable in free_pages_prepare
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
skip_kasan_poison is only used in a single place. Call should_skip_kasan_poison() directly for simplicity.
---
Changes v1->v2:
- Add this patch.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +1 -2
@@ -1301,7 +1301,6 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool check_free, fpi_t fpi_flags) { int bad = 0; -bool skip_kasan_poison =should_skip_kasan_poison (page, fpi_flags);bool init =want_init_on_free ();VM_BUG_ON_PAGE (PageTail (page), page);
@@ -1375,7 +1374,7 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,* With hardware tag-based KASAN, memory tags must be set before the * page becomes unavailable via debug_pagealloc or arch_free_page. */ -if (!skip_kasan_poison) { +if (!should_skip_kasan_poison (page, fpi_flags)) {kasan_poison_pages (page, order, init);/* Memory is already initialized if KASAN did it internally. */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 7/39 mm: clarify __GFP_ZEROTAGS comment
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
__GFP_ZEROTAGS is intended as an optimization: if memory is zeroed during allocation, it's possible to set memory tags at the same time with little performance impact.
Clarify this intention of __GFP_ZEROTAGS in the comment.
---
Changes v4->v5:
- Mention optimization intention in the comment.
--- include/linux/gfp.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/gfp.h +4 -2
@@ -232,8 +232,10 @@ struct vm_area_struct;* * %__GFP_ZERO returns a zeroed page on success. * -* %__GFP_ZEROTAGS returns a page with zeroed memory tags on success, if -* __GFP_ZERO is set. +* %__GFP_ZEROTAGS zeroes memory tags at allocation time if the memory itself +* is being zeroed (either via __GFP_ZERO or via init_on_alloc). This flag is +* intended for optimization: setting memory tags at the same time as zeroing +* memory has minimal additional performace impact. * * %__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON returns a page which does not need to be poisoned * on deallocation. Typically used for userspace pages. Currently only has an
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 8/39 kasan: only apply __GFP_ZEROTAGS when memory is zeroed
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
__GFP_ZEROTAGS should only be effective if memory is being zeroed. Currently, hardware tag-based KASAN violates this requirement.
Fix by including an initialization check along with checking for __GFP_ZEROTAGS.
--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +2 -1
@@ -199,11 +199,12 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t flags)* page_alloc.c. */ bool init = !want_init_on_free () &&want_init_on_alloc (flags); +bool init_tags = init && (flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS);if (flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)SetPageSkipKASanPoison (page); -if (flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS) { +if (init_tags) {int i;for (i =0 ; i !=1 << order; ++i)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 9/39 kasan, page_alloc: refactor init checks in post_alloc_hook
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Separate code for zeroing memory from the code clearing tags in post_alloc_hook().
This patch is not useful by itself but makes the simplifications in the following patches easier to follow.
This patch does no functional changes.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +10 -8
@@ -2420,19 +2420,21 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,kasan_alloc_pages (page, order, gfp_flags); }else {bool init = !want_init_on_free () &&want_init_on_alloc (gfp_flags); +bool init_tags = init && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS);kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); -if (init) { -if (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS) { -int i; +if (init_tags) { +int i; -for (i =0 ; i <1 << order; i++) -tag_clear_highpage (page + i); - }else { -kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); - } +for (i =0 ; i <1 << order; i++) +tag_clear_highpage (page + i); + + init = false; } + +if (init) +kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); }set_page_owner (page, order, gfp_flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 10/39 kasan, page_alloc: merge kasan_alloc_pages into post_alloc_hook
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Currently, the code responsible for initializing and poisoning memory in post_alloc_hook() is scattered across two locations: kasan_alloc_pages() hook for HW_TAGS KASAN and post_alloc_hook() itself. This is confusing.
This and a few following patches combine the code from these two locations. Along the way, these patches do a step-by-step restructure the many performed checks to make them easier to follow.
Replace the only caller of kasan_alloc_pages() with its implementation.
As kasan_has_integrated_init() is only true when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled, moving the code does no functional changes.
Also move init and init_tags variables definitions out of kasan_has_integrated_init() clause in post_alloc_hook(), as they have the same values regardless of what the if condition evaluates to.
This patch is not useful by itself but makes the simplifications in the following patches easier to follow.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 9 --------- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 22 ---------------------- mm/page_alloc.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -9
@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_hw_tags_enabled(void) return kasan_enabled(); } -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order,gfp_t flags); -#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ static inline bool kasan_enabled (void )
@@ -109,13 +107,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_hw_tags_enabled(void) return false; } -static __always_inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, -unsigned int order,gfp_t flags) -{ -/* Only available for integrated init. */ -BUILD_BUG (); -} -#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ static inline bool kasan_has_integrated_init (void )
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,return NULL ;/* -* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_alloc_pages() for +* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages() for * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc(). */
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -22
@@ -192,28 +192,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_hw_tags(void) kasan_stack_collection_enabled() ? "on" : "off"); } -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order,gfp_t flags) -{ -/* -* This condition should match the one in post_alloc_hook() in -* page_alloc.c. -*/ -bool init = !want_init_on_free () &&want_init_on_alloc (flags); -bool init_tags = init && (flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS); - -if (flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON) -SetPageSkipKASanPoison (page); - -if (init_tags) { -int i; - -for (i =0 ; i !=1 << order; ++i) -tag_clear_highpage (page + i); - }else { -kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); - } -} -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST )void kasan_enable_tagging_sync (void )
mm/page_alloc.c +15 -5
@@ -2398,6 +2398,9 @@ static bool check_new_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)inline void post_alloc_hook (struct page *page,unsigned int order,gfp_t gfp_flags) { +bool init = !want_init_on_free () &&want_init_on_alloc (gfp_flags); +bool init_tags = init && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS); +set_page_private (page,0 );set_page_refcounted (page);
@@ -2413,15 +2416,22 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,/* * As memory initialization might be integrated into KASAN, -* kasan_alloc_pages and kernel_init_free_pages must be +* KASAN unpoisoning and memory initializion code must be * kept together to avoid discrepancies in behavior. */ if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) { -kasan_alloc_pages (page, order, gfp_flags); - }else { -bool init = !want_init_on_free () &&want_init_on_alloc (gfp_flags); -bool init_tags = init && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS); +if (gfp_flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON) +SetPageSkipKASanPoison (page); + +if (init_tags) { +int i; +for (i =0 ; i !=1 << order; ++i) +tag_clear_highpage (page + i); + }else { +kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); + } + }else {kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init);if (init_tags) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 11/39 kasan, page_alloc: combine tag_clear_highpage calls in post_alloc_hook
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Move tag_clear_highpage() loops out of the kasan_has_integrated_init() clause as a code simplification.
This patch does no functional changes.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +16 -16
@@ -2419,30 +2419,30 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,* KASAN unpoisoning and memory initializion code must be * kept together to avoid discrepancies in behavior. */ + +/* +* If memory tags should be zeroed (which happens only when memory +* should be initialized as well). +*/ +if (init_tags) { +int i; + +/* Initialize both memory and tags. */ +for (i =0 ; i !=1 << order; ++i) +tag_clear_highpage (page + i); + +/* Note that memory is already initialized by the loop above. */ + init = false; + }if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) {if (gfp_flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)SetPageSkipKASanPoison (page); -if (init_tags) { -int i; - -for (i =0 ; i !=1 << order; ++i) -tag_clear_highpage (page + i); - }else { +if (!init_tags)kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); - } }else {kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); -if (init_tags) { -int i; - -for (i =0 ; i <1 << order; i++) -tag_clear_highpage (page + i); - - init = false; - } -if (init)kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 12/39 kasan, page_alloc: move SetPageSkipKASanPoison in post_alloc_hook
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Pull the SetPageSkipKASanPoison() call in post_alloc_hook() out of the big if clause for better code readability. This also allows for more simplifications in the following patches.
Also turn the kasan_has_integrated_init() check into the proper kasan_hw_tags_enabled() one. These checks evaluate to the same value, but logically skipping kasan poisoning has nothing to do with integrated init.
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Use proper kasan_hw_tags_enabled() check instead of IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS).
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +3 -3
@@ -2435,9 +2435,6 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order, init = false; }if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) { -if (gfp_flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON) -SetPageSkipKASanPoison (page); -if (!init_tags)kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); }else {
@@ -2446,6 +2443,9 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,if (init)kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); } +/* Propagate __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON to page flags. */ +if (kasan_hw_tags_enabled () && (gfp_flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)) +SetPageSkipKASanPoison (page);set_page_owner (page, order, gfp_flags);page_table_check_alloc (page, order);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 13/39 kasan, page_alloc: move kernel_init_free_pages in post_alloc_hook
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Pull the kernel_init_free_pages() call in post_alloc_hook() out of the big if clause for better code readability. This also allows for more simplifications in the following patch.
This patch does no functional changes.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +8 -4
@@ -2435,14 +2435,18 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order, init = false; }if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) { -if (!init_tags) +if (!init_tags) {kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); + +/* Note that memory is already initialized by KASAN. */ + init = false; + } }else {kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); - -if (init) -kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order); } +/* If memory is still not initialized, do it now. */ +if (init) +kernel_init_free_pages (page,1 << order);/* Propagate __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON to page flags. */ if (kasan_hw_tags_enabled () && (gfp_flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON))SetPageSkipKASanPoison (page);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 14/39 kasan, page_alloc: rework kasan_unpoison_pages call site
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Rework the checks around kasan_unpoison_pages() call in post_alloc_hook().
The logical condition for calling this function is:
- If a software KASAN mode is enabled, we need to mark shadow memory.
- Otherwise, HW_TAGS KASAN is enabled, and it only makes sense to set tags if they haven't already been cleared by tag_clear_highpage(), which is indicated by init_tags.
This patch concludes the changes for post_alloc_hook().
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Make the confition checks more explicit.
- Update patch description.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +12 -7
@@ -2434,15 +2434,20 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,/* Note that memory is already initialized by the loop above. */ init = false; } -if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) { -if (!init_tags) { -kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); +/* +* If either a software KASAN mode is enabled, or, +* in the case of hardware tag-based KASAN, +* if memory tags have not been cleared via tag_clear_highpage(). +*/ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || +kasan_hw_tags_enabled () && !init_tags) { +/* Mark shadow memory or set memory tags. */ +kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); -/* Note that memory is already initialized by KASAN. */ +/* Note that memory is already initialized by KASAN. */ +if (kasan_has_integrated_init ()) init = false; - } - }else { -kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init); }/* If memory is still not initialized, do it now. */ if (init)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 15/39 kasan: clean up metadata byte definitions
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Most of the metadata byte values are only used for Generic KASAN.
Remove KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK definition for !CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC case, and put it along with other metadata values for the Generic mode under a corresponding ifdef.
--- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/kasan.h +5 -2
@@ -71,15 +71,16 @@ static inline bool kasan_sync_fault_possible(void)#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE 0xFE/* redzone for kmalloc_large allocations */ #define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE 0xFC/* redzone inside slub object */ #define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE 0xFB/* object was freed (kmem_cache_free/kfree) */ -#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK 0xFA/* object was freed and has free track set */ #else #define KASAN_FREE_PAGE KASAN_TAG_INVALID#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE KASAN_TAG_INVALID#define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE KASAN_TAG_INVALID#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE KASAN_TAG_INVALID -#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK KASAN_TAG_INVALID#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC + +#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK 0xFA/* object was freed and has free track set */ #define KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE 0xF9/* redzone for global variable */ #define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID 0xF8/* unallocated space in vmapped page */
@@ -110,6 +111,8 @@ static inline bool kasan_sync_fault_possible(void)#define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 1#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */ +/* Metadata layout customization. */ #define META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1#define META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW 16
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 16/39 kasan: define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID for SW_TAGS
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
In preparation for adding vmalloc support to SW_TAGS KASAN, provide a KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID definition for it.
HW_TAGS KASAN won't be using this value, as it falls back onto page_alloc for poisoning freed vmalloc() memory.
--- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -1
@@ -71,18 +71,19 @@ static inline bool kasan_sync_fault_possible(void)#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE 0xFE/* redzone for kmalloc_large allocations */ #define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE 0xFC/* redzone inside slub object */ #define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE 0xFB/* object was freed (kmem_cache_free/kfree) */ +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID 0xF8/* unallocated space in vmapped page */ #else #define KASAN_FREE_PAGE KASAN_TAG_INVALID#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE KASAN_TAG_INVALID#define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE KASAN_TAG_INVALID#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE KASAN_TAG_INVALID +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID KASAN_TAG_INVALID/* only for SW_TAGS */ #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC #define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK 0xFA/* object was freed and has free track set */ #define KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE 0xF9/* redzone for global variable */ -#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID 0xF8/* unallocated space in vmapped page */ /* * Stack redzone shadow values
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 17/39 kasan, x86, arm64, s390: rename functions for modules shadow
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Rename kasan_free_shadow to kasan_free_module_shadow and kasan_module_alloc to kasan_alloc_module_shadow.
These functions are used to allocate/free shadow memory for kernel modules when KASAN_VMALLOC is not enabled. The new names better reflect their purpose.
Also reword the comment next to their declaration to improve clarity.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 14 +++++++------- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 4 ++-- mm/vmalloc.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/module.c +1 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)PAGE_KERNEL ,0 ,NUMA_NO_NODE , __builtin_return_address(0)); -if (p && (kasan_module_alloc (p, size, gfp_mask) <0 )) { +if (p && (kasan_alloc_module_shadow (p, size, gfp_mask) <0 )) {vfree (p);return NULL ; }
arch/s390/kernel/module.c +1 -1
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size) p =__vmalloc_node_range (size,MODULE_ALIGN ,MODULES_VADDR ,MODULES_END , gfp_mask,PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC ,VM_DEFER_KMEMLEAK ,NUMA_NO_NODE ,__builtin_return_address (0 )); -if (p && (kasan_module_alloc (p, size, gfp_mask) <0 )) { +if (p && (kasan_alloc_module_shadow (p, size, gfp_mask) <0 )) {vfree (p);return NULL ; }
arch/x86/kernel/module.c +1 -1
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)MODULES_END , gfp_mask,PAGE_KERNEL ,VM_DEFER_KMEMLEAK ,NUMA_NO_NODE , __builtin_return_address(0)); -if (p && (kasan_module_alloc (p, size, gfp_mask) <0 )) { +if (p && (kasan_alloc_module_shadow (p, size, gfp_mask) <0 )) {vfree (p);return NULL ; }
include/linux/kasan.h +7 -7
@@ -454,17 +454,17 @@ static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, !defined (CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC )/* -* These functions provide a special case to support backing module -* allocations with real shadow memory. With KASAN vmalloc, the special -* case is unnecessary, as the work is handled in the generic case. +* These functions allocate and free shadow memory for kernel modules. +* They are only required when KASAN_VMALLOC is not supported, as otherwise +* shadow memory is allocated by the generic vmalloc handlers. */ -int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size,gfp_t gfp_mask); -void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm); +int kasan_alloc_module_shadow (void *addr,size_t size,gfp_t gfp_mask); +void kasan_free_module_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm);#else /* (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ -static inline int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size,gfp_t gfp_mask) {return 0 ; } -static inline void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm) {} +static inline int kasan_alloc_module_shadow (void *addr,size_t size,gfp_t gfp_mask) {return 0 ; } +static inline void kasan_free_module_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm) {}#endif /* (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
mm/kasan/shadow.c +2 -2
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ -int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size,gfp_t gfp_mask) +int kasan_alloc_module_shadow (void *addr,size_t size,gfp_t gfp_mask) {void *ret;size_t scaled_size;
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask)return -ENOMEM ; } -void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm) +void kasan_free_module_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm) {if (vm->flags &VM_KASAN )vfree (kasan_mem_to_shadow (vm->addr));
mm/vmalloc.c +1 -1
@@ -2526,7 +2526,7 @@ struct vm_struct *remove_vm_area(const void *addr) va->vm =NULL ;spin_unlock (&vmap_area_lock); -kasan_free_shadow (vm); +kasan_free_module_shadow (vm);free_unmap_vmap_area (va);return vm;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 18/39 kasan, vmalloc: drop outdated VM_KASAN comment
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
The comment about VM_KASAN in include/linux/vmalloc.c is outdated. VM_KASAN is currently only used to mark vm_areas allocated for kernel modules when CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC is disabled.
Drop the comment.
--- include/linux/vmalloc.h | 11 ----------- 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)
include/linux/vmalloc.h +0 -11
@@ -35,17 +35,6 @@ struct notifier_block; /* in notifier.h */#define VM_DEFER_KMEMLEAK 0#endif -/* -* VM_KASAN is used slightly differently depending on CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC. -* -* If IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC), VM_KASAN is set on a vm_struct after -* shadow memory has been mapped. It's used to handle allocation errors so that -* we don't try to poison shadow on free if it was never allocated. -* -* Otherwise, VM_KASAN is set for kasan_module_alloc() allocations and used to -* determine which allocations need the module shadow freed. -*/ -/* bits [20..32] reserved for arch specific ioremap internals */ /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 19/39 kasan: reorder vmalloc hooks
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Group functions that [de]populate shadow memory for vmalloc. Group functions that [un]poison memory for vmalloc.
This patch does no functional changes but prepares KASAN code for adding vmalloc support to HW_TAGS KASAN.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 20 +++++++++----------- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +9 -11
@@ -418,34 +418,32 @@ static inline void kasan_init_hw_tags(void) { }#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC +void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size);int kasan_populate_vmalloc (unsigned long addr,unsigned long size); -void kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); -void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size);void kasan_release_vmalloc (unsigned long start,unsigned long end,unsigned long free_region_start,unsigned long free_region_end); -void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size); +void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); +void kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size);#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ +static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow (void *start, +unsigned long size) { }static inline int kasan_populate_vmalloc (unsigned long start,unsigned long size) {return 0 ; } - -static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) -{ } -static inline void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) -{ }static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc (unsigned long start,unsigned long end,unsigned long free_region_start, -unsigned long free_region_end) {} +unsigned long free_region_end) { } -static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow (void *start, -unsigned long size) +static inline void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) +{ } +static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) { }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
mm/kasan/shadow.c +22 -21
55 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 20/39 kasan: add wrappers for vmalloc hooks
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Add wrappers around functions that [un]poison memory for vmalloc allocations. These functions will be used by HW_TAGS KASAN and therefore need to be disabled when kasan=off command line argument is provided.
This patch does no functional changes for software KASAN modes.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 17 +++++++++++++++-- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +15 -2
@@ -424,8 +424,21 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,unsigned long free_region_start, unsigned long free_region_end); -void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); -void kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); +void __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); +static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, +unsigned long size) +{ +if (kasan_enabled ()) +__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (start, size); +} + +void __kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); +static __always_inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, +unsigned long size) +{ +if (kasan_enabled ()) +__kasan_poison_vmalloc (start, size); +}#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
mm/kasan/shadow.c +2 -3
@@ -475,8 +475,7 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, } } - -void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) +void __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) {if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr (start))return ;
@@ -488,7 +487,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)* Poison the shadow for a vmalloc region. Called as part of the * freeing process at the time the region is freed. */ -void kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) +void __kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) {if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr (start))return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 21/39 kasan, vmalloc: reset tags in vmalloc functions
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
In preparation for adding vmalloc support to SW/HW_TAGS KASAN, reset pointer tags in functions that use pointer values in range checks.
vread() is a special case here. Despite the untagging of the addr pointer in its prologue, the accesses performed by vread() are checked.
Instead of accessing the virtual mappings though addr directly, vread() recovers the physical address via page_address(vmalloc_to_page()) and acceses that. And as page_address() recovers the pointer tag, the accesses get checked.
---
Changes v1->v2:
- Clarified the description of untagging in vread().
--- mm/vmalloc.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/vmalloc.c +9 -3
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static const bool vmap_allow_huge = false;bool is_vmalloc_addr (const void *x) { -unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )x; +unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )kasan_reset_tag (x);return addr >=VMALLOC_START && addr <VMALLOC_END ; }
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x)* just put it in the vmalloc space. */ #if defined(CONFIG_MODULES ) && defined(MODULES_VADDR ) -unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )x; +unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )kasan_reset_tag (x);if (addr >=MODULES_VADDR && addr <MODULES_END )return 1 ;#endif
@@ -806,6 +806,8 @@ static struct vmap_area *find_vmap_area_exceed_addr(unsigned long addr)struct vmap_area *va =NULL ;struct rb_node *n = vmap_area_root.rb_node; + addr = (unsigned long )kasan_reset_tag ((void *)addr); +while (n) {struct vmap_area *tmp;
@@ -827,6 +829,8 @@ static struct vmap_area *__find_vmap_area(unsigned long addr) {struct rb_node *n = vmap_area_root.rb_node; + addr = (unsigned long )kasan_reset_tag ((void *)addr); +while (n) {struct vmap_area *va;
@@ -2145,7 +2149,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vm_unmap_aliases);void vm_unmap_ram (const void *mem,unsigned int count) {unsigned long size = (unsigned long )count <<PAGE_SHIFT ; -unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )mem; +unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )kasan_reset_tag (mem);struct vmap_area *va;might_sleep ();
@@ -3404,6 +3408,8 @@ long vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)unsigned long buflen = count;unsigned long n; + addr =kasan_reset_tag (addr); +/* Don't allow overflow */ if ((unsigned long ) addr + count < count) count = -(unsigned long ) addr;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 22/39 kasan, fork: reset pointer tags of vmapped stacks
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc() allocations, kernel stacks start getting tagged if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled.
Reset the tag of kernel stack pointers after allocation in alloc_thread_stack_node().
For SW_TAGS KASAN, when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled, the instrumentation can't handle the SP register being tagged.
For HW_TAGS KASAN, there's no instrumentation-related issues. However, the impact of having a tagged SP register needs to be properly evaluated, so keep it non-tagged for now.
Note, that the memory for the stack allocation still gets tagged to catch vmalloc-into-stack out-of-bounds accesses.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- kernel/fork.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/fork.c +1 -0
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)* so cache the vm_struct. */ if (stack) { + stack =kasan_reset_tag (stack); tsk->stack_vm_area =find_vm_area (stack); tsk->stack = stack; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 23/39 kasan, arm64: reset pointer tags of vmapped stacks
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc() allocations, kernel stacks start getting tagged if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled.
Reset the tag of kernel stack pointers after allocation in arch_alloc_vmap_stack().
For SW_TAGS KASAN, when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled, the instrumentation can't handle the SP register being tagged.
For HW_TAGS KASAN, there's no instrumentation-related issues. However, the impact of having a tagged SP register needs to be properly evaluated, so keep it non-tagged for now.
Note, that the memory for the stack allocation still gets tagged to catch vmalloc-into-stack out-of-bounds accesses.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Add this patch.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/vmap_stack.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/vmap_stack.h +4 -1
@@ -17,10 +17,13 @@*/ static inline unsigned long *arch_alloc_vmap_stack (size_t stack_size,int node) { +void *p; +BUILD_BUG_ON (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK )); -return __vmalloc_node (stack_size,THREAD_ALIGN ,THREADINFO_GFP , node, + p =__vmalloc_node (stack_size,THREAD_ALIGN ,THREADINFO_GFP , node,__builtin_return_address (0 )); +return kasan_reset_tag (p); }#endif /* __ASM_VMAP_STACK_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 24/39 kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Add vmalloc tagging support to SW_TAGS KASAN.
- __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() now assigns a random pointer tag, poisons the virtual mapping accordingly, and embeds the tag into the returned pointer.
- __get_vm_area_node() (used by vmalloc() and vmap()) and pcpu_get_vm_areas() save the tagged pointer into vm_struct->addr (note: not into vmap_area->addr). This requires putting kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() after setup_vmalloc_vm[_locked](); otherwise the latter will overwrite the tagged pointer. The tagged pointer then is naturally propagateed to vmalloc() and vmap().
- vm_map_ram() returns the tagged pointer directly.
As a result of this change, vm_struct->addr is now tagged.
Enabling KASAN_VMALLOC with SW_TAGS is not yet allowed.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Drop accidentally added kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() argument for when KASAN is off.
- Drop __must_check for kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(), as its result is sometimes intentionally ignored.
- Move allowing enabling KASAN_VMALLOC with SW_TAGS into a separate patch.
- Update patch description.
Changes v1->v2:
- Allow enabling KASAN_VMALLOC with SW_TAGS in this patch.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++++++------ mm/kasan/shadow.c | 6 ++++-- mm/vmalloc.c | 14 ++++++++------ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +10 -6
@@ -424,12 +424,13 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,unsigned long free_region_start, unsigned long free_region_end); -void __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); -static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, -unsigned long size) +void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); +static __always_inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, +unsigned long size) {if (kasan_enabled ()) -__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (start, size); +return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (start, size); +return (void *)start; }void __kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size);
@@ -454,8 +455,11 @@ static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long free_region_start, unsigned long free_region_end) { } -static inline void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) -{ } +static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start, +unsigned long size) +{ +return (void *)start; +}static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) { }
mm/kasan/shadow.c +4 -2
@@ -475,12 +475,14 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, } } -void __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) +void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) {if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr (start)) -return ; +return (void *)start; + start =set_tag (start,kasan_random_tag ());kasan_unpoison (start, size, false); +return (void *)start; }/*
mm/vmalloc.c +8 -6
@@ -2210,7 +2210,7 @@ void *vm_map_ram(struct page **pages, unsigned int count, int node) mem = (void *)addr; } -kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (mem, size); + mem =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (mem, size);if (vmap_pages_range (addr, addr + size,PAGE_KERNEL , pages,PAGE_SHIFT ) <0 ) {
@@ -2443,10 +2443,10 @@ static struct vm_struct *__get_vm_area_node(unsigned long size,return NULL ; } -kasan_unpoison_vmalloc ((void *)va->va_start, requested_size); -setup_vmalloc_vm (area, va, flags, caller); + area->addr =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (area->addr, requested_size); +return area; }
@@ -3795,9 +3795,6 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets,for (area =0 ; area < nr_vms; area++) {if (kasan_populate_vmalloc (vas[area]->va_start, sizes[area])) goto err_free_shadow; - -kasan_unpoison_vmalloc ((void *)vas[area]->va_start, - sizes[area]); }/* insert all vm's */
@@ -3810,6 +3807,11 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets, }spin_unlock (&vmap_area_lock); +/* mark allocated areas as accessible */ +for (area =0 ; area < nr_vms; area++) + vms[area]->addr =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (vms[area]->addr, + vms[area]->size); +kfree (vas);return vms;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 25/39 kasan, vmalloc, arm64: mark vmalloc mappings as pgprot_tagged
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
HW_TAGS KASAN relies on ARM Memory Tagging Extension (MTE). With MTE, a memory region must be mapped as MT_NORMAL_TAGGED to allow setting memory tags via MTE-specific instructions.
Add proper protection bits to vmalloc() allocations. These allocations are always backed by page_alloc pages, so the tags will actually be getting set on the corresponding physical memory.
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Rename arch_vmalloc_pgprot_modify() to arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged() to be consistent with other arch vmalloc hooks.
- Move checks from arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged() to __vmalloc_node_range() as the same condition is used for other things in subsequent patches.
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/vmalloc.h | 7 +++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h +6 -0
@@ -25,4 +25,10 @@ static inline bool arch_vmap_pmd_supported(pgprot_t prot)#endif +#define arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged +static inline pgprot_t arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged (pgprot_t prot) +{ +return pgprot_tagged (prot); +} +#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_VMALLOC_H */
include/linux/vmalloc.h +7 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ static inline int arch_vmap_pte_supported_shift(unsigned long size) }#endif +#ifndef arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged +static inline pgprot_t arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged (pgprot_t prot) +{ +return prot; +} +#endif +/* * Highlevel APIs for driver use */
mm/vmalloc.c +9 -0
@@ -3108,6 +3108,15 @@ void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, goto fail; } +/* +* Modify protection bits to allow tagging. +* This must be done before mapping by __vmalloc_area_node(). +*/ +if (kasan_hw_tags_enabled () && +pgprot_val (prot) ==pgprot_val (PAGE_KERNEL )) + prot =arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged (prot); + +/* Allocate physical pages and map them into vmalloc space. */ addr =__vmalloc_area_node (area, gfp_mask, prot, shift, node);if (!addr) goto fail;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 26/39 kasan, vmalloc: unpoison VM_ALLOC pages after mapping
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Make KASAN unpoison vmalloc mappings after they have been mapped in when it's possible: for vmalloc() (indentified via VM_ALLOC) and vm_map_ram().
The reasons for this are:
- For vmalloc() and vm_map_ram(): pages don't get unpoisoned in case mapping them fails.
- For vmalloc(): HW_TAGS KASAN needs pages to be mapped to set tags via kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
As a part of these changes, the return value of __vmalloc_node_range() is changed to area->addr. This is a non-functional change, as __vmalloc_area_node() returns area->addr anyway.
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Don't forget to save tagged addr to vm_struct->addr for VM_ALLOC so that find_vm_area(addr)->addr == addr for vmalloc().
- Reword comments.
- Update patch description.
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- mm/vmalloc.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/vmalloc.c +22 -8
@@ -2210,14 +2210,15 @@ void *vm_map_ram(struct page **pages, unsigned int count, int node) mem = (void *)addr; } - mem =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (mem, size); -if (vmap_pages_range (addr, addr + size,PAGE_KERNEL , pages,PAGE_SHIFT ) <0 ) {vm_unmap_ram (mem, count);return NULL ; } +/* Mark the pages as accessible, now that they are mapped. */ + mem =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (mem, size); +return mem; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (vm_map_ram);
@@ -2445,7 +2446,14 @@ static struct vm_struct *__get_vm_area_node(unsigned long size,setup_vmalloc_vm (area, va, flags, caller); - area->addr =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (area->addr, requested_size); +/* +* Mark pages for non-VM_ALLOC mappings as accessible. Do it now as a +* best-effort approach, as they can be mapped outside of vmalloc code. +* For VM_ALLOC mappings, the pages are marked as accessible after +* getting mapped in __vmalloc_node_range(). +*/ +if (!(flags &VM_ALLOC )) + area->addr =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (area->addr, requested_size);return area; }
@@ -3055,7 +3063,7 @@ void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, const void *caller) {struct vm_struct *area; -void *addr; +void *ret;unsigned long real_size = size;unsigned long real_align = align;unsigned int shift =PAGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -3117,10 +3125,13 @@ void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, prot =arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged (prot);/* Allocate physical pages and map them into vmalloc space. */ - addr =__vmalloc_area_node (area, gfp_mask, prot, shift, node); -if (!addr) + ret =__vmalloc_area_node (area, gfp_mask, prot, shift, node); +if (!ret) goto fail; +/* Mark the pages as accessible, now that they are mapped. */ + area->addr =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (area->addr, real_size); +/* * In this function, newly allocated vm_struct has VM_UNINITIALIZED * flag. It means that vm_struct is not fully initialized.
@@ -3132,7 +3143,7 @@ void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,if (!(vm_flags &VM_DEFER_KMEMLEAK ))kmemleak_vmalloc (area, size, gfp_mask); -return addr; +return area->addr; fail:if (shift >PAGE_SHIFT ) {
@@ -3816,7 +3827,10 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets, }spin_unlock (&vmap_area_lock); -/* mark allocated areas as accessible */ +/* +* Mark allocated areas as accessible. Do it now as a best-effort +* approach, as they can be mapped outside of vmalloc code. +*/ for (area =0 ; area < nr_vms; area++) vms[area]->addr =kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 27/39 kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Only define the ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON flag when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled.
This patch it not useful by itself, but it prepares the code for additions of new KASAN-specific GFP patches.
---
Changes v3->v4:
- This is a new patch.
--- include/linux/gfp.h | 8 +++++++- include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 12 +++++++++--- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/gfp.h +7 -1
@@ -54,7 +54,11 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define ___GFP_THISNODE 0x200000u#define ___GFP_ACCOUNT 0x400000u#define ___GFP_ZEROTAGS 0x800000u +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS #define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x1000000u +#else +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x2000000u#else
@@ -251,7 +255,9 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */ -#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (25 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP)) +#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))#define __GFP_BITS_MASK ((__force gfp_t)((1 << __GFP_BITS_SHIFT) - 1))/**
include/trace/events/mmflags.h +9 -3
@@ -49,12 +49,18 @@ {(unsigned long)__GFP_RECLAIM, "__GFP_RECLAIM"}, \ {(unsigned long)__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, "__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM"},\ {(unsigned long)__GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM, "__GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM"},\ - {(unsigned long)__GFP_ZEROTAGS, "__GFP_ZEROTAGS"}, \ - {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON,"__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON"}\ + {(unsigned long)__GFP_ZEROTAGS, "__GFP_ZEROTAGS"} \ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +#define __def_gfpflag_names_kasan \ + , {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, "__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON"} +#else +#define __def_gfpflag_names_kasan +#endif #define show_gfp_flags(flags) \ (flags) ? __print_flags(flags, "|", \ - __def_gfpflag_names \ + __def_gfpflag_names __def_gfpflag_names_kasan \ ) : "none" #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v6 27/39] kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
Quoted 36 lines · On 1/24/22 19:05, [email protected] wrote:
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Only define the
___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISONflag whenCONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGSis enabled.This patch it not useful by itself, but it prepares the code for additions of new KASAN-specific GFP patches.
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>---
Changes
v3->v4:
- This is a new patch.--- include/linux/gfp.h | 8 +++++++- include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 12 +++++++++--- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)include/linux/gfp.h +4
-0@@ -54,7 +54,11 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define ___GFP_THISNODE 0x200000u#define ___GFP_ACCOUNT 0x400000u#define ___GFP_ZEROTAGS 0x800000u +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS #define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x1000000u +#else +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x2000000u#else
include/linux/gfp.h struct vm_area_struct; · line 260
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +3
-1@@ -251,7 +255,9 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */ -#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (25 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP)) +#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))
This breaks __GFP_NOLOCKDEP, see:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Quoted 29 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +0
-0#define __GFP_BITS_MASK ((__force gfp_t)((1 << __GFP_BITS_SHIFT) - 1))/** include/trace/events/mmflags.h +9
-3@@ -49,12 +49,18 @@ {(unsigned long)__GFP_RECLAIM, "__GFP_RECLAIM"}, \ {(unsigned long)__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, "__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM"},\ {(unsigned long)__GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM, "__GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM"},\ - {(unsigned long)__GFP_ZEROTAGS, "__GFP_ZEROTAGS"}, \ - {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON,"__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON"}\ + {(unsigned long)__GFP_ZEROTAGS, "__GFP_ZEROTAGS"} \ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +#define __def_gfpflag_names_kasan \ + , {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, "__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON"} +#else +#define __def_gfpflag_names_kasan +#endif #define show_gfp_flags(flags) \ (flags) ? __print_flags(flags, "|", \ - __def_gfpflag_names \ + __def_gfpflag_names __def_gfpflag_names_kasan \ ) : "none" #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
Re: [PATCH v6 27/39] kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
Quoted 11 lines · Vlastimil Babka
Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +4
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS #define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x1000000u +#else +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x2000000u#else @@ -251,7 +255,9 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/gfp.h struct vm_area_struct; · line 260
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +3
-1/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */ -#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (25 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP)) +#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))This breaks
__GFP_NOLOCKDEP, see:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
This could work because ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP is still 0x2000000u. In
("kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping memory init for HW_TAGS")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/0d53efeff345de7d708e0baa0d8829167772521e.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com/This is replaced with 0x8000000u which breaks lockdep.
Sebastian
Re: [PATCH v6 27/39] kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
Quoted 21 lines · Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Quoted 11 lines · Vlastimil Babka
Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +4
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS #define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x1000000u +#else +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x2000000u#else @@ -251,7 +255,9 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/gfp.h struct vm_area_struct; · line 260
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +3
-1/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */ -#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (25 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP)) +#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))This breaks
__GFP_NOLOCKDEP, see:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Quoted 1 line
This could work because
___GFP_NOLOCKDEPis still0x2000000u. In
Hm but already this patch makes gfp_allowed_mask to be 0x1ffffff (thus not covering 0x2000000u) when CONFIG_LOCKDEP is enabled and the KASAN stuff not? 0x8000000u is just even further away.
Quoted 7 lines
("kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping memory init for HW_TAGS") https://lore.kernel.org/all/0d53efeff345de7d708e0baa0d8829167772521e.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com/This is replaced with
0x8000000uwhich breaks lockdep.Sebastian
Andrey Konovalov
reviewerRe: [PATCH v6 27/39] kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
In reply to Sebastian Andrzej SiewiorQuoted 22 lines · Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Quoted 11 lines · Vlastimil Babka
Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +4
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS #define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x1000000u +#else +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x2000000u#else @@ -251,7 +255,9 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/gfp.h struct vm_area_struct; · line 260
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +3
-1/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */ -#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (25 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP)) +#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))This breaks
__GFP_NOLOCKDEP, see:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Quoted 7 lines
This could work because
___GFP_NOLOCKDEPis still0x2000000u. In
("kasan,page_alloc: allow skipping memory init forHW_TAGS")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/0d53efeff345de7d708e0baa0d8829167772521e.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com/This is replaced with
0x8000000uwhich breaks lockdep.Sebastian
Hi Sebastian,
Indeed, sorry for breaking lockdep. Thank you for the report!
I wonder what's the proper fix for this. Perhaps, don't hide KASAN GFP bits under CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS? And then do:
#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (27 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))
Vlastimil, Andrew do you have any preference?
If my suggestion sounds good, Andrew, could you directly apply the changes? They are needed for these 3 patches:
kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping memory init for HW_TAGS kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping unpoisoning for HW_TAGS kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
As these depend on each other, I can't send separate patches that can be folded for all 3.
Thanks!
Re: [PATCH v6 27/39] kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
Quoted 34 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 22 lines · Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Quoted 11 lines · Vlastimil Babka
Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +4
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS #define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x1000000u +#else +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x2000000u#else @@ -251,7 +255,9 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/gfp.h struct vm_area_struct; · line 260
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/gfp.h +3
-1/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */ -#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (25 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP)) +#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))This breaks
__GFP_NOLOCKDEP, see:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/Quoted 7 lines
This could work because
___GFP_NOLOCKDEPis still0x2000000u. In
("kasan,page_alloc: allow skipping memory init forHW_TAGS")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/0d53efeff345de7d708e0baa0d8829167772521e.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com/This is replaced with
0x8000000uwhich breaks lockdep.Sebastian
Hi Sebastian,
Quoted 8 lines
Indeed, sorry for breaking lockdep. Thank you for the report!
I wonder what's the proper fix for this. Perhaps, don't hide KASAN GFP bits under
CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS? And then do:#define
__GFP_BITS_SHIFT(27 +IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))Vlastimil, Andrew do you have any preference?
I guess it's the simplest thing to do for now. For the future we can still improve and handle all combinations of kasan/lockdep to occupy as few bits as possible and set the shift/mask appropriately. Or consider first if it's necessary anyway. I don't know if we really expect at any point to start triggering the BUILD_BUG_ON() in radix_tree_init() and then only some combination of configs will reduce the flags to a number that works. Or is there anything else that depends on __GFP_BITS_SHIFT? I mean if we don't expect to go this way, we can just define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT as a constant that assumes all the config-dependent flags to be defined (not zero).
Quoted 11 lines
If my suggestion sounds good, Andrew, could you directly apply the changes? They are needed for these 3 patches:
kasan,
page_alloc: allow skipping memory init forHW_TAGSkasan,page_alloc: allow skipping unpoisoning forHW_TAGSkasan, mm: only define___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISONwithHW_TAGSAs these depend on each other, I can't send separate patches that can be folded for all 3.
Thanks!
Re: [PATCH v6 27/39] kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
Quoted 7 lines · Vlastimil Babka
I guess it's the simplest thing to do for now. For the future we can still improve and handle all combinations of kasan/lockdep to occupy as few bits as possible and set the shift/mask appropriately. Or consider first if it's necessary anyway. I don't know if we really expect at any point to start triggering the
BUILD_BUG_ON()inradix_tree_init()and then only some combination of configs will reduce the flags to a number that works. Or is there anything else that depends on__GFP_BITS_SHIFT?
The correct long-term solution is to transition all the radix tree users to the XArray, which has the GFP flags specified in the correct place (ie at the call site) instead of embedding the GFP flags in the data structure.
I've paused work on that while I work on folios; by my count there are about 60 users left. What I really need is something which prevents any attempt to add new users. Maybe that's a job for checkpatch.
Andrew Morton
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 27/39] kasan, mm: only define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON with HW_TAGS
In reply to Andrey KonovalovQuoted 9 lines · On Wed, 23 Mar 2022 14:36:29 +0100 Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>…
If my suggestion sounds good, Andrew, could you directly apply the changes? They are needed for these 3 patches:
kasan,
page_alloc: allow skipping memory init forHW_TAGSkasan,page_alloc: allow skipping unpoisoning forHW_TAGSkasan, mm: only define___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISONwithHW_TAGSAs these depend on each other, I can't send separate patches that can be folded for all 3.
It's all upstream now, so please send along a fixup patch.
PATCH v6 28/39 kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping unpoisoning for HW_TAGS
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Add a new GFP flag __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON that allows skipping KASAN poisoning for page_alloc allocations. The flag is only effective with HW_TAGS KASAN.
This flag will be used by vmalloc code for page_alloc allocations backing vmalloc() mappings in a following patch. The reason to skip KASAN poisoning for these pages in page_alloc is because vmalloc code will be poisoning them instead.
Also reword the comment for __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON.
---
Changes v4->v5:
- Cosmetic changes to __def_gfpflag_names_kasan and __GFP_BITS_SHIFT.
Changes v3->v4:
- Only define __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled.
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
--- include/linux/gfp.h | 21 +++++++++++++-------- include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 5 +++-- mm/page_alloc.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
include/linux/gfp.h +13 -8
@@ -55,12 +55,14 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define ___GFP_ACCOUNT 0x400000u#define ___GFP_ZEROTAGS 0x800000u#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS -#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x1000000u +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON 0x1000000u +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x2000000u#else +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON 0#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP -#define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x2000000u +#define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x4000000u#else #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0#endif
@@ -241,22 +243,25 @@ struct vm_area_struct;* intended for optimization: setting memory tags at the same time as zeroing * memory has minimal additional performace impact. * -* %__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON returns a page which does not need to be poisoned -* on deallocation. Typically used for userspace pages. Currently only has an -* effect in HW tags mode. +* %__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON makes KASAN skip unpoisoning on page allocation. +* Only effective in HW_TAGS mode. +* +* %__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON makes KASAN skip poisoning on page deallocation. +* Typically, used for userspace pages. Only effective in HW_TAGS mode. */ #define __GFP_NOWARN ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOWARN)#define __GFP_COMP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_COMP)#define __GFP_ZERO ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_ZERO)#define __GFP_ZEROTAGS ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_ZEROTAGS) -#define __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON) +#define __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON) +#define __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)/* Disable lockdep for GFP context tracking */ #define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */ -#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ +#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ + 2 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))#define __GFP_BITS_MASK ((__force gfp_t)((1 << __GFP_BITS_SHIFT) - 1))
include/trace/events/mmflags.h +3 -2
@@ -52,8 +52,9 @@ {(unsigned long)__GFP_ZEROTAGS, "__GFP_ZEROTAGS"} \#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS -#define __def_gfpflag_names_kasan \ - , {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, "__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON"} +#define __def_gfpflag_names_kasan , \ + {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, "__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON"}, \ + {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON, "__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON"}#else #define __def_gfpflag_names_kasan#endif
mm/page_alloc.c +22 -9
@@ -2395,6 +2395,26 @@ static bool check_new_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)return false; } +static inline bool should_skip_kasan_unpoison (gfp_t flags,bool init_tags) +{ +/* Don't skip if a software KASAN mode is enabled. */ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) +return false; + +/* Skip, if hardware tag-based KASAN is not enabled. */ +if (!kasan_hw_tags_enabled ()) +return true; + +/* +* With hardware tag-based KASAN enabled, skip if either: +* +* 1. Memory tags have already been cleared via tag_clear_highpage(). +* 2. Skipping has been requested via __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON. +*/ +return init_tags || (flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON); +} +inline void post_alloc_hook (struct page *page,unsigned int order,gfp_t gfp_flags) {
@@ -2434,15 +2454,8 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,/* Note that memory is already initialized by the loop above. */ init = false; } -/* -* If either a software KASAN mode is enabled, or, -* in the case of hardware tag-based KASAN, -* if memory tags have not been cleared via tag_clear_highpage(). -*/ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || -IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || -kasan_hw_tags_enabled () && !init_tags) { -/* Mark shadow memory or set memory tags. */ +if (!should_skip_kasan_unpoison (gfp_flags, init_tags)) { +/* Unpoison shadow memory or set memory tags. */ kasan_unpoison_pages (page, order, init);/* Note that memory is already initialized by KASAN. */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 29/39 kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping memory init for HW_TAGS
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Add a new GFP flag __GFP_SKIP_ZERO that allows to skip memory initialization. The flag is only effective with HW_TAGS KASAN.
This flag will be used by vmalloc code for page_alloc allocations backing vmalloc() mappings in a following patch. The reason to skip memory initialization for these pages in page_alloc is because vmalloc code will be initializing them instead.
With the current implementation, when __GFP_SKIP_ZERO is provided, __GFP_ZEROTAGS is ignored. This doesn't matter, as these two flags are never provided at the same time. However, if this is changed in the future, this particular implementation detail can be changed as well.
---
Changes v5->v6:
- Drop unnecessary explicit checks for software KASAN modes from should_skip_init().
Changes v4->v5:
- Cosmetic changes to __def_gfpflag_names_kasan and __GFP_BITS_SHIFT.
Changes v3->v4:
- Only define __GFP_SKIP_ZERO when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled.
- Add __GFP_SKIP_ZERO to include/trace/events/mmflags.h.
- Use proper kasan_hw_tags_enabled() check instead of IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS). Also add explicit checks for software modes.
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
Changes v1->v2:
- Add this patch.
--- include/linux/gfp.h | 18 +++++++++++------- include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 1 + mm/page_alloc.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/gfp.h +11 -7
@@ -55,14 +55,16 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define ___GFP_ACCOUNT 0x400000u#define ___GFP_ZEROTAGS 0x800000u#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS -#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON 0x1000000u -#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x2000000u +#define ___GFP_SKIP_ZERO 0x1000000u +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON 0x2000000u +#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0x4000000u#else +#define ___GFP_SKIP_ZERO 0#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON 0#define ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON 0#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP -#define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x4000000u +#define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0x8000000u#else #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0#endif
@@ -239,9 +241,10 @@ struct vm_area_struct;* %__GFP_ZERO returns a zeroed page on success. * * %__GFP_ZEROTAGS zeroes memory tags at allocation time if the memory itself -* is being zeroed (either via __GFP_ZERO or via init_on_alloc). This flag is -* intended for optimization: setting memory tags at the same time as zeroing -* memory has minimal additional performace impact. +* is being zeroed (either via __GFP_ZERO or via init_on_alloc, provided that +* __GFP_SKIP_ZERO is not set). This flag is intended for optimization: setting +* memory tags at the same time as zeroing memory has minimal additional +* performace impact. * * %__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON makes KASAN skip unpoisoning on page allocation. * Only effective in HW_TAGS mode.
@@ -253,6 +256,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;#define __GFP_COMP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_COMP)#define __GFP_ZERO ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_ZERO)#define __GFP_ZEROTAGS ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_ZEROTAGS) +#define __GFP_SKIP_ZERO ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_SKIP_ZERO)#define __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON)#define __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)
@@ -261,7 +265,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */ #define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (24 + \ - 2 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ + 3 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) + \ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))#define __GFP_BITS_MASK ((__force gfp_t)((1 << __GFP_BITS_SHIFT) - 1))
include/trace/events/mmflags.h +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS #define __def_gfpflag_names_kasan , \ + {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_ZERO, "__GFP_SKIP_ZERO"}, \ {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, "__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON"}, \ {(unsigned long)__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON, "__GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON"}#else
mm/page_alloc.c +12 -1
@@ -2415,10 +2415,21 @@ static inline bool should_skip_kasan_unpoison(gfp_t flags, bool init_tags)return init_tags || (flags & __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON); } +static inline bool should_skip_init (gfp_t flags) +{ +/* Don't skip, if hardware tag-based KASAN is not enabled. */ +if (!kasan_hw_tags_enabled ()) +return false; + +/* For hardware tag-based KASAN, skip if requested. */ +return (flags & __GFP_SKIP_ZERO); +} +inline void post_alloc_hook (struct page *page,unsigned int order,gfp_t gfp_flags) { -bool init = !want_init_on_free () &&want_init_on_alloc (gfp_flags); +bool init = !want_init_on_free () &&want_init_on_alloc (gfp_flags) && + !should_skip_init (gfp_flags);bool init_tags = init && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZEROTAGS);set_page_private (page,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 30/39 kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for HW_TAGS
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Add vmalloc tagging support to HW_TAGS KASAN.
The key difference between HW_TAGS and the other two KASAN modes when it comes to vmalloc: HW_TAGS KASAN can only assign tags to physical memory. The other two modes have shadow memory covering every mapped virtual memory region.
Make __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() for HW_TAGS KASAN:
- Skip non-VM_ALLOC mappings as HW_TAGS KASAN can only tag a single mapping of normal physical memory; see the comment in the function.
- Generate a random tag, tag the returned pointer and the allocation, and initialize the allocation at the same time.
- Propagate the tag into the page stucts to allow accesses through page_address(vmalloc_to_page()).
The rest of vmalloc-related KASAN hooks are not needed:
- The shadow-related ones are fully skipped.
- __kasan_poison_vmalloc() is kept as a no-op with a comment.
Poisoning and zeroing of physical pages that are backing vmalloc() allocations are skipped via __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON and __GFP_SKIP_ZERO: __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() does that instead.
Enabling CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC with HW_TAGS is not yet allowed.
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Fix comment style in __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
- Set __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON and __GFP_SKIP_ZERO flags instead of resetting.
- Move setting KASAN GFP flags to __vmalloc_node_range() and do it only for normal non-executable mapping when HW_TAGS KASAN is enabled.
Changes v2->v3:
- Switch kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() to using a single flags argument.
- Update kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() arguments in kernel/scs.c.
- Move allowing enabling KASAN_VMALLOC with SW_TAGS into a separate patch.
- Minor comments fixes.
- Update patch description.
Changes v1->v2:
- Allow enabling CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC with HW_TAGS in this patch.
- Move memory init for page_alloc pages backing vmalloc() into kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 36 +++++++++++++++-- kernel/scs.c | 4 +- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/kasan/shadow.c | 10 ++++- mm/vmalloc.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++------ 5 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +32 -4
@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ struct kunit_kasan_expectation {#endif +typedef unsigned int __bitwise kasan_vmalloc_flags_t ; + +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_NONE 0x00u +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT 0x01u +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC 0x02u +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#include <linux/pgtable.h>
@@ -418,18 +424,39 @@ static inline void kasan_init_hw_tags(void) { }#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) +void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size);int kasan_populate_vmalloc (unsigned long addr,unsigned long size);void kasan_release_vmalloc (unsigned long start,unsigned long end,unsigned long free_region_start,unsigned long free_region_end); -void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size); +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ + +static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow (void *start, +unsigned long size) +{ } +static inline int kasan_populate_vmalloc (unsigned long start, +unsigned long size) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc (unsigned long start, +unsigned long end, +unsigned long free_region_start, +unsigned long free_region_end) { } + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ + +void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size, +kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags); static __always_inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, -unsigned long size) +unsigned long size, +kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) {if (kasan_enabled ()) -return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (start, size); +return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (start, size, flags);return (void *)start; }
@@ -456,7 +483,8 @@ static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long free_region_end) { }static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start, -unsigned long size) +unsigned long size, +kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) {return (void *)start; }
kernel/scs.c +2 -2
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static void *__scs_alloc(int node)for (i =0 ; i <NR_CACHED_SCS ; i++) { s =this_cpu_xchg (scs_cache[i],NULL );if (s) { -kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (s,SCS_SIZE ); +kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (s,SCS_SIZE ,KASAN_VMALLOC_NONE );memset (s,0 ,SCS_SIZE );return s; }
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ void scs_free(void *s)if (this_cpu_cmpxchg (scs_cache[i],0 , s) ==NULL )return ; -kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (s,SCS_SIZE ); +kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (s,SCS_SIZE ,KASAN_VMALLOC_NONE );vfree_atomic (s); }
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +92 -0
98 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/kasan/shadow.c +9 -1
@@ -475,8 +475,16 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, } } -void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size) +void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size, +kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) { +/* +* Software KASAN modes unpoison both VM_ALLOC and non-VM_ALLOC +* mappings, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC flag is ignored. +* Software KASAN modes can't optimize zeroing memory by combining it +* with setting memory tags, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT flag is ignored. +*/ +if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr (start))return (void *)start;
mm/vmalloc.c +40 -11
94 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v6 30/39] kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for HW_TAGS
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
Hi,
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
[also build test WARNING on v5.17-rc1 next-20220124]
[cannot apply to arm64/for-next/core rostedt-trace/for-next] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/andrey-konovalov-linux-dev/kasan-vmalloc-arm64-add-vmalloc-tagging-support-for-SW-HW_TAGS/20220125-021005 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git dd81e1c7d5fb126e5fbc5c9e334d7b3ec29a16a0 config: microblaze-randconfig-s032-20220124 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220125/202201251102.bV52975D-lkp(a)intel.com/config) compiler: microblaze-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.4-dirty
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/04d94d9a5279576fc7d5b6dd381a6d4a86edfac2
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review andrey-konovalov-linux-dev/kasan-vmalloc-arm64-add-vmalloc-tagging-support-for-SW-HW_TAGS/20220125-021005 git checkout 04d94d9a5279576fc7d5b6dd381a6d4a86edfac2
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=microblaze SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
mm/vmalloc.c:3156:21: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t [usertype] kasan_flags @@ got unsigned int @@
mm/vmalloc.c:3156:21: sparse: expected restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t [usertype] kasan_flags
mm/vmalloc.c:3156:21: sparse: got unsigned int
>> mm/vmalloc.c:3158:29: sparse: sparse: invalid assignment: |= >> mm/vmalloc.c:3158:29: sparse: left side has type restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t >> mm/vmalloc.c:3158:29: sparse: right side has type unsigned int
vim +3158 mm/vmalloc.c
3038
3039 /**
3040 * __vmalloc_node_range - allocate virtually contiguous memory
3041 * @size: allocation size
3042 * @align: desired alignment
3043 * @start: vm area range start
3044 * @end: vm area range end
3045 * @gfp_mask: flags for the page level allocator
3046 * @prot: protection mask for the allocated pages
3047 * @vm_flags: additional vm area flags (e.g. %VM_NO_GUARD)
3048 * @node: node to use for allocation or NUMA_NO_NODE
3049 * @caller: caller's return address
3050 *
3051 * Allocate enough pages to cover @size from the page level
3052 * allocator with @gfp_mask flags. Please note that the full set of gfp
3053 * flags are not supported. GFP_KERNEL, GFP_NOFS and GFP_NOIO are all
3054 * supported.
3055 * Zone modifiers are not supported. From the reclaim modifiers
3056 * __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM is required (aka GFP_NOWAIT is not supported)
3057 * and only __GFP_NOFAIL is supported (i.e. __GFP_NORETRY and
3058 * __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL are not supported).
3059 *
3060 * __GFP_NOWARN can be used to suppress failures messages.
3061 *
3062 * Map them into contiguous kernel virtual space, using a pagetable
3063 * protection of @prot.
3064 *
3065 * Return: the address of the area or %NULL on failure
3066 */
3067 void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
3068 unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask,
3069 pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node,
3070 const void *caller)
3071 {
3072 struct vm_struct *area;
3073 void *ret;
3074 kasan_vmalloc_flags_t kasan_flags;
3075 unsigned long real_size = size;
3076 unsigned long real_align = align;
3077 unsigned int shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
3078
3079 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!size))
3080 return NULL;
3081
3082 if ((size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > totalram_pages()) {
3083 warn_alloc(gfp_mask, NULL,
3084 "vmalloc error: size %lu, exceeds total pages",
3085 real_size);
3086 return NULL;
3087 }
3088
3089 if (vmap_allow_huge && !(vm_flags & VM_NO_HUGE_VMAP)) {
3090 unsigned long size_per_node;
3091
3092 /*
3093 * Try huge pages. Only try for PAGE_KERNEL allocations,
3094 * others like modules don't yet expect huge pages in
3095 * their allocations due to apply_to_page_range not
3096 * supporting them.
3097 */
3098
3099 size_per_node = size;
3100 if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
3101 size_per_node /= num_online_nodes();
3102 if (arch_vmap_pmd_supported(prot) && size_per_node >= PMD_SIZE)
3103 shift = PMD_SHIFT;
3104 else
3105 shift = arch_vmap_pte_supported_shift(size_per_node);
3106
3107 align = max(real_align, 1UL << shift);
3108 size = ALIGN(real_size, 1UL << shift);
3109 }
3110
3111 again:
3112 area = __get_vm_area_node(real_size, align, shift, VM_ALLOC |
3113 VM_UNINITIALIZED | vm_flags, start, end, node,
3114 gfp_mask, caller);
3115 if (!area) {
3116 bool nofail = gfp_mask & __GFP_NOFAIL;
3117 warn_alloc(gfp_mask, NULL,
3118 "vmalloc error: size %lu, vm_struct allocation failed%s",
3119 real_size, (nofail) ? ". Retrying." : "");
3120 if (nofail) {
3121 schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
3122 goto again;
3123 }
3124 goto fail;
3125 }
3126
3127 /* Prepare arguments for __vmalloc_area_node(). */
3128 if (kasan_hw_tags_enabled() &&
3129 pgprot_val(prot) == pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL)) {
3130 /*
3131 * Modify protection bits to allow tagging.
3132 * This must be done before mapping in __vmalloc_area_node().
3133 */
3134 prot = arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged(prot);
3135
3136 /*
3137 * Skip page_alloc poisoning and zeroing for physical pages
3138 * backing VM_ALLOC mapping. Memory is instead poisoned and
3139 * zeroed by kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
3140 */
3141 gfp_mask |= __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON | __GFP_SKIP_ZERO;
3142 }
3143
3144 /* Allocate physical pages and map them into vmalloc space. */
3145 ret = __vmalloc_area_node(area, gfp_mask, prot, shift, node);
3146 if (!ret)
3147 goto fail;
3148
3149 /*
3150 * Mark the pages as accessible, now that they are mapped.
3151 * The init condition should match the one in post_alloc_hook()
3152 * (except for the should_skip_init() check) to make sure that memory
3153 * is initialized under the same conditions regardless of the enabled
3154 * KASAN mode.
3155 */
3156 kasan_flags = KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC;
3157 if (!want_init_on_free() && want_init_on_alloc(gfp_mask))
> 3158 kasan_flags |= KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT;
3159 area->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(area->addr, real_size, kasan_flags);
3160
3161 /*
3162 * In this function, newly allocated vm_struct has VM_UNINITIALIZED
3163 * flag. It means that vm_struct is not fully initialized.
3164 * Now, it is fully initialized, so remove this flag here.
3165 */
3166 clear_vm_uninitialized_flag(area);
3167
3168 size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
3169 if (!(vm_flags & VM_DEFER_KMEMLEAK))
3170 kmemleak_vmalloc(area, size, gfp_mask);
3171
3172 return area->addr;
3173
3174 fail:
3175 if (shift > PAGE_SHIFT) {
3176 shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
3177 align = real_align;
3178 size = real_size;
3179 goto again;
3180 }
3181
3182 return NULL;
3183 }
3184
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
PATCH v6 31/39 kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
The kernel can use to allocate executable memory. The only supported way to do that is via __vmalloc_node_range() with the executable bit set in the prot argument. (vmap() resets the bit via pgprot_nx()).
Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc allocations, executing code from such allocations will lead to the PC register getting a tag, which is not tolerated by the kernel.
Only tag the allocations for normal kernel pages.
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Rename KASAN_VMALLOC_NOEXEC to KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL.
- Compare with PAGE_KERNEL instead of using pgprot_nx().
- Update patch description.
Changes v2->v3:
- Add this patch.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 7 ++++--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 7 +++++++ mm/kasan/shadow.c | 7 +++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +4 -3
@@ -27,9 +27,10 @@ struct kunit_kasan_expectation {typedef unsigned int __bitwise kasan_vmalloc_flags_t ; -#define KASAN_VMALLOC_NONE 0x00u -#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT 0x01u -#define KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC 0x02u +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_NONE 0x00u +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT 0x01u +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC 0x02u +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL 0x04u#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +7 -0
@@ -247,6 +247,13 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,if (!(flags &KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC ))return (void *)start; +/* +* Don't tag executable memory. +* The kernel doesn't tolerate having the PC register tagged. +*/ +if (!(flags &KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL )) +return (void *)start; + tag =kasan_random_tag (); start =set_tag (start, tag);
mm/kasan/shadow.c +7 -0
@@ -488,6 +488,13 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr (start))return (void *)start; +/* +* Don't tag executable memory. +* The kernel doesn't tolerate having the PC register tagged. +*/ +if (!(flags &KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL )) +return (void *)start; + start =set_tag (start,kasan_random_tag ());kasan_unpoison (start, size, false);return (void *)start;
mm/vmalloc.c +29 -20
89 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v6 31/39] kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
Hi,
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
[also build test WARNING on v5.17-rc1 next-20220124]
[cannot apply to arm64/for-next/core rostedt-trace/for-next hnaz-mm/master] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/andrey-konovalov-linux-dev/kasan-vmalloc-arm64-add-vmalloc-tagging-support-for-SW-HW_TAGS/20220125-021005 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git dd81e1c7d5fb126e5fbc5c9e334d7b3ec29a16a0 config: x86_64-randconfig-s022-20220124 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220125/202201251257.quQ9h8XG-lkp(a)intel.com/config) compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0 reproduce: # apt-get install sparse # sparse version: v0.6.4-dirty # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/e53c62ef4d4998f3bdd75ec887bc39a1ef2dd740 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review andrey-konovalov-linux-dev/kasan-vmalloc-arm64-add-vmalloc-tagging-support-for-SW-HW_TAGS/20220125-021005 git checkout e53c62ef4d4998f3bdd75ec887bc39a1ef2dd740 # save the config file to linux build tree mkdir build_dir make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=x86_64 SHELL=/bin/bash mm/kasan/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> mm/kasan/shadow.c:495:15: sparse: sparse: restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t degrades to integer
vim +495 mm/kasan/shadow.c
477
478 void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
479 kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
480 {
481 /*
482 * Software KASAN modes unpoison both VM_ALLOC and non-VM_ALLOC
483 * mappings, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC flag is ignored.
484 * Software KASAN modes can't optimize zeroing memory by combining it
485 * with setting memory tags, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT flag is ignored.
486 */
487
488 if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
489 return (void *)start;
490
491 /*
492 * Don't tag executable memory.
493 * The kernel doesn't tolerate having the PC register tagged.
494 */
> 495 if (!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL))
496 return (void *)start;
497
498 start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
499 kasan_unpoison(start, size, false);
500 return (void *)start;
501 }
502
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v6 31/39] kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
In reply to [email protected]I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
Hi,
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
[also build test WARNING on v5.17-rc1 next-20220124]
[cannot apply to arm64/for-next/core rostedt-trace/for-next] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/andrey-konovalov-linux-dev/kasan-vmalloc-arm64-add-vmalloc-tagging-support-for-SW-HW_TAGS/20220125-021005 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git dd81e1c7d5fb126e5fbc5c9e334d7b3ec29a16a0 config: microblaze-randconfig-s032-20220124 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220125/202201251520.0CgVaz6r-lkp(a)intel.com/config) compiler: microblaze-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.4-dirty
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/e53c62ef4d4998f3bdd75ec887bc39a1ef2dd740
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review andrey-konovalov-linux-dev/kasan-vmalloc-arm64-add-vmalloc-tagging-support-for-SW-HW_TAGS/20220125-021005 git checkout e53c62ef4d4998f3bdd75ec887bc39a1ef2dd740
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=microblaze SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> mm/vmalloc.c:2224:49: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 3 (different base types) @@ expected restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t [usertype] flags @@ got unsigned int @@
mm/vmalloc.c:2224:49: sparse: expected restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t [usertype] flags
mm/vmalloc.c:2224:49: sparse: got unsigned int
mm/vmalloc.c:2463:53: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 3 (different base types) @@ expected restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t [usertype] flags @@ got unsigned int @@
mm/vmalloc.c:2463:53: sparse: expected restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t [usertype] flags
mm/vmalloc.c:2463:53: sparse: got unsigned int
mm/vmalloc.c:3148:29: sparse: sparse: invalid assignment: |=
mm/vmalloc.c:3148:29: sparse: left side has type restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t
mm/vmalloc.c:3148:29: sparse: right side has type unsigned int
mm/vmalloc.c:3165:21: sparse: sparse: invalid assignment: |=
mm/vmalloc.c:3165:21: sparse: left side has type restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t
mm/vmalloc.c:3165:21: sparse: right side has type unsigned int
mm/vmalloc.c:3167:29: sparse: sparse: invalid assignment: |=
mm/vmalloc.c:3167:29: sparse: left side has type restricted kasan_vmalloc_flags_t
mm/vmalloc.c:3167:29: sparse: right side has type unsigned int
vim +2224 mm/vmalloc.c
2176
2177 /**
2178 * vm_map_ram - map pages linearly into kernel virtual address (vmalloc space)
2179 * @pages: an array of pointers to the pages to be mapped
2180 * @count: number of pages
2181 * @node: prefer to allocate data structures on this node
2182 *
2183 * If you use this function for less than VMAP_MAX_ALLOC pages, it could be
2184 * faster than vmap so it's good. But if you mix long-life and short-life
2185 * objects with vm_map_ram(), it could consume lots of address space through
2186 * fragmentation (especially on a 32bit machine). You could see failures in
2187 * the end. Please use this function for short-lived objects.
2188 *
2189 * Returns: a pointer to the address that has been mapped, or %NULL on failure
2190 */
2191 void *vm_map_ram(struct page **pages, unsigned int count, int node)
2192 {
2193 unsigned long size = (unsigned long)count << PAGE_SHIFT;
2194 unsigned long addr;
2195 void *mem;
2196
2197 if (likely(count <= VMAP_MAX_ALLOC)) {
2198 mem = vb_alloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
2199 if (IS_ERR(mem))
2200 return NULL;
2201 addr = (unsigned long)mem;
2202 } else {
2203 struct vmap_area *va;
2204 va = alloc_vmap_area(size, PAGE_SIZE,
2205 VMALLOC_START, VMALLOC_END, node, GFP_KERNEL);
2206 if (IS_ERR(va))
2207 return NULL;
2208
2209 addr = va->va_start;
2210 mem = (void *)addr;
2211 }
2212
2213 if (vmap_pages_range(addr, addr + size, PAGE_KERNEL,
2214 pages, PAGE_SHIFT) < 0) {
2215 vm_unmap_ram(mem, count);
2216 return NULL;
2217 }
2218
2219 /*
2220 * Mark the pages as accessible, now that they are mapped.
2221 * With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for
2222 * non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
2223 */
> 2224 mem = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(mem, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
2225
2226 return mem;
2227 }
2228 EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_map_ram);
2229
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
Vasily Gorbik
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 31/39] kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 6 lines · On Mon, Jan 24, 2022 at 07:05:05PM +0100, [email protected] wrote:
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
The kernel can use to allocate executable memory. The only supported way to do that is via
__vmalloc_node_range()with the executable bit set in the prot argument. (vmap()resets the bit viapgprot_nx()).
Quoted 7 lines
Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc allocations, executing code from such allocations will lead to the PC register getting a tag, which is not tolerated by the kernel.
Only tag the allocations for normal kernel pages.
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
This breaks s390 and produce huge amount of false positives. I haven't been testing linux-next with KASAN for while, now tried it with next-20220308 and bisected false positives to this commit.
Any idea what is going wrong here?
I see 2 patterns:
[ 1.123723] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in ftrace_plt_init+0xb8/0xe0 [ 1.123740] Write of size 8 at addr 001bffff80000000 by task swapper/0/1 [ 1.123745] [ 1.123749] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-118520-ga20d77ce812a #142 [ 1.123755] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 701 (KVM/Linux) [ 1.123758] Call Trace: [ 1.123761] [<000000000218e5fe>] dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0xf8 [ 1.123782] [<0000000002176cb4>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x64/0x2f0 [ 1.123793] [<000000000086fd3e>] kasan_report+0x15e/0x1c8 [ 1.123802] [<0000000000870f5c>] kasan_check_range+0x174/0x1c0 [ 1.123808] [<0000000000871988>] memcpy+0x58/0x88 [ 1.123813] [<000000000342cea8>] ftrace_plt_init+0xb8/0xe0 [ 1.123819] [<0000000000101522>] do_one_initcall+0xc2/0x468 [ 1.123825] [<000000000341ffc6>] do_initcalls+0x1be/0x1e8 [ 1.123830] [<0000000003420504>] kernel_init_freeable+0x494/0x4e8 [ 1.123834] [<0000000002196556>] kernel_init+0x2e/0x180 [ 1.123838] [<000000000010625a>] __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8 [ 1.123843] [<00000000021b557a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 [ 1.123852] [ 1.123854] [ 1.123856] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 1.123861] 001bffff7fffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 1.123865] 001bffff7fffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 1.123868] >001bffff80000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 [ 1.123872] ^ [ 1.123874] 001bffff80000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 [ 1.123878] 001bffff80000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
$ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables ---[ Modules Area Start ]--- 0x001bffff80000000-0x001bffff80001000 4K PTE RO X 0x001bffff80001000-0x001bffff80002000 4K PTE I 0x001bffff80002000-0x001bffff80003000 4K PTE RO X 0x001bffff80003000-0x001bffff80004000 4K PTE I
[ 1.409146] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in bpf_jit_binary_alloc+0x138/0x170 [ 1.409154] Write of size 4 at addr 001bffff80002000 by task systemd/1 [ 1.409158] [ 1.409160] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G B W 5.17.0-rc7-118520-ga20d77ce812a #141 [ 1.409166] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 701 (KVM/Linux) [ 1.409169] Call Trace: [ 1.409171] [<000000000218e5fe>] dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0xf8 [ 1.409176] [<0000000002176cb4>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x64/0x2f0 [ 1.409183] [<000000000086fd3e>] kasan_report+0x15e/0x1c8 [ 1.409188] [<0000000000588860>] bpf_jit_binary_alloc+0x138/0x170 [ 1.409192] [<000000000019fa84>] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x814/0xca8 [ 1.409197] [<000000000058b60e>] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x286/0x3e8 [ 1.409202] [<000000000059ac2e>] bpf_prog_load+0xe66/0x1a10 [ 1.409206] [<000000000059ebd4>] __sys_bpf+0x8bc/0x1088 [ 1.409211] [<000000000059f9e8>] __s390x_sys_bpf+0x98/0xc8 [ 1.409216] [<000000000010ce74>] do_syscall+0x22c/0x328 [ 1.409221] [<000000000219599c>] __do_syscall+0x94/0xf0 [ 1.409226] [<00000000021b5542>] system_call+0x82/0xb0 [ 1.409232] [ 1.409234] [ 1.409235] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 1.409238] 001bffff80001f00: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 [ 1.409242] 001bffff80001f80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 [ 1.409246] >001bffff80002000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 [ 1.409249] ^ [ 1.409251] 001bffff80002080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 [ 1.409255] 001bffff80002100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
$ git bisect log git bisect start # good: [ea4424be16887a37735d6550cfd0611528dbe5d9] Merge tag 'mtd/fixes-for-5.17-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux git bisect good ea4424be16887a37735d6550cfd0611528dbe5d9 # bad: [cb153b68ff91cbc434f3de70ac549e110543e1bb] Add linux-next specific files for 20220308 git bisect bad cb153b68ff91cbc434f3de70ac549e110543e1bb # good: [1ce7aac49a7b73abbd691c6e6a1577a449d90bad] Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/cryptodev-2.6.git git bisect good 1ce7aac49a7b73abbd691c6e6a1577a449d90bad # good: [08688e100b1b07ce178c1d3c6b9983e00cd85413] Merge branch 'for-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace.git git bisect good 08688e100b1b07ce178c1d3c6b9983e00cd85413 # good: [82a204646439657e5c2f94da5cad7ba96de10414] Merge branch 'togreg' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jic23/iio.git git bisect good 82a204646439657e5c2f94da5cad7ba96de10414 # good: [ac82bf337c937458bf4f75985857bf3a68cd7c16] Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl.git git bisect good ac82bf337c937458bf4f75985857bf3a68cd7c16 # good: [a36f330518af9bd205451bedb4eb22a5245cf010] ipc/mqueue: use get_tree_nodev() in mqueue_get_tree() git bisect good a36f330518af9bd205451bedb4eb22a5245cf010 # good: [339c1d0fb400ab3acd2da2d9990242f654689f6e] Merge branch 'for-next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache.git git bisect good 339c1d0fb400ab3acd2da2d9990242f654689f6e # good: [b8a58fecbd4982211f528d405a9ded00ddc7d646] kasan: only apply __GFP_ZEROTAGS when memory is zeroed git bisect good b8a58fecbd4982211f528d405a9ded00ddc7d646 # bad: [141e05389762bee5fb0eb54af9c4d5266ce11d26] kasan: drop addr check from describe_object_addr git bisect bad 141e05389762bee5fb0eb54af9c4d5266ce11d26 # good: [97fedbc9a6bccd508c392b0e177380313dd9fcd2] kasan, page_alloc: allow skipping unpoisoning for HW_TAGS git bisect good 97fedbc9a6bccd508c392b0e177380313dd9fcd2 # bad: [606c2ee3fabbf66594f39998be9b5a21c2bf5dff] arm64: select KASAN_VMALLOC for SW/HW_TAGS modes git bisect bad 606c2ee3fabbf66594f39998be9b5a21c2bf5dff # bad: [bd2c296805cff9572080bf56807c16d1dd382260] kasan, scs: support tagged vmalloc mappings git bisect bad bd2c296805cff9572080bf56807c16d1dd382260 # good: [7b80fa947b3a3ee746115395d1c5f7157119b7d2] kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for HW_TAGS git bisect good 7b80fa947b3a3ee746115395d1c5f7157119b7d2 # bad: [f51c09448ea124622f8ebcfb41d06c809ee01bca] fix for "kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations" git bisect bad f51c09448ea124622f8ebcfb41d06c809ee01bca # bad: [a20d77ce812a3e11b3cf2cb4f411904bb5c6edaa] kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations git bisect bad a20d77ce812a3e11b3cf2cb4f411904bb5c6edaa # first bad commit: [a20d77ce812a3e11b3cf2cb4f411904bb5c6edaa] kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
Andrey Konovalov
reviewerRe: [PATCH v6 31/39] kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
Quoted 14 lines · Vasily Gorbik
Quoted 12 lines · On Mon, Jan 24, 2022 at 07:05:05PM +0100, [email protected] wrote:
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
The kernel can use to allocate executable memory. The only supported way to do that is via
__vmalloc_node_range()with the executable bit set in the prot argument. (vmap()resets the bit viapgprot_nx()).Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc allocations, executing code from such allocations will lead to the PC register getting a tag, which is not tolerated by the kernel.
Only tag the allocations for normal kernel pages.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>This breaks s390 and produce huge amount of false positives. I haven't been testing linux-next with KASAN for while, now tried it with next-20220308 and bisected false positives to this commit.
Any idea what is going wrong here?
Hi Vasily,
Could you try the attached fix?
Thanks!
Vasily Gorbik
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 31/39] kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
Quoted 17 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 16 lines · Vasily Gorbik
Quoted 13 lines · On Mon, Jan 24, 2022 at 07:05:05PM +0100, [email protected] wrote:
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
The kernel can use to allocate executable memory. The only supported way to do that is via
__vmalloc_node_range()with the executable bit set in the prot argument. (vmap()resets the bit viapgprot_nx()).Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc allocations, executing code from such allocations will lead to the PC register getting a tag, which is not tolerated by the kernel.
Only tag the allocations for normal kernel pages.
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
This breaks s390 and produce huge amount of false positives. I haven't been testing linux-next with KASAN for while, now tried it with next-20220308 and bisected false positives to this commit.
Any idea what is going wrong here?
Could you try the attached fix?
Wow, that was quick!
Yes, it fixes the issue for s390, kasan tests pass as well. Thank you!
PATCH v6 32/39 kasan, arm64: don't tag executable vmalloc allocations
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Besides asking vmalloc memory to be executable via the prot argument of __vmalloc_node_range() (see the previous patch), the kernel can skip that bit and instead mark memory as executable via set_memory_x().
Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc allocations, executing code from such allocations will lead to the PC register getting a tag, which is not tolerated by the kernel.
Generic kernel code typically allocates memory via module_alloc() if it intends to mark memory as executable. (On arm64 module_alloc() uses __vmalloc_node_range() without setting the executable bit).
Thus, reset pointer tags of pointers returned from module_alloc().
However, on arm64 there's an exception: the eBPF subsystem. Instead of using module_alloc(), it uses vmalloc() (via bpf_jit_alloc_exec()) to allocate its JIT region.
Thus, reset pointer tags of pointers returned from bpf_jit_alloc_exec().
Resetting tags for these pointers results in untagged pointers being passed to set_memory_x(). This causes conflicts in arithmetic checks in change_memory_common(), as vm_struct->addr pointer returned by find_vm_area() is tagged.
Reset pointer tag of find_vm_area(addr)->addr in change_memory_common().
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Reset pointer tag in change_memory_common().
Changes v2->v3:
- Add this patch.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 3 ++- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/module.c +2 -1
@@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)return NULL ; } -return p; +/* Memory is intended to be executable, reset the pointer tag. */ +return kasan_reset_tag (p); }enum aarch64_reloc_op {
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +1 -1
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static int change_memory_common(unsigned long addr, int numpages,*/ area =find_vm_area ((void *)addr);if (!area || - end > (unsigned long )area->addr + area->size || + end > (unsigned long )kasan_reset_tag (area->addr) + area->size || !(area->flags &VM_ALLOC ))return -EINVAL ;
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +2 -1
@@ -1150,7 +1150,8 @@ u64 bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit(void)void *bpf_jit_alloc_exec (unsigned long size) { -return vmalloc (size); +/* Memory is intended to be executable, reset the pointer tag. */ +return kasan_reset_tag (vmalloc (size)); }void bpf_jit_free_exec (void *addr)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 33/39 kasan: mark kasan_arg_stacktrace as __initdata
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
As kasan_arg_stacktrace is only used in __init functions, mark it as __initdata instead of __ro_after_init to allow it be freed after boot.
The other enums for KASAN args are used in kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu(), which is not marked as __init as a CPU can be hot-plugged after boot. Clarify this in a comment.
---
Changes v1->v2:
- Add this patch.
--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +5 -2
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ enum kasan_arg_stacktrace {static enum kasan_arg kasan_arg__ro_after_init ;static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode__ro_after_init ; -static enum kasan_arg_stacktrace kasan_arg_stacktrace__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_stacktrace kasan_arg_stacktrace__initdata ;/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_flag_enabled);
@@ -116,7 +116,10 @@ static inline const char *kasan_mode_info(void)return "sync" ; } -/* kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu() is called for each CPU. */ +/* +* kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu() is called for each CPU. +* Not marked as __init as a CPU can be hot-plugged after boot. +*/ void kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu (void ) {/*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 34/39 kasan: clean up feature flags for HW_TAGS mode
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
- Untie kasan_init_hw_tags() code from the default values of kasan_arg_mode and kasan_arg_stacktrace.
- Move static_branch_enable(&kasan_flag_enabled) to the end of kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu().
- Remove excessive comments in kasan_arg_mode switch.
- Add new comments.
---
Changes v4->v5:
- Add this patch.
--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +21 -17
@@ -42,16 +42,22 @@ static enum kasan_arg kasan_arg __ro_after_init;static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode__ro_after_init ;static enum kasan_arg_stacktrace kasan_arg_stacktrace__initdata ; -/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */ +/* +* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. +* The value remains false until KASAN is initialized by kasan_init_hw_tags(). +*/ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_flag_enabled);EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_flag_enabled); -/* Whether the selected mode is synchronous/asynchronous/asymmetric.*/ +/* +* Whether the selected mode is synchronous, asynchronous, or asymmetric. +* Defaults to KASAN_MODE_SYNC. +*/ enum kasan_mode kasan_mode__ro_after_init ;EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kasan_mode);/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */ -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_flag_stacktrace); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_flag_stacktrace);/* kasan=off/on */ static int __init early_kasan_flag (char *arg)
@@ -127,7 +133,11 @@ void kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu(void)* as this function is only called for MTE-capable hardware. */ -/* If KASAN is disabled via command line, don't initialize it. */ +/* +* If KASAN is disabled via command line, don't initialize it. +* When this function is called, kasan_flag_enabled is not yet +* set by kasan_init_hw_tags(). Thus, check kasan_arg instead. +*/ if (kasan_arg ==KASAN_ARG_OFF )return ;
@@ -154,42 +164,36 @@ void __init kasan_init_hw_tags(void)if (kasan_arg ==KASAN_ARG_OFF )return ; -/* Enable KASAN. */ -static_branch_enable (&kasan_flag_enabled); -switch (kasan_arg_mode) {case KASAN_ARG_MODE_DEFAULT : -/* -* Default to sync mode. -*/ - fallthrough; +/* Default is specified by kasan_mode definition. */ +break ;case KASAN_ARG_MODE_SYNC : -/* Sync mode enabled. */ kasan_mode =KASAN_MODE_SYNC ;break ;case KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYNC : -/* Async mode enabled. */ kasan_mode =KASAN_MODE_ASYNC ;break ;case KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYMM : -/* Asymm mode enabled. */ kasan_mode =KASAN_MODE_ASYMM ;break ; }switch (kasan_arg_stacktrace) {case KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_DEFAULT : -/* Default to enabling stack trace collection. */ -static_branch_enable (&kasan_flag_stacktrace); +/* Default is specified by kasan_flag_stacktrace definition. */ break ;case KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_OFF : -/* Do nothing, kasan_flag_stacktrace keeps its default value. */ +static_branch_disable (&kasan_flag_stacktrace);break ;case KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_ON :static_branch_enable (&kasan_flag_stacktrace);break ; } +/* KASAN is now initialized, enable it. */ +static_branch_enable (&kasan_flag_enabled); +pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized (hw-tags, mode=%s, stacktrace=%s)\n" ,kasan_mode_info (),kasan_stack_collection_enabled () ?"on" :"off" );
mm/kasan/kasan.h +1 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@#include <linux/static_key.h> #include "../slab.h" -DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_flag_stacktrace); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_flag_stacktrace);enum kasan_mode {KASAN_MODE_SYNC ,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 35/39 kasan: add kasan.vmalloc command line flag
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Allow disabling vmalloc() tagging for HW_TAGS KASAN via a kasan.vmalloc command line switch.
This is a fail-safe switch intended for production systems that enable HW_TAGS KASAN. In case vmalloc() tagging ends up having an issue not detected during testing but that manifests in production, kasan.vmalloc allows to turn vmalloc() tagging off while leaving page_alloc/slab tagging on.
---
Changes v4->v5:
- Use true as kasan_flag_vmalloc static key default.
Changes v1->v2:
- Mark kasan_arg_stacktrace as __initdata instead of __ro_after_init.
- Combine KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_DEFAULT and KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_ON switch cases.
--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +44 -1
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ enum kasan_arg_mode { KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYMM, }; +enum kasan_arg_vmalloc { +KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_ON , +}; +enum kasan_arg_stacktrace {KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_DEFAULT ,KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_OFF ,
@@ -40,6 +46,7 @@ enum kasan_arg_stacktrace {static enum kasan_arg kasan_arg__ro_after_init ;static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_vmalloc kasan_arg_vmalloc__initdata ;static enum kasan_arg_stacktrace kasan_arg_stacktrace__initdata ;/*
@@ -56,6 +63,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_flag_enabled);enum kasan_mode kasan_mode__ro_after_init ;EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kasan_mode); +/* Whether to enable vmalloc tagging. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_flag_vmalloc); +/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_flag_stacktrace);
@@ -95,6 +105,23 @@ static int __init early_kasan_mode(char *arg) }early_param ("kasan.mode" , early_kasan_mode); +/* kasan.vmalloc=off/on */ +static int __init early_kasan_flag_vmalloc (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_vmalloc =KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"on" )) + kasan_arg_vmalloc =KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_ON ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.vmalloc" , early_kasan_flag_vmalloc); +/* kasan.stacktrace=off/on */ static int __init early_kasan_flag_stacktrace (char *arg) {
@@ -179,6 +206,18 @@ void __init kasan_init_hw_tags(void)break ; } +switch (kasan_arg_vmalloc) { +case KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_DEFAULT : +/* Default is specified by kasan_flag_vmalloc definition. */ +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_OFF : +static_branch_disable (&kasan_flag_vmalloc); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_ON : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_flag_vmalloc); +break ; + } +switch (kasan_arg_stacktrace) {case KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_DEFAULT :/* Default is specified by kasan_flag_stacktrace definition. */
@@ -194,8 +233,9 @@ void __init kasan_init_hw_tags(void)/* KASAN is now initialized, enable it. */ static_branch_enable (&kasan_flag_enabled); -pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized (hw-tags, mode=%s, stacktrace=%s)\n" , +pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized (hw-tags, mode=%s, vmalloc=%s, stacktrace=%s)\n" ,kasan_mode_info (), +kasan_vmalloc_enabled () ?"on" :"off" ,kasan_stack_collection_enabled () ?"on" :"off" ); }
@@ -228,6 +268,9 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,u8 tag;unsigned long redzone_start, redzone_size; +if (!kasan_vmalloc_enabled ()) +return (void *)start; +if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr (start))return (void *)start;
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <linux/static_key.h> #include "../slab.h" +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_flag_vmalloc);DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_flag_stacktrace);enum kasan_mode {
@@ -22,6 +23,11 @@ enum kasan_mode {extern enum kasan_mode kasan_mode__ro_after_init ; +static inline bool kasan_vmalloc_enabled (void ) +{ +return static_branch_likely (&kasan_flag_vmalloc); +} +static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled (void ) {return static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_flag_stacktrace);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 36/39 kasan: allow enabling KASAN_VMALLOC and SW/HW_TAGS
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Allow enabling CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC with SW_TAGS and HW_TAGS KASAN modes.
Also adjust CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC description:
- Mention HW_TAGS support.
- Remove unneeded internal details: they have no place in Kconfig description and are already explained in the documentation.
--- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
lib/Kconfig.kasan +10 -10
@@ -178,17 +178,17 @@ config KASAN_TAGS_IDENTIFY memory consumption. config KASAN_VMALLOC - bool "Back mappings in vmalloc space with real shadow memory" - depends on KASAN_GENERIC && HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC + bool "Check accesses to vmalloc allocations" + depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC help - By default, the shadow region for vmalloc space is the read-only - zero page. This means that KASAN cannot detect errors involving - vmalloc space. - - Enabling this option will hook in to vmap/vmalloc and back those - mappings with real shadow memory allocated on demand. This allows - for KASAN to detect more sorts of errors (and to support vmapped - stacks), but at the cost of higher memory usage. + This mode makes KASAN check accesses to vmalloc allocations for + validity. + + With software KASAN modes, checking is done for all types of vmalloc + allocations. Enabling this option leads to higher memory usage. + + With hardware tag-based KASAN, only VM_ALLOC mappings are checked. + There is no additional memory usage. config KASAN_KUNIT_TEST tristate "KUnit-compatible tests of KASAN bug detection capabilities" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 37/39 arm64: select KASAN_VMALLOC for SW/HW_TAGS modes
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Generic KASAN already selects KASAN_VMALLOC to allow VMAP_STACK to be selected unconditionally, see commit acc3042d62cb9 ("arm64: Kconfig:
select KASAN_VMALLOC if KANSAN_GENERIC is enabled").
The same change is needed for SW_TAGS KASAN.
HW_TAGS KASAN does not require enabling KASAN_VMALLOC for VMAP_STACK, they already work together as is. Still, selecting KASAN_VMALLOC still makes sense to make vmalloc() always protected. In case any bugs in KASAN's vmalloc() support are discovered, the command line kasan.vmalloc flag can be used to disable vmalloc() checking.
Select KASAN_VMALLOC for all KASAN modes for arm64.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Update patch description.
Changes v1->v2:
- Split out this patch.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ config ARM64 select IOMMU_DMA if IOMMU_SUPPORT select IRQ_DOMAIN select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING - select KASAN_VMALLOC if KASAN_GENERIC + select KASAN_VMALLOC if KASAN select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 38/39 kasan: documentation updates
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Update KASAN documentation:
- Bump Clang version requirement for HW_TAGS as ARM64_MTE depends on AS_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS as of commit 2decad92f4731 ("arm64: mte: Ensure TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT is set atomically"), which requires Clang 12.
- Add description of the new kasan.vmalloc command line flag.
- Mention that SW_TAGS and HW_TAGS modes now support vmalloc tagging.
- Explicitly say that the "Shadow memory" section is only applicable to software KASAN modes.
- Mention that shadow-based KASAN_VMALLOC is supported on arm64.
--- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +11 -6
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Software tag-based KASAN mode is only supported in Clang. The hardware KASAN mode (#3) relies on hardware to perform the checks but still requires a compiler version that supports memory tagging instructions. -This mode is supported in GCC 10+ and Clang 11+. +This mode is supported in GCC 10+ and Clang 12+. Both software KASAN modes work with SLUB and SLAB memory allocators, while the hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports SLUB.
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ additional boot parameters that allow disabling KASAN or controlling features: Asymmetric mode: a bad access is detected synchronously on reads and asynchronously on writes. +- ``kasan.vmalloc=off`` or ``=on`` disables or enables tagging of vmalloc + allocations (default: ``on``). + - ``kasan.stacktrace=off`` or ``=on`` disables or enables alloc and free stack traces collection (default: ``on``).
@@ -279,8 +282,8 @@ Software tag-based KASAN uses 0xFF as a match-all pointer tag (accesses through pointers with the 0xFF pointer tag are not checked). The value 0xFE is currently reserved to tag freed memory regions. -Software tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of slab and page_alloc -memory. +Software tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of slab, page_alloc, +and vmalloc memory. Hardware tag-based KASAN ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@@ -303,8 +306,8 @@ Hardware tag-based KASAN uses 0xFF as a match-all pointer tag (accesses through pointers with the 0xFF pointer tag are not checked). The value 0xFE is currently reserved to tag freed memory regions. -Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of slab and page_alloc -memory. +Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of slab, page_alloc, +and VM_ALLOC-based vmalloc memory. If the hardware does not support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN will not be enabled. In this case, all KASAN boot parameters are ignored.
@@ -319,6 +322,8 @@ checking gets disabled. Shadow memory ------------- +The contents of this section are only applicable to software KASAN modes. + The kernel maps memory in several different parts of the address space. The range of kernel virtual addresses is large: there is not enough real memory to support a real shadow region for every address that could be
@@ -349,7 +354,7 @@ CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC With ``CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC``, KASAN can cover vmalloc space at the cost of greater memory usage. Currently, this is supported on x86, -riscv, s390, and powerpc. +arm64, riscv, s390, and powerpc. This works by hooking into vmalloc and vmap and dynamically allocating real shadow memory to back the mappings.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 39/39 kasan: improve vmalloc tests
In reply to [email protected]From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Update the existing vmalloc_oob() test to account for the specifics of the tag-based modes. Also add a few new checks and comments.
Add new vmalloc-related tests:
- vmalloc_helpers_tags() to check that exported vmalloc helpers can handle tagged pointers.
- vmap_tags() to check that SW_TAGS mode properly tags vmap() mappings.
- vm_map_ram_tags() to check that SW_TAGS mode properly tags vm_map_ram() mappings.
- vmalloc_percpu() to check that SW_TAGS mode tags regions allocated for __alloc_percpu(). The tagging of per-cpu mappings is best-effort; proper tagging is tracked in [1].
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215019
--- lib/test_kasan.c | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 183 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
lib/test_kasan.c +183 -6
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -1049,21 +1050,181 @@ static void kmalloc_double_kzfree(struct kunit *test)KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL (test,kfree_sensitive (ptr)); } +static void vmalloc_helpers_tags (struct kunit *test) +{ +void *ptr; +int rv; + +/* This test is intended for tag-based modes. */ +KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF (test,CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); + +KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON (test,CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC ); + + ptr =vmalloc (PAGE_SIZE ); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, ptr); + +/* Check that the returned pointer is tagged. */ +KUNIT_EXPECT_GE (test, (u8 )get_tag (ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_MIN ); +KUNIT_EXPECT_LT (test, (u8 )get_tag (ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_KERNEL ); + +/* Make sure exported vmalloc helpers handle tagged pointers. */ +KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE (test,is_vmalloc_addr (ptr)); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test,vmalloc_to_page (ptr)); + +/* Make sure vmalloc'ed memory permissions can be changed. */ + rv =set_memory_ro ((unsigned long )ptr,1 ); +KUNIT_ASSERT_GE (test, rv,0 ); + rv =set_memory_rw ((unsigned long )ptr,1 ); +KUNIT_ASSERT_GE (test, rv,0 ); + +vfree (ptr); +} +static void vmalloc_oob (struct kunit *test) { -void *area; +char *v_ptr, *p_ptr; +struct page *page; +size_t size =PAGE_SIZE /2 -KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE -5 ;KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON (test,CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC ); + v_ptr =vmalloc (size); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, v_ptr); +/* -* We have to be careful not to hit the guard page. +* We have to be careful not to hit the guard page in vmalloc tests. * The MMU will catch that and crash us. */ - area =vmalloc (3000 ); -KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, area); -KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL (test, ((volatile char *)area)[3100 ]); -vfree (area); +/* Make sure in-bounds accesses are valid. */ + v_ptr[0 ] =0 ; + v_ptr[size -1 ] =0 ; + +/* +* An unaligned access past the requested vmalloc size. +* Only generic KASAN can precisely detect these. +*/ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC )) +KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL (test, ((volatile char *)v_ptr)[size]); + +/* An aligned access into the first out-of-bounds granule. */ +KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL (test, ((volatile char *)v_ptr)[size +5 ]); + +/* Check that in-bounds accesses to the physical page are valid. */ + page =vmalloc_to_page (v_ptr); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, page); + p_ptr =page_address (page); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, p_ptr); + p_ptr[0 ] =0 ; + +vfree (v_ptr); + +/* +* We can't check for use-after-unmap bugs in this nor in the following +* vmalloc tests, as the page might be fully unmapped and accessing it +* will crash the kernel. +*/ +} + +static void vmap_tags (struct kunit *test) +{ +char *p_ptr, *v_ptr; +struct page *p_page, *v_page; +size_t order =1 ; + +/* +* This test is specifically crafted for the software tag-based mode, +* the only tag-based mode that poisons vmap mappings. +*/ +KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON (test,CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ); + +KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON (test,CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC ); + + p_page =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL , order); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, p_page); + p_ptr =page_address (p_page); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, p_ptr); + + v_ptr =vmap (&p_page,1 << order,VM_MAP ,PAGE_KERNEL ); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, v_ptr); + +/* +* We can't check for out-of-bounds bugs in this nor in the following +* vmalloc tests, as allocations have page granularity and accessing +* the guard page will crash the kernel. +*/ + +KUNIT_EXPECT_GE (test, (u8 )get_tag (v_ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_MIN ); +KUNIT_EXPECT_LT (test, (u8 )get_tag (v_ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_KERNEL ); + +/* Make sure that in-bounds accesses through both pointers work. */ + *p_ptr =0 ; + *v_ptr =0 ; + +/* Make sure vmalloc_to_page() correctly recovers the page pointer. */ + v_page =vmalloc_to_page (v_ptr); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, v_page); +KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ (test, p_page, v_page); + +vunmap (v_ptr); +free_pages ((unsigned long )p_ptr, order); +} + +static void vm_map_ram_tags (struct kunit *test) +{ +char *p_ptr, *v_ptr; +struct page *page; +size_t order =1 ; + +/* +* This test is specifically crafted for the software tag-based mode, +* the only tag-based mode that poisons vm_map_ram mappings. +*/ +KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON (test,CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ); + + page =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL , order); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, page); + p_ptr =page_address (page); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, p_ptr); + + v_ptr =vm_map_ram (&page,1 << order,-1 ); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, v_ptr); + +KUNIT_EXPECT_GE (test, (u8 )get_tag (v_ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_MIN ); +KUNIT_EXPECT_LT (test, (u8 )get_tag (v_ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_KERNEL ); + +/* Make sure that in-bounds accesses through both pointers work. */ + *p_ptr =0 ; + *v_ptr =0 ; + +vm_unmap_ram (v_ptr,1 << order); +free_pages ((unsigned long )p_ptr, order); +} + +static void vmalloc_percpu (struct kunit *test) +{ +char __percpu *ptr; +int cpu; + +/* +* This test is specifically crafted for the software tag-based mode, +* the only tag-based mode that poisons percpu mappings. +*/ +KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON (test,CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ); + + ptr =__alloc_percpu (PAGE_SIZE ,PAGE_SIZE ); + +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { +char *c_ptr =per_cpu_ptr (ptr, cpu); + +KUNIT_EXPECT_GE (test, (u8 )get_tag (c_ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_MIN ); +KUNIT_EXPECT_LT (test, (u8 )get_tag (c_ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_KERNEL ); + +/* Make sure that in-bounds accesses don't crash the kernel. */ + *c_ptr =0 ; + } + +free_percpu (ptr); }/*
@@ -1097,6 +1258,18 @@ static void match_all_not_assigned(struct kunit *test)KUNIT_EXPECT_LT (test, (u8 )get_tag (ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_KERNEL );free_pages ((unsigned long )ptr, order); } + +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC )) +return ; + +for (i =0 ; i <256 ; i++) { + size = (get_random_int () %1024 ) +1 ; + ptr =vmalloc (size); +KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL (test, ptr); +KUNIT_EXPECT_GE (test, (u8 )get_tag (ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_MIN ); +KUNIT_EXPECT_LT (test, (u8 )get_tag (ptr), (u8 )KASAN_TAG_KERNEL ); +vfree (ptr); + } }/* Check that 0xff works as a match-all pointer tag for tag-based modes. */
@@ -1202,7 +1375,11 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {KUNIT_CASE (kasan_bitops_generic),KUNIT_CASE (kasan_bitops_tags),KUNIT_CASE (kmalloc_double_kzfree), +KUNIT_CASE (vmalloc_helpers_tags),KUNIT_CASE (vmalloc_oob), +KUNIT_CASE (vmap_tags), +KUNIT_CASE (vm_map_ram_tags), +KUNIT_CASE (vmalloc_percpu),KUNIT_CASE (match_all_not_assigned),KUNIT_CASE (match_all_ptr_tag), KUNIT_CASE(match_all_mem_tag),
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 7 lines · On Mon, 24 Jan 2022 at 19:02, <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Hi,
This patchset adds vmalloc tagging support for
SW_TAGSandHW_TAGSKASAN modes.
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
Acked-by Marco Elver <[email protected]>
FYI, my Ack may get lost here - on rebase you could apply it to all patches to carry it forward. As-is, Andrew would still have to apply it manually.
An Ack to the cover letter saves replying to each patch and thus generating less emails, which I think is preferred.
My Ack is still valid, given v6 is mainly a rebase and I don't see any major changes.
Thanks,
-- Marco
Quoted 70 lines
Andrey Konovalov (39):
kasan,page_alloc: deduplicateshould_skip_kasan_poisonkasan,page_alloc: movetag_clear_highpageout of
kernel_init_free_pages
kasan,page_alloc: mergekasan_free_pagesintofree_pages_preparekasan,page_alloc: simplifykasan_poison_pagescall site kasan,page_alloc: init memory of skipped pages on free
kasan: dropskip_kasan_poisonvariable infree_pages_prepare
mm: clarify__GFP_ZEROTAGScomment
kasan: only apply__GFP_ZEROTAGSwhen memory is zeroed kasan,page_alloc: refactor init checks inpost_alloc_hookkasan,page_alloc: mergekasan_alloc_pagesintopost_alloc_hookkasan,page_alloc: combinetag_clear_highpagecalls inpost_alloc_hookkasan,page_alloc: move SetPageSkipKASanPoison inpost_alloc_hookkasan,page_alloc: movekernel_init_free_pagesinpost_alloc_hookkasan,page_alloc: reworkkasan_unpoison_pagescall site
kasan: clean up metadata byte definitions
kasan: defineKASAN_VMALLOC_INVALIDforSW_TAGS
kasan, x86, arm64, s390: rename functions for modules shadow kasan, vmalloc: drop outdatedVM_KASANcomment
kasan: reorder vmalloc hooks
kasan: add wrappers for vmalloc hooks
kasan, vmalloc: reset tags in vmalloc functions
kasan, fork: reset pointer tags of vmapped stacks
kasan, arm64: reset pointer tags of vmapped stacks
kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging forSW_TAGS
kasan, vmalloc, arm64: mark vmalloc mappings aspgprot_taggedkasan, vmalloc: unpoisonVM_ALLOCpages after mapping kasan, mm: only define___GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISONwithHW_TAGSkasan,page_alloc: allow skipping unpoisoning forHW_TAGSkasan,page_alloc: allow skipping memory init forHW_TAGSkasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging forHW_TAGS
kasan, vmalloc: only tag normal vmalloc allocations
kasan, arm64: don't tag executable vmalloc allocations
kasan: markkasan_arg_stacktraceas__initdata
kasan: clean up feature flags forHW_TAGSmode
kasan: add kasan.vmalloc command line flag
kasan: allow enablingKASAN_VMALLOCand SW/HW_TAGS
arm64: selectKASAN_VMALLOCfor SW/HW_TAGS modes
kasan: documentation updates
kasan: improve vmalloc testsDocumentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 17 ++- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/vmap_stack.h | 5 +- arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 5 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 3 +- arch/s390/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 2 +- include/linux/gfp.h | 35 +++-- include/linux/kasan.h | 97 +++++++++----- include/linux/vmalloc.h | 18 +-- include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 14 +- kernel/fork.c | 1 + kernel/scs.c | 4 +- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 20 +-- lib/test_kasan.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/common.c | 4 +- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 18 ++- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 63 +++++---- mm/page_alloc.c | 152 +++++++++++++++------- mm/vmalloc.c | 99 +++++++++++--- 23 files changed, 731 insertions(+), 220 deletions(-)--
2.25.1
Andrey Konovalov
reviewerQuoted 9 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 7 lines · On Mon, 24 Jan 2022 at 19:02, <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Hi,
This patchset adds vmalloc tagging support for
SW_TAGSandHW_TAGSKASAN modes.
Quoted 7 lines
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
Acked-by Marco Elver <[email protected]>FYI, my Ack may get lost here - on rebase you could apply it to all patches to carry it forward. As-is, Andrew would still have to apply it manually.
Sounds good, will do if there is a v7.
Quoted 5 lines
An Ack to the cover letter saves replying to each patch and thus generating less emails, which I think is preferred.
My Ack is still valid, given v6 is mainly a rebase and I don't see any major changes.
Thanks, Marco!
Quoted 24 lines · On Mon, Jan 24, 2022 at 07:02:08PM +0100, [email protected] wrote:
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Hi,
This patchset adds vmalloc tagging support for
SW_TAGSandHW_TAGSKASAN modes.The tree with patches is available here:
https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-kasan-vmalloc-tags-v6
About half of patches are cleanups I went for along the way. None of them seem to be important enough to go through stable, so I decided not to split them out into separate patches/series.
The patchset is partially based on an early version of the
HW_TAGSpatchset by Vincenzo that had vmalloc support. Thus, I added a Co-developed-by tag into a few patches.
SW_TAGSvmalloc tagging support is straightforward. It reuses all of the generic KASAN machinery, but uses shadow memory to store tags instead of magic values. Naturally, vmalloc tagging requires adding a fewkasan_reset_tag()annotations to the vmalloc code.
Quoted 4 lines
HW_TAGSvmalloc tagging support stands out.HW_TAGSKASAN is based on Arm MTE, which can only assigns tags to physical memory. As a result,HW_TAGSKASAN only tagsvmalloc()allocations, which are backed bypage_allocmemory. It ignoresvmap()and others.
I could use some help here. Ever since this series, our system starts to trigger bad page state bugs from time to time. Any thoughts?
BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-udevd pfn:83ffffcd page:fffffc20fdfff340 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x83ffffcd flags: 0xbfffc0000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 0bfffc0000001000 fffffc20fdfff348 fffffc20fdfff348 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set page_owner info is not present (never set?) CPU: 76 PID: 1873 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.18.0-rc4-next-20220428-dirty #67 Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack bad_page free_pcp_prepare free_unref_page __free_pages free_pages.part.0 free_pages kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte (inlined by) kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte at mm/kasan/shadow.c:361 apply_to_pte_range apply_to_pmd_range apply_to_pud_range __apply_to_page_range apply_to_existing_page_range kasan_release_vmalloc (inlined by) kasan_release_vmalloc at mm/kasan/shadow.c:469 __purge_vmap_area_lazy purge_vmap_area_lazy alloc_vmap_area __get_vm_area_node.constprop.0 __vmalloc_node_range module_alloc move_module layout_and_allocate load_module __do_sys_finit_module __arm64_sys_finit_module invoke_syscall el0_svc_common.constprop.0 do_el0_svc el0_svc el0t_64_sync_handler el0t_64_sync Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-udevd pfn:83ffffcc page:fffffc20fdfff300 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x83ffffcc flags: 0xbfffc0000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 0bfffc0000001000 fffffc20fdfff308 fffffc20fdfff308 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set page_owner info is not present (never set?) CPU: 76 PID: 1873 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G B 5.18.0-rc4-next-20220428-dirty #67 Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack bad_page free_pcp_prepare free_unref_page __free_pages free_pages.part.0 free_pages kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte apply_to_pte_range apply_to_pmd_range apply_to_pud_range __apply_to_page_range apply_to_existing_page_range kasan_release_vmalloc __purge_vmap_area_lazy purge_vmap_area_lazy alloc_vmap_area __get_vm_area_node.constprop.0 __vmalloc_node_range module_alloc move_module layout_and_allocate load_module __do_sys_finit_module __arm64_sys_finit_module invoke_syscall el0_svc_common.constprop.0 do_el0_svc el0_svc el0t_64_sync_handler el0t_64_sync
Andrey Konovalov
reviewerQuoted 9 lines · Qian Cai
Quoted 5 lines
SW_TAGSvmalloc tagging support is straightforward. It reuses all of the generic KASAN machinery, but uses shadow memory to store tags instead of magic values. Naturally, vmalloc tagging requires adding a fewkasan_reset_tag()annotations to the vmalloc code.I could use some help here. Ever since this series, our system starts to trigger bad page state bugs from time to time. Any thoughts?
Quoted 7 lines
BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-udevd pfn:83ffffcd page:fffffc20fdfff340 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x83ffffcd flags: 0xbfffc0000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 0bfffc0000001000 fffffc20fdfff348 fffffc20fdfff348 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set page_owner info is not present (never set?)
Hi Qian,
No ideas so far.
Looks like the page has reserved tag set when it's being freed.
Does this crash only happen with the SW_TAGS mode?
Does this crash only happen when loading modules?
Does your system have any hot-plugged memory?
Thanks!
Quoted 5 lines · Andrey Konovalov
No ideas so far.
Looks like the page has reserved tag set when it's being freed.
Does this crash only happen with the
SW_TAGSmode?
No, the system is running exclusively with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y
Quoted 1 line
Does this crash only happen when loading modules?
Yes. Here is another sligtly different path at the bottom.
Quoted 1 line
Does your system have any hot-plugged memory?
No.
BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-udevd pfn:403fc007c page:fffffd00fd001f00 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x403fc007c flags: 0x1bfffc0000001000(reserved|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 1bfffc0000001000 fffffd00fd001f08 fffffd00fd001f08 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set CPU: 101 PID: 2004 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8-next-20220317-dirty #39 Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack bad_page free_pcp_prepare free_pages_prepare at mm/page_alloc.c:1348 (inlined by) free_pcp_prepare at mm/page_alloc.c:1403 free_unref_page __free_pages free_pages.part.0 free_pages kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte (inlined by) kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte at mm/kasan/shadow.c:359 apply_to_pte_range apply_to_pte_range at mm/memory.c:2547 apply_to_pmd_range apply_to_pud_range __apply_to_page_range apply_to_existing_page_range kasan_release_vmalloc (inlined by) kasan_release_vmalloc at mm/kasan/shadow.c:469 __purge_vmap_area_lazy _vm_unmap_aliases.part.0 __vunmap __vfree vfree module_memfree free_module do_init_module load_module __do_sys_finit_module __arm64_sys_finit_module invoke_syscall el0_svc_common.constprop.0 do_el0_svc el0_svc el0t_64_sync_handler el0t_64_sync Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-udevd pfn:403fc007b page:fffffd00fd001ec0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x403fc007b flags: 0x1bfffc0000001000(reserved|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 1bfffc0000001000 fffffd00fd001ec8 fffffd00fd001ec8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set CPU: 101 PID: 2004 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G B 5.17.0-rc8-next-20220317-dirty #39 Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack bad_page free_pcp_prepare free_unref_page __free_pages free_pages.part.0 free_pages kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte apply_to_pte_range apply_to_pmd_range apply_to_pud_range __apply_to_page_range apply_to_existing_page_range kasan_release_vmalloc __purge_vmap_area_lazy _vm_unmap_aliases.part.0 __vunmap __vfree vfree module_memfree free_module do_init_module load_module __do_sys_finit_module __arm64_sys_finit_module invoke_syscall el0_svc_common.constprop.0 do_el0_svc el0_svc el0t_64_sync_handler el0t_64_sync