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xkey: Use a custom error level for debug messages

PATCH In review [email protected]... 3 participants 12 messages Jan 25, 2022 – Jan 26, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 xkey: Use a custom error level for debug messages

From: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>

D_XKEY = loglev(6, 69, M_DEBUG) is defined and used for all low level debug messages from xkey_provider.c and xkey_helper.c

As suggested by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>

---
 src/openvpn/errlevel.h      |  1 +
 src/openvpn/xkey_helper.c   |  8 +--
 src/openvpn/xkey_provider.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/errlevel.h +1 -0
index 602e48a8..94c6c282 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
 #define D_TUN_RW             LOGLEV(6, 69, M_DEBUG)  /* show TUN/TAP reads/writes */
 #define D_TAP_WIN_DEBUG      LOGLEV(6, 69, M_DEBUG)  /* show TAP-Windows driver debug info */
 #define D_CLIENT_NAT         LOGLEV(6, 69, M_DEBUG)  /* show client NAT debug info */
+#define D_XKEY               LOGLEV(6, 69, M_DEBUG)  /* show xkey-provider debug info */
 
 #define D_SHOW_KEYS          LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG)  /* show data channel encryption keys */
 #define D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE    LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG)  /* show data channel key source entropy */
src/openvpn/xkey_helper.c +4 -4
index c667f7be..582bec5d 100644
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ int
 xkey_digest(const unsigned char *src, size_t srclen, unsigned char *buf,
             size_t *buflen, const char *mdname)
 {
-    dmsg(D_LOW, "In xkey_digest");
+    dmsg(D_XKEY, "In xkey_digest");
     EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, mdname, NULL); /* from default context */
     if (!md)
     {
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int
 xkey_management_sign(void *unused, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
                      const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen, XKEY_SIGALG alg)
 {
-    dmsg(D_LOW, "In xkey_management_sign with keytype = %s, op = %s",
+    dmsg(D_XKEY, "In xkey_management_sign with keytype = %s, op = %s",
          alg.keytype, alg.op);
 
     (void) unused;
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ xkey_management_sign(void *unused, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
     /* if management client cannot do digest -- we do it here */
     if (!strcmp(alg.op, "DigestSign") && !(flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY_DIGEST))
     {
-        dmsg(D_LOW, "xkey_management_sign: computing digest");
+        dmsg(D_XKEY, "xkey_management_sign: computing digest");
         if (xkey_digest(tbs, tbslen, buf, &buflen, alg.mdname))
         {
             tbs = buf;
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ encode_pkcs1(unsigned char *enc, size_t *enc_len, const char *mdname,
         /* combine header and digest */
         memcpy(enc, di->header, di->sz);
         memcpy(enc + di->sz, tbs, tbslen);
-        dmsg(D_LOW, "encode_pkcs1: digest length = %d encoded length = %d",
+        dmsg(D_XKEY, "encode_pkcs1: digest length = %d encoded length = %d",
              (int) tbslen, (int) out_len);
         ret = true;
     }
src/openvpn/xkey_provider.c +49 -49

388 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 Fix max saltlen calculation in cryptoapi.c

From: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>

(nbits - 1)/8 should have been rounded up. Fix and move it to an inlined function for reuse in pkcs11_openssl.c (used in the next commit).

Note: The error is not triggered in normal use as OpenSSL always seems to use saltlen="digest" for signing.

---
 src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c   |  2 +-
 src/openvpn/xkey_common.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c +1 -1
index 8e0ceba7..56cab962 100644
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ xkey_cng_rsa_sign(CAPI_DATA *cd, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsig
         int saltlen = tbslen; /* digest size by default */
         if (!strcmp(sigalg.saltlen, "max"))
         {
-            saltlen = (EVP_PKEY_bits(cd->pubkey) - 1)/8 - tbslen - 2;
+            saltlen = xkey_max_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_bits(cd->pubkey), tbslen);
             if (saltlen < 0)
             {
                 msg(M_NONFATAL, "Error in cryptoapicert: invalid salt length (%d)", saltlen);
src/openvpn/xkey_common.h +14 -0
index 75ca5011..1e51e672 100644
@@ -153,6 +153,20 @@ xkey_load_generic_key(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, void *handle, EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
 
 extern OSSL_LIB_CTX *tls_libctx; /* Global */
 
+/**
+ * Maximum salt length for PSS signature.
+ *
+ * @param modBits    Number of bits in RSA modulus
+ * @param hLen       Length of digest to be signed
+ * @returns the maximum allowed salt length. Caller must check it's not < 0.
+ */
+static inline int
+xkey_max_saltlen(int modBits, int hLen)
+{
+    int emLen = (modBits - 1 + 7)/8; /* ceil((modBits - 1)/8) */
+
+    return emLen - hLen - 2;
+}
 #endif /* HAVE_XKEY_PROVIDER */
 
 #endif /* XKEY_COMMON_H_ */
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Acked-by on v1 2/3
#2 lore raw

Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/3] Fix max saltlen calculation in cryptoapi.c

Am 25.01.22 um 03:51 schrieb [email protected]...:

Quoted 8 lines

From: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>

(nbits - 1)/8 should have been rounded up. Fix and move it to an inlined function for reuse in pkcs11_openssl.c (used in the next commit).

Note: The error is not triggered in normal use as OpenSSL always seems to use saltlen="digest" for signing.

That calculation is just too familiar.

#3 lore raw

[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Fix max saltlen calculation in cryptoapi.c

In reply to [email protected]...

I won't claim to understand this, but if Arne says the math is (now) fine, I'm happy to believe this :-) - only compile tested on 3.0.1 / Linux.

Your patch has been applied to the master branch.

commit 72daac6973c304b93e6516879948c5470d0c805a

Author: Selva Nair
Date:   Mon Jan 24 21:51:27 2022 -0500
     Fix max saltlen calculation in cryptoapi.c

     Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg23648.html
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering

#4 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 Support PSS signing using pkcs11-helper >= 1.28

In reply to [email protected]...

From: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>

- Call pkcs11h_certificate_signAny_ex() when available so that the signature mechanism parameters can be pased. (Required for RSA-PSS signature).

---
 src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +118 -5
index 9cf46b2c..5d1a5de6 100644
@@ -45,10 +45,112 @@
 #ifdef HAVE_XKEY_PROVIDER
 static XKEY_EXTERNAL_SIGN_fn xkey_pkcs11h_sign;
 
+#if PKCS11H_VERSION > ((1<<16) | (27<<8)) /* version > 1.27 */
+
+/* Table linking OpenSSL digest NID with CKM and CKG constants in PKCS#11 */
+#define MD_TYPE(n) {NID_sha##n, CKM_SHA##n, CKG_MGF1_SHA##n}
+static const struct
+{
+   int nid;
+   unsigned long ckm_id;
+   unsigned long mgf_id;
+} mdtypes[] = {MD_TYPE(224), MD_TYPE(256), MD_TYPE(384), MD_TYPE(512),
+              {NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, CKG_MGF1_SHA1}, /* SHA_1 naming is an oddity */
+              {NID_undef, 0, 0}};
+
+/* From sigalg, derive parameters for pss signature and fill in  pss_params.
+ * Its of type CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS struct with three fields to be filled in:
+ * {enum hashAlg, enum mgf, ulong sLen}
+ * where hashAlg is CKM_SHA256 etc., mgf is CKG_MGF1_SHA256 etc.
+ */
+static int
+set_pss_params(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *pss_params, XKEY_SIGALG sigalg,
+               pkcs11h_certificate_t cert)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *x509 = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+
+    if ((x509 = pkcs11h_openssl_getX509(cert)) == NULL
+        || (pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509)) == NULL)
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Unable get public key");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* map mdname to CKM and CKG constants for hash and mgf algorithms */
+    int i = 0;
+    int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(sigalg.mdname);
+    while (mdtypes[i].nid != NID_undef && mdtypes[i].nid != nid)
+    {
+        i++;
+    }
+    pss_params->hashAlg = mdtypes[i].ckm_id;
+    pss_params->mgf = mdtypes[i].mgf_id;
+
+    /* determine salt length */
+    int mdsize = EVP_MD_size(EVP_get_digestbyname(sigalg.mdname));
+
+    int saltlen = -1;
+    if (!strcmp(sigalg.saltlen, "digest")) /* same as digest size */
+    {
+        saltlen = mdsize;
+    }
+    else if (!strcmp(sigalg.saltlen, "max")) /* maximum possible value */
+    {
+        saltlen = xkey_max_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pubkey), mdsize);
+    }
+
+    if (saltlen < 0 || pss_params->hashAlg == 0)
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "WARN: invalid RSA_PKCS1_PSS parameters: saltlen = <%s> "
+                    "mdname = <%s>.", sigalg.saltlen, sigalg.mdname);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    pss_params->sLen = (unsigned long) saltlen; /* saltlen >= 0 at this point */
+
+    msg(D_XKEY, "set_pss_params: sLen = %lu, hashAlg = %lu, mgf = %lu",
+        pss_params->sLen, pss_params->hashAlg, pss_params->mgf);
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+cleanup:
+    if (x509)
+    {
+        X509_free(x509);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* Make set_pss_params a no-op that always succeeds */
+#define set_pss_params(...) (1)
+
+/* Use a wrapper for pkcs11h_certificate_signAny_ex() for versions < 1.28
+ * where its not available.
+ * We just call pkcs11h_certificate_signAny() unless the padding
+ * is PSS in which case we return an error.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+pkcs11h_certificate_signAny_ex(const pkcs11h_certificate_t cert,
+        const CK_MECHANISM *mech, const unsigned char *tbs,
+        size_t tbslen, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen)
+{
+    if (mech->mechanism == CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS)
+    {
+        msg(M_NONFATAL, "PKCS#11: Error: PSS padding is not supported by "
+                        "this version of pkcs11-helper library.");
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+    }
+    return pkcs11h_certificate_signAny(cert, mech->mechanism, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen);
+}
+#endif /* PKCS11H_VERSION > 1.27 */
+
 /**
  * Sign op called from xkey provider
  *
- * We support ECDSA, RSA_NO_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
+ * We support ECDSA, RSA_NO_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, RSA_PKCS_PSS_PADDING
  */
 static int
 xkey_pkcs11h_sign(void *handle, unsigned char *sig,
@@ -62,7 +164,7 @@ xkey_pkcs11h_sign(void *handle, unsigned char *sig,
 
     if (!strcmp(sigalg.op, "DigestSign"))
     {
-        dmsg(D_LOW, "xkey_pkcs11h_sign: computing digest");
+        msg(D_XKEY, "xkey_pkcs11h_sign: computing digest");
         if (xkey_digest(tbs, tbslen, buf, &buflen, sigalg.mdname))
         {
             tbs = buf;
@@ -77,18 +179,29 @@ xkey_pkcs11h_sign(void *handle, unsigned char *sig,
 
     if (!strcmp(sigalg.keytype, "EC"))
     {
+        msg(D_XKEY, "xkey_pkcs11h_sign: signing with EC key");
         mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
     }
     else if (!strcmp(sigalg.keytype, "RSA"))
     {
+        msg(D_XKEY, "xkey_pkcs11h_sign: signing with RSA key: padmode = %s",
+            sigalg.padmode);
         if (!strcmp(sigalg.padmode,"none"))
         {
             mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_X_509;
         }
         else if (!strcmp(sigalg.padmode, "pss"))
         {
-            msg(M_NONFATAL, "PKCS#11: Error: PSS padding is not yet supported.");
-            return 0;
+            CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pss_params = {0};
+            mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS;
+
+            if (!set_pss_params(&pss_params, sigalg, cert))
+            {
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            mech.pParameter = &pss_params;
+            mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(pss_params);
         }
         else if (!strcmp(sigalg.padmode, "pkcs1"))
         {
@@ -114,7 +227,7 @@ xkey_pkcs11h_sign(void *handle, unsigned char *sig,
          ASSERT(0); /* coding error -- we couldnt have created any such key */
     }
 
-    return CKR_OK == pkcs11h_certificate_signAny(cert, mech.mechanism,
+    return CKR_OK == pkcs11h_certificate_signAny_ex(cert, &mech,
                                                  tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
#5 lore raw

Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] Support PSS signing using pkcs11-helper >= 1.28

Am 25.01.22 um 03:51 schrieb [email protected]...:

Quoted 54 lines

From: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>

- Call pkcs11h_certificate_signAny_ex() when available so that the signature mechanism parameters can be pased. (Required for RSA-PSS signature).

---
  src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
  1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +35 -0
index 9cf46b2c..5d1a5de6 100644
@@ -45,10 +45,112 @@
  #ifdef HAVE_XKEY_PROVIDER
  static XKEY_EXTERNAL_SIGN_fn xkey_pkcs11h_sign;
 
+#if PKCS11H_VERSION > ((1<<16) | (27<<8)) /* version > 1.27 */
+
+/* Table linking OpenSSL digest NID with CKM and CKG constants in PKCS#11 */
+#define MD_TYPE(n) {NID_sha##n, CKM_SHA##n, CKG_MGF1_SHA##n}
+static const struct
+{
+   int nid;
+   unsigned long ckm_id;
+   unsigned long mgf_id;
+} mdtypes[] = {MD_TYPE(224), MD_TYPE(256), MD_TYPE(384), MD_TYPE(512),
+              {NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, CKG_MGF1_SHA1}, /* SHA_1 naming is an oddity */
+              {NID_undef, 0, 0}};
+
+/* From sigalg, derive parameters for pss signature and fill in  pss_params.
+ * Its of type CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS struct with three fields to be filled in:
+ * {enum hashAlg, enum mgf, ulong sLen}
+ * where hashAlg is CKM_SHA256 etc., mgf is CKG_MGF1_SHA256 etc.
+ */
+static int
+set_pss_params(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *pss_params, XKEY_SIGALG sigalg,
+               pkcs11h_certificate_t cert)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *x509 = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+
+    if ((x509 = pkcs11h_openssl_getX509(cert)) == NULL
+        || (pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509)) == NULL)
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Unable get public key");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* map mdname to CKM and CKG constants for hash and mgf algorithms */
+    int i = 0;

src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c line 92

Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +10 -0
+    int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(sigalg.mdname);
+    while (mdtypes[i].nid != NID_undef && mdtypes[i].nid != nid)
+    {
+        i++;
+    }
+    pss_params->hashAlg = mdtypes[i].ckm_id;
+    pss_params->mgf = mdtypes[i].mgf_id;
+
+    /* determine salt length */
+    int mdsize = EVP_MD_size(EVP_get_digestbyname(sigalg.mdname));

This will break for newer hashes since it relies on nids but we have a fixed table anyway, it will break before that. But maybe we should bail out if we cannot find an entry in the translation table? Or is EVP_MD_size(NID_undef) well defined?

Arne

author
#6 lore raw

Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] Support PSS signing using pkcs11-helper >= 1.28

Quoted 71 lines · Arne Schwabe

Am 25.01.22 um 03:51 schrieb [email protected]...:

Quoted 16 lines

From: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>

- Call pkcs11h_certificate_signAny_ex() when available so that the signature mechanism parameters can be pased. (Required for RSA-PSS signature).

---
  src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
  1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +0 -0
index 9cf46b2c..5d1a5de6 100644

src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c line 50

Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +3 -0
@@ -45,10 +45,112 @@
  #ifdef HAVE_XKEY_PROVIDER
  static XKEY_EXTERNAL_SIGN_fn xkey_pkcs11h_sign;
 
+#if PKCS11H_VERSION > ((1<<16) | (27<<8)) /* version > 1.27 */
+
+/* Table linking OpenSSL digest NID with CKM and CKG constants in

PKCS#11 */

src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c

Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +8 -0
+#define MD_TYPE(n) {NID_sha##n, CKM_SHA##n, CKG_MGF1_SHA##n}
+static const struct
+{
+   int nid;
+   unsigned long ckm_id;
+   unsigned long mgf_id;
+} mdtypes[] = {MD_TYPE(224), MD_TYPE(256), MD_TYPE(384), MD_TYPE(512),
+              {NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, CKG_MGF1_SHA1}, /* SHA_1 naming is

an oddity */

src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c

Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +3 -0
+              {NID_undef, 0, 0}};
+
+/* From sigalg, derive parameters for pss signature and fill in

pss_params.

src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c line 62

Quoted 1 line
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +1 -0
+ * Its of type CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS struct with three fields to be

filled in:

Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +9 -0
+ * {enum hashAlg, enum mgf, ulong sLen}
+ * where hashAlg is CKM_SHA256 etc., mgf is CKG_MGF1_SHA256 etc.
+ */
+static int
+set_pss_params(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *pss_params, XKEY_SIGALG sigalg,
+               pkcs11h_certificate_t cert)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *x509 = NULL;

src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c

Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +10 -0
+    EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+
+    if ((x509 = pkcs11h_openssl_getX509(cert)) == NULL
+        || (pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509)) == NULL)
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Unable get public key");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* map mdname to CKM and CKG constants for hash and mgf algorithms

*/

src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c line 92

Quoted 11 lines
src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c +11 -0
+    int i = 0;
+    int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(sigalg.mdname);
+    while (mdtypes[i].nid != NID_undef && mdtypes[i].nid != nid)
+    {
+        i++;
+    }
+    pss_params->hashAlg = mdtypes[i].ckm_id;
+    pss_params->mgf = mdtypes[i].mgf_id;
+
+    /* determine salt length */
+    int mdsize = EVP_MD_size(EVP_get_digestbyname(sigalg.mdname));
Quoted 5 lines

This will break for newer hashes since it relies on nids but we have a fixed table anyway, it will break before that. But maybe we should bail out if we cannot find an entry in the translation table? Or is EVP_MD_size(NID_undef) well defined?

EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname) will return NULL if mdname is not recognized (or has no NID etc), that when passed to EVP_MD_size(NULL) will trigger an error and return -1 (based on OpenSSL source). So, yes, mdsize will be wrong (-1), but we will catch it below where we check whether NID was found in the table.

Not ideal, and you say, may be better to error out earlier if NID is NID_undef or not in our table, or if EVP_get_digestbyname() returns NULL.

Selva
P.S. If the commit is not pushed yet, I can send a v2 for review, or follow up with a fixup.

#7 lore raw

Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] Support PSS signing using pkcs11-helper >= 1.28

Hi,

Quoted 2 lines · Selva Nair

P.S. If the commit is not pushed yet, I can send a v2 for review, or follow up with a fixup.

I only noticed it after pushing, so yes, messed-up. Sorry again.

gert

Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you 
 feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted 
 it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
                             Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress

Gert Doering - Munich, Germany                             [email protected]...
#8 lore raw

[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Support PSS signing using pkcs11-helper >= 1.28

In reply to [email protected]...

I'm not claiming to understand any of this... so I have test compiled on Linux/3.0.1, and also bumped my MinGW test rig to pkcs11-helper 1.28 (though only 1.1.1 yet). So maybe I tested something useful, or maybe not... but at least these combinations still compile fine :-)

Your patch has been applied to the master branch.

commit 15ba808503113f685d254e9007b8e9937e01532d

Author: Selva Nair
Date:   Mon Jan 24 21:51:28 2022 -0500
     Support PSS signing using pkcs11-helper >= 1.28

     Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg23647.html
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering

#9 lore raw

Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Support PSS signing using pkcs11-helper >= 1.28

Hi,

Quoted 6 lines · Gert Doering

I'm not claiming to understand any of this... so I have test compiled on Linux/3.0.1, and also bumped my MinGW test rig to pkcs11-helper 1.28 (though only 1.1.1 yet). So maybe I tested something useful, or maybe not... but at least these combinations still compile fine :-)

Your patch has been applied to the master branch.

Oops. I did not look closely enough, saw "Arne ACKed 1/3 and 2/3, and this one is complex, compiles fine, and Arne also sent something in reply" but it turns out it was not an ACK but concerns.

(*If* it breaks, it will break for very cases unknown today, so it's not as bad as this sounds, but still, meh)

Sorry.

Selva, can you send a followup patch if you share Arne's concerns here?

gert

Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you 
 feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted 
 it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
                             Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress

Gert Doering - Munich, Germany                             [email protected]...
#11 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]...

Looks good, compile tested on 3.0.1/Linux (no surprises, straightforward enough).

Your patch has been applied to the master branch.

commit dfb9cd62dc8b643c95f862d3f75c53f36aecd2da

Author: Selva Nair
Date:   Mon Jan 24 21:51:26 2022 -0500
     xkey: Use a custom error level for debug messages

     Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg23649.html
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering