IPI virtualization support for VM
v6 cover IPI virtualization support for VM
Currently, issuing an IPI except self-ipi in guest on Intel CPU always causes a VM-exit. It can lead to non-negligible overhead to some workloads involving frequent IPIs when running in VMs.
IPI virtualization is a new VT-x feature, targeting to eliminate VM-exits on source vCPUs when issuing unicast, physical-addressing IPIs. Once it is enabled, the processor virtualizes following kinds of operations that send IPIs without causing VM-exits:
- Memory-mapped ICR writes
- MSR-mapped ICR writes
- SENDUIPI execution
This patch series implements IPI virtualization support in KVM.
Patches 1-4 add tertiary processor-based VM-execution support framework, which is used to enumerate IPI virtualization.
Patch 5 handles APIC-write VM exit due to writes to ICR MSR when guest works in x2APIC mode. This is a new case introduced by Intel VT-x.
Patch 6 disable the APIC ID change in any case.
Patch 7 implements IPI virtualization related function including feature enabling through tertiary processor-based VM-execution in various scenarios of VMCS configuration, PID table setup in vCPU creation and vCPU block consideration.
Patch 8-9 provide userspace capability to set maximum possible VCPU ID for current VM. IPIv can refer to this value to allocate essential memory for PID-pointer table instead of using KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS. It targets to reduce overall memory footprint.
Document for IPI virtualization is now available at the latest "Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference".
We did experiment to measure average time sending IPI from source vCPU to the target vCPU completing the IPI handling by kvm unittest w/ and w/o IPI virtualization. When IPI virtualization enabled, it will reduce 22.21% and 15.98% cycles consuming in xAPIC mode and x2APIC mode respectively.
--------------------------------------
KVM unittest:vmexit/ipi
2 vCPU, AP was modified to run in idle loop instead of halt to ensure no VM exit impact on target vCPU.
Cycles of IPI
xAPIC mode x2APIC mode
test w/o IPIv w/ IPIv w/o IPIv w/ IPIv
1 6106 4816 4265 3768
2 6244 4656 4404 3546
3 6165 4658 4233 3474
4 5992 4710 4363 3430
5 6083 4741 4215 3551
6 6238 4904 4304 3547
7 6164 4617 4263 3709
8 5984 4763 4518 3779
9 5931 4712 4645 3667
10 5955 4530 4332 3724
11 5897 4673 4283 3569
12 6140 4794 4178 3598
13 6183 4728 4363 3628
14 5991 4994 4509 3842
15 5866 4665 4520 3739
16 6032 4654 4229 3701
17 6050 4653 4185 3726
18 6004 4792 4319 3746
19 5961 4626 4196 3392
20 6194 4576 4433 3760Average cycles 6059 4713.1 4337.85 3644.8 %Reduction -22.21% -15.98%
--------------------------------------
IPI microbenchmark:
(https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected])
2 vCPUs, 1:1 pin vCPU to pCPU, guest VM runs with idle=poll, x2APIC mode
Result with IPIv enabled:
Dry-run: 0, 272798 ns Self-IPI: 5094123, 11114037 ns Normal IPI: 131697087, 173321200 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 155649075 ns Broadcast lock: 0, 161518031 ns
Result with IPIv disabled:
Dry-run: 0, 272766 ns Self-IPI: 5091788, 11123699 ns Normal IPI: 145215772, 174558920 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 175785384 ns Broadcast lock: 0, 149076195 ns
As IPIv can benefit unicast IPI to other CPU, Normal IPI test case gain about 9.73% time saving on average out of 15 test runs when IPIv is enabled.
Normal IPI statistics (unit:ns):
test w/o IPIv w/ IPIv
1 153346049 140907046
2 147218648 141660618
3 145215772 117890672
4 146621682 136430470
5 144821472 136199421
6 144704378 131676928
7 141403224 131697087
8 144775766 125476250
9 140658192 137263330
10 144768626 138593127
11 145166679 131946752
12 145020451 116852889
13 148161353 131406280
14 148378655 130174353
15 148903652 127969674Average time 145944306.6 131742993.1 ns
%Reduction -9.73%
--------------------------------------
hackbench:
8 vCPUs, guest VM free run, x2APIC mode
./hackbench -p -l 100000
w/o IPIv w/ IPIv Time 91.887 74.605 %Reduction -18.808%
96 vCPUs, guest VM free run, x2APIC mode
./hackbench -p -l 1000000
w/o IPIv w/ IPIv Time 287.504 235.185 %Reduction -18.198%
--------------------------------------v5->v6:
1. Adapt kvm_apic_write_nodecode() implementation based on Sean's fix of x2apic's ICR register process.
2. Drop the patch handling IPIv table entry setting in case APIC ID changed, instead applying Levitsky's patch to disallow setting APIC ID in any case.
3. Drop the patch resizing the PID-pointer table on demand. Allow userspace to set maximum vcpu id at runtime that IPIv can refer to the practical value to allocate necessary memory for PID-pointer table.
v4 -> v5:
1. Deal with enable_ipiv parameter following current vmcs configuration rule.
2. Allocate memory for PID-pointer table dynamically
3. Support guest runtime modify APIC ID in xAPIC mode
4. Helper to judge possibility to take PI block in IPIv case
v3 -> v4:
1. Refine code style of patch 2
2. Move tertiary control shadow build into patch 3
3. Make vmx_tertiary_exec_control to be static function
v2 -> v3:
1. Misc change on tertiary execution control
definition and capability setup
2. Alternative to get tertiary execution
control configuration
v1 -> v2:
1. Refine the IPIv enabling logic for VM.
Remove ipiv_active definition per vCPU.
--------------------------------------
Gao Chao (1):
KVM: VMX: enable IPI virtualization
Maxim Levitsky (1):
KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Robert Hoo (4):
x86/cpu: Add new VMX feature, Tertiary VM-Execution control
KVM: VMX: Extend BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW macro to support 64-bit
variation
KVM: VMX: Detect Tertiary VM-Execution control when setup VMCS config
KVM: VMX: dump_vmcs() reports tertiary_exec_control field as well
Zeng Guang (3):
KVM: x86: Add support for vICR APIC-write VM-Exits in x2APIC mode
KVM: x86: Allow userspace set maximum VCPU id for VM
KVM: VMX: Optimize memory allocation for PID-pointer table
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 11 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h | 5 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 50 ++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 13 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 12 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 63 +++++++------ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 +++ 14 files changed, 274 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v6 1/9 x86/cpu: Add new VMX feature, Tertiary VM-Execution control
From: Robert Hoo <[email protected]>
A new 64-bit control field "tertiary processor-based VM-execution controls", is defined [1]. It's controlled by bit 17 of the primary processor-based VM-execution controls.
Different from its brother VM-execution fields, this tertiary VM- execution controls field is 64 bit. So it occupies 2 vmx_feature_leafs, TERTIARY_CTLS_LOW and TERTIARY_CTLS_HIGH.
Its companion VMX capability reporting MSR,MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 (0x492), is also semantically different from its brothers, whose 64 bits consist of all allow-1, rather than 32-bit allow-0 and 32-bit allow-1 [1][2]. Therefore, its init_vmx_capabilities() is a little different from others.
[1] ISE 6.2 "VMCS Changes"
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.html
[2] SDM Vol3. Appendix A.3
--- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 9 ++++++++- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -0
@@ -938,6 +938,7 @@#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS 0x0000048f#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS 0x00000490#define MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC 0x00000491 +#define MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 0x00000492/* VMX_BASIC bits and bitmasks */ #define VMX_BASIC_VMCS_SIZE_SHIFT 32
arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h +2 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@/* * Defines VMX CPU feature bits */ -#define NVMXINTS 3/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NVMXINTS 5/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ /* * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#define VMX_FEATURE_RDTSC_EXITING ( 1*32+ 12)/* "" VM-Exit on RDTSC */ #define VMX_FEATURE_CR3_LOAD_EXITING ( 1*32+ 15)/* "" VM-Exit on writes to CR3 */ #define VMX_FEATURE_CR3_STORE_EXITING ( 1*32+ 16)/* "" VM-Exit on reads from CR3 */ +#define VMX_FEATURE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ( 1*32+ 17)/* "" Enable Tertiary VM-Execution Controls */ #define VMX_FEATURE_CR8_LOAD_EXITING ( 1*32+ 19)/* "" VM-Exit on writes to CR8 */ #define VMX_FEATURE_CR8_STORE_EXITING ( 1*32+ 20)/* "" VM-Exit on reads from CR8 */ #define VMX_FEATURE_VIRTUAL_TPR ( 1*32+ 21)/* "vtpr" TPR virtualization, a.k.a. TPR shadow */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +8 -1
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ enum vmx_feature_leafs {MISC_FEATURES =0 ,PRIMARY_CTLS ,SECONDARY_CTLS , +TERTIARY_CTLS_LOW , +TERTIARY_CTLS_HIGH , NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS, };
@@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ enum vmx_feature_leafs {static void init_vmx_capabilities (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { -u32 supported, funcs, ept, vpid, ign; +u32 supported, funcs, ept, vpid, ign, low, high;BUILD_BUG_ON (NVMXINTS !=NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS );
@@ -42,6 +44,11 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2 , &ign, &supported); c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS ] = supported; +/* All 64 bits of tertiary controls MSR are allowed-1 settings. */ +rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 , &low, &high); + c->vmx_capability[TERTIARY_CTLS_LOW ] = low; + c->vmx_capability[TERTIARY_CTLS_HIGH ] = high; +rdmsr (MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS , ign, supported);rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC , &ign, &funcs);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] x86/cpu: Add new VMX feature, Tertiary VM-Execution control
Quoted 86 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Robert Hoo <[email protected]>
A new 64-bit control field "tertiary processor-based VM-execution controls", is defined [1]. It's controlled by bit 17 of the primary processor-based VM-execution controls.
Different from its brother VM-execution fields, this tertiary VM- execution controls field is 64 bit. So it occupies 2
vmx_feature_leafs,TERTIARY_CTLS_LOWandTERTIARY_CTLS_HIGH.Its companion VMX capability reporting MSR,MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 (
0x492), is also semantically different from its brothers, whose 64 bits consist of all allow-1, rather than 32-bit allow-0 and 32-bit allow-1 [1][2]. Therefore, itsinit_vmx_capabilities()is a little different from others.[1] ISE 6.2 "VMCS Changes"
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.html[2] SDM Vol3. Appendix A.3
Signed-off-by Robert Hoo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 9 ++++++++- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1
-0@@ -938,6 +938,7 @@#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS 0x0000048f#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS 0x00000490#define MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC 0x00000491 +#define MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 0x00000492/* VMX_BASIC bits and bitmasks */ #define VMX_BASIC_VMCS_SIZE_SHIFT 32arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h +2
-1@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@/* * Defines VMX CPU feature bits */ -#define NVMXINTS 3/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NVMXINTS 5/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ /* * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#define VMX_FEATURE_RDTSC_EXITING ( 1*32+ 12)/* "" VM-Exit on RDTSC */ #define VMX_FEATURE_CR3_LOAD_EXITING ( 1*32+ 15)/* "" VM-Exit on writes to CR3 */ #define VMX_FEATURE_CR3_STORE_EXITING ( 1*32+ 16)/* "" VM-Exit on reads from CR3 */ +#define VMX_FEATURE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ( 1*32+ 17)/* "" Enable Tertiary VM-Execution Controls */ #define VMX_FEATURE_CR8_LOAD_EXITING ( 1*32+ 19)/* "" VM-Exit on writes to CR8 */ #define VMX_FEATURE_CR8_STORE_EXITING ( 1*32+ 20)/* "" VM-Exit on reads from CR8 */ #define VMX_FEATURE_VIRTUAL_TPR ( 1*32+ 21)/* "vtpr" TPR virtualization, a.k.a. TPR shadow */ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +3
-1@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ enum vmx_feature_leafs {MISC_FEATURES =0 ,PRIMARY_CTLS ,SECONDARY_CTLS , +TERTIARY_CTLS_LOW , +TERTIARY_CTLS_HIGH , NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS, };@@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ enum vmx_feature_leafs {static void init_vmx_capabilities (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { -u32 supported, funcs, ept, vpid, ign; +u32 supported, funcs, ept, vpid, ign, low, high;BUILD_BUG_ON (NVMXINTS !=NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS );@@ -42,6 +44,11 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2 , &ign, &supported);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 54
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +5
-0c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS ] = supported; +/* All 64 bits of tertiary controls MSR are allowed-1 settings. */ +rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 , &low, &high); + c->vmx_capability[TERTIARY_CTLS_LOW ] = low; + c->vmx_capability[TERTIARY_CTLS_HIGH ] = high; +rdmsr (MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS , ign, supported);rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC , &ign, &funcs);
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
PATCH v6 2/9 KVM: VMX: Extend BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW macro to support 64-bit variation
In reply to Zeng GuangFrom: Robert Hoo <[email protected]>
The Tertiary VM-Exec Control, different from previous control fields, is 64 bit. So extend BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW() by adding a 'bit' parameter, to support both 32 bit and 64 bit fields' auxiliary functions building.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +31 -28
@@ -456,35 +456,38 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)return vmcs_read16 (GUEST_INTR_STATUS ) &0xff ; } -#define BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (lname, uname) \ -static inline void lname##_controls_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val) \ -{ \ - if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname != val) { \ - vmcs_write32(uname, val); \ - vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname = val; \ - } \ -} \ -static inline u32 __##lname##_controls_get(struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs) \ -{ \ - return vmcs->controls_shadow.lname; \ -} \ -static inline u32 lname##_controls_get(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) \ -{ \ - return __##lname##_controls_get(vmx->loaded_vmcs); \ -} \ -static inline void lname##_controls_setbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val) \ -{ \ - lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) | val); \ -} \ -static inline void lname##_controls_clearbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val) \ -{ \ - lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) & ~val); \ +#define BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (lname, uname, bits) \ +static inline \ +void lname##_controls_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val) \ +{ \ + if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname != val) { \ + vmcs_write##bits(uname, val); \ + vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname = val; \ + } \ +} \ +static inline u##bits __##lname##_controls_get(struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs)\ +{ \ + return vmcs->controls_shadow.lname; \ +} \ +static inline u##bits lname##_controls_get(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) \ +{ \ + return __##lname##_controls_get(vmx->loaded_vmcs); \ +} \ +static inline \ +void lname##_controls_setbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val) \ +{ \ + lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) | val); \ +} \ +static inline \ +void lname##_controls_clearbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val) \ +{ \ + lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) & ~val); \ } -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_entry, VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS) -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(pin, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(exec, CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (secondary_exec,SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_entry, VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(pin, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(exec, CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (secondary_exec,SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ,32 )/* * VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET - The set of registers that will be updated in the
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 2/9] KVM: VMX: Extend BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW macro to support 64-bit variation
Quoted 74 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Robert Hoo <[email protected]>
The Tertiary VM-Exec Control, different from previous control fields, is 64 bit. So extend
BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW()by adding a 'bit' parameter, to support both 32 bit and 64 bit fields' auxiliary functions building.Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Robert Hoo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +26
-26@@ -456,35 +456,38 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)return vmcs_read16 (GUEST_INTR_STATUS ) &0xff ; } -#define BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (lname, uname) \ -static inline void lname##_controls_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val) \ -{ \ - if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname != val) { \ - vmcs_write32(uname, val); \ - vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname = val; \ - } \ -} \ -static inline u32 __##lname##_controls_get(struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs) \ -{ \ - return vmcs->controls_shadow.lname; \ -} \ -static inline u32 lname##_controls_get(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) \ -{ \ - return __##lname##_controls_get(vmx->loaded_vmcs); \ -} \ -static inline void lname##_controls_setbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val) \ -{ \ - lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) | val); \ -} \ -static inline void lname##_controls_clearbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val) \ -{ \ - lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) & ~val); \ +#define BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (lname, uname, bits) \ +static inline \ +void lname##_controls_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val) \ +{ \ + if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname != val) { \ + vmcs_write##bits(uname, val); \ + vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname = val; \ + } \ +} \ +static inline u##bits __##lname##_controls_get(struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs)\ +{ \ + return vmcs->controls_shadow.lname; \ +} \ +static inline u##bits lname##_controls_get(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) \ +{ \ + return __##lname##_controls_get(vmx->loaded_vmcs); \ +} \ +static inline \ +void lname##_controls_setbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val) \ +{ \ + lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) | val); \ +} \ +static inline \ +void lname##_controls_clearbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val) \ +{ \ + lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) & ~val); \ } -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_entry, VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS) -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (pin,PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL )
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void) · line 493
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +5
-2-BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(exec, CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) -BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (secondary_exec,SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_entry, VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(pin, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(exec, CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (secondary_exec,SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ,32 )/* * VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET - The set of registers that will be updated in the
I must admit that this will make it a bit harder to find references in the code. I personally would just use pair of 32 bit capabilities, but I don't have strong opinion on this.
Thus:
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
PATCH v6 3/9 KVM: VMX: Detect Tertiary VM-Execution control when setup VMCS config
In reply to Zeng GuangFrom: Robert Hoo <[email protected]>
Check VMX features on tertiary execution control in VMCS config setup. Sub-features in tertiary execution control to be enabled are adjusted according to hardware capabilities although no sub-feature is enabled in this patch.
EVMCSv1 doesn't support tertiary VM-execution control, so disable it when EVMCSv1 is in use. And define the auxiliary functions for Tertiary control field here, using the new BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW().
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 7 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +3 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#define CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(RDTSC_EXITING)#define CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(CR3_LOAD_EXITING)#define CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(CR3_STORE_EXITING) +#define CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(TERTIARY_CONTROLS)#define CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(CR8_LOAD_EXITING)#define CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(CR8_STORE_EXITING)#define CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(VIRTUAL_TPR)
@@ -221,6 +222,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP_HIGH =0x0000202F ,TSC_MULTIPLIER =0x00002032 ,TSC_MULTIPLIER_HIGH =0x00002033 , +TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL =0x00002034 , +TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL_HIGH =0x00002035 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS =0x00002400 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH =0x00002401 , VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +7 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct vmcs_config {u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl;u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl;u32 cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl; +u64 cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;u32 vmexit_ctrl;u32 vmentry_ctrl;struct nested_vmx_msrs nested;
@@ -131,6 +132,12 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls(void)CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ; } +static inline bool cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls (void ) +{ +return vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl & +CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ; +} +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses (void ) { return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c +2 -0
@@ -297,8 +297,10 @@ const unsigned int nr_evmcs_1_fields = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1);#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HYPERV )__init void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls (struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) { + vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_EXEC_CTRL ; vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL ; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC ; + vmcs_conf->cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl =0 ; vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL ; vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL ;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(enable_evmcs);*/ #define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL (PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR | \ PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER) +#define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_EXEC_CTRL (CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)#define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC \ (SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | \ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES | \
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct vmcs_controls_shadow {u32 pin;u32 exec;u32 secondary_exec; +u64 tertiary_exec; };/*
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +37 -1
@@ -2422,6 +2422,21 @@ static __init int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt,return 0 ; } +static __init int adjust_vmx_controls_64 (u64 ctl_min,u64 ctl_opt, +u32 msr,u64 *result) +{ +u64 allowed1; + +rdmsrl (msr, allowed1); + +/* Ensure minimum (required) set of control bits are supported. */ +if (ctl_min & ~allowed1) +return -EIO ; + + *result = (ctl_min | ctl_opt) & allowed1; +return 0 ; +} +static __init int setup_vmcs_config (struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap) {
@@ -2430,6 +2445,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,u32 _pin_based_exec_control =0 ;u32 _cpu_based_exec_control =0 ;u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control =0 ; +u64 _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control =0 ;u32 _vmexit_control =0 ;u32 _vmentry_control =0 ;
@@ -2451,7 +2467,8 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, opt =CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS | -CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ; +CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS | +CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ;if (adjust_vmx_controls (min, opt,MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS , &_cpu_based_exec_control) <0 )return -EIO ;
@@ -2525,6 +2542,16 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, "1-setting enable VPID VM-execution control\n"); } +if (_cpu_based_exec_control &CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ) { +u64 opt3 =0 ; +u64 min3 =0 ; + +if (adjust_vmx_controls_64 (min3, opt3, +MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 , + &_cpu_based_3rd_exec_control)) +return -EIO ; + } + min =VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS |VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT ;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 min |=VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE ;
@@ -2611,6 +2638,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control; + vmcs_conf->cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control; vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl = _vmexit_control; vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl = _vmentry_control;
@@ -4230,6 +4258,11 @@ static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)return exec_control; } +static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ +return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; +} +/* * Adjust a single secondary execution control bit to intercept/allow an * instruction in the guest. This is usually done based on whether or not a
@@ -4395,6 +4428,9 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls ())secondary_exec_controls_set (vmx,vmx_secondary_exec_control (vmx)); +if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ()) +tertiary_exec_controls_set (vmx,vmx_tertiary_exec_control (vmx)); +if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (&vmx->vcpu)) {vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 ,0 );vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1 ,0 );
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +1 -0
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, 32) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(pin, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(exec, CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(secondary_exec, SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (tertiary_exec,TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ,64 )/* * VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET - The set of registers that will be updated in the
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 3/9] KVM: VMX: Detect Tertiary VM-Execution control when setup VMCS config
Quoted 204 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Robert Hoo <[email protected]>
Check VMX features on tertiary execution control in VMCS config setup. Sub-features in tertiary execution control to be enabled are adjusted according to hardware capabilities although no sub-feature is enabled in this patch.
EVMCSv1 doesn't support tertiary VM-execution control, so disable it when EVMCSv1 is in use. And define the auxiliary functions for Tertiary control field here, using the new
BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW().Signed-off-by Robert Hoo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 7 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +3
-0@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#define CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(RDTSC_EXITING)#define CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(CR3_LOAD_EXITING)#define CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(CR3_STORE_EXITING) +#define CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(TERTIARY_CONTROLS)#define CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(CR8_LOAD_EXITING)#define CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(CR8_STORE_EXITING)#define CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(VIRTUAL_TPR)@@ -221,6 +222,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP_HIGH =0x0000202F ,TSC_MULTIPLIER =0x00002032 ,TSC_MULTIPLIER_HIGH =0x00002033 , +TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL =0x00002034 , +TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL_HIGH =0x00002035 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS =0x00002400 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH =0x00002401 , VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800,arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +7
-0@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct vmcs_config {u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl;u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl;u32 cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl; +u64 cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;u32 vmexit_ctrl;u32 vmentry_ctrl;struct nested_vmx_msrs nested;@@ -131,6 +132,12 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls(void)CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ; } +static inline bool cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls (void ) +{ +return vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl & +CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ; +} +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses (void ) { return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c +2
-0@@ -297,8 +297,10 @@ const unsigned int nr_evmcs_1_fields = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1);#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HYPERV )__init void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls (struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) { + vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_EXEC_CTRL ; vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL ; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC ; + vmcs_conf->cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl =0 ; vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL ; vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL ;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h +1
-0@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(enable_evmcs);*/ #define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL (PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR | \ PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER) +#define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_EXEC_CTRL (CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)#define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC \ (SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | \ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES | \arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h +1
-0@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct vmcs_controls_shadow {u32 pin;u32 exec;u32 secondary_exec; +u64 tertiary_exec; };/* arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +37
-1@@ -2422,6 +2422,21 @@ static __init int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt,return 0 ; } +static __init int adjust_vmx_controls_64 (u64 ctl_min,u64 ctl_opt, +u32 msr,u64 *result) +{ +u64 allowed1; + +rdmsrl (msr, allowed1); + +/* Ensure minimum (required) set of control bits are supported. */ +if (ctl_min & ~allowed1) +return -EIO ; + + *result = (ctl_min | ctl_opt) & allowed1; +return 0 ; +} +static __init int setup_vmcs_config (struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap) {@@ -2430,6 +2445,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,u32 _pin_based_exec_control =0 ;u32 _cpu_based_exec_control =0 ;u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control =0 ; +u64 _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control =0 ;u32 _vmexit_control =0 ;u32 _vmentry_control =0 ;@@ -2451,7 +2467,8 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, opt =CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS | -CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS ; +CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS | +CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ;if (adjust_vmx_controls (min, opt,MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS , &_cpu_based_exec_control) <0 )return -EIO ;@@ -2525,6 +2542,16 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, "1-setting enable VPID VM-execution control\n"); } +if (_cpu_based_exec_control &CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ) { +u64 opt3 =0 ; +u64 min3 =0 ; + +if (adjust_vmx_controls_64 (min3, opt3, +MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 , + &_cpu_based_3rd_exec_control)) +return -EIO ; + } + min =VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS |VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT ;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 min |=VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE ;@@ -2611,6 +2638,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control; + vmcs_conf->cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control; vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl = _vmexit_control; vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl = _vmentry_control;@@ -4230,6 +4258,11 @@ static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)return exec_control; } +static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ +return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; +} +/* * Adjust a single secondary execution control bit to intercept/allow an * instruction in the guest. This is usually done based on whether or not a @@ -4395,6 +4428,9 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls ())secondary_exec_controls_set (vmx,vmx_secondary_exec_control (vmx)); +if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ()) +tertiary_exec_controls_set (vmx,vmx_tertiary_exec_control (vmx)); +if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (&vmx->vcpu)) {vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 ,0 );vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1 ,0 );arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, 32) · line 494
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +1
-0@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, 32) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(pin, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(exec, CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(secondary_exec, SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32) +BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW (tertiary_exec,TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ,64 )/* * VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET - The set of registers that will be updated in the
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
PATCH v6 4/9 KVM: VMX: dump_vmcs() reports tertiary_exec_control field as well
In reply to Zeng GuangFrom: Robert Hoo <[email protected]>
Add tertiary_exec_control field report in dump_vmcs()
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +13 -4
@@ -5891,6 +5891,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct vcpu_vmx *vmx =to_vmx (vcpu);u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control; +u64 tertiary_exec_control;unsigned long cr4;int efer_slot;
@@ -5904,9 +5905,16 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) cpu_based_exec_ctrl =vmcs_read32 (CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); pin_based_exec_ctrl =vmcs_read32 (PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); cr4 =vmcs_readl (GUEST_CR4 ); - secondary_exec_control =0 ; +if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls ()) secondary_exec_control =vmcs_read32 (SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); +else + secondary_exec_control =0 ; + +if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ()) + tertiary_exec_control =vmcs_read64 (TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); +else + tertiary_exec_control =0 ;pr_err ("VMCS %p, last attempted VM-entry on CPU %d\n" , vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
@@ -6006,9 +6014,10 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)vmx_dump_msrs ("host autoload" , &vmx->msr_autoload.host);pr_err ("*** Control State ***\n" ); -pr_err ("PinBased=%08x CPUBased=%08x SecondaryExec=%08x\n" , - pin_based_exec_ctrl, cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control); -pr_err ("EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n" , vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl); +pr_err ("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n" , + cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control); +pr_err ("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n" , + pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl); pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n", vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP), vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 4/9] KVM: VMX: dump_vmcs() reports tertiary_exec_control field as well
Quoted 44 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Robert Hoo <[email protected]>
Add
tertiary_exec_controlfield report indump_vmcs()Signed-off-by Robert Hoo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +9
-1@@ -5891,6 +5891,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct vcpu_vmx *vmx =to_vmx (vcpu);u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control; +u64 tertiary_exec_control;unsigned long cr4;int efer_slot;@@ -5904,9 +5905,16 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) cpu_based_exec_ctrl =vmcs_read32 (CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); pin_based_exec_ctrl =vmcs_read32 (PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); cr4 =vmcs_readl (GUEST_CR4 ); - secondary_exec_control =0 ; +if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls ()) secondary_exec_control =vmcs_read32 (SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); +else + secondary_exec_control =0 ; + +if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ()) + tertiary_exec_control =vmcs_read64 (TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ); +else + tertiary_exec_control =0 ;pr_err ("VMCS %p, last attempted VM-entry on CPU %d\n" , vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);@@ -6006,9 +6014,10 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)vmx_dump_msrs ("host autoload" , &vmx->msr_autoload.host);pr_err ("*** Control State ***\n" );
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 6023
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +4
-3-pr_err ("PinBased=%08x CPUBased=%08x SecondaryExec=%08x\n" , - pin_based_exec_ctrl, cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control); -pr_err ("EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n" , vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl); +pr_err ("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n" , + cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control); +pr_err ("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n" , + pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl); pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n", vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP), vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
PATCH v6 5/9 KVM: x86: Add support for vICR APIC-write VM-Exits in x2APIC mode
In reply to Zeng GuangUpcoming Intel CPUs will support virtual x2APIC MSR writes to the vICR, i.e. will trap and generate an APIC-write VM-Exit instead of intercepting the WRMSR. Add support for handling "nodecode" x2APIC writes, which were previously impossible.
Note, x2APIC MSR writes are 64 bits wide.
--- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +22 -3
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static bool lapic_timer_advance_dynamic __read_mostly;#define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_MAX 5000/* step-by-step approximation to mitigate fluctuation */ #define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_STEP 8 +static int kvm_lapic_msr_read (struct kvm_lapic *apic,u32 reg,u64 *data);static inline void __kvm_lapic_set_reg (char *regs,int reg_off,u32 val) {
@@ -2227,10 +2228,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_set_eoi);/* emulate APIC access in a trap manner */ void kvm_apic_write_nodecode (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 offset) { -u32 val =kvm_lapic_get_reg (vcpu->arch.apic, offset); +struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic; +u64 val; + +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { +/* +* When guest APIC is in x2APIC mode and IPI virtualization +* is enabled, accessing APIC_ICR may cause trap-like VM-exit +* on Intel hardware. Other offsets are not possible. +*/ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (offset !=APIC_ICR )) +return ; -/* TODO: optimize to just emulate side effect w/o one more write */ -kvm_lapic_reg_write (vcpu->arch.apic, offset, val); +kvm_lapic_msr_read (apic, offset, &val); +if (val &APIC_ICR_BUSY ) +kvm_x2apic_icr_write (apic, val); +else +kvm_apic_send_ipi (apic, (u32 )val, (u32)(val >>32 )); + }else { + val =kvm_lapic_get_reg (apic, offset); +/* TODO: optimize to just emulate side effect w/o one more write */ +kvm_lapic_reg_write (apic, offset, (u32 )val); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_apic_write_nodecode);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 5/9] KVM: x86: Add support for vICR APIC-write VM-Exits in x2APIC mode
Quoted 38 lines · Zeng Guang
Upcoming Intel CPUs will support virtual x2APIC MSR writes to the vICR, i.e. will trap and generate an APIC-write VM-Exit instead of intercepting the WRMSR. Add support for handling "nodecode" x2APIC writes, which were previously impossible.
Note, x2APIC MSR writes are 64 bits wide.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +10
-1@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static bool lapic_timer_advance_dynamic __read_mostly;#define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_MAX 5000/* step-by-step approximation to mitigate fluctuation */ #define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_STEP 8 +static int kvm_lapic_msr_read (struct kvm_lapic *apic,u32 reg,u64 *data);static inline void __kvm_lapic_set_reg (char *regs,int reg_off,u32 val) {@@ -2227,10 +2228,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_set_eoi);/* emulate APIC access in a trap manner */ void kvm_apic_write_nodecode (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 offset) { -u32 val =kvm_lapic_get_reg (vcpu->arch.apic, offset); +struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic; +u64 val; + +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { +/* +* When guest APIC is in x2APIC mode and IPI virtualization +* is enabled, accessing APIC_ICR may cause trap-like VM-exit +* on Intel hardware. Other offsets are not possible. +*/
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_set_eoi); · line 2247
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +7
-2+if (WARN_ON_ONCE (offset !=APIC_ICR )) +return ; -/* TODO: optimize to just emulate side effect w/o one more write */ -kvm_lapic_reg_write (vcpu->arch.apic, offset, val); +kvm_lapic_msr_read (apic, offset, &val); +if (val &APIC_ICR_BUSY ) +kvm_x2apic_icr_write (apic, val); +else +kvm_apic_send_ipi (apic, (u32 )val, (u32)(val >>32 ));
I don't fully understand the above code.
First of where kvm_x2apic_icr_write is defined?
Second, I thought that busy bit is not used in x2apic mode? At least in intel's SDM, section 10.12.9 'ICR Operation in x2APIC Mode' this bit is not defined.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +5
-0+ }else { + val =kvm_lapic_get_reg (apic, offset); +/* TODO: optimize to just emulate side effect w/o one more write */ +kvm_lapic_reg_write (apic, offset, (u32 )val); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_apic_write_nodecode);
Re: [PATCH v6 5/9] KVM: x86: Add support for vICR APIC-write VM-Exits in x2APIC mode
Quoted 51 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 38 lines · Zeng Guang
Upcoming Intel CPUs will support virtual x2APIC MSR writes to the vICR, i.e. will trap and generate an APIC-write VM-Exit instead of intercepting the WRMSR. Add support for handling "nodecode" x2APIC writes, which were previously impossible.
Note, x2APIC MSR writes are 64 bits wide.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +10
-1@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static bool lapic_timer_advance_dynamic __read_mostly;#define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_MAX 5000/* step-by-step approximation to mitigate fluctuation */ #define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_STEP 8 +static int kvm_lapic_msr_read (struct kvm_lapic *apic,u32 reg,u64 *data);static inline void __kvm_lapic_set_reg (char *regs,int reg_off,u32 val) {@@ -2227,10 +2228,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_set_eoi);/* emulate APIC access in a trap manner */ void kvm_apic_write_nodecode (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 offset) { -u32 val =kvm_lapic_get_reg (vcpu->arch.apic, offset); +struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic; +u64 val; + +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { +/* +* When guest APIC is in x2APIC mode and IPI virtualization +* is enabled, accessing APIC_ICR may cause trap-like VM-exit +* on Intel hardware. Other offsets are not possible. +*/ arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_set_eoi); · line 2247
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +7
-2+if (WARN_ON_ONCE (offset !=APIC_ICR )) +return ; -/* TODO: optimize to just emulate side effect w/o one more write */ -kvm_lapic_reg_write (vcpu->arch.apic, offset, val); +kvm_lapic_msr_read (apic, offset, &val); +if (val &APIC_ICR_BUSY ) +kvm_x2apic_icr_write (apic, val); +else +kvm_apic_send_ipi (apic, (u32 )val, (u32)(val >>32 ));I don't fully understand the above code.
Quoted 1 line
First of where
kvm_x2apic_icr_writeis defined?
Sean introduces it in his "prep work for VMX IPI virtualization" series, which is merged into kvm/queue branch.
Quoted 4 lines
Second, I thought that busy bit is not used in x2apic mode? At least in intel's SDM, section 10.12.9 'ICR Operation in x2APIC Mode' this bit is not defined.
You are right. We will remove the pointless check against APIC_ICR_BUSY and just invoke kvm_apic_send_ipi().
In that section, SDM also says:
With the removal of the Delivery Status bit, system software no longer has a reason to read the ICR. It remains readable only to aid in debugging; however, ***software should not assume the value returned by reading the ICR is the last written value***.
PATCH v6 6/9 KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
In reply to Zeng GuangFrom: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs, and allowing this introduces bugs into APIC acceleration code.
And Intel recent hardware just ignores writes to APIC_ID in xAPIC mode. More background can be found at:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Looks there is no much value to support writable xAPIC ID in guest except supporting some old and crazy use cases which probably would fail on real hardware. So, make xAPIC ID read-only for KVM guests.
--- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +18 -7
@@ -2044,10 +2044,17 @@ static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)switch (reg) {case APIC_ID :/* Local APIC ID */ -if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) -kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 ); -else +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { ret =1 ; +break ; + } +/* Don't allow changing APIC ID to avoid unexpected issues */ +if ((val >>24 ) != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id) { +kvm_vm_bugged (apic->vcpu->kvm); +break ; + } + +kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 );break ;case APIC_TASKPRI :
@@ -2631,11 +2638,15 @@ int kvm_get_apic_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static int kvm_apic_state_fixup (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_lapic_state *s,bool set) { -if (apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { -u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); -u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); -u64 icr; +u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); +u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); +u64 icr; +if (!apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { +/* Don't allow changing APIC ID to avoid unexpected issues */ +if ((*id >>24 ) != vcpu->vcpu_id) +return -EINVAL ; + }else {if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {if (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id)return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 9 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs, and allowing this introduces bugs into APIC acceleration code.
And Intel recent hardware just ignores writes to
APIC_IDin xAPIC mode. More background can be found at:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Quoted 7 lines
Looks there is no much value to support writable xAPIC ID in guest except supporting some old and crazy use cases which probably would fail on real hardware. So, make xAPIC ID read-only for KVM guests.
Signed-off-by Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>
Assuming that this is approved and accepted upstream, that is even better that my proposal of doing this when APICv is enabled.
Since now apic id is always read only, now we should not forget to clean up some parts of kvm like kvm_recalculate_apic_map, which are not needed anymore.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 49 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +18
-7@@ -2044,10 +2044,17 @@ static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)switch (reg) {case APIC_ID :/* Local APIC ID */ -if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) -kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 ); -else +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { ret =1 ; +break ; + } +/* Don't allow changing APIC ID to avoid unexpected issues */ +if ((val >>24 ) != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id) { +kvm_vm_bugged (apic->vcpu->kvm); +break ; + } + +kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 );break ;case APIC_TASKPRI :@@ -2631,11 +2638,15 @@ int kvm_get_apic_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static int kvm_apic_state_fixup (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_lapic_state *s,bool set) { -if (apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { -u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); -u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); -u64 icr; +u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); +u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); +u64 icr; +if (!apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { +/* Don't allow changing APIC ID to avoid unexpected issues */ +if ((*id >>24 ) != vcpu->vcpu_id) +return -EINVAL ; + }else {if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {if (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id)return -EINVAL ;
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 21 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 12 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Maxim Levitsky <
[email protected]Quoted 1 line
No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs, and allowing this introduces bugs into APIC acceleration code.
And Intel recent hardware just ignores writes to
APIC_IDin xAPIC mode. More background can be found at:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Quoted 7 lines
Looks there is no much value to support writable xAPIC ID in guest except supporting some old and crazy use cases which probably would fail on real hardware. So, make xAPIC ID read-only for KVM guests.
Signed-off-by Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Assuming that this is approved and accepted upstream, that is even better that my proposal of doing this when APICv is enabled.
Since now apic id is always read only, now we should not forget to clean up some parts of kvm like
kvm_recalculate_apic_map, which are not needed anymore
Can we also now optimise kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() so it doesn't have to do a linear search over all the vCPUs when there isn't a 1:1 correspondence with the vCPU index?
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 25 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 24 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 11 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Maxim Levitsky <
[email protected]No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs, and allowing this introduces bugs into APIC acceleration code.
And Intel recent hardware just ignores writes to
APIC_IDin xAPIC mode. More background can be found at:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Quoted 7 lines
Looks there is no much value to support writable xAPIC ID in guest except supporting some old and crazy use cases which probably would fail on real hardware. So, make xAPIC ID read-only for KVM guests.
Signed-off-by Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>Assuming that this is approved and accepted upstream, that is even better that my proposal of doing this when APICv is enabled.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Since now apic id is always read only, now we should not forget to clean up some parts of kvm like
kvm_recalculate_apic_map, which are not needed anymoreCan we also now optimise
kvm_get_vcpu_by_id()so it doesn't have to do a linear search over all the vCPUs when there isn't a 1:1 correspondence with the vCPU index?
I don't think so since vcpu id can still be set by userspace to anything, and this is even used to encode topology in it.
However a hash table can still be used there to speed it up regardless of read-only apic id IMHO.
Or, even better than a hash table, I see that KVM already limits vcpu_id to KVM_MAX_VCPUS * 4 with a comment that only two extra bits of topology are used:
"In the worst case, we'll need less than one extra bit for the
* Core ID, and less than one extra bit for the Package (Die) ID,
* so ratio of 4 should be enough"
Thus, we could in theory standardize location of those bits in apic_id (even with a new KVM extension and do linear search for legacy userspace), and then just mask/shift the topology bits.
The kvm extension would be defining how many low (or high?) bits of vcpu_id are topology bits.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 10 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 9 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 7 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Assuming that this is approved and accepted upstream, that is even better that my proposal of doing this when APICv is enabled.
Since now apic id is always read only, now we should not forget to clean up some parts of kvm like
kvm_recalculate_apic_map, which are not needed anymore
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Can we also now optimise
kvm_get_vcpu_by_id()so it doesn't have to do a linear search over all the vCPUs when there isn't a 1:1 correspondence with the vCPU index?I don't think so since vcpu id can still be set by userspace to anything, and this is even used to encode topology in it.
Yes, but it can only be set at vCPU creation time and it has to be unique.
Quoted 6 lines
However a hash table can still be used there to speed it up regardless of read-only apic id IMHO.
Or, even better than a hash table, I see that KVM already limits
vcpu_idtoKVM_MAX_VCPUS* 4 with a comment that only two extra bits of topology are used:
We already have the kvm_apic_map which provides a fast lookup. The key point here is that the APIC ID can't *change* from vcpu->vcpu_id any more, so we can actually use the kvm_apic_map for kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() now, can't we?
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 24 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 10 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 9 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 7 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Assuming that this is approved and accepted upstream, that is even better that my proposal of doing this when APICv is enabled.
Since now apic id is always read only, now we should not forget to clean up some parts of kvm like
kvm_recalculate_apic_map, which are not needed anymoreQuoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Can we also now optimise
kvm_get_vcpu_by_id()so it doesn't have to do a linear search over all the vCPUs when there isn't a 1:1 correspondence with the vCPU index?I don't think so since vcpu id can still be set by userspace to anything, and this is even used to encode topology in it.
Yes, but it can only be set at vCPU creation time and it has to be unique.
Quoted 3 lines
However a hash table can still be used there to speed it up regardless of read-only apic id IMHO.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Or, even better than a hash table, I see that KVM already limits
vcpu_idtoKVM_MAX_VCPUS* 4 with a comment that only two extra bits of topology are used:We already have the
kvm_apic_mapwhich provides a fast lookup. The key point here is that the APIC ID can't *change* fromvcpu->vcpu_idany more, so we can actually use thekvm_apic_mapforkvm_get_vcpu_by_id()now, can't we?
Right! I wrote my response partially when I still assumed that vcpu_id can be any 32 bit number (thus hash table),
and later checked that it is capped by KVM_MAX_VCPUS * 4 which isn't a big number, plus as I now see in the kvm_recalculate_apic_map
the map is dynamically allocated up to the max apic id.
(technically speaking an array is a hash table).
Now the map would only be needed to be rebuit few times when new vCPUs are added, and can be used to locate vcpu by its apic id.
I so hope that this patch is accepted so all of this could be done.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
In reply to Maxim LevitskyQuoted 15 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 14 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs, and allowing this introduces bugs into APIC acceleration code.
And Intel recent hardware just ignores writes to
APIC_IDin xAPIC mode. More background can be found at:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Looks there is no much value to support writable xAPIC ID in guest except supporting some old and crazy use cases which probably would fail on real hardware. So, make xAPIC ID read-only for KVM guests.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>Assuming that this is approved and accepted upstream, that is even better that my proposal of doing this when APICv is enabled.
Sean & Paolo
what's your opinion? Shall we make xAPIC ID read-only unconditionally or just when enable_apicv is enabled or use a parameter to control it as Sean suggested at
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Intel SDM Vol3 10.4.6 Local APID ID says:
In MP systems, the local APIC ID is also used as a processor ID by the BIOS and the operating system. Some processors permit software to modify the APIC ID. However, the ability of software to modify the APIC ID is processor model specific. Because of this, operating system software should avoid writing to the local APIC ID register.
So, we think it is fine to make xAPIC ID always read-only. Instead of supporting writable xAPIC ID in KVM guest, it may be better to fix software that modify local APIC ID.
Intel IPI virtualization and AVIC are two cases that requires special handling if xAPIC ID is writable. But it doesn't worth the effort and is error-prone (e.g., AVIC is broken if guest changed its APIC ID).
Quoted 4 lines
Since now apic id is always read only, now we should not forget to clean up some parts of kvm like
kvm_recalculate_apic_map, which are not needed anymore.
Do you mean marking apic_map as DIRTY isn't needed in some cases? Or some cleanup should be done inside kvm_recalculate_apic_map()?
For the former, I think we can ...
Quoted 14 lines
Best regards,
Maxim LevitskyQuoted 10 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +0
-0@@ -2044,10 +2044,17 @@ static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +1
-3switch (reg) {case APIC_ID :/* Local APIC ID */ -if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) -kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 ); -else +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) {arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val) · line 2057
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +9
-0ret =1 ; +break ; + } +/* Don't allow changing APIC ID to avoid unexpected issues */ +if ((val >>24 ) != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id) { +kvm_vm_bugged (apic->vcpu->kvm); +break ; + } + +kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 );
... drop the kvm_apic_set_xapic_id().
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
In reply to Zeng GuangQuoted 3 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs,
I don't think we can reasonably assume this, my analysis in the link (that I just realized I deleted from context here) shows it's at least plausible that an existing guest could rely on the APIC ID being writable. And that's just one kernel, who know what else is out there, especially given that people use KVM to emulate really old stuff, often on really old hardware.
Practically speaking, anyone that wants to deploy IPIv is going to have to make the switch at some point, but that doesn't help people running legacy crud that don't care about IPIv.
I was thinking a module param would be trivial, and it is (see below) if the param is off by default. A module param will also provide a convenient opportunity to resolve the loophole reported by Maxim[1][2], though it's a bit funky.
Anyways, with an off-by-default module param, we can just do:
if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv() || !xapic_id_readonly) enable_ipiv = false;
Forcing userspace to take advantage of IPIv is rather annoying, but it's not the end of world.
Having the param on by default is a mess. Either we break userspace (above), or we only kinda break userspace by having it on iff IPIv is on, but then we end up with cyclical dependency hell. E.g. userspace makes xAPIC ID writable and forces on IPIv, which one "wins"? And if it's on by default, we can't fix the loophole in KVM_SET_LAPIC.
If we really wanted to have it on by default, we could have a Kconfig and make _that_ off by default, e.g.
static bool __read_mostly xapic_id_readonly = IS_ENABLED(CONFING_KVM_XAPIC_ID_RO);
but that seems like overkill. If a kernel owner knows they want the param on, it should be easy enough to force it without a Kconfig.
So I think my vote would be for something like this? Compile tested only...
--- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 14 +++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +9 -5
@@ -2043,7 +2043,7 @@ static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)switch (reg) {case APIC_ID :/* Local APIC ID */ -if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) +if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic) && !xapic_id_readonly)kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 );else ret =1 ;
@@ -2634,10 +2634,7 @@ static int kvm_apic_state_fixup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR );u64 icr; -if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) { -if (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id) -return -EINVAL ; - }else { +if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {if (set) *id >>=24 ;else
@@ -2650,6 +2647,10 @@ static int kvm_apic_state_fixup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,* split to ICR+ICR2 in userspace for backwards compatibility. */ if (set) { +if ((vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format || xapic_id_readonly) && + (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id)) +return -EINVAL ; + *ldr =kvm_apic_calc_x2apic_ldr (*id); icr = __kvm_lapic_get_reg(s->regs, APIC_ICR) |
@@ -2659,6 +2660,9 @@ static int kvm_apic_state_fixup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, icr =__kvm_lapic_get_reg64 (s->regs,APIC_ICR );__kvm_lapic_set_reg (s->regs,APIC_ICR2 , icr >>32 ); } + }else if (set && xapic_id_readonly && + (__kvm_lapic_get_reg (s->regs,APIC_ID ) >>24 ) != vcpu->vcpu_id) { +return -EINVAL ; }return 0 ;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +5 -0
@@ -442,6 +442,11 @@ static int avic_handle_apic_id_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct vcpu_svm *svm =to_svm (vcpu);u32 id =kvm_xapic_id (vcpu->arch.apic); +if (xapic_id_readonly && id != vcpu->vcpu_id) { +kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit (vcpu); +return 0 ; + } +if (vcpu->vcpu_id == id)return 0 ;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +4 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,10 @@ module_param(tsc_tolerance_ppm, uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);static int __read_mostly lapic_timer_advance_ns =-1 ;module_param (lapic_timer_advance_ns, int,S_IRUGO |S_IWUSR ); +bool __read_mostly xapic_id_readonly; +module_param (xapic_id_readonly, bool,0444 ); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xapic_id_readonly); +static bool __read_mostly vector_hashing = true;module_param (vector_hashing, bool,S_IRUGO );
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +1 -0
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_mpx_supported(void)extern unsigned int min_timer_period_us;extern bool enable_vmware_backdoor; +extern bool xapic_id_readonly;extern int pi_inject_timer;
base-commit: 1e147f6f90668f2c2b57406d451f0cfcd2ba19d0 --
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs,
I don't think we can reasonably assume this, my analysis in the link (that I just realized I deleted from context here) shows it's at least plausible that an existing guest could rely on the APIC ID being writable. And that's just one kernel, who know what else is out there, especially given that people use KVM to emulate really old stuff, often on really old hardware.
Making xAPIC ID readonly is not only based on your analysis, but also Intel SDM clearly saying writable xAPIC ID is processor model specific and ***software should avoid writing to xAPIC ID***.
If writable xAPIC ID support should be retained and is tied to a module param, live migration would depend on KVM's module params: e.g., migrate a VM with modified xAPIC ID (apic_id_readonly off on this system) to one with xapic_id_readonly on would fail, right? Is this failure desired? if not, we need to have a VM-scope control. e.g., add an inhibitor of APICv (XAPIC_ID_MODIFIED) and disable APICv forever for this VM if its vCPUs or QEMU modifies xAPIC ID.
Quoted 8 lines
Practically speaking, anyone that wants to deploy IPIv is going to have to make the switch at some point, but that doesn't help people running legacy crud that don't care about IPIv.
I was thinking a module param would be trivial, and it is (see below) if the param is off by default. A module param will also provide a convenient opportunity to resolve the loophole reported by Maxim[1][2], though it's a bit funky.
Could you share the links?
Quoted 6 lines
Anyways, with an off-by-default module param, we can just do:
if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv() || !xapic_id_readonly) enable_ipiv = false;
Quoted 8 lines
Forcing userspace to take advantage of IPIv is rather annoying, but it's not the end of world.
Having the param on by default is a mess. Either we break userspace (above), or we only kinda break userspace by having it on iff IPIv is on, but then we end up with cyclical dependency hell. E.g. userspace makes xAPIC ID writable and forces on IPIv, which one "wins"? And if it's on by default, we can't fix the loophole in
KVM_SET_LAPIC.
We are fine with having this param off by default.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
TL;DR: Maxim, any objection to yet another inhibit? Any potential issues you can think of?
Quoted 12 lines · Chao Gao
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs,
I don't think we can reasonably assume this, my analysis in the link (that I just realized I deleted from context here) shows it's at least plausible that an existing guest could rely on the APIC ID being writable. And that's just one kernel, who know what else is out there, especially given that people use KVM to emulate really old stuff, often on really old hardware.
Quoted 3 lines
Making xAPIC ID readonly is not only based on your analysis, but also Intel SDM clearly saying writable xAPIC ID is processor model specific and ***software should avoid writing to xAPIC ID***.
Intel isn't the only vendor KVM supports, and xAPIC ID is fully writable according to AMD's docs and AMD's hardware. x2APIC is even (indirectly) writable, but luckily KVM has never modeled that...
Don't get me wrong, I would love to make xAPIC ID read-only, and I fully agree that the probability of breaking someone's setup is very low, I just don't think the benefits of forcing it are worth the risk of breaking userspace.
Quoted 4 lines
If writable xAPIC ID support should be retained and is tied to a module param, live migration would depend on KVM's module params: e.g., migrate a VM with modified xAPIC ID (
apic_id_readonlyoff on this system) to one withxapic_id_readonlyon would fail, right? Is this failure desired?
Hrm, I was originally thinking it's not a terrible outcome, but I was assuming that userspace would gracefully handle migration failure. That's a bad assumption.
Quoted 3 lines
if not, we need to have a VM-scope control. e.g., add an inhibitor of APICv (
XAPIC_ID_MODIFIED) and disable APICv forever for this VM if its vCPUs or QEMU modifies xAPIC ID.
Inhibiting APICv if IPIv is enabled (implied for AMD's AVIC) is probably a better option than a module param. I was worried about ending up with silently degraded VM performance, but that's easily solved by adding a stat to track APICv inhibitions, which would be useful for other cases too (getting AMD's AVIC enabled is comically difficult).
That would also let us drop the code buggy avic_handle_apic_id_update().
And it wouldn't necessarily have to be forever, though I agree that's a perfectly fine approach until we have data that shows anything fancier is necessary.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Practically speaking, anyone that wants to deploy IPIv is going to have to make the switch at some point, but that doesn't help people running legacy crud that don't care about IPIv.
I was thinking a module param would be trivial, and it is (see below) if the param is off by default. A module param will also provide a convenient opportunity to resolve the loophole reported by Maxim[1][2], though it's a bit funky.
Could you share the links?
Doh, sorry (they're both in this one).
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 58 lines · Sean Christopherson
TL;DR: Maxim, any objection to yet another inhibit? Any potential issues you can think of?
Quoted 12 lines · Chao Gao
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
No normal guest has any reason to change physical APIC IDs,
I don't think we can reasonably assume this, my analysis in the link (that I just realized I deleted from context here) shows it's at least plausible that an existing guest could rely on the APIC ID being writable. And that's just one kernel, who know what else is out there, especially given that people use KVM to emulate really old stuff, often on really old hardware.
Quoted 3 lines
Making xAPIC ID readonly is not only based on your analysis, but also Intel SDM clearly saying writable xAPIC ID is processor model specific and ***software should avoid writing to xAPIC ID***.
Intel isn't the only vendor KVM supports, and xAPIC ID is fully writable according to AMD's docs and AMD's hardware. x2APIC is even (indirectly) writable, but luckily KVM has never modeled that...
Don't get me wrong, I would love to make xAPIC ID read-only, and I fully agree that the probability of breaking someone's setup is very low, I just don't think the benefits of forcing it are worth the risk of breaking userspace.
Quoted 4 lines
If writable xAPIC ID support should be retained and is tied to a module param, live migration would depend on KVM's module params: e.g., migrate a VM with modified xAPIC ID (
apic_id_readonlyoff on this system) to one withxapic_id_readonlyon would fail, right? Is this failure desired?Hrm, I was originally thinking it's not a terrible outcome, but I was assuming that userspace would gracefully handle migration failure. That's a bad assumption.
Quoted 3 lines
if not, we need to have a VM-scope control. e.g., add an inhibitor of APICv (
XAPIC_ID_MODIFIED) and disable APICv forever for this VM if its vCPUs or QEMU modifies xAPIC ID.Inhibiting APICv if IPIv is enabled (implied for AMD's AVIC) is probably a better option than a module param. I was worried about ending up with silently degraded VM performance, but that's easily solved by adding a stat to track APICv inhibitions, which would be useful for other cases too (getting AMD's AVIC enabled is comically difficult).
That would also let us drop the code buggy
avic_handle_apic_id_update().And it wouldn't necessarily have to be forever, though I agree that's a perfectly fine approach until we have data that shows anything fancier is necessary.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Practically speaking, anyone that wants to deploy IPIv is going to have to make the switch at some point, but that doesn't help people running legacy crud that don't care about IPIv.
I was thinking a module param would be trivial, and it is (see below) if the param is off by default. A module param will also provide a convenient opportunity to resolve the loophole reported by Maxim[1][2], though it's a bit funky.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Could you share the links?
Doh, sorry (they're both in this one).
My opinion on this subject is very simple: we need to draw the line somewhere.
There is balance between supporting (poorly) unused hardware features and not supporting them at all.
Writable APIC id is not just some legacy feature like task switch but a feature that is frowned upon in both Intel and AMD manual:
Yes, look at AMD's SDM at:
"16.3.3 Local APIC ID
Unique local APIC IDs are assigned to each CPU core in the system. The value is determined by hardware, based on the number of CPU cores on the processor and the node ID of the processor.
The APIC ID is located in the APIC ID register at APIC offset 20h. See Figure 16-3. It is model dependent, whether software can modify the APIC ID Register. The initial value of the APIC ID (after a reset) is the value returned in CPUID function 0000_0001h_EBX[31:24]."
Also in section '16.12 x2APIC_ID' of SDM it is mentioned:
RDMSR. An RDMSR of MSR 0802h returns the x2APIC_ID in EAX[31:0]. The x2APIC_ID is a read-only register.
Attempting to write MSR 802h or attempting to read this MSR when not in x2APIC mode causes a #GP(0) exception. See 16.11 “Accessing x2APIC Registers”.
CPUID. The x2APIC ID is reported by the following CPUID functions Fn0000_000B (Extended Topology Enumeration) and CPUID Fn8000_001E (Extended APIC ID) as follows:
From this you can also infer that x2apic id is assigned once on boot, and same value is reported in CPUID and in MSR 0x0802.
The fact that one can outsmart the microcode, change apic id and then switch to x2apic mode, is more a like a microcode bug that a feature IMHO, that nobody bothered to fix since nobody uses it.
Sean, please don't get me wrong, I used to think differently on this - I implemented PDPTRS migration in kvm, although in retrospect I probably shouldn't.
I also understand your concerns - and I am not going to fight over this, a module param for read only apic id, will work for me.
All I wanted to do is to make KVM better by simplifying it - KVM is already as complex as it can get, anything to make it simpler is welcome IMHO.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 9 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line
Could you share the links?
Doh, sorry (they're both in this one).
My opinion on this subject is very simple: we need to draw the line somewhere.
...
Quoted 2 lines
I also understand your concerns - and I am not going to fight over this, a module param for read only apic id, will work for me.
Sadly, I don't think a module param would actually help. I was thinking it would avoid breakage by allowing for graceful fallback on migration failure, but that was wishful thinking. An inhibit seems like the least awful idea if we don't end up making it unconditionally readonly.
Quoted 2 lines
All I wanted to do is to make KVM better by simplifying it - KVM is already as complex as it can get, anything to make it simpler is welcome IMHO.
I agree that simplifying KVM is a goal, and that we need to decide when enough is enough. But we also can't break userspace or existing deployments, that's a very clearly drawn line in Linux.
My biggest worry is that, unlike the KVM_SET_CPUID2 breakage, which was obvious and came relatively quick, this could cause breakage at the worst possible time (migration) months or years down the road.
Since the goal is to simplify KVM, can we try the inhibit route and see what the code looks like before making a decision? I think it might actually yield a less awful KVM than the readonly approach, especially if the inhibit is "sticky", i.e. we don't try to remove the inhibit on subsequent changes.
Killing the VM, as proposed, is very user unfriendly as the user will have no idea why the VM was killed. WARN is out of the question because this is user triggerable. Returning an emulation error would be ideal, but getting that result up through apic_mmio_write() could be annoying and end up being more complex.
The touchpoints will all be the same, unless I'm missing something the difference should only be a call to set an inhibit instead killing the VM.
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 120 lines · Zeng Guang
Quoted 20 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line
Could you share the links?
Doh, sorry (they're both in this one).
My opinion on this subject is very simple: we need to draw the line somewhere.
...
Since the goal is to simplify KVM, can we try the inhibit route and see what the code looks like before making a decision? I think it might actually yield a less awful KVM than the readonly approach, especially if the inhibit is "sticky", i.e. we don't try to remove the inhibit on subsequent changes.
Quoted 7 lines
Killing the VM, as proposed, is very user unfriendly as the user will have no idea why the VM was killed. WARN is out of the question because this is user triggerable. Returning an emulation error would be ideal, but getting that result up through
apic_mmio_write()could be annoying and end up being more complex.The touchpoints will all be the same, unless I'm missing something the difference should only be a call to set an inhibit instead killing the VM.
Introduce an inhibition -
APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHGto deactivate APICv once KVM guest would try to change APIC ID in xapic mode, and same sanity check in KVM_{SET,GET}_LAPIC for live migration. KVM will keep alive but obviously lose benefit from hardware acceleration in this way.So how do you think the proposal like this ?
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_msr_filter {#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC 5#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ 6#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT 7 +#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG 8struct kvm_arch {unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +24
-7@@ -2044,10 +2044,19 @@ static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)switch (reg) {case APIC_ID :/* Local APIC ID */ -if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) -kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 ); -else +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { ret =1 ; +break ; + } +/* +* If changing APIC ID with any APIC acceleration enabled, +* deactivate APICv to avoid unexpected issues. +*/ +if (enable_apicv && (val >>24 ) != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id) +kvm_request_apicv_update (apic->vcpu->kvm, + false,APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG ); + +kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 );break ;case APIC_TASKPRI :@@ -2628,11 +2637,19 @@ int kvm_get_apic_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static int kvm_apic_state_fixup (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_lapic_state *s,bool set) { -if (apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { -u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); -u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); -u64 icr; +u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); +u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); +u64 icr; +if (!apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { +/* +* If APIC ID changed with any APIC acceleration enabled, +* deactivate APICv to avoid unexpected issues. +*/ +if (enable_apicv && (*id >>24 ) != vcpu->vcpu_id) +kvm_request_apicv_update (vcpu->kvm, + false,APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG ); + }else {if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {if (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id)return -EINVAL ;arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +2
-1@@ -931,7 +931,8 @@ bool svm_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC ) | -BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ); +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ) | +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG );return supported &BIT (bit); }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit) · line 7758
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2
-1@@ -7751,7 +7751,8 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)ulong supported =BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV ) | -BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ); +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ) | +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG );return supported &BIT (bit); }
This won't work with nested AVIC - we can't just inhibit a nested guest using its own AVIC, because migration happens.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 124 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 123 lines · Zeng Guang
Quoted 20 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line
Could you share the links?
Doh, sorry (they're both in this one).
My opinion on this subject is very simple: we need to draw the line somewhere.
...
Since the goal is to simplify KVM, can we try the inhibit route and see what the code looks like before making a decision? I think it might actually yield a less awful KVM than the readonly approach, especially if the inhibit is "sticky", i.e. we don't try to remove the inhibit on subsequent changes.
Quoted 7 lines
Killing the VM, as proposed, is very user unfriendly as the user will have no idea why the VM was killed. WARN is out of the question because this is user triggerable. Returning an emulation error would be ideal, but getting that result up through
apic_mmio_write()could be annoying and end up being more complex.The touchpoints will all be the same, unless I'm missing something the difference should only be a call to set an inhibit instead killing the VM.
Introduce an inhibition -
APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHGto deactivate APICv once KVM guest would try to change APIC ID in xapic mode, and same sanity check in KVM_{SET,GET}_LAPIC for live migration. KVM will keep alive but obviously lose benefit from hardware acceleration in this way.So how do you think the proposal like this ?
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_msr_filter {#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC 5#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ 6#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT 7 +#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG 8struct kvm_arch {unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +24
-7@@ -2044,10 +2044,19 @@ static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)switch (reg) {case APIC_ID :/* Local APIC ID */ -if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) -kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 ); -else +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { ret =1 ; +break ; + } +/* +* If changing APIC ID with any APIC acceleration enabled, +* deactivate APICv to avoid unexpected issues. +*/ +if (enable_apicv && (val >>24 ) != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id) +kvm_request_apicv_update (apic->vcpu->kvm, + false,APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG ); + +kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 );break ;case APIC_TASKPRI :@@ -2628,11 +2637,19 @@ int kvm_get_apic_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static int kvm_apic_state_fixup (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_lapic_state *s,bool set) { -if (apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { -u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); -u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); -u64 icr; +u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); +u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); +u64 icr; +if (!apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { +/* +* If APIC ID changed with any APIC acceleration enabled, +* deactivate APICv to avoid unexpected issues. +*/ +if (enable_apicv && (*id >>24 ) != vcpu->vcpu_id) +kvm_request_apicv_update (vcpu->kvm, + false,APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG ); + }else {if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {if (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id)return -EINVAL ;arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +2
-1@@ -931,7 +931,8 @@ bool svm_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC ) | -BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ); +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ) | +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG );return supported &BIT (bit); }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2
-1@@ -7751,7 +7751,8 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)ulong supported =BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV ) | -BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ); +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ) | +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG );
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit) · line 7758
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0return supported &BIT (bit); }This won't work with nested AVIC - we can't just inhibit a nested guest using its own AVIC, because migration happens.
I mean because host decided to change its apic id, which it can in theory do any time, even after the nested guest has started. Seriously, the only reason guest has to change apic id, is to try to exploit some security hole.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 3 lines
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 134 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 124 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 123 lines · Zeng Guang
Quoted 20 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line
Could you share the links?
Doh, sorry (they're both in this one).
My opinion on this subject is very simple: we need to draw the line somewhere.
...
Since the goal is to simplify KVM, can we try the inhibit route and see what the code looks like before making a decision? I think it might actually yield a less awful KVM than the readonly approach, especially if the inhibit is "sticky", i.e. we don't try to remove the inhibit on subsequent changes.
Quoted 7 lines
Killing the VM, as proposed, is very user unfriendly as the user will have no idea why the VM was killed. WARN is out of the question because this is user triggerable. Returning an emulation error would be ideal, but getting that result up through
apic_mmio_write()could be annoying and end up being more complex.The touchpoints will all be the same, unless I'm missing something the difference should only be a call to set an inhibit instead killing the VM.
Introduce an inhibition -
APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHGto deactivate APICv once KVM guest would try to change APIC ID in xapic mode, and same sanity check in KVM_{SET,GET}_LAPIC for live migration. KVM will keep alive but obviously lose benefit from hardware acceleration in this way.So how do you think the proposal like this ?
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_msr_filter {#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC 5#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ 6#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT 7 +#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG 8struct kvm_arch {unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +24
-7@@ -2044,10 +2044,19 @@ static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)switch (reg) {case APIC_ID :/* Local APIC ID */ -if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) -kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 ); -else +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { ret =1 ; +break ; + } +/* +* If changing APIC ID with any APIC acceleration enabled, +* deactivate APICv to avoid unexpected issues. +*/ +if (enable_apicv && (val >>24 ) != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id) +kvm_request_apicv_update (apic->vcpu->kvm, + false,APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG ); + +kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 );break ;case APIC_TASKPRI :@@ -2628,11 +2637,19 @@ int kvm_get_apic_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static int kvm_apic_state_fixup (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_lapic_state *s,bool set) { -if (apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { -u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); -u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); -u64 icr; +u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); +u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); +u64 icr; +if (!apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { +/* +* If APIC ID changed with any APIC acceleration enabled, +* deactivate APICv to avoid unexpected issues. +*/ +if (enable_apicv && (*id >>24 ) != vcpu->vcpu_id) +kvm_request_apicv_update (vcpu->kvm, + false,APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG ); + }else {if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {if (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id)return -EINVAL ;arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +2
-1@@ -931,7 +931,8 @@ bool svm_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC ) | -BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ); +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ) | +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG );return supported &BIT (bit); }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2
-1@@ -7751,7 +7751,8 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)ulong supported =BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV ) | -BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ); +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ) | +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG );Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit) · line 7758
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0return supported &BIT (bit); }This won't work with nested AVIC - we can't just inhibit a nested guest using its own AVIC, because migration happens.
Quoted 3 lines
I mean because host decided to change its apic id, which it can in theory do any time, even after the nested guest has started. Seriously, the only reason guest has to change apic id, is to try to exploit some security hole.
Hi
Thanks for the information.
IIUC, you mean KVM applies APICv inhibition only to L1 VM, leaving APICv enabled for L2 VM. Shouldn't KVM disable APICv for L2 VM in this case? It looks like a generic issue in dynamically toggling APICv scheme, e.g., qemu can set KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ after nested guest has started.
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 139 lines · Chao Gao
Quoted 134 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 124 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 123 lines · Zeng Guang
Quoted 20 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line
Could you share the links?
Doh, sorry (they're both in this one).
My opinion on this subject is very simple: we need to draw the line somewhere.
...
Since the goal is to simplify KVM, can we try the inhibit route and see what the code looks like before making a decision? I think it might actually yield a less awful KVM than the readonly approach, especially if the inhibit is "sticky", i.e. we don't try to remove the inhibit on subsequent changes.
Quoted 7 lines
Killing the VM, as proposed, is very user unfriendly as the user will have no idea why the VM was killed. WARN is out of the question because this is user triggerable. Returning an emulation error would be ideal, but getting that result up through
apic_mmio_write()could be annoying and end up being more complex.The touchpoints will all be the same, unless I'm missing something the difference should only be a call to set an inhibit instead killing the VM.
Introduce an inhibition -
APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHGto deactivate APICv once KVM guest would try to change APIC ID in xapic mode, and same sanity check in KVM_{SET,GET}_LAPIC for live migration. KVM will keep alive but obviously lose benefit from hardware acceleration in this way.So how do you think the proposal like this ?
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_msr_filter {#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC 5#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ 6#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT 7 +#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG 8struct kvm_arch {unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +24
-7@@ -2044,10 +2044,19 @@ static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)switch (reg) {case APIC_ID :/* Local APIC ID */ -if (!apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) -kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 ); -else +if (apic_x2apic_mode (apic)) { ret =1 ; +break ; + } +/* +* If changing APIC ID with any APIC acceleration enabled, +* deactivate APICv to avoid unexpected issues. +*/ +if (enable_apicv && (val >>24 ) != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id) +kvm_request_apicv_update (apic->vcpu->kvm, + false,APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG ); + +kvm_apic_set_xapic_id (apic, val >>24 );break ;case APIC_TASKPRI :@@ -2628,11 +2637,19 @@ int kvm_get_apic_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static int kvm_apic_state_fixup (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_lapic_state *s,bool set) { -if (apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { -u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); -u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); -u64 icr; +u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_ID ); +u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs +APIC_LDR ); +u64 icr; +if (!apic_x2apic_mode (vcpu->arch.apic)) { +/* +* If APIC ID changed with any APIC acceleration enabled, +* deactivate APICv to avoid unexpected issues. +*/ +if (enable_apicv && (*id >>24 ) != vcpu->vcpu_id) +kvm_request_apicv_update (vcpu->kvm, + false,APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG ); + }else {if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {if (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id)return -EINVAL ;arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +2
-1@@ -931,7 +931,8 @@ bool svm_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC ) | -BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ); +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ) | +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG );return supported &BIT (bit); }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2
-1@@ -7751,7 +7751,8 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)ulong supported =BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT ) |BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV ) | -BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ); +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ ) | +BIT (APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APICID_CHG );Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit) · line 7758
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0return supported &BIT (bit); }This won't work with nested AVIC - we can't just inhibit a nested guest using its own AVIC, because migration happens.
Quoted 3 lines
I mean because host decided to change its apic id, which it can in theory do any time, even after the nested guest has started. Seriously, the only reason guest has to change apic id, is to try to exploit some security hole.
Quoted 9 lines
Hi
Thanks for the information.
IIUC, you mean KVM applies APICv inhibition only to L1 VM, leaving APICv enabled for L2 VM. Shouldn't KVM disable APICv for L2 VM in this case? It looks like a generic issue in dynamically toggling APICv scheme, e.g., qemu can set
KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQafter nested guest has started.
That is the problem - you can't disable it for L2, unless you are willing to emulate it in software. Or in other words, when nested guest uses a hardware feature, you can't at some point say to it:
sorry buddy - hardware feature disappeared.
It is *currently* not a problem for APICv because it doesn't do IPI virtualization, and even with these patches, it doesn't do this for nesting.
It does become when you allow nested guest to use this which I did in the nested AVIC code.
and writable apic ids do pose a large problem, since nested AVIC, will target L1's apic ids, and when they can change under you without any notice, and even worse be duplicate, it is just nightmare.
About KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ - yes, but that is a best effort hack anyway, which not supposed to 100% work - running gdbstub with nested is broken in many ways anyway.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This won't work with nested AVIC - we can't just inhibit a nested guest using its own AVIC, because migration happens.
I mean because host decided to change its apic id, which it can in theory do any time, even after the nested guest has started. Seriously, the only reason guest has to change apic id, is to try to exploit some security hole.
Quoted 9 lines
Hi
Thanks for the information.
IIUC, you mean KVM applies APICv inhibition only to L1 VM, leaving APICv enabled for L2 VM. Shouldn't KVM disable APICv for L2 VM in this case? It looks like a generic issue in dynamically toggling APICv scheme, e.g., qemu can set
KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQafter nested guest has started.
Quoted 3 lines
That is the problem - you can't disable it for L2, unless you are willing to emulate it in software. Or in other words, when nested guest uses a hardware feature, you can't at some point say to it:
sorry buddy - hardware feature disappeared.
Agreed. I missed this.
Quoted 9 lines
It is *currently* not a problem for APICv because it doesn't do IPI virtualization, and even with these patches, it doesn't do this for nesting.
It does become when you allow nested guest to use this which I did in the nested AVIC code.and writable apic ids do pose a large problem, since nested AVIC, will target L1's apic ids, and when they can change under you without any notice, and even worse be duplicate, it is just nightmare.
OK. So the problem of disabling APICv is if we choose to disable APICv instead of making APIC ID read-only, although it can work perfectly for VMX IPIv, it effectively makes future cleanup to AVIC difficult/impossible because nested AVIC is practically to implement without assuming APIC IDs of L1 is immutable.
Sean & Maxim
How about go back to use a module parameter to opt in to read-only APIC ID. Although migration in some cases may fail but it shouldn't be a big issue as migration VMs from a KVM with nested=on to a KVM with nested=off may also fail.
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
In reply to Maxim LevitskyQuoted 17 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This won't work with nested AVIC - we can't just inhibit a nested guest using its own AVIC, because migration happens.
I mean because host decided to change its apic id, which it can in theory do any time, even after the nested guest has started. Seriously, the only reason guest has to change apic id, is to try to exploit some security hole.
Quoted 9 lines
Hi
Thanks for the information.
IIUC, you mean KVM applies APICv inhibition only to L1 VM, leaving APICv enabled for L2 VM. Shouldn't KVM disable APICv for L2 VM in this case? It looks like a generic issue in dynamically toggling APICv scheme, e.g., qemu can set
KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQafter nested guest has started.
Quoted 3 lines
That is the problem - you can't disable it for L2, unless you are willing to emulate it in software. Or in other words, when nested guest uses a hardware feature, you can't at some point say to it:
sorry buddy - hardware feature disappeared.
Hi Maxim,
I may miss something. When reading Sean's APICv inhibition cleanups, I find AVIC is disabled for L1 when nested is enabled (SVM is advertised to L1). Then, I think the new inhibition introduced for changed xAPIC ID shouldn't be a problem for L2 VM. Or, you plan to remove APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_NESTED and expose AVIC to L1?
svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid:
/*
* Currently, AVIC does not work with nested virtualization.
* So, we disable AVIC when cpuid for SVM is set in the L1 guest.
*/
if (nested && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM))
kvm_request_apicv_update(vcpu->kvm, false,
APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_NESTED);Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 22 lines · Chao Gao
Quoted 17 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This won't work with nested AVIC - we can't just inhibit a nested guest using its own AVIC, because migration happens.
I mean because host decided to change its apic id, which it can in theory do any time, even after the nested guest has started. Seriously, the only reason guest has to change apic id, is to try to exploit some security hole.
Quoted 9 lines
Hi
Thanks for the information.
IIUC, you mean KVM applies APICv inhibition only to L1 VM, leaving APICv enabled for L2 VM. Shouldn't KVM disable APICv for L2 VM in this case? It looks like a generic issue in dynamically toggling APICv scheme, e.g., qemu can set
KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQafter nested guest has started.Quoted 3 lines
That is the problem - you can't disable it for L2, unless you are willing to emulate it in software. Or in other words, when nested guest uses a hardware feature, you can't at some point say to it:
sorry buddy - hardware feature disappeared.
Quoted 7 lines
Hi Maxim,
I may miss something. When reading Sean's APICv inhibition cleanups, I find AVIC is disabled for L1 when nested is enabled (SVM is advertised to L1). Then, I think the new inhibition introduced for changed xAPIC ID shouldn't be a problem for L2 VM. Or, you plan to remove
APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_NESTEDand expose AVIC to L1?
Yep, I have a patch for this ( which I hope to be accepted really soon (KVM: x86: SVM: allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running)
I also implemented working support for nested AVIC, which includes support for IPI without vm exits between L2's vCPUs. I had sent an RFC for that.
With all patches applied both L1 and L2 switch hands on AVIC, L1's avic is inhibited (only locally) on the vCPU which runs nested, and while it runs nested, L2 uses AVIC to target other vCPUs which also run nested.
I and Paolo talked about this, and we reached a very promising conclusion.
I will add new KVM cap, say KVM_CAP_READ_ONLY_APIC, which userspace will set prior to creating a vCPU, and which will make APIC ID fully readonly when set.
As a bonus, if you don't object, I will also make this cap, make APIC base read-only, since this feature is also broken in kvm, optional in x86 spec, and not really used by guests just like writable apic id.
I hope to have patches in day or two for this.
When this cap is not set, it is fair to disable both IPIv, my nested AVIC, or even better inhibit AVIC completely, including any nested support.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 10 lines
svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid:/* * Currently, AVIC does not work with nested virtualization. * So, we disable AVIC when cpuid for SVM is set in the L1 guest. */ if (nested && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) kvm_request_apicv_update(vcpu->kvm, false, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_NESTED);
Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID unconditionally
Quoted 6 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Yep, I have a patch for this ( which I hope to be accepted really soon (KVM: x86: SVM: allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running)
I also implemented working support for nested AVIC, which includes support for IPI without vm exits between L2's vCPUs. I had sent an RFC for that.
Quoted 8 lines
With all patches applied both L1 and L2 switch hands on AVIC, L1's avic is inhibited (only locally) on the vCPU which runs nested, and while it runs nested, L2 uses AVIC to target other vCPUs which also run nested.
I and Paolo talked about this, and we reached a very promising conclusion.
I will add new KVM cap, say
KVM_CAP_READ_ONLY_APIC, which userspace will set prior to creating a vCPU, and which will make APIC ID fully readonly when set.
Will KVM report violations to QEMU? then, QEMU can know the VM attempted to change APIC ID and report an error to admin. Then admin can relaunch the VM without setting this new cap.
Quoted 6 lines
As a bonus, if you don't object, I will also make this cap, make APIC base read-only, since this feature is also broken in kvm, optional in x86 spec, and not really used by guests just like writable apic id.
I hope to have patches in day or two for this.
Great. And no objection to making APIC base read-only.
PATCH v6 7/9 KVM: VMX: enable IPI virtualization
In reply to Zeng GuangFrom: Gao Chao <[email protected]>
With IPI virtualization enabled, the processor emulates writes to APIC registers that would send IPIs. The processor sets the bit corresponding to the vector in target vCPU's PIR and may send a notification (IPI) specified by NDST and NV fields in target vCPU's Posted-Interrupt Descriptor (PID). It is similar to what IOMMU engine does when dealing with posted interrupt from devices.
A PID-pointer table is used by the processor to locate the PID of a vCPU with the vCPU's APIC ID.
Like VT-d PI, if a vCPU goes to blocked state, VMM needs to switch its notification vector to wakeup vector. This can ensure that when an IPI for blocked vCPUs arrives, VMM can get control and wake up blocked vCPUs. And if a VCPU is preempted, its posted interrupt notification is suppressed.
Note that IPI virtualization can only virualize physical-addressing, flat mode, unicast IPIs. Sending other IPIs would still cause a trap-like APIC-write VM-exit and need to be handled by VMM.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 12 ++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 ++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +8 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(USR_WAIT_PAUSE)#define SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(BUS_LOCK_DETECTION) +/* +* Definitions of Tertiary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls. +*/ +#define TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(IPI_VIRT) +#define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(INTR_EXITING)#define PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(NMI_EXITING)#define PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(VIRTUAL_NMIS)
@@ -159,6 +164,7 @@ static inline int vmx_misc_mseg_revid(u64 vmx_misc)enum vmcs_field {VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID =0x00000000 ,POSTED_INTR_NV =0x00000002 , +LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX =0x00000008 ,GUEST_ES_SELECTOR =0x00000800 ,GUEST_CS_SELECTOR =0x00000802 ,GUEST_SS_SELECTOR =0x00000804 ,
@@ -224,6 +230,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {TSC_MULTIPLIER_HIGH =0x00002033 ,TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL =0x00002034 ,TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL_HIGH =0x00002035 , +PID_POINTER_TABLE =0x00002042 , +PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH =0x00002043 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS =0x00002400 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH =0x00002401 , VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800,
arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h +2 -0
@@ -86,4 +86,6 @@#define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLV_EXITING ( 2*32+ 28)/* "" VM-Exit on ENCLV (leaf dependent) */ #define VMX_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION ( 2*32+ 30)/* "" VM-Exit when bus lock caused */ +/* Tertiary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls, word 3 */ +#define VMX_FEATURE_IPI_VIRT (3*32 + 4)/* "" Enable IPI virtualization */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_VMXFEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +6 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept;extern bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest;extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits;extern bool __read_mostly enable_pml; +extern bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv;extern int __read_mostly pt_mode;#define PT_MODE_SYSTEM 0
@@ -283,6 +284,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_apicv(void)cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr (); } +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ipiv (void ) +{ +return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl &TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ; +} +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority (void ) { return cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() &&
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c +11 -1
@@ -177,11 +177,21 @@ static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)local_irq_restore (flags); } +static bool vmx_can_use_ipiv_pi (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return irqchip_in_kernel (kvm) && enable_ipiv; +} + +static bool vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return vmx_can_use_ipiv_pi (kvm) ||vmx_can_use_vtd_pi (kvm); +} +void vmx_vcpu_pi_put (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct pi_desc *pi_desc =vcpu_to_pi_desc (vcpu); -if (!vmx_can_use_vtd_pi (vcpu->kvm)) +if (!vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts (vcpu->kvm))return ;if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking (vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked (vcpu))
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +67 -7
170 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +3 -0
@@ -365,6 +365,9 @@ struct kvm_vmx {unsigned int tss_addr;bool ept_identity_pagetable_done;gpa_t ept_identity_map_addr; +/* PID table for IPI virtualization */ +u64 *pid_table; +u16 pid_last_index; };bool nested_vmx_allowed (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 7/9] KVM: VMX: enable IPI virtualization
Quoted 107 lines · Zeng Guang
From: Gao Chao <[email protected]>
With IPI virtualization enabled, the processor emulates writes to APIC registers that would send IPIs. The processor sets the bit corresponding to the vector in target vCPU's PIR and may send a notification (IPI) specified by NDST and NV fields in target vCPU's Posted-Interrupt Descriptor (PID). It is similar to what IOMMU engine does when dealing with posted interrupt from devices.
A PID-pointer table is used by the processor to locate the PID of a vCPU with the vCPU's APIC ID.
Like VT-d PI, if a vCPU goes to blocked state, VMM needs to switch its notification vector to wakeup vector. This can ensure that when an IPI for blocked vCPUs arrives, VMM can get control and wake up blocked vCPUs. And if a VCPU is preempted, its posted interrupt notification is suppressed.
Note that IPI virtualization can only virualize physical-addressing, flat mode, unicast IPIs. Sending other IPIs would still cause a trap-like APIC-write VM-exit and need to be handled by VMM.
Signed-off-by Gao Chao <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 12 ++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 ++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +8
-0@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(USR_WAIT_PAUSE)#define SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(BUS_LOCK_DETECTION) +/* +* Definitions of Tertiary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls. +*/ +#define TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(IPI_VIRT) +#define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(INTR_EXITING)#define PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(NMI_EXITING)#define PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(VIRTUAL_NMIS)@@ -159,6 +164,7 @@ static inline int vmx_misc_mseg_revid(u64 vmx_misc)enum vmcs_field {VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID =0x00000000 ,POSTED_INTR_NV =0x00000002 , +LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX =0x00000008 ,GUEST_ES_SELECTOR =0x00000800 ,GUEST_CS_SELECTOR =0x00000802 ,GUEST_SS_SELECTOR =0x00000804 ,@@ -224,6 +230,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {TSC_MULTIPLIER_HIGH =0x00002033 ,TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL =0x00002034 ,TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL_HIGH =0x00002035 , +PID_POINTER_TABLE =0x00002042 , +PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH =0x00002043 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS =0x00002400 ,GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH =0x00002401 , VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800,arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h +2
-0@@ -86,4 +86,6 @@#define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLV_EXITING ( 2*32+ 28)/* "" VM-Exit on ENCLV (leaf dependent) */ #define VMX_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION ( 2*32+ 30)/* "" VM-Exit when bus lock caused */ +/* Tertiary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls, word 3 */ +#define VMX_FEATURE_IPI_VIRT (3*32 + 4)/* "" Enable IPI virtualization */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_VMXFEATURES_H */ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +6
-0@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept;extern bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest;extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits;extern bool __read_mostly enable_pml; +extern bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv;extern int __read_mostly pt_mode;#define PT_MODE_SYSTEM 0@@ -283,6 +284,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_apicv(void)cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr (); } +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ipiv (void ) +{ +return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl &TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ; +} +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority (void ) { return cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() &&arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c +0
-0@@ -177,11 +177,21 @@ static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)local_irq_restore (flags);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 187
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c +8
-0} +static bool vmx_can_use_ipiv_pi (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return irqchip_in_kernel (kvm) && enable_ipiv; +} + +static bool vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return vmx_can_use_ipiv_pi (kvm) ||vmx_can_use_vtd_pi (kvm);
It took me a while to figure that out.
vmx_can_use_vtd_pi returns true when the VM can be targeted by posted interrupts from the IOMMU, which leads to
1. update of the NV vector and SN bit on vcpu_load/vcpu_put to let IOMMU knows where the vCPU really runs.
2. in vmx_pi_update_irte to configure the posted interrupts.
Now IPIv will also use the same NV vector and SN bit for IPI virtualization, thus they have to be kept up to date on vcpu load/put.
I would appreciate a comment about this in vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts because posted interrupts can mean too many things, like a host->guest posted interrupt which is sent by just interrupt.
Maybe also rename the function to something like
vmx_need_up_to_date_nv_sn(). Sounds silly to me so maybe something else.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 194
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c +3
-1+} +void vmx_vcpu_pi_put (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct pi_desc *pi_desc =vcpu_to_pi_desc (vcpu); -if (!vmx_can_use_vtd_pi (vcpu->kvm)) +if (!vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts (vcpu->kvm))
I see here it is used.
Quoted 58 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c +0
-0return ;if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking (vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked (vcpu))arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +13
-3@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ module_param(fasteoi, bool, S_IRUGO);module_param (enable_apicv, bool,S_IRUGO ); +bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv = true; +module_param (enable_ipiv, bool,0444 ); +/* * If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use * VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not @@ -227,6 +230,11 @@ static const struct { };#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 + +/* PID(Posted-Interrupt Descriptor)-pointer table entry is 64-bit long */ +#define MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER get_order(KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS * sizeof(u64)) +#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1 +static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush (enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)@@ -2543,7 +2551,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, }if (_cpu_based_exec_control &CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS ) { -u64 opt3 =0 ; +u64 opt3 =TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ;u64 min3 =0 ; if (adjust_vmx_controls_64(min3, opt3,@@ -3898,6 +3906,8 @@ static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,X2APIC_MSR (APIC_TMCCT ),MSR_TYPE_RW );vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,X2APIC_MSR (APIC_EOI ),MSR_TYPE_W );vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,X2APIC_MSR (APIC_SELF_IPI ),MSR_TYPE_W ); +if (enable_ipiv) +vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,X2APIC_MSR (APIC_ICR ),MSR_TYPE_RW ); } }@@ -4219,14 +4229,21 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)pin_controls_set (vmx,vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl (vmx));if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls ()) { -if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) +if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) {secondary_exec_controls_setbit (vmx,SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY ); -else +if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls () && enable_ipiv)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 4246
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0+tertiary_exec_controls_setbit (vmx, +TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ); + }else {secondary_exec_controls_clearbit (vmx,SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY ); +if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ()) +tertiary_exec_controls_clearbit (vmx, +TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ); + }
Why check for cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls()? wouldn't it be always true (enable_ipiv has to be turned to false if CPU doesn't support IPIv, and if it does it will support tertiary exec controls).
I don't mind this as a precaution + consistency with other code.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0}vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic (vcpu);@@ -4260,7 +4277,16 @@ static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) · line 4287
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +8
-1{ -return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; +u64 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; + +/* +* IPI virtualization relies on APICv. Disable IPI +* virtualization if APICv is inhibited. +*/ +if (!enable_ipiv || !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (&vmx->vcpu)) + exec_control &= ~TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ;
I am not 100% sure, but kvm_vcpu_apicv_active might not be the best thing to check here, as it reflects per-cpu dynamic APICv inhibit.
It probably works, but it might be better to use enable_apicv here and rely on normal APICv inhibit, and there inibit IPIv as well as you do in vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl/
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +5
-0+ +return exec_control; }/* @@ -4412,6 +4438,9 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)static void init_vmcs (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) { +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu; +struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (vcpu->kvm); +if (nested)nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap ();
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) · line 4463
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1
-1@@ -4431,7 +4460,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ())tertiary_exec_controls_set (vmx,vmx_tertiary_exec_control (vmx)); -if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (&vmx->vcpu)) { +if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) {
here too (pre-existing), I also not 100% sure that kvm_vcpu_apicv_active should be used. I haven't studied APICv code that much to be 100% sure.
Quoted 18 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 ,0 );vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1 ,0 );vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2 ,0 );@@ -4441,6 +4470,13 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)vmcs_write16 (POSTED_INTR_NV ,POSTED_INTR_VECTOR );vmcs_write64 (POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR ,__pa ((&vmx->pi_desc))); + +if (enable_ipiv) { +WRITE_ONCE (kvm_vmx->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id], +__pa (&vmx->pi_desc) |PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID ); +vmcs_write64 (PID_POINTER_TABLE ,__pa (kvm_vmx->pid_table)); +vmcs_write16 (LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX , kvm_vmx->pid_last_index); + } }if (!kvm_pause_in_guest (vmx->vcpu.kvm)) {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) · line 4531
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1
-1@@ -4492,7 +4528,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)vmcs_write16 (GUEST_PML_INDEX ,PML_ENTITY_NUM -1 ); } -vmx_write_encls_bitmap (&vmx->vcpu,NULL ); +vmx_write_encls_bitmap (vcpu,NULL );
I might have separated the refactoring of using vcpu instead of &vmx->vcpu in a separate patch, but I don't mind that that much.
Quoted 32 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +13
-1if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest ()) {memset (&vmx->pt_desc,0 ,sizeof (vmx->pt_desc));@@ -4508,7 +4544,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow ()) {vmcs_write64 (VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR ,0 ); -if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow (&vmx->vcpu)) +if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow (vcpu))vmcs_write64 (VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR ,__pa (vmx->vcpu.arch.apic->regs));vmcs_write32 (TPR_THRESHOLD ,0 );@@ -7165,6 +7201,18 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)break ; } } + +if (enable_ipiv) { +struct page *pages; + + pages =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER ); +if (!pages) +return -ENOMEM ; + +to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->pid_table = (void *)page_address (pages); +to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->pid_last_index =KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS -1 ; + } +return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit) · line 7812
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6
-0@@ -7756,6 +7804,14 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)return supported &BIT (bit); } +static void vmx_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (kvm); + +if (kvm_vmx->pid_table) +free_pages ((unsigned long )kvm_vmx->pid_table,MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER );
Maybe add a warning checking that ipiv was actually enabled. Maybe this is overkill.
Quoted 28 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6
-0+} +static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,@@ -7768,6 +7824,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), .vm_init = vmx_vm_init, + .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, .vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu, .vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu,@@ -8022,6 +8079,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)if (!enable_apicv) vmx_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr =NULL ; +if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv ()) + enable_ipiv = false; +if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling ()) { kvm_has_tsc_control = true; kvm_max_tsc_scaling_ratio =KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX ;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h struct kvm_vmx { · line 373
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +3
-0@@ -365,6 +365,9 @@ struct kvm_vmx {unsigned int tss_addr;bool ept_identity_pagetable_done;gpa_t ept_identity_map_addr; +/* PID table for IPI virtualization */ +u64 *pid_table; +u16 pid_last_index; };bool nested_vmx_allowed (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
I might have missed something, but overall looks good.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Re: [PATCH v6 7/9] KVM: VMX: enable IPI virtualization
Quoted 23 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 187
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c +8
-0+static bool vmx_can_use_ipiv_pi (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return irqchip_in_kernel (kvm) && enable_ipiv; +} + +static bool vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return vmx_can_use_ipiv_pi (kvm) ||vmx_can_use_vtd_pi (kvm);It took me a while to figure that out.
vmx_can_use_vtd_pireturns true when the VM can be targeted by posted interrupts from the IOMMU, which leads to1. update of the NV vector and SN bit on vcpu_load/vcpu_put to let IOMMU knows where the vCPU really runs.
2. in
vmx_pi_update_irteto configure the posted interrupts.Now IPIv will also use the same NV vector and SN bit for IPI virtualization, thus they have to be kept up to date on vcpu load/put.
Quoted 8 lines
I would appreciate a comment about this in
vmx_can_use_posted_interruptsbecause posted interrupts can mean too many things, like ahost->guestposted interrupt which is sent by just interrupt.Maybe also rename the function to something like
vmx_need_up_to_date_nv_sn(). Sounds silly to me so maybe something else.
It makes sense.
Will add a comment and rename the function.
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +5
-2@@ -4219,14 +4229,21 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)pin_controls_set (vmx,vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl (vmx));if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls ()) { -if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) +if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) {secondary_exec_controls_setbit (vmx,SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY ); -else +if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls () && enable_ipiv) +tertiary_exec_controls_setbit (vmx, +TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ); + }else {secondary_exec_controls_clearbit (vmx,SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY );
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 4246
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +4
-0+if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ()) +tertiary_exec_controls_clearbit (vmx, +TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ); + }Why check for
cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls()? wouldn't it be always true (enable_ipivhas to be turned to false if CPU doesn't support IPIv, and if it does it will support tertiary exec controls).
yes. Checking enable_ipiv in two if()s above is enough.
Quoted 24 lines
I don't mind this as a precaution + consistency with other code.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0}vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic (vcpu);@@ -4260,7 +4277,16 @@ static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) · line 4287
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +8
-1{ -return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; +u64 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; + +/* +* IPI virtualization relies on APICv. Disable IPI +* virtualization if APICv is inhibited. +*/ +if (!enable_ipiv || !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (&vmx->vcpu)) + exec_control &= ~TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT ;I am not 100% sure, but
kvm_vcpu_apicv_activemight not be the best thing to check here, as it reflects per-cpu dynamic APICv inhibit.
Quoted 4 lines
It probably works, but it might be better to use
enable_apicvhere and rely on normal APICv inhibit, and there inibit IPIv as well as you do in vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl/
What's the difference between normal and per-cpu dynamic APICv inhibit?
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +5
-0+ +return exec_control; }/* @@ -4412,6 +4438,9 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)static void init_vmcs (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) { +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu; +struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (vcpu->kvm); +if (nested)nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap ();@@ -4431,7 +4460,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ())tertiary_exec_controls_set (vmx,vmx_tertiary_exec_control (vmx));
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) · line 4463
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1
-1-if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (&vmx->vcpu)) { +if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) {here too (pre-existing), I also not 100% sure that
kvm_vcpu_apicv_activeshould be used. I haven't studied APICv code that much to be 100% sure.
I think kvm_vcpu_apicv_active is better.
The question is: If CPU supports a VMX feature (APICv), but it isn't enabled now, is it allowed to configure VMCS fields defined by the feature? Would CPU ignore the values written to the fields or retain them after enabling the feature later?
Personally, KVM shouldn't rely on CPU's behavior in this case. So, It is better for KVM to write below VMCS fields only if APICv is enabled.
Quoted 64 lines
Quoted 20 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 ,0 );vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1 ,0 );vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2 ,0 );@@ -4441,6 +4470,13 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)vmcs_write16 (POSTED_INTR_NV ,POSTED_INTR_VECTOR );vmcs_write64 (POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR ,__pa ((&vmx->pi_desc))); + +if (enable_ipiv) { +WRITE_ONCE (kvm_vmx->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id], +__pa (&vmx->pi_desc) |PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID ); +vmcs_write64 (PID_POINTER_TABLE ,__pa (kvm_vmx->pid_table)); +vmcs_write16 (LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX , kvm_vmx->pid_last_index); + } }if (!kvm_pause_in_guest (vmx->vcpu.kvm)) {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) · line 4531
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1
-1@@ -4492,7 +4528,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)vmcs_write16 (GUEST_PML_INDEX ,PML_ENTITY_NUM -1 ); } -vmx_write_encls_bitmap (&vmx->vcpu,NULL ); +vmx_write_encls_bitmap (vcpu,NULL );I might have separated the refactoring of using vcpu instead of
&vmx->vcpuin a separate patch, but I don't mind that that much.Quoted 35 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +13
-1if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest ()) {memset (&vmx->pt_desc,0 ,sizeof (vmx->pt_desc));@@ -4508,7 +4544,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow ()) {vmcs_write64 (VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR ,0 ); -if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow (&vmx->vcpu)) +if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow (vcpu))vmcs_write64 (VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR ,__pa (vmx->vcpu.arch.apic->regs));vmcs_write32 (TPR_THRESHOLD ,0 );@@ -7165,6 +7201,18 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)break ; } } + +if (enable_ipiv) { +struct page *pages; + + pages =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER ); +if (!pages) +return -ENOMEM ; + +to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->pid_table = (void *)page_address (pages); +to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->pid_last_index =KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS -1 ; + } +return 0 ; }@@ -7756,6 +7804,14 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)return supported &BIT (bit); }
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit) · line 7812
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6
-0+static void vmx_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (kvm); + +if (kvm_vmx->pid_table) +free_pages ((unsigned long )kvm_vmx->pid_table,MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER );Maybe add a warning checking that ipiv was actually enabled.
Do you mean ipiv was enabled on one of vCPU or just enable_ipiv is true?
The former will lead to false positives if qemu creates a VM and destroys the vm without creating any vCPUs.
Quoted 39 lines
Maybe this is overkill.
Quoted 36 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6
-0+} +static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,@@ -7768,6 +7824,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), .vm_init = vmx_vm_init, + .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, .vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu, .vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu,@@ -8022,6 +8079,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)if (!enable_apicv) vmx_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr =NULL ; +if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv ()) + enable_ipiv = false; +if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling ()) { kvm_has_tsc_control = true; kvm_max_tsc_scaling_ratio =KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX ;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +3
-0@@ -365,6 +365,9 @@ struct kvm_vmx {unsigned int tss_addr;bool ept_identity_pagetable_done;gpa_t ept_identity_map_addr; +/* PID table for IPI virtualization */ +u64 *pid_table; +u16 pid_last_index; };
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h struct kvm_vmx { · line 373
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +0
-0bool nested_vmx_allowed (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);I might have missed something, but overall looks good.
Thanks.
Re: [PATCH v6 7/9] KVM: VMX: enable IPI virtualization
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
static void
init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3
-0+struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu; +struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (vcpu->kvm); +if (nested)nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap ();@@ -4431,7 +4460,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls ())tertiary_exec_controls_set (vmx,vmx_tertiary_exec_control (vmx));
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) · line 4463
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1
-1-if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (&vmx->vcpu)) { +if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) {here too (pre-existing), I also not 100% sure that
kvm_vcpu_apicv_activeshould be used. I haven't studied APICv code that much to be 100% sure.
On second thoughts, I think you are correct. Below VMCS fields (i.e, EIO_EXIT_BITMAP0/1/2, POSTED_INTR_NV/DESC_ADDR) should be configured as long as the VM can enable APICv, particularly considering vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl() doesn't configure these VMCS fields when APICv gets activated.
This is a latent bug in KVM. We will fix it with a separate patch.
Quoted 6 lines
I think
kvm_vcpu_apicv_activeis better.The question is: If CPU supports a VMX feature (APICv), but it isn't enabled now, is it allowed to configure VMCS fields defined by the feature? Would CPU ignore the values written to the fields or retain them after enabling the feature later?
This concern is invalid. SDM doesn't mention any ordering requirement about configuring a feature's vm-execution bit and other VMCS fields introduced for the feature. Please disregard my original remark.
Quoted 21 lines
Personally, KVM shouldn't rely on CPU's behavior in this case. So, It is better for KVM to write below VMCS fields only if APICv is enabled.
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 ,0 );vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1 ,0 );vmcs_write64 (EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2 ,0 );@@ -4441,6 +4470,13 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)vmcs_write16 (POSTED_INTR_NV ,POSTED_INTR_VECTOR );vmcs_write64 (POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR ,__pa ((&vmx->pi_desc))); + +if (enable_ipiv) { +WRITE_ONCE (kvm_vmx->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id], +__pa (&vmx->pi_desc) |PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID ); +vmcs_write64 (PID_POINTER_TABLE ,__pa (kvm_vmx->pid_table)); +vmcs_write16 (LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX , kvm_vmx->pid_last_index); + } }
PATCH v6 8/9 KVM: x86: Allow userspace set maximum VCPU id for VM
In reply to Zeng GuangIntroduce new max_vcpu_id in KVM for x86 architecture. Userspace can assign maximum possible vcpu id for current VM session using KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID of KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl().
This is done for x86 only because the sole use case is to guide memory allocation for PID-pointer table, a structure needed to enable VMX IPI.
By default, max_vcpu_id set as KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS.
---
No new KVM capability is added to advertise the support of configurable maximum vCPU ID to user space because max_vcpu_id is just a hint/commitment to allow KVM to reduce the size of PID-pointer table. But I am not 100% sure if it is proper to do so.
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +6 -0
@@ -1233,6 +1233,12 @@ struct kvm_arch {hpa_t hv_root_tdp;spinlock_t hv_root_tdp_lock;#endif +/* +* VM-scope maximum vCPU ID. Used to determine the size of structures +* that increase along with the maximum vCPU ID, in which case, using +* the global KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS may lead to significant memory waste. +*/ +u32 max_vcpu_id; };struct kvm_vm_stat {
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +11 -0
@@ -5994,6 +5994,13 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, kvm->arch.exit_on_emulation_error = cap->args[0 ]; r =0 ;break ; +case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID : +if (cap->args[0 ] <=KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS ) { + kvm->arch.max_vcpu_id = cap->args[0 ]; + r =0 ; + }else + r = -E2BIG ; +break ;default : r = -EINVAL ;break ;
@@ -11067,6 +11074,9 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct page *page;int r; +if (vcpu->vcpu_id >= vcpu->kvm->arch.max_vcpu_id) +return -E2BIG ; + vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu =-1 ; vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~0 ; vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = ~0 ;
@@ -11589,6 +11599,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)spin_lock_init (&kvm->arch.hv_root_tdp_lock); kvm->arch.hv_root_tdp =INVALID_PAGE ;#endif + kvm->arch.max_vcpu_id =KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS ;INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&kvm->arch.kvmclock_update_work, kvmclock_update_fn);INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work, kvmclock_sync_fn);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 8/9] KVM: x86: Allow userspace set maximum VCPU id for VM
Quoted 68 lines · Zeng Guang
Introduce new
max_vcpu_idin KVM for x86 architecture. Userspace can assign maximum possible vcpu id for current VM session usingKVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_IDofKVM_ENABLE_CAPioctl().This is done for x86 only because the sole use case is to guide memory allocation for PID-pointer table, a structure needed to enable VMX IPI.
By default,
max_vcpu_idset asKVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS.Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>---
No new KVM capability is added to advertise the support of configurable maximum vCPU ID to user space becausemax_vcpu_idis just a hint/commitment to allow KVM to reduce the size of PID-pointer table. But I am not 100% sure if it is proper to do so.arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +6
-0@@ -1233,6 +1233,12 @@ struct kvm_arch {hpa_t hv_root_tdp;spinlock_t hv_root_tdp_lock;#endif +/* +* VM-scope maximum vCPU ID. Used to determine the size of structures +* that increase along with the maximum vCPU ID, in which case, using +* the global KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS may lead to significant memory waste. +*/ +u32 max_vcpu_id; };struct kvm_vm_stat {arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +10
-0@@ -5994,6 +5994,13 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, kvm->arch.exit_on_emulation_error = cap->args[0 ]; r =0 ;break ; +case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID : +if (cap->args[0 ] <=KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS ) { + kvm->arch.max_vcpu_id = cap->args[0 ]; + r =0 ; + }else + r = -E2BIG ; +break ;default : r = -EINVAL ;break ;@@ -11067,6 +11074,9 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct page *page;int r; +if (vcpu->vcpu_id >= vcpu->kvm->arch.max_vcpu_id) +return -E2BIG ; + vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu =-1 ; vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~0 ; vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = ~0 ;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type) · line 11605
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0@@ -11589,6 +11599,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)spin_lock_init (&kvm->arch.hv_root_tdp_lock); kvm->arch.hv_root_tdp =INVALID_PAGE ;#endif + kvm->arch.max_vcpu_id =KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS ;INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&kvm->arch.kvmclock_update_work, kvmclock_update_fn);INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work, kvmclock_sync_fn);
+ Reminder for myself to use this in AVIC code to as well to limit the size of the physid table. (The max size of the table (for now...) is 1 page (or 1/2 of page for non x2avic),
but still no doubt it takes some effort for microcode to scan all the unused entries in it for nothing (and soon my nested avic code will have to scan it as well).
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
PATCH v6 9/9 KVM: VMX: Optimize memory allocation for PID-pointer table
In reply to Zeng GuangCurrent kvm allocates 8 pages in advance for Posted Interrupt Descriptor pointer (PID-pointer) table to accommodate vCPUs with APIC ID up to KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS - 1. This policy wastes some memory because most of VMs have less than 512 vCPUs and then just need one page.
If user hypervisor specify max practical vcpu id prior to vCPU creation, IPIv can allocate only essential memory for PID-pointer table and reduce the memory footprint of VMs.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +30 -15
@@ -230,9 +230,6 @@ static const struct { };#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 - -/* PID(Posted-Interrupt Descriptor)-pointer table entry is 64-bit long */ -#define MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER get_order(KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS * sizeof(u64))#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
@@ -4434,6 +4431,24 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)return exec_control; } +static int vmx_alloc_pid_table (struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx) +{ +struct page *pages; + +if (kvm_vmx->pid_table) +return 0 ; + + pages =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, +get_order (kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_id *sizeof (u64))); + +if (!pages) +return -ENOMEM ; + + kvm_vmx->pid_table = (void *)page_address (pages); + kvm_vmx->pid_last_index = kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_id -1 ; +return 0 ; +} +#define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0static void init_vmcs (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
@@ -7159,6 +7174,16 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto free_vmcs; } +if (enable_ipiv &&kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) { +struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (vcpu->kvm); + +mutex_lock (&vcpu->kvm->lock); + err =vmx_alloc_pid_table (kvm_vmx); +mutex_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->lock); +if (err) + goto free_vmcs; + } +return 0 ; free_vmcs:
@@ -7202,17 +7227,6 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) } } -if (enable_ipiv) { -struct page *pages; - - pages =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER ); -if (!pages) -return -ENOMEM ; - -to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->pid_table = (void *)page_address (pages); -to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->pid_last_index =KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS -1 ; - } -return 0 ; }
@@ -7809,7 +7823,8 @@ static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (kvm);if (kvm_vmx->pid_table) -free_pages ((unsigned long )kvm_vmx->pid_table,MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER ); +free_pages ((unsigned long )kvm_vmx->pid_table, +get_order ((kvm_vmx->pid_last_index +1 ) *sizeof (u64))); }static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops__initdata = {
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v6 9/9] KVM: VMX: Optimize memory allocation for PID-pointer table
Quoted 57 lines · Zeng Guang
Current kvm allocates 8 pages in advance for Posted Interrupt Descriptor pointer (PID-pointer) table to accommodate vCPUs with APIC ID up to
KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS- 1. This policy wastes some memory because most of VMs have less than 512 vCPUs and then just need one page.If user hypervisor specify max practical vcpu id prior to vCPU creation, IPIv can allocate only essential memory for PID-pointer table and reduce the memory footprint of VMs.
Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +18
-3@@ -230,9 +230,6 @@ static const struct { };#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 - -/* PID(Posted-Interrupt Descriptor)-pointer table entry is 64-bit long */ -#define MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER get_order(KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS * sizeof(u64))#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;@@ -4434,6 +4431,24 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)return exec_control; } +static int vmx_alloc_pid_table (struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx) +{ +struct page *pages; + +if (kvm_vmx->pid_table) +return 0 ; + + pages =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, +get_order (kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_id *sizeof (u64))); + +if (!pages) +return -ENOMEM ; + + kvm_vmx->pid_table = (void *)page_address (pages); + kvm_vmx->pid_last_index = kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_id -1 ; +return 0 ; +} +#define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0static void init_vmcs (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)@@ -7159,6 +7174,16 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto free_vmcs; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 7185
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +9
-0+if (enable_ipiv &&kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) { +struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (vcpu->kvm); + +mutex_lock (&vcpu->kvm->lock); + err =vmx_alloc_pid_table (kvm_vmx); +mutex_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->lock); +if (err) + goto free_vmcs; + }
This could be dangerous. If APICv is temporary inhibited, this code won't run and we will end up without PID table.
I think that kvm_vcpu_apicv_active should be just dropped from this condition.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 32 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3
-12+return 0 ; free_vmcs:@@ -7202,17 +7227,6 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) } } -if (enable_ipiv) { -struct page *pages; - - pages =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER ); -if (!pages) -return -ENOMEM ; - -to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->pid_table = (void *)page_address (pages); -to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->pid_last_index =KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS -1 ; - } -return 0 ; }@@ -7809,7 +7823,8 @@ static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (kvm);if (kvm_vmx->pid_table) -free_pages ((unsigned long )kvm_vmx->pid_table,MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER ); +free_pages ((unsigned long )kvm_vmx->pid_table, +get_order ((kvm_vmx->pid_last_index +1 ) *sizeof (u64))); }static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops__initdata = {
Re: [PATCH v6 9/9] KVM: VMX: Optimize memory allocation for PID-pointer table
Quoted 72 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 57 lines · Zeng Guang
Current kvm allocates 8 pages in advance for Posted Interrupt Descriptor pointer (PID-pointer) table to accommodate vCPUs with APIC ID up to
KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS- 1. This policy wastes some memory because most of VMs have less than 512 vCPUs and then just need one page.If user hypervisor specify max practical vcpu id prior to vCPU creation, IPIv can allocate only essential memory for PID-pointer table and reduce the memory footprint of VMs.
Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +18
-3@@ -230,9 +230,6 @@ static const struct { };#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 - -/* PID(Posted-Interrupt Descriptor)-pointer table entry is 64-bit long */ -#define MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER get_order(KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS * sizeof(u64))#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;@@ -4434,6 +4431,24 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)return exec_control; } +static int vmx_alloc_pid_table (struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx) +{ +struct page *pages; + +if (kvm_vmx->pid_table) +return 0 ; + + pages =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, +get_order (kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_id *sizeof (u64))); + +if (!pages) +return -ENOMEM ; + + kvm_vmx->pid_table = (void *)page_address (pages); + kvm_vmx->pid_last_index = kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_id -1 ; +return 0 ; +} +#define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0static void init_vmcs (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)@@ -7159,6 +7174,16 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto free_vmcs; }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 7185
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +9
-0+if (enable_ipiv &&kvm_vcpu_apicv_active (vcpu)) { +struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx =to_kvm_vmx (vcpu->kvm); + +mutex_lock (&vcpu->kvm->lock); + err =vmx_alloc_pid_table (kvm_vmx); +mutex_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->lock); +if (err) + goto free_vmcs; + }This could be dangerous. If APICv is temporary inhibited, this code won't run and we will end up without PID table.
Quoted 2 lines
I think that
kvm_vcpu_apicv_activeshould be just dropped from this condition.
Agreed. Will fix it.