AARCH64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support
PATCH v2 1/1 AARCH64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support
Shadow call stacks will be available in GCC >= 12, this patch makes the corresponding kernel configuration available when compiling the kernel with the gcc.
Note that the implementation in GCC is slightly different from Clang. With SCS enabled, functions will only pop x30 once in the epilogue, like:
str x30, [x18], #8
stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
......
- ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 //clang + ldr x29, [sp], #16 //GCC ldr x30, [x18, #-8]!
---
FYI:
This function can be used to test if the shadow call stack works:
//noinline void __noscs scs_test(void)
noinline void scs_test(void)
{
unsigned long * lr = (unsigned long *)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1;
asm volatile("str xzr, [%0]\n\t": : "r"(lr) : "x30");
} ffff800008012770 <scs_test>:
ffff800008012770: d503245f bti c ffff800008012774: d503233f paciasp ffff800008012778: f800865e str x30, [x18], #8 ffff80000801277c: a9bf7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ffff800008012780: 910003fd mov x29, sp ffff800008012784: 910023a0 add x0, x29, #0x8 ffff800008012788: f900001f str xzr, [x0] ffff80000801278c: f85f8e5e ldr x30, [x18, #-8]! ffff800008012790: f84107fd ldr x29, [sp], #16 ffff800008012794: d50323bf autiasp ffff800008012798: d65f03c0 ret
If SCS protection is enabled, this function will return normally. If the function has __noscs attribute (scs disabled), it will crash due to 0 address access.
arch/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++--------- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/Kconfig +10 -9
@@ -599,21 +599,22 @@ config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK bool help - An architecture should select this if it supports Clang's Shadow - Call Stack and implements runtime support for shadow stack + An architecture should select this if it supports the compiler's + Shadow Call Stack and implements runtime support for shadow stack switching. config SHADOW_CALL_STACK - bool "Clang Shadow Call Stack" - depends on CC_IS_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK + bool "Shadow Call Stack" + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS || !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER help - This option enables Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a - shadow stack to protect function return addresses from being - overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found in - Clang's documentation: + This option enables the compiler's Shadow Call Stack, which + uses a shadow stack to protect function return addresses from + being overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found + in the compiler's documentation: - https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html + - Clang (https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html) + - GCC (https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options) Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ config HW_PERF_EVENTS config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT def_bool y -# Supported by clang >= 7.0 +# Supported by clang >= 7.0 or GCC >= 12.0.0 config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18)
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +4 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@#define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 4#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif +#if __has_attribute (__no_sanitize_address__)#define __no_sanitize_address __attribute__((no_sanitize_address))#else
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
arch/Kconfig config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG · line 617
Quoted 3 lines · Dan Li
arch/Kconfig +2
-0+ - Clang (https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html) + - GCC (https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options)
Maybe Clang: and GCC: instead of the parenthesis?
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h line 102
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +3
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif
Since both compilers have it, and I guess the #ifdef condition would work for both, could this be moved into compiler_types.h where the empty __noscs definition is, and remove the one from compiler-clang.h?
Cheers,
Miguel
Quoted 7 lines · Miguel Ojeda
arch/Kconfig config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG · line 617
Quoted 3 lines · Dan Li
arch/Kconfig +2
-0+ - Clang (https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html) + - GCC (https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options)Maybe Clang: and GCC: instead of the parenthesis?
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h line 102
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +3
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif Since both compilers have it, and I guess the
#ifdefcondition would work for both, could this be moved intocompiler_types.hwhere the empty__noscsdefinition is, and remove the one fromcompiler-clang.h?
I thought about that too, but I think it's less simple due to the __has_feature vs CONFIG differences, etc:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202202251243.1E38256F9@keescook/
But maybe __has_feature doesn't really matter here?
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook
I thought about that too, but I think it's less simple due to the
__has_featurevs CONFIG differences, etc:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202202251243.1E38256F9@keescook/But maybe
__has_featuredoesn't really matter here?
I have not tested it, but I was assuming the CONFIG could do its job, since it comes from testing the compiler flag.
If the __has_feature is actually restricting it more than that, then we should probably get the CONFIG fixed so that it only gets enabled when really it is going to be used.
Cheers,
Miguel
Quoted 7 lines · Miguel Ojeda
arch/Kconfig config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG · line 617
Quoted 3 lines · Dan Li
arch/Kconfig +2
-0+ - Clang (https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html) + - GCC (https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options)Maybe Clang: and GCC: instead of the parenthesis?
Got it.
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h line 102
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +3
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif Since both compilers have it, and I guess the
#ifdefcondition would work for both, could this be moved intocompiler_types.hwhere the empty__noscsdefinition is, and remove the one fromcompiler-clang.h?
In the clang documentation I see __has_feature(shadow_call_stack) is used to check if -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack is enabled, so I think maybe it's fine to use "#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK" instead of "#if __has_attribute(__no_sanitize_address__)" here, then move it to compiler_types.h.
And from the results of my local clang 12 compilation, this doesn't seem to be a problem.
Quoted 22 lines · Dan Li
Quoted 7 lines · Miguel Ojeda
arch/Kconfig config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG · line 617
Quoted 3 lines · Dan Li
arch/Kconfig +2
-0+ - Clang (https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html) + - GCC (https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options)Maybe Clang: and GCC: instead of the parenthesis?
Got it.
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h line 102
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +3
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif Since both compilers have it, and I guess the
#ifdefcondition would work for both, could this be moved intocompiler_types.hwhere the empty__noscsdefinition is, and remove the one fromcompiler-clang.h?
Quoted 5 lines
In the clang documentation I see
__has_feature(shadow_call_stack)is used to check if -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack is enabled, so I think maybe it's fine to use "#ifdefCONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK" instead of "#if__has_attribute(__no_sanitize_address__)" here, then move it tocompiler_types.h.
Or simply add a #define for __noscs to include/linux/compiler-gcc.h with appropriate guard and leave the existing #ifndef in include/linux/compiler_types.h as is. I'd prefer that when the compilers differ in terms of feature detection since it's as explicit as possible.
Quoted 5 lines
And from the results of my local clang 12 compilation, this doesn't seem to be a problem.
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, ~Nick Desaulniers
Quoted 16 lines · Nick Desaulniers
Quoted 9 lines · Dan Li
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h line 102
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +3
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif Since both compilers have it, and I guess the
#ifdefcondition would work for both, could this be moved intocompiler_types.hwhere the empty__noscsdefinition is, and remove the one fromcompiler-clang.h?Quoted 5 lines
In the clang documentation I see
__has_feature(shadow_call_stack)is used to check if -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack is enabled, so I think maybe it's fine to use "#ifdefCONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK" instead of "#if__has_attribute(__no_sanitize_address__)" here, then move it tocompiler_types.h.
Quoted 6 lines
Or simply add a #define for
__noscstoinclude/linux/compiler-gcc.hwith appropriate guard and leave the existing #ifndef ininclude/linux/compiler_types.has is. I'd prefer that when the compilers differ in terms of feature detection since it's as explicit as possible.
To make sure I understand correctly, that means I should keep the current patch unchanged right?
Thanks,
Dan.
Nick Desaulniers
Reviewed-byQuoted 27 lines · Dan Li
Quoted 16 lines · Nick Desaulniers
Quoted 9 lines · Dan Li
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h line 102
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +3
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif Since both compilers have it, and I guess the
#ifdefcondition would work for both, could this be moved intocompiler_types.hwhere the empty__noscsdefinition is, and remove the one fromcompiler-clang.h?Quoted 5 lines
In the clang documentation I see
__has_feature(shadow_call_stack)is used to check if -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack is enabled, so I think maybe it's fine to use "#ifdefCONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK" instead of "#if__has_attribute(__no_sanitize_address__)" here, then move it tocompiler_types.h.Quoted 6 lines
Or simply add a #define for
__noscstoinclude/linux/compiler-gcc.hwith appropriate guard and leave the existing #ifndef ininclude/linux/compiler_types.has is. I'd prefer that when the compilers differ in terms of feature detection since it's as explicit as possible.
Quoted 2 lines
To make sure I understand correctly, that means I should keep the current patch unchanged right?
Yes.
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, ~Nick Desaulniers
Quoted 6 lines · Nick Desaulniers
Or simply add a #define for
__noscstoinclude/linux/compiler-gcc.hwith appropriate guard and leave the existing #ifndef ininclude/linux/compiler_types.has is. I'd prefer that when the compilers differ in terms of feature detection since it's as explicit as possible.
The idea is to avoid differing here to begin with, i.e. to use the same code for both compilers (only whenever that is possible, of course), thus having a single #define in a single file.
Do you think we will have to change in the future for some reason, thus needing to split it again?
Cheers,
Miguel
From: Miguel Ojeda
Quoted 11 lines
Sent: 01 March 2022 09:29
Quoted 6 lines · Nick Desaulniers
Or simply add a #define for
__noscstoinclude/linux/compiler-gcc.hwith appropriate guard and leave the existing #ifndef ininclude/linux/compiler_types.has is. I'd prefer that when the compilers differ in terms of feature detection since it's as explicit as possible.
Quoted 6 lines
The idea is to avoid differing here to begin with, i.e. to use the same code for both compilers (only whenever that is possible, of course), thus having a single
#definein a single file.Do you think we will have to change in the future for some reason, thus needing to split it again?
What happens if an out of tree module is compiled with the other compiler? Surely this is part of the ABI and should be defined for the architecture?
David
-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)
Quoted 15 lines · Dan Li
Shadow call stacks will be available in GCC >= 12, this patch makes the corresponding kernel configuration available when compiling the kernel with the gcc.
Note that the implementation in GCC is slightly different from Clang. With SCS enabled, functions will only pop x30 once in the epilogue, like:
str x30, [x18], #8 stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ......(quoted diff) +1
-1- ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 //clang + ldr x29, [sp], #16 //GCC ldr x30, [x18, #-8]!
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Dan Li <[email protected]>
Thanks for the tweaks!
Quoted 10 lines
---
FYI:
This function can be used to test if the shadow call stack works:
//noinline void__noscsscs_test(void)
noinline voidscs_test(void){ unsigned long * lr = (unsigned long *)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1; asm volatile("str xzr, [%0]\n\t": : "r"(lr) : "x30"); }
Not a big deal, but just FYI, there's a lot of whitespace trailing the "}" above...
Quoted 14 lines
ffff800008012770<scs_test>:ffff800008012770: d503245f bti c ffff800008012774: d503233f paciasp ffff800008012778: f800865e str x30, [x18], #8 ffff80000801277c: a9bf7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ffff800008012780: 910003fd mov x29, sp ffff800008012784: 910023a0 add x0, x29, #0x8 ffff800008012788: f900001f str xzr, [x0] ffff80000801278c: f85f8e5e ldr x30, [x18, #-8]! ffff800008012790: f84107fd ldr x29, [sp], #16 ffff800008012794: d50323bf autiasp ffff800008012798: d65f03c0 ret
Quoted 3 lines
If SCS protection is enabled, this function will return normally. If the function has
__noscsattribute (scs disabled), it will crash due to 0 address access.
It would be cool to turn this into an LKDTM test... (see things like the CFI_FORWARD_PROTO test). I imagine this should be CFI_BACKWARD_SHADOW or something...
Also, I assume you're using real hardware to test this? It'd be nice to see if qemu can be convinced to run with the needed features. Whenever I've tried this it becomes impossibly slow. :)
Quoted 60 lines
arch/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++--------- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)arch/Kconfig +10
-9@@ -599,21 +599,22 @@ config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK bool help - An architecture should select this if it supports Clang's Shadow - Call Stack and implements runtime support for shadow stack + An architecture should select this if it supports the compiler's + Shadow Call Stack and implements runtime support for shadow stack switching. config SHADOW_CALL_STACK - bool "Clang Shadow Call Stack" - depends on CC_IS_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK + bool "Shadow Call Stack" + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS || !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER help - This option enables Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a - shadow stack to protect function return addresses from being - overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found in - Clang's documentation: + This option enables the compiler's Shadow Call Stack, which + uses a shadow stack to protect function return addresses from + being overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found + in the compiler's documentation: - https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html + - Clang (https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html) + - GCC (https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options) Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addressesarch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-1@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ config HW_PERF_EVENTS config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT def_bool y -# Supported by clang >= 7.0 +# Supported by clang >= 7.0 or GCC >= 12.0.0 config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18)include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +0
-0
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h line 102
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +3
-0@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@#define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 4#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif
I initially wondered if we need a separate __no_sanitize(STUFF) patch to make the compiler-clang.h macros easier, but I see there are places where we do multiple ("address", "hwaddress") and have specialized macros, so I think this is fine. And since GCC doesn't support "__has_feature", I think this is the correct location for this.
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +1
-0+#if __has_attribute (__no_sanitize_address__)#define __no_sanitize_address __attribute__((no_sanitize_address))#else Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 13 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 1 line · Dan Li
Signed-off-by Dan Li <[email protected]>Thanks for the tweaks!
Quoted 8 lines
---
FYI:
This function can be used to test if the shadow call stack works:
//noinline void__noscsscs_test(void)
noinline voidscs_test(void){ unsigned long * lr = (unsigned long *)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1;
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
asm volatile("str xzr, [%0]\n\t": : "r"(lr) : "x30"); }Not a big deal, but just FYI, there's a lot of whitespace trailing the "}" above...
Ah, sorry for the mistake.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
If SCS protection is enabled, this function will return normally. If the function has
__noscsattribute (scs disabled), it will crash due to 0 address access.It would be cool to turn this into an LKDTM test... (see things like the
CFI_FORWARD_PROTOtest). I imagine this should beCFI_BACKWARD_SHADOWor something...
OK, I'll add it in the next version.
Quoted 4 lines
Also, I assume you're using real hardware to test this? It'd be nice to see if qemu can be convinced to run with the needed features. Whenever I've tried this it becomes impossibly slow. :)
I also use qemu to test the patch (qemu 6.1.0 with command "-cpu max"), and can feel the performance drop.
Maybe because my test environment only has simple busybox and ltp, the feeling of a slow system running is not that strong for me :)
For comparison, I simply tested the difference in kernel boot time in my test environment:
//run qemu with "-cpu cortex-a57",
[ 1.254481] Run /linuxrc as init process //run qemu with "-cpu max" [ 3.566091] Run /linuxrc as init process
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +0
-0@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@#define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 4#endif
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h line 102
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +3
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif I initially wondered if we need a separate
__no_sanitize(STUFF)patch to make thecompiler-clang.hmacros easier, but I see there are places where we do multiple ("address", "hwaddress") and have specialized macros, so I think this is fine. And since GCC doesn't support "__has_feature", I think this is the correct location for this.
As in:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
I think maybe we could use "#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK" instead of "#if __has_attribute(__no_sanitize_address__)" here, then move it to compiler_types.h.
From my current test results, __noscs seems to work fine in clang compilation.
Thanks,
Dan.