Remove panic() from keyring init calls
Subsystems (3)
cover Remove panic() from keyring init calls
As suggested by Jarkko [1], let's remove the panic() calls from the keyring initializations. This series applies on top of commit c9e54f38976a ("integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true"), which also includes 50c486fe3108 ("certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring").
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/commit/?id=c9e54f38976a1c0ec69c0a6208b3fd55fceb01d1
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (2):
certs: Remove panic() calls from blacklist_init()
certs: Remove panic() calls from system_trusted_keyring_init()
certs/blacklist.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ certs/system_keyring.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
base-commit: c9e54f38976a1c0ec69c0a6208b3fd55fceb01d1
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
PATCH 1/2 certs: Remove panic() calls from blacklist_init()
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace panic() calls from device_initcall(blacklist_init) with proper error handling using -ENODEV.
--- certs/blacklist.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +21 -6
@@ -313,12 +313,16 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)const char *const *bl;struct key_restriction *restriction; -if (register_key_type (&key_type_blacklist) <0 ) -panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n" ); +if (register_key_type (&key_type_blacklist) <0 ) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + } restriction =kzalloc (sizeof (*restriction),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!restriction) -panic ("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n" ); +if (!restriction) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n" ); + goto err_restriction; + } restriction->check = restrict_link_for_blacklist; blacklist_keyring =
@@ -333,13 +337,24 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void) , KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP , restriction, NULL); -if (IS_ERR (blacklist_keyring)) -panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (blacklist_keyring)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n" ); + goto err_keyring; + }for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted (*bl) <0 )pr_err ("- blacklisting failed\n" );return 0 ; + + +err_keyring: +kfree (restriction); + +err_restriction: +unregister_key_type (&key_type_blacklist); + +return -ENODEV ; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] certs: Remove panic() calls from blacklist_init()
Quoted 5 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace
panic()calls fromdevice_initcall(blacklist_init)with proper error handling using-ENODEV.
Quoted 7 lines
Suggested-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> [1]Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
I'm not sure we can safely rely on a non-zero error code saving us in the care of failure, can we?
The blacklist_init() function is registered as an initcall via device_initcall() which I believe is either executed via do_init_module() in the case of a dynamic module load, or via do_initcalls() if built into the kernel. In either case the result is that the module/functionality doesn't load and the kernel continues on executing. While this could be acceptable for some non-critical modules, if this particular module fails to load it defeats the certificate/key based deny list for signed modules, yes?
I completely understand the strong desire to purge the kernel of panic()s, BUG()s, and the like, but if a critical piece of security functionality that users expect to be present fails to initialize, panic()ing is likely the right thing to do.
Quoted 50 lines
certs/blacklist.c +21
-6@@ -313,12 +313,16 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)const char *const *bl;struct key_restriction *restriction; -if (register_key_type (&key_type_blacklist) <0 ) -panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n" ); +if (register_key_type (&key_type_blacklist) <0 ) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + } restriction =kzalloc (sizeof (*restriction),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!restriction) -panic ("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n" ); +if (!restriction) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n" ); + goto err_restriction; + } restriction->check = restrict_link_for_blacklist; blacklist_keyring =@@ -333,13 +337,24 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void) , KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP , restriction, NULL); -if (IS_ERR (blacklist_keyring)) -panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (blacklist_keyring)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n" ); + goto err_keyring; + }for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted (*bl) <0 )pr_err ("- blacklisting failed\n" );return 0 ; + + +err_keyring: +kfree (restriction); + +err_restriction: +unregister_key_type (&key_type_blacklist); + +return -ENODEV ; }
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 1/2] certs: Remove panic() calls from blacklist_init()
Quoted 26 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 5 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace
panic()calls fromdevice_initcall(blacklist_init)with proper error handling using-ENODEV.Quoted 7 lines
Suggested-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> [1]Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)I'm not sure we can safely rely on a non-zero error code saving us in the care of failure, can we?
The
blacklist_init()function is registered as an initcall viadevice_initcall()which I believe is either executed viado_init_module()in the case of a dynamic module load, or viado_initcalls()if built into the kernel. In either case the result is that the module/functionality doesn't load and the kernel continues on executing. While this could be acceptable for some non-critical modules, if this particular module fails to load it defeats the certificate/key based deny list for signed modules, yes?
Quoted 4 lines
I completely understand the strong desire to purge the kernel of panic()s, BUG()s, and the like, but if a critical piece of security functionality that users expect to be present fails to initialize, panic()ing is likely the right thing to do.
OK, I get this.
What this function should have is this information documented in the header. Otherwise, this is just confusing.
BR, Jarkko
PATCH 2/2 certs: Remove panic() calls from system_trusted_keyring_init()
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace panic() calls from device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init) with proper error handling using -ENODEV.
--- certs/system_keyring.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
certs/system_keyring.c +20 -6
@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA , NULL, NULL); -if (IS_ERR (builtin_trusted_keys)) -panic ("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (builtin_trusted_keys)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + }#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING secondary_trusted_keys =
@@ -161,14 +163,26 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ,get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction (), NULL); -if (IS_ERR (secondary_trusted_keys)) -panic ("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (secondary_trusted_keys)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n" ); + goto err_secondary; + } -if (key_link (secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) <0 ) -panic ("Can't link trusted keyrings\n" ); +if (key_link (secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) <0 ) { +pr_err ("Can't link trusted keyrings\n" ); + goto err_link; + }#endif return 0 ; + +err_link: +key_put (secondary_trusted_keys); + +err_secondary: +key_put (builtin_trusted_keys); + +return -ENODEV ; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/2] certs: Remove panic() calls from system_trusted_keyring_init()
Quoted 64 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace
panic()calls fromdevice_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init)with proper error handling using-ENODEV.Suggested-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> [1]Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>--- certs/system_keyring.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)certs/system_keyring.c +20
-6@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA , NULL, NULL); -if (IS_ERR (builtin_trusted_keys)) -panic ("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (builtin_trusted_keys)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + }#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING secondary_trusted_keys =@@ -161,14 +163,26 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ,get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction (), NULL); -if (IS_ERR (secondary_trusted_keys)) -panic ("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (secondary_trusted_keys)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n" ); + goto err_secondary; + } -if (key_link (secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) <0 ) -panic ("Can't link trusted keyrings\n" ); +if (key_link (secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) <0 ) { +pr_err ("Can't link trusted keyrings\n" ); + goto err_link; + }#endif return 0 ; + +err_link: +key_put (secondary_trusted_keys); + +err_secondary: +key_put (builtin_trusted_keys); + +return -ENODEV ; }/* Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Changes make sense to me but you should implement all this to the original patch set.
BR, Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] certs: Remove panic() calls from system_trusted_keyring_init()
Quoted 61 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 60 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace
panic()calls fromdevice_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init)with proper error handling using-ENODEV.Suggested-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> [1]Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>--- certs/system_keyring.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)certs/system_keyring.c +20
-6@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA , NULL, NULL); -if (IS_ERR (builtin_trusted_keys)) -panic ("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (builtin_trusted_keys)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + }#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING secondary_trusted_keys =@@ -161,14 +163,26 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ,get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction (), NULL); -if (IS_ERR (secondary_trusted_keys)) -panic ("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (secondary_trusted_keys)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n" ); + goto err_secondary; + } -if (key_link (secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) <0 ) -panic ("Can't link trusted keyrings\n" ); +if (key_link (secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) <0 ) { +pr_err ("Can't link trusted keyrings\n" ); + goto err_link; + }#endif return 0 ; + +err_link: +key_put (secondary_trusted_keys); + +err_secondary: +key_put (builtin_trusted_keys); + +return -ENODEV ; }
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
certs/system_keyring.c +0
-0/* Signature · 1 line
2.35.1Changes make sense to me but you should implement all this to the original patch set.
You agreed to add this patch on top of the others a few days ago: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
What do you think about Paul's concerns?
Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] certs: Remove panic() calls from system_trusted_keyring_init()
Quoted 59 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 57 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 56 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace
panic()calls fromdevice_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init)with proper error handling using-ENODEV.Suggested-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> [1]Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>---
certs/system_keyring.c| 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)certs/system_keyring.c +4
-2@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH), KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys)) - panic("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n"); + if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys)) { + pr_err("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
secondary_trusted_keys=certs/system_keyring.c +16
-4@@ -161,14 +163,26 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(), NULL); - if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys)) - panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n"); + if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys)) { + pr_err("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n"); + goto err_secondary; + } - if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0) - panic("Can't link trusted keyrings\n"); + if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0) { + pr_err("Can't link trusted keyrings\n"); + goto err_link; + } #endif return 0; + +err_link: + key_put(secondary_trusted_keys); + +err_secondary: + key_put(builtin_trusted_keys); + + return -ENODEV;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
certs/system_keyring.c +0
-0} /*Signature · 1 line
2.35.1Changes make sense to me but you should implement all this to the original patch set.
Do you mean to squash these two patches together?
Quoted 5 lines
You agreed to add this patch on top of the others a few days ago: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
What do you think about Paul's concerns?
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/2] certs: Remove panic() calls from system_trusted_keyring_init()
Quoted 71 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 60 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 58 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 57 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace
panic()calls fromdevice_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init)with proper error handling using-ENODEV.Suggested-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> [1]Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>---
certs/system_keyring.c| 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)certs/system_keyring.c +4
-2@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH), KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys)) - panic("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n"); + if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys)) { + pr_err("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
secondary_trusted_keys=certs/system_keyring.c +16
-4@@ -161,14 +163,26 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(), NULL); - if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys)) - panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n"); + if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys)) { + pr_err("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n"); + goto err_secondary; + } - if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0) - panic("Can't link trusted keyrings\n"); + if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0) { + pr_err("Can't link trusted keyrings\n"); + goto err_link; + } #endif return 0; + +err_link: + key_put(secondary_trusted_keys); + +err_secondary: + key_put(builtin_trusted_keys); + + return -ENODEV; }Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
certs/system_keyring.c +0
-0/*Signature · 1 line
2.35.1Changes make sense to me but you should implement all this to the original
patch set.
Quoted 1 line
Do you mean to squash these two patches together?
You could squash function documentation to the corresponding patch addressing the use of panic() so that we know why things are done against normal status quo.
BR, Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/2] certs: Remove panic() calls from system_trusted_keyring_init()
In reply to Mickaël SalaünQuoted 67 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 56 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 55 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace
panic()calls fromdevice_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init)with proper error handling using-ENODEV.Suggested-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> [1]Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>--- certs/system_keyring.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)certs/system_keyring.c +20
-6@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA , NULL, NULL); -if (IS_ERR (builtin_trusted_keys)) -panic ("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (builtin_trusted_keys)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + }#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING secondary_trusted_keys =@@ -161,14 +163,26 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ,get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction (), NULL); -if (IS_ERR (secondary_trusted_keys)) -panic ("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (secondary_trusted_keys)) { +pr_err ("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n" ); + goto err_secondary; + } -if (key_link (secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) <0 ) -panic ("Can't link trusted keyrings\n" ); +if (key_link (secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) <0 ) { +pr_err ("Can't link trusted keyrings\n" ); + goto err_link; + }#endif return 0 ; + +err_link: +key_put (secondary_trusted_keys); + +err_secondary: +key_put (builtin_trusted_keys); + +return -ENODEV ;Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
certs/system_keyring.c +0
-0}/* Signature · 1 line
2.35.1Changes make sense to me but you should implement all this to the original patch set.
Quoted 3 lines
You agreed to add this patch on top of the others a few days ago: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
What do you think about Paul's concerns?
Yes, but I missed this part.
I think the right call would be to include Paul's concerns documented.
BR, Jarkko