Support microcode updates affecting SGX
v2 cover Support microcode updates affecting SGX
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
Changes since v1:
- Remove the sysfs file svnupdate. (Thomas Gleixner, Dave Hansen)
- Let late microcode load path call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure directly. (Borislav Petkov)
- Update cover letter by removing saying that "...triggered by administrators via sysfs...".
- Drop the patch for documentation change.
cover letter:
== General Microcode Background ==
Historically, microcode updates are applied by the BIOS or early in boot. In recent years, several trends have made these old approaches less palatable.
First, the cadence of microcode updates has increased to deliver security mitigations. Second, the value of those updates has increased, meaning that any delay in applying them is unacceptable. Third, users have become accustomed to approaches like hot patching their kernels and have a growing aversion to reboots in general.
Users want microcode updates to behave more like a hot patching a kernel and less like a BIOS update.
== SGX Attestation Background ==
SGX enclaves have an attestation mechanism. An enclave might, for instance, need to attest to its state before it is given a special decryption key. Since SGX must trust the CPU microcode, attestation incorporates the microcode versions of all processors on the system and is affected by microcode updates. This allows the entity to which the enclave is attesting to make deployment decisions based on the microcode version. For example, an enclave might be denied a decryption key if it runs on a system that has old microcode without a specific mitigation.
Unfortunately, this attestation metric (called CPUSVN) is only a snapshot. When the kernel first uses SGX (successfully executes any ENCLS instruction), SGX inspects all CPUs in the system and incorporates a record of their microcode versions into CPUSVN. Today, that value is locked and is not updated until a reboot.
== Problems ==
This means that, although the microcode may be update, enclaves can never attest to this fact. Enclaves are stuck attesting to the old version until a reboot.
Old enclaves created before the microcode update are presumed to be compromised must not be allowed to attest with the new microcode version.
== Solution ==
EUPDATESVN is a new SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a reboot.
Whenever a microcode update affects SGX, the SGX attestation architecture assumes that all running enclaves and cryptographic assets (like internal SGX encryption keys) have been compromised. To mitigate the impact of this presumed compromise, EUPDATESVN success requires that all SGX memory to be marked as "unused" and its contents destroyed. This requirement ensures that no compromised enclave can survive the EUPDATESVN procedure and provides an opportunity to generate new cryptographic assets.
This series implements the infrastructure needed to track and tear down bare-metal enclaves and then run EUPDATESVN, it will be called by the late microcode load path after the microcode update.
This is a very slow operation. It is, of course, exceedingly disruptive to enclaves but should be infrequent as microcode updates are released on the order of every few months. Also, this is not the first piece of the SGX architecture which will destroy all enclave contents.
A follow-on series will add Virtual EPC (KVM guest) support.
SGX Seamless should handle most SGX flows while doing SVN update, so, this RFC series is based on SGX EDMM v2 which introduces SGX2 flows.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/
Here is the spec for your reference:
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/648682?explicitVersion=true
Cathy Zhang (10):
x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC
pages
x86/sgx: Provide VA page non-NULL owner
x86/sgx: Save enclave pointer for VA page
x86/sgx: Keep record for SGX VA and Guest page type x86/sgx: Save the size of each EPC section
x86/sgx: Forced EPC page zapping for EUPDATESVN x86/sgx: Define error codes for ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] x86/sgx: Implement ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update x86/sgx: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] during SGX initialization
arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 46 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 16 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 23 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 9 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 46 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 53 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 460 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 22 ++ 10 files changed, 658 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH v2 1/10 x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages
== Background ==
EUPDATESVN is a new SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a reboot.
The SGX hardware maintains metadata for each enclave page to help enforce its security guarantees. This includes things like a record of the enclave to which the page belongs and the type of the page:
SGX metadata like "VA" or "SECS" pages, or regular enclave pages like those that store user data.
Before an EUPDATESVN operation can be successful, all SGX memory (aka. EPC) must be marked as "unused" in the SGX hardware metadata (aka, EPCM). The SGX microcode now maintains a reference count of pages which are unused to aid in determining when all pages reach the "unused" state.
Both bare-metal and KVM guest EPC must be made unused. To increase the chance of a successful EUPDATESVN, the kernel prevents existing enclaves from creating new, valid pages and prevents new enclave creation (creating an enclave involves initializing a "SECS" page).
The entire EUPDATESVN process is very slow since it potentially affects gigabytes of enclave memory. It can potentially take seconds or minutes to complete. Userspace may encounter -EBUSY errors during the update and is expected to retry.
== Patch contents ==
Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages.
Use a flag to indicate when SGX EPC pages are "locked", which means it's not allowed to allocate new EPC page for use. Check it in all paths that can initialize an EPC page. Use SRCU to ensure that the flag is visible across the system before proceeding with an update.
Add checks to all sites that call SGX instructions that can transition pages from unused to initialized to ensure that the SRCU lock is held.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 10 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 25 +++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 20 +++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +10 -0
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)/* Initialize an EPC page into an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) page. */ static inline int __ecreate (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *secs) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (ECREATE , pginfo, secs); }
@@ -154,6 +156,8 @@ static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr)*/ static inline int __eadd (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EADD , pginfo, addr); }
@@ -191,6 +195,8 @@ static inline int __etrack(void *addr)static inline int __eldu (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr,void *va) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_ret_3 (ELDU , pginfo, addr, va); }
@@ -205,6 +211,8 @@ static inline int __epa(void *addr) {unsigned long rbx =SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA ; +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EPA , rbx, addr); }
@@ -230,6 +238,8 @@ static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)/* Zero a page of EPC memory and add it to an initialized enclave. */ static inline int __eaug (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EAUG , pginfo, addr); }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +3 -0
@@ -104,4 +104,7 @@ static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash (u64 *lepubkeyhash); +extern struct srcu_struct sgx_lock_epc_srcu; +bool sgx_epc_is_locked (void ); +#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +23 -2
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)unsigned long phys_addr;struct sgx_encl *encl;vm_fault_t ret; +int srcu_idx; encl = vma->vm_private_data;
@@ -275,6 +276,12 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)if (unlikely (!encl))return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + } +/* * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and
@@ -283,14 +290,18 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)* enclave that will be checked for right away. */ if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ) && - (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) -return sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); + (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) { + ret =sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return ret; + }mutex_lock (&encl->lock); entry =sgx_encl_load_page (encl, addr);if (IS_ERR (entry)) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (PTR_ERR (entry) == -EBUSY )return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ;
@@ -315,12 +326,14 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));if (ret !=VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; }sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young (vma->vm_mm, entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ; }
@@ -513,6 +526,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,struct sgx_encl_page *entry =NULL ;char data[sizeof (unsigned long )];unsigned long align; +int srcu_idx;int offset;int cnt;int ret =0 ;
@@ -529,6 +543,12 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,return -EFAULT ;for (i =0 ; i < len; i += cnt) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out; + } + entry =sgx_encl_reserve_page (encl, (addr + i) &PAGE_MASK );if (IS_ERR (entry)) { ret =PTR_ERR (entry);
@@ -555,6 +575,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, out:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (ret)break ;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +49 -1
150 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +37 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ static int sgx_nr_epc_sections;static struct task_struct *ksgxd_tsk;static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (ksgxd_waitq);static DEFINE_XARRAY (sgx_epc_address_space); +/* +* The flag sgx_epc_locked prevents any new SGX flows that +* may attempt to allocate a new EPC page. +*/ +static bool __rcu sgx_epc_locked; +/* +* By synchronizing around sgx_epc_locked SRCU ensures that any executing +* SGX flows have completed before proceeding with an SVN update. New SGX flows +* will be prevented from starting during an SVN update. +*/ +DEFINE_SRCU (sgx_lock_epc_srcu);/* * These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed
@@ -378,6 +389,8 @@ void sgx_direct_reclaim(void)static int ksgxd (void *p) { +int srcu_idx; +set_freezable ();/*
@@ -398,9 +411,15 @@ static int ksgxd(void *p)kthread_should_stop () || sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES)); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) + goto maybe_resched; +if (sgx_should_reclaim (SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES ))sgx_reclaim_pages (); +maybe_resched: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);cond_resched (); }
@@ -943,3 +962,21 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void) }device_initcall (sgx_init); + +static void sgx_lock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = true; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +static void sgx_unlock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = false; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +bool sgx_epc_is_locked (void ) +{ +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return sgx_epc_locked; +}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +20 -0
@@ -75,10 +75,21 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vepc_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct sgx_vepc *vepc = vma->vm_private_data; +int srcu_idx;int ret;mutex_lock (&vepc->lock); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); + +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out_unlock; + } + ret =__sgx_vepc_fault (vepc, vma, vmf->address); + +out_unlock: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);mutex_unlock (&vepc->lock);if (!ret)
@@ -331,6 +342,7 @@ int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)int sgx_virt_ecreate (struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,void __user *secs,int *trapnr) { +int srcu_idx;int ret;/*
@@ -347,6 +359,12 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!access_ok (secs,PAGE_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } +__uaccess_begin (); ret =__ecreate (pageinfo, (void *)secs);__uaccess_end ();
@@ -356,6 +374,8 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,return -EFAULT ; } +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +/* ECREATE doesn't return an error code, it faults or succeeds. */ WARN_ON_ONCE (ret);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages
Quoted 497 lines · Cathy Zhang
== Background ==
EUPDATESVN is a new SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a reboot.
The SGX hardware maintains metadata for each enclave page to help enforce its security guarantees. This includes things like a record of the enclave to which the page belongs and the type of the page:
SGX metadata like "VA" or "SECS" pages, or regular enclave pages like those that store user data.Before an EUPDATESVN operation can be successful, all SGX memory (aka. EPC) must be marked as "unused" in the SGX hardware metadata (aka, EPCM). The SGX microcode now maintains a reference count of pages which are unused to aid in determining when all pages reach the "unused" state.
Both bare-metal and KVM guest EPC must be made unused. To increase the chance of a successful EUPDATESVN, the kernel prevents existing enclaves from creating new, valid pages and prevents new enclave creation (creating an enclave involves initializing a "SECS" page).
The entire EUPDATESVN process is very slow since it potentially affects gigabytes of enclave memory. It can potentially take seconds or minutes to complete. Userspace may encounter
-EBUSYerrors during the update and is expected to retry.== Patch contents ==
Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages.
Use a flag to indicate when SGX EPC pages are "locked", which means it's not allowed to allocate new EPC page for use. Check it in all paths that can initialize an EPC page. Use SRCU to ensure that the flag is visible across the system before proceeding with an update.
Add checks to all sites that call SGX instructions that can transition pages from unused to initialized to ensure that the SRCU lock is held.
Signed-off-by Cathy Zhang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 10 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 25 +++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 20 +++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +10
-0@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)/* Initialize an EPC page into an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) page. */ static inline int __ecreate (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *secs) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (ECREATE , pginfo, secs); }@@ -154,6 +156,8 @@ static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr)*/ static inline int __eadd (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EADD , pginfo, addr); }@@ -191,6 +195,8 @@ static inline int __etrack(void *addr)static inline int __eldu (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr,void *va) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_ret_3 (ELDU , pginfo, addr, va); }@@ -205,6 +211,8 @@ static inline int __epa(void *addr) {unsigned long rbx =SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA ; +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EPA , rbx, addr); }@@ -230,6 +238,8 @@ static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)/* Zero a page of EPC memory and add it to an initialized enclave. */ static inline int __eaug (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EAUG , pginfo, addr); }arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +3
-0@@ -104,4 +104,7 @@ static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash (u64 *lepubkeyhash); +extern struct srcu_struct sgx_lock_epc_srcu; +bool sgx_epc_is_locked (void ); +#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +23
-2@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)unsigned long phys_addr;struct sgx_encl *encl;vm_fault_t ret; +int srcu_idx; encl = vma->vm_private_data;@@ -275,6 +276,12 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)if (unlikely (!encl))return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + } +/* * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and @@ -283,14 +290,18 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)* enclave that will be checked for right away. */ if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ) && - (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) -return sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); + (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) { + ret =sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return ret; + }mutex_lock (&encl->lock); entry =sgx_encl_load_page (encl, addr);if (IS_ERR (entry)) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (PTR_ERR (entry) == -EBUSY )return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ;@@ -315,12 +326,14 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));if (ret !=VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; }sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young (vma->vm_mm, entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ; }@@ -513,6 +526,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,struct sgx_encl_page *entry =NULL ;char data[sizeof (unsigned long )];unsigned long align; +int srcu_idx;int offset;int cnt;int ret =0 ;@@ -529,6 +543,12 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,return -EFAULT ;for (i =0 ; i < len; i += cnt) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out; + } + entry =sgx_encl_reserve_page (encl, (addr + i) &PAGE_MASK );if (IS_ERR (entry)) { ret =PTR_ERR (entry);@@ -555,6 +575,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, out:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (ret)break ;arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +49
-1@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create (struct sgx_encl *encl,void __user *arg) {struct sgx_enclave_create create_arg; +int srcu_idx;void *secs;int ret;@@ -162,9 +163,18 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)if (copy_from_user (secs, (void __user *)create_arg.src,PAGE_SIZE )) ret = -EFAULT ; -else +else { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + ret =sgx_encl_create (encl, secs); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); + } +kfree (secs);return ret; }@@ -444,6 +454,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg;struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;unsigned long c; +int srcu_idx;int ret; if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) ||@@ -477,8 +488,18 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)if (need_resched ())cond_resched (); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +break ; + } + ret =sgx_encl_add_page (encl, add_arg.src + c, add_arg.offset + c, &secinfo, add_arg.flags); + +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +if (ret)break ; }@@ -952,6 +973,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;memset (&secinfo,0 ,sizeof (secinfo));@@ -960,6 +982,12 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, vm_prot =vm_prot_from_secinfo (secinfo_perm);for (c =0 ; c < modp->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1049,6 +1077,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (entry->epc_page);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1060,6 +1089,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (entry->epc_page); out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: modp->count = c;@@ -1143,6 +1173,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl *encl,unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;/* @@ -1156,6 +1187,12 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl *encl, secinfo.flags = page_type <<8 ;for (c =0 ; c < modt->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1255,6 +1292,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl *encl, entry->type = page_type;mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1265,6 +1303,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl *encl, entry->vm_run_prot_bits = run_prot_restore; out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: modt->count = c;@@ -1350,12 +1389,19 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;memset (&secinfo,0 ,sizeof (secinfo)); secinfo.flags =SGX_SECINFO_R |SGX_SECINFO_W |SGX_SECINFO_X ;for (c =0 ; c < params->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1411,6 +1457,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,kfree (entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1418,6 +1465,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: params->count = c;arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +37
-0@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ static int sgx_nr_epc_sections;static struct task_struct *ksgxd_tsk;static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (ksgxd_waitq);static DEFINE_XARRAY (sgx_epc_address_space); +/* +* The flag sgx_epc_locked prevents any new SGX flows that +* may attempt to allocate a new EPC page. +*/ +static bool __rcu sgx_epc_locked; +/* +* By synchronizing around sgx_epc_locked SRCU ensures that any executing +* SGX flows have completed before proceeding with an SVN update. New SGX flows +* will be prevented from starting during an SVN update. +*/ +DEFINE_SRCU (sgx_lock_epc_srcu);/* * These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed @@ -378,6 +389,8 @@ void sgx_direct_reclaim(void)static int ksgxd (void *p) { +int srcu_idx; +set_freezable ();/* @@ -398,9 +411,15 @@ static int ksgxd(void *p)kthread_should_stop () || sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES)); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) + goto maybe_resched; +if (sgx_should_reclaim (SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES ))sgx_reclaim_pages (); +maybe_resched: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);cond_resched (); }@@ -943,3 +962,21 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void) }device_initcall (sgx_init); + +static void sgx_lock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = true; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +static void sgx_unlock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = false; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +bool sgx_epc_is_locked (void ) +{ +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return sgx_epc_locked; +}arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +20
-0@@ -75,10 +75,21 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vepc_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct sgx_vepc *vepc = vma->vm_private_data; +int srcu_idx;int ret;mutex_lock (&vepc->lock); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); + +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out_unlock; + } + ret =__sgx_vepc_fault (vepc, vma, vmf->address); + +out_unlock: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);mutex_unlock (&vepc->lock);if (!ret)@@ -331,6 +342,7 @@ int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)int sgx_virt_ecreate (struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,void __user *secs,int *trapnr) { +int srcu_idx;int ret;/* @@ -347,6 +359,12 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!access_ok (secs,PAGE_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } +__uaccess_begin (); ret =__ecreate (pageinfo, (void *)secs);__uaccess_end ();@@ -356,6 +374,8 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,return -EFAULT ; } +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +/* ECREATE doesn't return an error code, it faults or succeeds. */ WARN_ON_ONCE (ret);return 0 ;Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
This series is broken. It does not apply on top of tip/x86/sgx. Also you forgot CC to me.
BR, Jarkko
RE: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 524 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2022 12:13 PM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesQuoted 39 lines · Cathy Zhang
== Background ==
EUPDATESVN is a new SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a reboot.
The SGX hardware maintains metadata for each enclave page to help enforce its security guarantees. This includes things like a record of the enclave to which the page belongs and the type of the page:
SGX metadata like "VA" or "SECS" pages, or regular enclave pages like those that store user data.Before an EUPDATESVN operation can be successful, all SGX memory (aka. EPC) must be marked as "unused" in the SGX hardware metadata (aka, EPCM). The SGX microcode now maintains a reference count of pages which are unused to aid in determining when all pages reach the "unused" state.
Both bare-metal and KVM guest EPC must be made unused. To increase the chance of a successful EUPDATESVN, the kernel prevents existing enclaves from creating new, valid pages and prevents new enclave creation (creating an enclave involves initializing a "SECS" page).
The entire EUPDATESVN process is very slow since it potentially affects gigabytes of enclave memory. It can potentially take seconds or minutes to complete. Userspace may encounter
-EBUSYerrors during the update and is expected to retry.== Patch contents ==
Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages.
Use a flag to indicate when SGX EPC pages are "locked", which means it's not allowed to allocate new EPC page for use. Check it in all paths that can initialize an EPC page. Use SRCU to ensure that the flag is visible across the system before proceeding with an update.
Add checks to all sites that call SGX instructions that can transition pages from unused to initialized to ensure that the SRCU lock is held.
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Cathy Zhang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 10 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 25 +++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c| 50++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault
Quoted 67 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c| 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c| 20 +++++++++++++6 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.hindex99004b02e2ed..3f1797ec2445100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +0
-0@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)/* Initialize an EPC page into an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) page. */ static inline int
__ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs){arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +10
-0+lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (ECREATE , pginfo, secs); }@@ -154,6 +156,8 @@ static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr)*/ static inline int __eadd (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EADD , pginfo, addr); }@@ -191,6 +195,8 @@ static inline int __etrack(void *addr) staticinline int __eldu (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr,void *va) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_ret_3 (ELDU , pginfo, addr, va); }@@ -205,6 +211,8 @@ static inline int __epa(void *addr) {unsigned long rbx =SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA ; +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EPA , rbx, addr); }@@ -230,6 +238,8 @@ static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)/* Zero a page of EPC memory and add it to an initialized enclave. */ static inline int __eaug (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EAUG , pginfo, addr); }(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.hindex85cbf103b0dd..dc8cb58100e3100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +3
-0@@ -104,4 +104,7 @@ static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash (u64 *lepubkeyhash); +extern struct srcu_struct sgx_lock_epc_srcu;bool +sgx_epc_is_locked (void ); +#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ (quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.cindexa0255d41e075..d2b428992910100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +0
-0@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault*vmf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0unsigned long phys_addr;struct sgx_encl *encl;vm_fault_t ret; +int srcu_idx; encl = vma->vm_private_data;@@ -275,6 +276,12 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault*vmf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault
Quoted 34 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +12
-3if (unlikely (!encl))return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + } +/* * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and @@ -283,14 +290,18 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) * enclave that will be checked for right away. */ if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ) && - (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) -return sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); + (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) { + ret =sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return ret; + }mutex_lock (&encl->lock); entry =sgx_encl_load_page (encl, addr);if (IS_ERR (entry)) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (PTR_ERR (entry) == -EBUSY )return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ;@@ -315,12 +326,14 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault*vmf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2
-0vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));if (ret !=VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; }sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young (vma->vm_mm, entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ; }@@ -513,6 +526,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct*vma, unsigned long addr,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0struct sgx_encl_page *entry =NULL ;char data[sizeof (unsigned long )];unsigned long align; +int srcu_idx;int offset;int cnt;int ret =0 ;@@ -529,6 +543,12 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct*vma, unsigned long addr,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +6
-0return -EFAULT ;for (i =0 ; i < len; i += cnt) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out; + } + entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) &
PAGE_MASK);arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct
Quoted 46 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0if (IS_ERR (entry)) { ret =PTR_ERR (entry);@@ -555,6 +575,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, out: mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (ret)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +0
-0break ;(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.cindexd8c3c07badb3..da3b569a10bd100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl,struct
sgx_secs*secs) static longsgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg){arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +11
-1struct sgx_enclave_create create_arg; +int srcu_idx;void *secs;int ret;@@ -162,9 +163,18 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)if (copy_from_user (secs, (void __user *)create_arg.src,PAGE_SIZE )) ret = -EFAULT ; -else +else { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + ret =sgx_encl_create (encl, secs); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); + } +kfree (secs);return ret;}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0@@ -444,6 +454,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl, void__user*arg)Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg;struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;unsigned long c; +int srcu_idx;int ret; if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) || @@ -477,8 +488,18@@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl, void
__user*arg)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0if (need_resched ())cond_resched (); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +break ; + } + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, add_arg.src + c,add_arg.offset + c,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +3
-0&secinfo, add_arg.flags); + +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +if (ret)break ; }@@ -952,6 +973,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
Quoted 30 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret; memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); @@ -960,6 +982,12 @@ staticlong sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0vm_prot =vm_prot_from_secinfo (secinfo_perm);for (c =0 ; c < modp->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1049,6 +1077,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (entry->epc_page);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); }arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0ret =0 ;@@ -1060,6 +1089,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (entry->epc_page); out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: modp->count = c;@@ -1143,6 +1173,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;/* @@ -1156,6 +1187,12 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6
-0secinfo.flags = page_type <<8 ;for (c =0 ; c < modt->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1255,6 +1292,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0entry->type = page_type;mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1265,6 +1303,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0entry->vm_run_prot_bits = run_prot_restore; out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: modt->count = c;@@ -1350,12 +1389,19 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
Quoted 20 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;memset (&secinfo,0 ,sizeof (secinfo)); secinfo.flags =SGX_SECINFO_R |SGX_SECINFO_W |SGX_SECINFO_X ;for (c =0 ; c < params->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1411,6 +1457,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl,Quoted 50 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2
-0kfree (entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1418,6 +1465,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(structsgx_encl *encl, out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: params->count = c;(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.cindex545da16bb3ea..99c86b77ca8f100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +13
-0@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ static int sgx_nr_epc_sections; static structtask_struct *ksgxd_tsk;static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (ksgxd_waitq);static DEFINE_XARRAY (sgx_epc_address_space); +/* +* The flag sgx_epc_locked prevents any new SGX flows that +* may attempt to allocate a new EPC page. +*/ +static bool __rcu sgx_epc_locked; +/* +* By synchronizing around sgx_epc_locked SRCU ensures that any +executing +* SGX flows have completed before proceeding with an SVN update. New +SGX flows +* will be prevented from starting during an SVN update. +*/ +DEFINE_SRCU (sgx_lock_epc_srcu);/* * These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed @@ -378,6 +389,8 @@ void
sgx_direct_reclaim(void)static int
ksgxd(void *p)
{arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +2
-0+int srcu_idx; +set_freezable ();/* arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static int ksgxd(void *p) · line 412
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0
-0@@ -398,9 +411,15 @@ static int ksgxd(void *p) kthread_should_stop() ||
sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES));arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,
Quoted 70 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +24
-0+ srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) + goto maybe_resched; +if (sgx_should_reclaim (SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES ))sgx_reclaim_pages (); +maybe_resched: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);cond_resched (); }@@ -943,3 +962,21 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void) }device_initcall (sgx_init); + +static void sgx_lock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = true; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +static void sgx_unlock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = false; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +bool sgx_epc_is_locked (void ) +{ +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return sgx_epc_locked; +}(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.cindex6a77a14eee38..e953816d7c8b100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +12
-0@@ -75,10 +75,21 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vepc_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct sgx_vepc *vepc = vma->vm_private_data; +int srcu_idx;int ret;mutex_lock (&vepc->lock); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); + +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out_unlock; + } + ret =__sgx_vepc_fault (vepc, vma, vmf->address); + +out_unlock: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);mutex_unlock (&vepc->lock);if (!ret)@@ -331,6 +342,7 @@ int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs, int *trapnr) { + int srcu_idx;int ret;/* @@ -347,6 +359,12 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,void
__user*secs,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +6
-0if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!access_ok (secs,PAGE_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } +__uaccess_begin (); ret =__ecreate (pageinfo, (void *)secs);__uaccess_end ();@@ -356,6 +374,8 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,void
__user*secs,Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +0
-0return -EFAULT ; }
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +2
-1+srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +/* ECREATE doesn't return an error code, it faults or succeeds. */ WARN_ON_ONCE (ret);return 0 ; --2.17.1
This series is broken. It does not apply on top of tip/x86/sgx. Also you forgot CC to me.
I'm sincerely sorry for not cc to you, I'm aware of that after sending out :- )
Yes, it requires to apply the following SGX2 v2 patches to tip/x86/sgx, prior to this series. As I mentioned in cover letter, SGX2 introduces new SGX instructions and flows, which should be handled during SVN update.
The v2 of SGX2 support patch set, with 32 patches in total, refer to the cover letter:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
The two additional patches SGX2 support requires:
"x86/sgx: Add poison handling to reclaimer"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/dcc95eb2aaefb042527ac50d0a50738c7c160dac.1643830353.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/b5e9f218064aa76e3026f778e1ad0a1d823e3db8.1643133224.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
Quoted 2 lines
BR, Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages
Quoted 538 lines · Cathy
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 524 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2022 12:13 PM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesQuoted 39 lines · Cathy Zhang
== Background ==
EUPDATESVN is a new SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a reboot.
The SGX hardware maintains metadata for each enclave page to help enforce its security guarantees. This includes things like a record of the enclave to which the page belongs and the type of the page:
SGX metadata like "VA" or "SECS" pages, or regular enclave pages like those that store user data.Before an EUPDATESVN operation can be successful, all SGX memory (aka. EPC) must be marked as "unused" in the SGX hardware metadata (aka, EPCM). The SGX microcode now maintains a reference count of pages which are unused to aid in determining when all pages reach the "unused" state.
Both bare-metal and KVM guest EPC must be made unused. To increase the chance of a successful EUPDATESVN, the kernel prevents existing enclaves from creating new, valid pages and prevents new enclave creation (creating an enclave involves initializing a "SECS" page).
The entire EUPDATESVN process is very slow since it potentially affects gigabytes of enclave memory. It can potentially take seconds or minutes to complete. Userspace may encounter
-EBUSYerrors during the update and is expected to retry.== Patch contents ==
Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages.
Use a flag to indicate when SGX EPC pages are "locked", which means it's not allowed to allocate new EPC page for use. Check it in all paths that can initialize an EPC page. Use SRCU to ensure that the flag is visible across the system before proceeding with an update.
Add checks to all sites that call SGX instructions that can transition pages from unused to initialized to ensure that the SRCU lock is held.
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Cathy Zhang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 10 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 25 +++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c| 50++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault
Quoted 67 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c| 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c| 20 +++++++++++++6 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.hindex99004b02e2ed..3f1797ec2445100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +0
-0@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)/* Initialize an EPC page into an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) page. */ static inline int
__ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs){arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +10
-0+lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (ECREATE , pginfo, secs); }@@ -154,6 +156,8 @@ static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr)*/ static inline int __eadd (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EADD , pginfo, addr); }@@ -191,6 +195,8 @@ static inline int __etrack(void *addr) staticinline int __eldu (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr,void *va) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_ret_3 (ELDU , pginfo, addr, va); }@@ -205,6 +211,8 @@ static inline int __epa(void *addr) {unsigned long rbx =SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA ; +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EPA , rbx, addr); }@@ -230,6 +238,8 @@ static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)/* Zero a page of EPC memory and add it to an initialized enclave. */ static inline int __eaug (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EAUG , pginfo, addr); }(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.hindex85cbf103b0dd..dc8cb58100e3100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +3
-0@@ -104,4 +104,7 @@ static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash (u64 *lepubkeyhash); +extern struct srcu_struct sgx_lock_epc_srcu;bool +sgx_epc_is_locked (void ); +#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ (quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.cindexa0255d41e075..d2b428992910100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +0
-0@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault*vmf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0unsigned long phys_addr;struct sgx_encl *encl;vm_fault_t ret; +int srcu_idx; encl = vma->vm_private_data;@@ -275,6 +276,12 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault*vmf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault
Quoted 34 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +12
-3if (unlikely (!encl))return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + } +/* * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and @@ -283,14 +290,18 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) * enclave that will be checked for right away. */ if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ) && - (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) -return sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); + (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) { + ret =sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return ret; + }mutex_lock (&encl->lock); entry =sgx_encl_load_page (encl, addr);if (IS_ERR (entry)) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (PTR_ERR (entry) == -EBUSY )return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ;@@ -315,12 +326,14 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault*vmf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2
-0vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));if (ret !=VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; }sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young (vma->vm_mm, entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ; }@@ -513,6 +526,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct*vma, unsigned long addr,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0struct sgx_encl_page *entry =NULL ;char data[sizeof (unsigned long )];unsigned long align; +int srcu_idx;int offset;int cnt;int ret =0 ;@@ -529,6 +543,12 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct*vma, unsigned long addr,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +6
-0return -EFAULT ;for (i =0 ; i < len; i += cnt) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out; + } + entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) &
PAGE_MASK);arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct
Quoted 46 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0if (IS_ERR (entry)) { ret =PTR_ERR (entry);@@ -555,6 +575,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, out: mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (ret)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +0
-0break ;(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.cindexd8c3c07badb3..da3b569a10bd100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl,struct
sgx_secs*secs) static longsgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg){arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +11
-1struct sgx_enclave_create create_arg; +int srcu_idx;void *secs;int ret;@@ -162,9 +163,18 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)if (copy_from_user (secs, (void __user *)create_arg.src,PAGE_SIZE )) ret = -EFAULT ; -else +else { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + ret =sgx_encl_create (encl, secs); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); + } +kfree (secs);return ret;}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0@@ -444,6 +454,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl, void__user*arg)Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg;struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;unsigned long c; +int srcu_idx;int ret; if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) || @@ -477,8 +488,18@@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl, void
__user*arg)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0if (need_resched ())cond_resched (); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +break ; + } + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, add_arg.src + c,add_arg.offset + c,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +3
-0&secinfo, add_arg.flags); + +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +if (ret)break ; }@@ -952,6 +973,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
Quoted 30 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret; memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); @@ -960,6 +982,12 @@ staticlong sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0vm_prot =vm_prot_from_secinfo (secinfo_perm);for (c =0 ; c < modp->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1049,6 +1077,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (entry->epc_page);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); }arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0ret =0 ;@@ -1060,6 +1089,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (entry->epc_page); out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: modp->count = c;@@ -1143,6 +1173,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;/* @@ -1156,6 +1187,12 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6
-0secinfo.flags = page_type <<8 ;for (c =0 ; c < modt->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1255,6 +1292,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0entry->type = page_type;mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1265,6 +1303,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0entry->vm_run_prot_bits = run_prot_restore; out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: modt->count = c;@@ -1350,12 +1389,19 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
Quoted 20 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;memset (&secinfo,0 ,sizeof (secinfo)); secinfo.flags =SGX_SECINFO_R |SGX_SECINFO_W |SGX_SECINFO_X ;for (c =0 ; c < params->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1411,6 +1457,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl,Quoted 50 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2
-0kfree (entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1418,6 +1465,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(structsgx_encl *encl, out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: params->count = c;(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.cindex545da16bb3ea..99c86b77ca8f100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +13
-0@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ static int sgx_nr_epc_sections; static structtask_struct *ksgxd_tsk;static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (ksgxd_waitq);static DEFINE_XARRAY (sgx_epc_address_space); +/* +* The flag sgx_epc_locked prevents any new SGX flows that +* may attempt to allocate a new EPC page. +*/ +static bool __rcu sgx_epc_locked; +/* +* By synchronizing around sgx_epc_locked SRCU ensures that any +executing +* SGX flows have completed before proceeding with an SVN update. New +SGX flows +* will be prevented from starting during an SVN update. +*/ +DEFINE_SRCU (sgx_lock_epc_srcu);/* * These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed @@ -378,6 +389,8 @@ void
sgx_direct_reclaim(void)static int
ksgxd(void *p)
{arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +2
-0+int srcu_idx; +set_freezable ();/* arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static int ksgxd(void *p) · line 412
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0
-0@@ -398,9 +411,15 @@ static int ksgxd(void *p) kthread_should_stop() ||
sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES));arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,
Quoted 70 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +24
-0+ srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) + goto maybe_resched; +if (sgx_should_reclaim (SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES ))sgx_reclaim_pages (); +maybe_resched: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);cond_resched (); }@@ -943,3 +962,21 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void) }device_initcall (sgx_init); + +static void sgx_lock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = true; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +static void sgx_unlock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = false; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +bool sgx_epc_is_locked (void ) +{ +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return sgx_epc_locked; +}(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.cindex6a77a14eee38..e953816d7c8b100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +12
-0@@ -75,10 +75,21 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vepc_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct sgx_vepc *vepc = vma->vm_private_data; +int srcu_idx;int ret;mutex_lock (&vepc->lock); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); + +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out_unlock; + } + ret =__sgx_vepc_fault (vepc, vma, vmf->address); + +out_unlock: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);mutex_unlock (&vepc->lock);if (!ret)@@ -331,6 +342,7 @@ int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs, int *trapnr) { + int srcu_idx;int ret;/* @@ -347,6 +359,12 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,void
__user*secs,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +6
-0if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!access_ok (secs,PAGE_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } +__uaccess_begin (); ret =__ecreate (pageinfo, (void *)secs);__uaccess_end ();@@ -356,6 +374,8 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,void
__user*secs,Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +0
-0return -EFAULT ; }Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +2
-1+srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +/* ECREATE doesn't return an error code, it faults or succeeds. */ WARN_ON_ONCE (ret);return 0 ; --2.17.1
This series is broken. It does not apply on top of tip/x86/sgx. Also you forgot CC to me.
Quoted 1 line
I'm sincerely sorry for not cc to you, I'm aware of that after sending out :- )
Apologies, I did not mean it like that. Just mentioning that I can look into this :-)
Quoted 11 lines
Yes, it requires to apply the following SGX2 v2 patches to tip/x86/sgx, prior to this series. As I mentioned in cover letter, SGX2 introduces new SGX instructions and flows, which should be handled during SVN update.
The v2 of SGX2 support patch set, with 32 patches in total, refer to the cover letter:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
The two additional patches SGX2 support requires:
"x86/sgx: Add poison handling to reclaimer"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/dcc95eb2aaefb042527ac50d0a50738c7c160dac.1643830353.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/b5e9f218064aa76e3026f778e1ad0a1d823e3db8.1643133224.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
Why don't you pick the dependent patches from that patch set and put them to this one? It does not matter if two patch sets contain same patches. If this gets merged first, then Reinette's job will be easier, and vice versa. Tags make sure that everyone gets what they deserve from their contribution.
Otherwise for instance giving a tested-by is impossible. You have to root this to the mainline, or at least to x86 tip.git.
BR, Jarkko
RE: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 568 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2022 2:53 AM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesQuoted 16 lines · Cathy
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 14 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2022 12:13 PM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesQuoted 4 lines · Cathy Zhang
== Background ==
EUPDATESVN is a new SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a
reboot.
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The SGX hardware maintains metadata for each enclave page to help enforce its security guarantees. This includes things like a record of the enclave to which the page belongs and the type of the
page:
Quoted 4 lines
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SGX metadata like "VA" or "SECS" pages, or regular enclave pages like those that store user data.
Before an EUPDATESVN operation can be successful, all SGX memory
(aka.
Quoted 15 lines
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EPC) must be marked as "unused" in the SGX hardware metadata (aka, EPCM). The SGX microcode now maintains a reference count of pages which are unused to aid in determining when all pages reach the "unused" state.
Both bare-metal and KVM guest EPC must be made unused. To increase the chance of a successful EUPDATESVN, the kernel prevents existing enclaves from creating new, valid pages and prevents new enclave creation (creating an enclave involves initializing a "SECS" page).
The entire EUPDATESVN process is very slow since it potentially affects gigabytes of enclave memory. It can potentially take seconds or minutes to complete. Userspace may encounter
-EBUSYerrors during the update and is expected to retry.Quoted 8 lines
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== Patch contents ==
Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages.
Use a flag to indicate when SGX EPC pages are "locked", which means it's not allowed to allocate new EPC page for use. Check it in all paths that can initialize an EPC page. Use SRCU to ensure that the flag is visible across the system before proceeding with an
update.
Quoted 3 lines
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Add checks to all sites that call SGX instructions that can transition pages from unused to initialized to ensure that the SRCU lock
is held.
Quoted 25 lines
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Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Cathy Zhang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 10 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 25 +++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c| 50++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c| 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c| 20 +++++++++++++6 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.hindex99004b02e2ed..3f1797ec2445100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +0
-0@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)/* Initialize an EPC page into an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) page. */ static inline int
__ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs){arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +2
-0+lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (ECREATE , pginfo, secs); }Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +0
-0@@ -154,6 +156,8 @@ static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void*addr)
Quoted 65 lines
Quoted 65 lines
Quoted 50 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +8
-0*/ static inline int __eadd (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EADD , pginfo, addr); }@@ -191,6 +195,8 @@ static inline int __etrack(void *addr) staticinline int __eldu (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr,void *va) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_ret_3 (ELDU , pginfo, addr, va); }@@ -205,6 +211,8 @@ static inline int __epa(void *addr) {unsigned long rbx =SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA ; +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EPA , rbx, addr); }@@ -230,6 +238,8 @@ static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)/* Zero a page of EPC memory and add it to an initialized enclave. */ static inline int __eaug (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) { +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return __encls_2 (EAUG , pginfo, addr); }(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.hindex85cbf103b0dd..dc8cb58100e3100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +3
-0@@ -104,4 +104,7 @@ static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash (u64 *lepubkeyhash); +extern struct srcu_struct sgx_lock_epc_srcu;bool +sgx_epc_is_locked (void ); +#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ (quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.cindexa0255d41e075..d2b428992910100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +0
-0@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(structQuoted 1 line
vm_fault*vmf)
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0unsigned long phys_addr;struct sgx_encl *encl;vm_fault_t ret; +int srcu_idx; encl = vma->vm_private_data;@@ -275,6 +276,12 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct
vm_fault*vmf)
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +0
-0if (unlikely (!encl))return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ;Quoted 11 lines
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +6
-0+ srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + } +/* * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and @@
-283,14 +290,18 @@ staticvm_fault_tsgx_vma_fault(structvm_fault*vmf)
Quoted 399 lines
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Quoted 21 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +6
-2* enclave that will be checked for right away. */ if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ) && - (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) -return sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); + (!xa_load (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (addr)))) { + ret =sgx_encl_eaug_page (vma, encl, addr); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return ret; + }mutex_lock (&encl->lock); entry =sgx_encl_load_page (encl, addr);if (IS_ERR (entry)) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (PTR_ERR (entry) == -EBUSY )return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ;@@ -315,12 +326,14 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(structQuoted 1 line
vm_fault*vmf)
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2
-0vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));if (ret !=VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ) {mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; }sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young (vma->vm_mm, entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ; }@@ -513,6 +526,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(structQuoted 1 line
vm_area_struct*vma, unsigned long addr,
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0struct sgx_encl_page *entry =NULL ;char data[sizeof (unsigned long )];unsigned long align; +int srcu_idx;int offset;int cnt;int ret =0 ;@@ -529,6 +543,12 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct
vm_area_struct*vma, unsigned long addr,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +6
-0return -EFAULT ;for (i =0 ; i < len; i += cnt) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out; + } + entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) &
PAGE_MASK);arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct
Quoted 46 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1
-0if (IS_ERR (entry)) { ret =PTR_ERR (entry);@@ -555,6 +575,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, out: mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);if (ret)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +0
-0break ;(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.cindexd8c3c07badb3..da3b569a10bd100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +11
-1@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs) static longsgx_ioc_enclave_create (struct sgx_encl *encl,void __user *arg) {struct sgx_enclave_create create_arg; +int srcu_idx;void *secs;int ret;@@ -162,9 +163,18 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)if (copy_from_user (secs, (void __user *)create_arg.src,PAGE_SIZE )) ret = -EFAULT ; -else +else { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + ret =sgx_encl_create (encl, secs); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); + } +kfree (secs);return ret;}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0@@ -444,6 +454,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl, void__user*arg)Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2
-0struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg;struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;unsigned long c; +int srcu_idx;int ret; if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) || @@ -477,8 +488,18 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl*encl, void
__user*arg)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0if (need_resched ())cond_resched (); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +break ; + } + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, add_arg.src + c,add_arg.offset + c,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +3
-0&secinfo, add_arg.flags); + +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +if (ret)break ; }@@ -952,6 +973,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
Quoted 30 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret; memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); @@ -960,6 +982,12 @@static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0vm_prot =vm_prot_from_secinfo (secinfo_perm);for (c =0 ; c < modp->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1049,6 +1077,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (entry->epc_page);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); }arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0ret =0 ;@@ -1060,6 +1089,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (entry->epc_page); out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: modp->count = c;@@ -1143,6 +1173,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;/* @@ -1156,6 +1187,12 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct
sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6
-0secinfo.flags = page_type <<8 ;for (c =0 ; c < modt->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1255,6 +1292,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0entry->type = page_type;mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1265,6 +1303,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl*encl,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-0entry->vm_run_prot_bits = run_prot_restore; out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: modt->count = c;@@ -1350,12 +1389,19 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl,arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
Quoted 20 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +7
-0unsigned long addr;unsigned long c;void *epc_virt; +int srcu_idx;int ret;memset (&secinfo,0 ,sizeof (secinfo)); secinfo.flags =SGX_SECINFO_R |SGX_SECINFO_W |SGX_SECINFO_X ;for (c =0 ; c < params->length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } + addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;sgx_direct_reclaim ();@@ -1411,6 +1457,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct
sgx_encl*encl,Quoted 51 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2
-0kfree (entry);mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); } ret =0 ;@@ -1418,6 +1465,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(structsgx_encl *encl, out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); out: params->count = c;(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.cindex545da16bb3ea..99c86b77ca8f100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0
-0@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ static int sgx_nr_epc_sections; static struct
task_struct*ksgxd_tsk; staticDECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(ksgxd_waitq);
staticDEFINE_XARRAY(sgx_epc_address_space);arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +13
-0+/* +* The flag sgx_epc_locked prevents any new SGX flows that +* may attempt to allocate a new EPC page. +*/ +static bool __rcu sgx_epc_locked; +/* +* By synchronizing around sgx_epc_locked SRCU ensures that any +executing +* SGX flows have completed before proceeding with an SVN update. +New SGX flows +* will be prevented from starting during an SVN update. +*/ +DEFINE_SRCU (sgx_lock_epc_srcu);/* * These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed @@ -378,6 +389,8 @@ void
sgx_direct_reclaim(void)static int
ksgxd(void *p)
{arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +2
-0+int srcu_idx; +set_freezable ();/* arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static int ksgxd(void *p) · line 412
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0
-0@@ -398,9 +411,15 @@ static int ksgxd(void *p) kthread_should_stop() ||
sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES));Quoted 71 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +24
-0+ srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) + goto maybe_resched; +if (sgx_should_reclaim (SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES ))sgx_reclaim_pages (); +maybe_resched: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);cond_resched (); }@@ -943,3 +962,21 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void) }device_initcall (sgx_init); + +static void sgx_lock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = true; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +static void sgx_unlock_epc (void ) +{ + sgx_epc_locked = false; +synchronize_srcu (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +} + +bool sgx_epc_is_locked (void ) +{ +lockdep_assert_held (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +return sgx_epc_locked; +}(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.cindex6a77a14eee38..e953816d7c8b100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +0
-0@@ -75,10 +75,21 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vepc_fault(struct
vm_fault
*vmf) {arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +12
-0struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct sgx_vepc *vepc = vma->vm_private_data; +int srcu_idx;int ret;mutex_lock (&vepc->lock); + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); + +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out_unlock; + } + ret =__sgx_vepc_fault (vepc, vma, vmf->address); + +out_unlock: +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx);mutex_unlock (&vepc->lock);if (!ret)@@ -331,6 +342,7 @@ int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs, int *trapnr) { + int srcu_idx;int ret;/* arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo · line 359
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +0
-0@@ -347,6 +359,12 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,void
__user*secs,Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +6
-0if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!access_ok (secs,PAGE_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu); +if (sgx_epc_is_locked ()) { +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +return -EBUSY ; + } +__uaccess_begin (); ret =__ecreate (pageinfo, (void *)secs);arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +0
-0__uaccess_end ();arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo · line 374
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +0
-0@@ -356,6 +374,8 @@ int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,void
__user*secs,Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +2
-0return -EFAULT ; } +srcu_read_unlock (&sgx_lock_epc_srcu, srcu_idx); +/* ECREATE doesn't return an error code, it faults or succeeds. */ WARN_ON_ONCE (ret);return 0;
--
2.17.1This series is broken. It does not apply on top of tip/x86/sgx. Also you forgot CC to me.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'm sincerely sorry for not cc to you, I'm aware of that after sending out :- )
Apologies, I did not mean it like that. Just mentioning that I can look into this :-)
It's very appreciated if you can help review to move this forward, thanks Jarkko!
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, it requires to apply the following SGX2 v2 patches to tip/x86/sgx, prior to this series. As I mentioned in cover letter, SGX2 introduces new SGX instructions and flows, which should be handled
during SVN update.
Quoted 2 lines
The v2 of SGX2 support patch set, with 32 patches in total, refer to the
cover letter:
Quoted 5 lines
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@inte
l.com/ The two additional patches SGX2 support requires:
"x86/sgx: Add poison handling to reclaimer"sgx/dcc95eb2aaefb042527ac50d0a50738c7c16
Quoted 3 lines
[email protected]/
"x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves"
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
sgx/b5e9f218064aa76e3026f778e1ad0a1d823e
Quoted 1 line
Why don't you pick the dependent patches from that patch set and put them to this one? It does not matter if two patch sets contain same patches. If this gets merged first, then Reinette's job will be easier, and vice versa. Tags make sure that everyone gets what they deserve from their contribution.
For easy to discuss, I split the SGX2 support patches into the following two parts:
1. auxiliary changes:
[V2,09/32] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m44e2b931e82a87a8b2c80058130182eb747fbcf0
[V2,10/32] x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask()
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#mf6268a66b5c48ca9a18a772b6eaea097c315dc1d
[V2,12/32] x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#ma3330f8ee8136aa084d0a2b5f110331e37f44c52
[V2,14/32] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m4ae80fdf67ad330119bfc2abaea845baa24ed14c
2. The other SGX2 support patches.
For #1, we can put them into this series. But regarding #2, it introduces EAUG/EMODPR/EMODT and the related flows, it seems not sensible to pick up only some of the patches, it will be not convenient to run the related test while doing SVN update.
Quoted 3 lines
Otherwise for instance giving a tested-by is impossible. You have to root this to the mainline, or at least to x86 tip.git.
Put this series on top of SGX2 support is based on the assumption that SGX2 will get merged first. If it's required to make this series independent of SGX2, we need to pick up the above #1, and make change in patch " x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages" to remove the handling on SGX2 flows. Once SGX2 gets merged, provide the changes in following patches.
How do you think, Jarkko? And I also would like to get suggestion from @Chatre, Reinette for this.
Quoted 2 lines
BR, Jarkko
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages
Hi Cathy,
Quoted 24 lines · Cathy
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 22 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2022 2:53 AM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesQuoted 12 lines · Cathy
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 10 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2022 12:13 PM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesOn Tue, Mar 15, 2022 at 09:02:51AM +0800, Cathy Zhang wrote:
...
Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Yes, it requires to apply the following SGX2 v2 patches to tip/x86/sgx, prior to this series. As I mentioned in cover letter, SGX2 introduces new SGX instructions and flows, which should be handled
during SVN update.
Quoted 2 lines
The v2 of SGX2 support patch set, with 32 patches in total, refer to the
cover letter:
Quoted 5 lines
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@inte
l.com/ The two additional patches SGX2 support requires:
"x86/sgx: Add poison handling to reclaimer"sgx/dcc95eb2aaefb042527ac50d0a50738c7c16
Quoted 3 lines
[email protected]/
"x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves"Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
sgx/b5e9f218064aa76e3026f778e1ad0a1d823e
Quoted 1 line
Why don't you pick the dependent patches from that patch set and put them to this one? It does not matter if two patch sets contain same patches. If this gets merged first, then Reinette's job will be easier, and vice versa. Tags make sure that everyone gets what they deserve from their contribution.
For easy to discuss, I split the SGX2 support patches into the following two parts:
1. auxiliary changes:
[V2,09/32] x86/sgx: Exportsgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m44e2b931e82a87a8b2c80058130182eb747fbcf0
[V2,10/32] x86/sgx: Renamesgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()assgx_encl_cpumask()
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#mf6268a66b5c48ca9a18a772b6eaea097c315dc1d
[V2,12/32] x86/sgx: Makesgx_ipi_cb()available internally
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#ma3330f8ee8136aa084d0a2b5f110331e37f44c52
[V2,14/32] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m4ae80fdf67ad330119bfc2abaea845baa24ed14c2. The other SGX2 support patches.
For #1, we can put them into this series. But regarding #2, it introduces EAUG/EMODPR/EMODT and the related flows, it seems not sensible to pick up only some of the patches, it will be not convenient to run the related test while doing SVN update.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise for instance giving a tested-by is impossible. You have to root this to the mainline, or at least to x86 tip.git.
Put this series on top of SGX2 support is based on the assumption that SGX2 will get merged first. If it's required to make this series independent of SGX2, we need to pick up the above #1, and make change in patch " x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages" to remove the handling on SGX2 flows. Once SGX2 gets merged, provide the changes in following patches.
How do you think, Jarkko? And I also would like to get suggestion from @Chatre, Reinette for this.
Is it possible to factor out the changes to the SGX2 flows into separate patches?
This should continue to support the testing you mentioned and the patches could then be dropped from your series and moved to the SGX2 series if the EUPDATESVN work is merged first. I am not sure about the testing though because I did not notice a selftest as part of the series. How can I test this work if/when it moves to the SGX2 series?
Reinette
RE: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages
Hi Reinette,
Quoted 106 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Chatre, Reinette <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, March 19, 2022 12:24 AM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>; Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesHi Cathy,
Quoted 25 lines · Cathy
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 23 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2022 2:53 AM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesQuoted 13 lines · Cathy
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 11 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2022 12:13 PM
To: Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/10] x86/sgx: Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pagesOn Tue, Mar 15, 2022 at 09:02:51AM +0800, Cathy Zhang wrote:
...
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, it requires to apply the following SGX2 v2 patches to tip/x86/sgx, prior to this series. As I mentioned in cover letter, SGX2 introduces new SGX instructions and flows, which should be handled
during SVN update.
Quoted 3 lines
The v2 of SGX2 support patch set, with 32 patches in total, refer to the
cover letter:
Quoted 5 lines
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@in
te l.com/ The two additional patches SGX2 support requires:
"x86/sgx: Add poison handling to reclaimer"sgx/dcc95eb2aaefb042527ac50d0a50738c7c16
Quoted 3 lines
[email protected]/
"x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves"Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
sgx/b5e9f218064aa76e3026f778e1ad0a1d823e
Quoted 1 line
Why don't you pick the dependent patches from that patch set and put them to this one? It does not matter if two patch sets contain same patches. If this gets merged first, then Reinette's job will be easier, and
vice versa.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Tags make sure that everyone gets what they deserve from their
contribution.
Quoted 2 lines
For easy to discuss, I split the SGX2 support patches into the following two
parts:
Quoted 16 lines
1. auxiliary changes:
[V2,09/32] x86/sgx: Exportsgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@inte
l.com/T/#m44e2b931e82a87a8b2c80058130182eb747fbcf0 [V2,10/32] x86/sgx: Renamesgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()assgx_encl_cpumask()
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@inte
l.com/T/#mf6268a66b5c48ca9a18a772b6eaea097c315dc1d [V2,12/32] x86/sgx: Makesgx_ipi_cb()available internally
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@inte
l.com/T/#ma3330f8ee8136aa084d0a2b5f110331e37f44c52 [V2,14/32] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@inte
l.com/T/#m4ae80fdf67ad330119bfc2abaea845baa24ed14cQuoted 3 lines
2. The other SGX2 support patches.
For #1, we can put them into this series. But regarding #2, it introduces
EAUG/EMODPR/EMODT and the related flows, it seems not sensible to pick up only some of the patches, it will be not convenient to run the related test while doing SVN update.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Otherwise for instance giving a tested-by is impossible. You have to root this to the mainline, or at least to x86 tip.git.
Put this series on top of SGX2 support is based on the assumption that
SGX2 will get merged first. If it's required to make this series independent of SGX2, we need to pick up the above #1, and make change in patch " x86/sgx:
Introduce mechanism to prevent new initializations of EPC pages" to remove the handling on SGX2 flows. Once SGX2 gets merged, provide the changes in following patches.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
How do you think, Jarkko? And I also would like to get suggestion from
@Chatre, Reinette for this.
Is it possible to factor out the changes to the SGX2 flows into separate patches?
Yes, the changes can be into separate patches. And the separate patches should be moved out from this series, to make sure this series is applied to tip branch independent of SGX2 series.
Quoted 6 lines
This should continue to support the testing you mentioned and the patches could then be dropped from your series and moved to the SGX2 series if the EUPDATESVN work is merged first. I am not sure about the testing though because I did not notice a selftest as part of the series. How can I test this work if/when it moves to the SGX2 series?
To test it, you will the following command while you run SGX2 stress test.
iucode-tool -K xxxxxx.PDB --overwrite ; echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload
Here xxxxxx.PDB is an ucode patch.
I'm not sure if it's possible to write a selftest for it for selftest should create a ucode patch.
Additionally, regarding the "auxiliary changes" I list above, would you like to move them into this SVN update series, or just let me rebase on them, like you rebased with some other patches?
Quoted 2 lines
Reinette
RFC PATCH v2 2/10 x86/sgx: Provide VA page non-NULL owner
In reply to Cathy ZhangProvide non-NULL owner for VA page, which tells that the EPC page is allocated for use.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 5 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +1 -1
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write);int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young (struct mm_struct *mm,struct sgx_encl_page *page);void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes (struct sgx_encl *encl,unsigned long addr); -struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page (void ); +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page (struct sgx_va_page *va_page);unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot (struct sgx_va_page *va_page);void sgx_free_va_slot (struct sgx_va_page *va_page,unsigned int offset);bool sgx_va_page_full (struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +1 -1
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_page {unsigned int section;u16 flags;u16 poison; -struct sgx_encl_page *owner; +void *owner;struct list_head list; };
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +3 -2
@@ -990,6 +990,7 @@ void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)/** * sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page +* @va_page: struct sgx_va_page connected to this VA page * * Allocate a free EPC page and convert it to a Version Array (VA) page. *
@@ -997,12 +998,12 @@ void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)* a VA page, * -errno otherwise */ -struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page (void ) +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page (struct sgx_va_page *va_page) {struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;int ret; - epc_page =sgx_alloc_epc_page (NULL , true); + epc_page =sgx_alloc_epc_page (va_page, true);if (IS_ERR (epc_page))return ERR_CAST (epc_page);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)if (!va_page)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - va_page->epc_page =sgx_alloc_va_page (); + va_page->epc_page =sgx_alloc_va_page (va_page);if (IS_ERR (va_page->epc_page)) { err =ERR_CAST (va_page->epc_page);kfree (va_page);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH v2 3/10 x86/sgx: Save enclave pointer for VA page
In reply to Cathy ZhangTearing down all enclaves is required by SGX SVN update, which involves running the ENCLS[EREMOVE] instruction on every EPC page. This (tearing down all enclaves) should be coordinated with any enclaves that may be in the process of existing and thus already be running ENCLS[EREMOVE] as part of enclave release.
In support of this coordination, it is required to know which enclave owns each in-use EPC page. It is already possible to locate the owning enclave of SECS and regular pages but not for VA pages.
Save the enclave pointer for each VA page to support locating its owning enclave.
Note: to track 2T EPC memory, this scheme of tracking will use additional 8M memory.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +1 -0
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct sgx_va_page {struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;DECLARE_BITMAP (slots,SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT );struct list_head list; +struct sgx_encl *encl; };struct sgx_backing {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)if (!va_page)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + va_page->encl = encl; va_page->epc_page =sgx_alloc_va_page (va_page);if (IS_ERR (va_page->epc_page)) { err =ERR_CAST (va_page->epc_page);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH v2 4/10 x86/sgx: Keep record for SGX VA and Guest page type
In reply to Cathy ZhangRegular enclave EPC pages have sgx_encl_page as their owner, but SGX VA page and KVM guest EPC page are maintained by different owner structures.
SGX CPUSVN update requires to know the EPC page owner's status and then decide how to handle the page.
Keep a record of page type for SGX VA and KVM guest page while the other EPC pages already have their type tracked, so that CPUSVN update can get EPC page's owner by type and handle it then.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +4 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@/* Pages on free list */ #define SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE BIT(1) +/* VA page */ +#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_VA BIT(2) +/* Pages allocated for KVM guest */ +#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_GUEST BIT(3)struct sgx_epc_page {unsigned int section;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2 -0
@@ -1014,6 +1014,8 @@ struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(struct sgx_va_page *va_page)return ERR_PTR (-EFAULT ); } + epc_page->flags |=SGX_EPC_PAGE_VA ; +return epc_page; }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +2 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ static int __sgx_vepc_fault(struct sgx_vepc *vepc,if (IS_ERR (epc_page))return PTR_ERR (epc_page); + epc_page->flags |=SGX_EPC_PAGE_GUEST ; + ret =xa_err (xa_store (&vepc->page_array, index, epc_page,GFP_KERNEL ));if (ret) goto err_free;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH v2 5/10 x86/sgx: Save the size of each EPC section
In reply to Cathy ZhangFor SGX CPUSVN update process will check all EPC pages in each section to ensure they will be marked as unused, it requires to know the size of each EPC section to end the loop.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +1 -0
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_section {void *virt_addr;struct sgx_epc_page *pages;struct sgx_numa_node *node; +u64 size; };extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS ];
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +1 -0
@@ -636,6 +636,7 @@ static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 phys_addr, u64 size, } section->phys_addr = phys_addr; + section->size = size;xa_store_range (&sgx_epc_address_space, section->phys_addr, phys_addr + size -1 , section,GFP_KERNEL );
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH v2 6/10 x86/sgx: Forced EPC page zapping for EUPDATESVN
In reply to Cathy ZhangBefore an EUPDATESVN instruction can be successful, all enclave pages (EPC) must be marked as unused in the SGX hardware metadata (EPCM).
A page becomes unused when an issued EREMOVE instruction succeeds. To prepare for EUPDATESVN, loop over all SGX pages and attempt to EREMOVE them. This is fatal to running enclaves and destroys all enclave state and memory contents. This destruction is by design and mitigates any compromise of enclaves or the SGX hardware itself which occurred before the microcode update.
An EREMOVE operation on a page may fail for a few reasons. Each has its own mitigations.
First, EREMOVE will fail if an enclave that uses the page is executing. Send an IPI to all CPUs that might be running the enclave to force it out of the enclave long enough to EREMOVE the page. Other CPUs might enter the enclave in the meantime, so this is not a rock-solid guarantee.
Second, EREMOVE can fail on special SGX metadata pages, such as SECS and VA. EREMOVE will work on them only after the normal SGX pages that depend on them have been EREMOVE'd. Defer handling those pages and repeat EREMOVE after the dependency has been addressed.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 13 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 14 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 347 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 373 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +13 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_VA BIT(2)/* Pages allocated for KVM guest */ #define SGX_EPC_PAGE_GUEST BIT(3) +/* +* Pages, failed to be zapped (EREMOVED) +* by SGX CPUSVN update process. +*/ +#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_ZAP_TRACKED BIT(4) +/* +* Pages, the associated enclave is being +* released while SGX CPUSVN update is +* running. +*/ +#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_IN_RELEASE BIT(5)struct sgx_epc_page {unsigned int section;
@@ -111,5 +122,7 @@ void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash);extern struct srcu_struct sgx_lock_epc_srcu;bool sgx_epc_is_locked (void ); +void sgx_zap_wakeup (void ); +void sgx_zap_abort (void );#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +13 -1
@@ -651,6 +651,12 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)WARN_ON_ONCE (encl->secs_child_cnt);WARN_ON_ONCE (encl->secs.epc_page); +/* +* EPC pages were freed and EREMOVE was executed. Wake +* up any zappers which were waiting for this. +*/ +sgx_zap_wakeup (); +kfree (encl); }
@@ -1077,8 +1083,14 @@ void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)WARN_ON_ONCE (page->flags &SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED ); ret =__eremove (sgx_get_epc_virt_addr (page)); -if (WARN_ONCE (ret,EREMOVE_ERROR_MESSAGE , ret, ret)) +if (WARN_ONCE (ret,EREMOVE_ERROR_MESSAGE , ret, ret)) { +/* +* The EREMOVE failed. If a CPUSVN is in progress, +* it is now expected to fail. Notify it. +*/ +sgx_zap_abort ();return ; + }sgx_free_epc_page (page); }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +347 -0
362 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH v2 7/10 x86/sgx: Define error codes for ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
In reply to Cathy ZhangAdd error codes for ENCLS[EUPDATESVN], then SGX CPUSVN update process can know the execution state of EUPDATESVN and notify userspace.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +8 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ enum sgx_encls_function {* public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH. * %SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE: The EPC page cannot be modified because it * is in the PENDING or MODIFIED state. +* %SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: Insufficient entropy in RNG. +* %SGX_EPC_NOT_READY: EPC is not ready for SVN update. +* %SGX_NO_UPDATE: EUPDATESVN was successful, but CPUSVN was not +* updated because current SVN was not newer than +* CPUSVN. * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received */ enum sgx_return_code {
@@ -81,6 +86,9 @@ enum sgx_return_code {SGX_CHILD_PRESENT =13 ,SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN =16 ,SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE =20 , +SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY =29 , +SGX_EPC_NOT_READY =30 , +SGX_NO_UPDATE =31 , SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT = 128, };
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH v2 8/10 x86/sgx: Implement ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
In reply to Cathy ZhangThe SGX attestation architecture assumes a compromise of all running enclaves and cryptographic assets (like internal SGX encryption keys) whenever a microcode update affects SGX. To mitigate the impact of this presumed compromise, a new supervisor SGX instruction:
ENCLS[EUPDATESVN], is introduced to update SGX microcode version and generate new cryptographic assets in runtime after SGX microcode update.
EUPDATESVN requires that SGX memory to be marked as "unused" before it will succeed. This ensures that no compromised enclave can survive the process and provides an opportunity to generate new cryptographic assets.
---
Changes since v1:
- Print message for each return code to notify userspace the ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] execution status.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 33 +++++++++++---------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +18 -15
@@ -26,23 +26,26 @@#define SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION 0x1/* The bitmask for the EPC section type. */ #define SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) +/* EUPDATESVN presence indication */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN BIT(10)enum sgx_encls_function { -ECREATE =0x00 , -EADD =0x01 , -EINIT =0x02 , -EREMOVE =0x03 , -EDGBRD =0x04 , -EDGBWR =0x05 , -EEXTEND =0x06 , -ELDU =0x08 , -EBLOCK =0x09 , -EPA =0x0A , -EWB =0x0B , -ETRACK =0x0C , -EAUG =0x0D , -EMODPR =0x0E , -EMODT =0x0F , +ECREATE =0x00 , +EADD =0x01 , +EINIT =0x02 , +EREMOVE =0x03 , +EDGBRD =0x04 , +EDGBWR =0x05 , +EEXTEND =0x06 , +ELDU =0x08 , +EBLOCK =0x09 , +EPA =0x0A , +EWB =0x0B , +ETRACK =0x0C , +EAUG =0x0D , +EMODPR =0x0E , +EMODT =0x0F , +EUPDATESVN =0x18 , };/**
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +6 -0
@@ -243,4 +243,10 @@ static inline int __eaug(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr) return __encls_2(EAUG, pginfo, addr); } +/* Update CPUSVN at runtime. */ +static inline int __eupdatesvn (void ) +{ +return __encls_ret_1 (EUPDATESVN ,"" ); +} +#endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +52 -0
55 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH v2 9/10 x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update
In reply to Cathy ZhangEUPDATESVN is the SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a reboot.
Microcode updates which affect SGX require two phases:
1. Do the main microcode update
2. Make the new CPUSVN available for enclave attestation via EUPDATESVN.
Before a EUPDATESVN can succeed, all enclave pages (EPC) must be marked as unused in the SGX metadata (EPCM). This operation destroys all preexisting SGX enclave data and metadata. This is by design and mitigates the impact of vulnerabilities that may have compromised enclaves or the SGX hardware itself prior to the update.
---
Changes since v1:
- Remove the sysfs file svnupdate. (Thomas Gleixner, Dave Hansen)
- Let late microcode load path call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure directly. (Borislav Petkov)
- Redefine update_cpusvn_intel() to return void instead of int.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h +5 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@#define _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_H#include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/sgx.h> #include <linux/earlycpio.h> #include <linux/initrd.h>
@@ -137,4 +138,8 @@ static inline void load_ucode_ap(void) { }static inline void reload_early_microcode (void ) { }#endif +#ifndef update_cpusvn_intel +static inline void update_cpusvn_intel (void ) {} +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +5 -0
@@ -412,4 +412,9 @@ int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,int sgx_set_attribute (unsigned long *allowed_attributes,unsigned int attribute_fd); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX +void update_cpusvn_intel (void ); +#define update_cpusvn_intel update_cpusvn_intel +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +9 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> #include <asm/sigframe.h> +#include <asm/sgx.h> #include "cpu.h"
@@ -2165,6 +2166,14 @@ void microcode_check(void)perf_check_microcode (); +/* +* SGX related microcode update requires EUPDATESVN to update CPUSVN, which +* will destroy all enclaves to ensure EPC is not in use. If SGX is configured +* and EUPDATESVN is supported, call the EUPDATESVN procecure. +*/ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_SGX ) && (cpuid_eax (SGX_CPUID ) &SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN )) +update_cpusvn_intel (); +/* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */ info.cpuid_level =cpuid_eax (0 );
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +12 -0
@@ -1380,3 +1380,15 @@ static int sgx_updatesvn(void)return ret; } + +void update_cpusvn_intel (void ) +{ +sgx_lock_epc (); +if (sgx_zap_pages ()) + goto out; + +sgx_updatesvn (); + +out: +sgx_unlock_epc (); +}
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 09/10] x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update
Quoted 97 lines · Cathy Zhang
EUPDATESVN is the SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a reboot.
Microcode updates which affect SGX require two phases:
1. Do the main microcode update
2. Make the new CPUSVN available for enclave attestation via EUPDATESVN.Before a EUPDATESVN can succeed, all enclave pages (EPC) must be marked as unused in the SGX metadata (EPCM). This operation destroys all preexisting SGX enclave data and metadata. This is by design and mitigates the impact of vulnerabilities that may have compromised enclaves or the SGX hardware itself prior to the update.
Signed-off-by Cathy Zhang <[email protected]>---
Changes since v1:
- Remove the sysfs file svnupdate. (Thomas Gleixner, Dave Hansen)
- Let late microcode load path call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure directly. (Borislav Petkov)
- Redefineupdate_cpusvn_intel()to return void instead of int.--- arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h +5
-0@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@#define _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_H#include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/sgx.h> #include <linux/earlycpio.h> #include <linux/initrd.h> @@ -137,4 +138,8 @@ static inline void load_ucode_ap(void) { }static inline void reload_early_microcode (void ) { }#endif +#ifndef update_cpusvn_intel +static inline void update_cpusvn_intel (void ) {} +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_H */ arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +5
-0@@ -412,4 +412,9 @@ int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,int sgx_set_attribute (unsigned long *allowed_attributes,unsigned int attribute_fd); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX +void update_cpusvn_intel (void ); +#define update_cpusvn_intel update_cpusvn_intel +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_H */ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +9
-0@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> #include <asm/sigframe.h> +#include <asm/sgx.h> #include "cpu.h" @@ -2165,6 +2166,14 @@ void microcode_check(void)perf_check_microcode (); +/* +* SGX related microcode update requires EUPDATESVN to update CPUSVN, which +* will destroy all enclaves to ensure EPC is not in use. If SGX is configured +* and EUPDATESVN is supported, call the EUPDATESVN procecure. +*/ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_SGX ) && (cpuid_eax (SGX_CPUID ) &SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN )) +update_cpusvn_intel (); +/* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */ info.cpuid_level =cpuid_eax (0 );arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static int sgx_updatesvn(void) · line 1387
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +5
-0@@ -1380,3 +1380,15 @@ static int sgx_updatesvn(void)return ret; } + +void update_cpusvn_intel (void ) +{ +sgx_lock_epc (); +if (sgx_zap_pages ())
Doing this automatically and unconditionally during a microcode update seems undesirable. This requires the userland tooling that is coordinating the microcode update to be aware of any SGX enclaves that are running and possibly coordinate sequencing with the processes containing those enclaves. This coupling does not exist today.
--
Jethro Beekman | Fortanix
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +7
-0+ goto out; + +sgx_updatesvn (); + +out: +sgx_unlock_epc (); +}
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 09/10] x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update
Quoted 99 lines · Jethro Beekman
Quoted 98 lines · Cathy Zhang
EUPDATESVN is the SGX instruction which allows enclave attestation to include information about updated microcode without a reboot.
Microcode updates which affect SGX require two phases:
1. Do the main microcode update
2. Make the new CPUSVN available for enclave attestation via EUPDATESVN.Before a EUPDATESVN can succeed, all enclave pages (EPC) must be marked as unused in the SGX metadata (EPCM). This operation destroys all preexisting SGX enclave data and metadata. This is by design and mitigates the impact of vulnerabilities that may have compromised enclaves or the SGX hardware itself prior to the update.
Signed-off-by Cathy Zhang <[email protected]>---
Changes since v1:
- Remove the sysfs file svnupdate. (Thomas Gleixner, Dave Hansen)
- Let late microcode load path call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure directly. (Borislav Petkov)
- Redefineupdate_cpusvn_intel()to return void instead of int.--- arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h +5
-0@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@#define _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_H#include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/sgx.h> #include <linux/earlycpio.h> #include <linux/initrd.h> @@ -137,4 +138,8 @@ static inline void load_ucode_ap(void) { }static inline void reload_early_microcode (void ) { }#endif +#ifndef update_cpusvn_intel +static inline void update_cpusvn_intel (void ) {} +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_H */ arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +5
-0@@ -412,4 +412,9 @@ int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,int sgx_set_attribute (unsigned long *allowed_attributes,unsigned int attribute_fd); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX +void update_cpusvn_intel (void ); +#define update_cpusvn_intel update_cpusvn_intel +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_H */ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +9
-0@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> #include <asm/sigframe.h> +#include <asm/sgx.h> #include "cpu.h" @@ -2165,6 +2166,14 @@ void microcode_check(void)perf_check_microcode (); +/* +* SGX related microcode update requires EUPDATESVN to update CPUSVN, which +* will destroy all enclaves to ensure EPC is not in use. If SGX is configured +* and EUPDATESVN is supported, call the EUPDATESVN procecure. +*/ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_SGX ) && (cpuid_eax (SGX_CPUID ) &SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN )) +update_cpusvn_intel (); +/* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */ info.cpuid_level =cpuid_eax (0 );arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0
-0@@ -1380,3 +1380,15 @@ static int sgx_updatesvn(void)
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static int sgx_updatesvn(void) · line 1387
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +5
-0return ret; } + +void update_cpusvn_intel (void ) +{ +sgx_lock_epc (); +if (sgx_zap_pages ())Doing this automatically and unconditionally during a microcode update seems undesirable. This requires the userland tooling that is coordinating the microcode update to be aware of any SGX enclaves that are running and possibly coordinate sequencing with the processes containing those enclaves. This coupling does not exist today.
Also, a microcode update may not affect SGX security at all and doing the EUPDATESVN procedure may not be required for this particular update. This case is called out specifically in the EUPDATESVN documentation.
--
Jethro Beekman | Fortanix
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 09/10] x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update
Quoted 10 lines · Jethro Beekman
Quoted 6 lines
Doing this automatically and unconditionally during a microcode update seems undesirable. This requires the userland tooling that is coordinating the microcode update to be aware of any SGX enclaves that are running and possibly coordinate sequencing with the processes containing those enclaves. This coupling does not exist today.
Also, a microcode update may not affect SGX security at all and doing the EUPDATESVN procedure may not be required for this particular update. This case is called out specifically in the EUPDATESVN documentation.
I don't think Intel provides the metadata for the kernel to tell if an update requires an EUPDATESVN procedure or not. If this is inconvenient for you, I'd suggest reporting this to the folks at Intel who can fix it. It doesn't seem like something which they are motivated to fix.
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 09/10] x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update
Quoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Jethro Beekman
Quoted 6 lines
Doing this automatically and unconditionally during a microcode update seems undesirable. This requires the userland tooling that is coordinating the microcode update to be aware of any SGX enclaves that are running and possibly coordinate sequencing with the processes containing those enclaves. This coupling does not exist today.
Also, a microcode update may not affect SGX security at all and doing the EUPDATESVN procedure may not be required for this particular update. This case is called out specifically in the EUPDATESVN documentation.
Quoted 4 lines
I don't think Intel provides the metadata for the kernel to tell if an update requires an EUPDATESVN procedure or not. If this is inconvenient for you, I'd suggest reporting this to the folks at Intel who can fix it. It doesn't seem like something which they are motivated to fix.
Whether or not metadata is currently made available is orthogonal to creating a mechanism by which userspace can indidate that a particular microcode update shouldn't trigger the EUPDATESVN procedure.
--
Jethro Beekman | Fortanix
RE: [RFC PATCH v2 09/10] x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update
Hi Jethro,
Thanks for helping review!
Quoted 23 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jethro Beekman <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2022 5:06 PM
To: Hansen, Dave <[email protected]>; Zhang, Cathy <[email protected]>; [email protected]; linux-Hi [email protected]
Cc: Raj, Ashok <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 09/10] x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode updateQuoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Jethro Beekman
Quoted 6 lines
Doing this automatically and unconditionally during a microcode update seems undesirable. This requires the userland tooling that is coordinating the microcode update to be aware of any SGX enclaves that are running and possibly coordinate sequencing with the processes containing those enclaves. This coupling does not exist today.
Also, a microcode update may not affect SGX security at all and doing the EUPDATESVN procedure may not be required for this particular update. This case is called out specifically in the EUPDATESVN documentation.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I don't think Intel provides the metadata for the kernel to tell if an update requires an EUPDATESVN procedure or not. If this is inconvenient for you, I'd suggest reporting this to the folks at Intel who can fix it. It doesn't seem like something which they are motivated to fix.
Whether or not metadata is currently made available is orthogonal to creating a mechanism by which userspace can indidate that a particular microcode update shouldn't trigger the EUPDATESVN procedure.
I'm not sure if you have noticed the discussions in v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/#m18e6fecd8c9c517c68cb4d62e53f24909abd50a7
We remove the sysfs which allows userspace to decide if and when to trigger the EUPDATESVN procedure. Please comment if you have other suggestion.
Quoted 3 lines
--
Jethro Beekman | Fortanix
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 09/10] x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update
In reply to Jethro BeekmanQuoted 8 lines · Jethro Beekman
Quoted 2 lines
+void
update_cpusvn_intel(void)+{ +sgx_lock_epc(); + if
(sgx_zap_pages())Doing this automatically and unconditionally during a microcode update seems undesirable. This requires the userland tooling that is coordinating the microcode update to be aware of any SGX enclaves that are running and possibly coordinate sequencing with the processes containing those enclaves. This coupling does not exist today.
"Today" in what?
If a microcode update changes SGX behavior and bumps CPUSVN, it's fundamentally incompatible with letting enclaves continue to run. They might as well be killed.
But, seriously, if you can't handle enclaves being killed every few months, don't use SGX. The architecture doesn't allow data to be persistent like normal x86. It's fundamental to the architecture. You can also think of this as a shiny new SGX *testing* feature: one that keeps enclave owners from becoming complacent and forgetting about what the SGX architecture provides.
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 09/10] x86/cpu: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] procedure in microcode update
Quoted 11 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Jethro Beekman
Quoted 2 lines
+void
update_cpusvn_intel(void)+{ +sgx_lock_epc(); + if
(sgx_zap_pages())Doing this automatically and unconditionally during a microcode update seems undesirable. This requires the userland tooling that is coordinating the microcode update to be aware of any SGX enclaves that are running and possibly coordinate sequencing with the processes containing those enclaves. This coupling does not exist today.
"Today" in what?
In distros.
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If a microcode update changes SGX behavior and bumps CPUSVN, it's fundamentally incompatible with letting enclaves continue to run. They might as well be killed.
It's not "fundamentally incompatible". It works fine today and will continue to work fine in CPUs that have EUPDATESVN support. Yes your enclaves are probably vulnerable to some attacks, but people run vulnerable software intentionally all the time.
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But, seriously, if you can't handle enclaves being killed every few months, don't use SGX. The architecture doesn't allow data to be
I don't think anyone is making a claim that there are enclaves that wouldn't be able handle this? Being able to deal with something is not the same as wanting to deal with something. My laptop can handle running out of battery in the middle of writing some new code. That doesn't mean I want my laptop to arbitrarily turn off at uncontrollable times?
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persistent like normal x86. It's fundamental to the architecture. You can also think of this as a shiny new SGX *testing* feature: one that keeps enclave owners from becoming complacent and forgetting about what the SGX architecture provides.
Great idea, why not expand on this and just randomly call EREMOVE at timed intervals?
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Jethro Beekman | Fortanix
RFC PATCH v2 10/10 x86/sgx: Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] during SGX initialization
In reply to Cathy ZhangA snapshot of the processor microcode SVN is taken each boot cycle at the time when Intel SGX is first used. This results in microcode updates being loadable at any time, fixing microcode issues. However, if system boot up through kexec() from error recovery, no hardware reset happens, any SGX leaf execution during boot up is not assumed as the first use in such case, and no snapshot of SVN is taken. So, it's necessary to call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] to update SVN automatically, rather than waiting for the admin to do it when he/she is even not aware of that.
Call ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] after sanitizing pages will increase the chance of success, for it requires that EPC is empty.
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Changes since v1:
- Update accordingly for update_cpusvn_intel() return *void*.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +10 -1
@@ -397,8 +397,10 @@ void sgx_direct_reclaim(void)sgx_reclaim_pages (); } +void update_cpusvn_intel (void );static int ksgxd (void *p) { +int ret;int srcu_idx;set_freezable ();
@@ -411,7 +413,14 @@ static int ksgxd(void *p)__sgx_sanitize_pages (&sgx_dirty_page_list);/* sanity check: */ -WARN_ON (!list_empty (&sgx_dirty_page_list)); +if (!WARN_ON (!list_empty (&sgx_dirty_page_list))) { +/* +* Do SVN update for kexec(). It should complete without error, for +* all EPC pages are unused at this point. +*/ +if (cpuid_eax (SGX_CPUID ) &SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN ) +update_cpusvn_intel (); + }while (!kthread_should_stop ()) {if (try_to_freeze ())
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1