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package/libopenssl: bump version to 1.1.1n

PATCH Applied Peter Seiderer 3 participants 6 messages Mar 15, 2022 – Mar 20, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/libopenssl: bump version to 1.1.1n

Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]

*) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever
for non-prime moduli.

Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.

It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters.

Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters.

Thus vulnerable situations include:

- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters

Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. (CVE-2022-0778)
[Tomáš Mráz]

*) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489)
to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as required by SECLEVEL >= 3.

[Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]

---
 package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash | 4 ++--
 package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash +2 -2
index a055cbc270..22bb365bcc 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz.sha256
-sha256  f89199be8b23ca45fc7cb9f1d8d3ee67312318286ad030f5316aca6462db6c96  openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz
+# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz.sha256
+sha256  40dceb51a4f6a5275bde0e6bf20ef4b91bfc32ed57c0552e2e8e15463372b17a  openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz
 
 # License files
 sha256  c32913b33252e71190af2066f08115c69bc9fddadf3bf29296e20c835389841c  LICENSE
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk +1 -1
index bd8ef6141a..ae6658ed40 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1m
+LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1n
 LIBOPENSSL_SITE = https://www.openssl.org/source
 LIBOPENSSL_SOURCE = openssl-$(LIBOPENSSL_VERSION).tar.gz
 LIBOPENSSL_LICENSE = OpenSSL or SSLeay
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#1 lore raw

Peter, All,

+Peter K.: candidate to be backported, that's a security fix.

On 2022-03-15 21:54 +0100, Peter Seiderer spake thusly:

Quoted 31 lines

Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]

*) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever
for non-prime moduli.

Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.

It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters.

Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters.

Thus vulnerable situations include:

- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters

Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. (CVE-2022-0778)
[Tomáš Mráz]

Quoted 7 lines

*) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489)
to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as required by SECLEVEL >= 3.

[Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]

Applied to master, thanks.

Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.

Quoted 37 lines
---
 package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash | 4 ++--
 package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash +2 -2
index a055cbc270..22bb365bcc 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz.sha256
-sha256  f89199be8b23ca45fc7cb9f1d8d3ee67312318286ad030f5316aca6462db6c96  openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz
+# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz.sha256
+sha256  40dceb51a4f6a5275bde0e6bf20ef4b91bfc32ed57c0552e2e8e15463372b17a  openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz
 
 # License files
 sha256  c32913b33252e71190af2066f08115c69bc9fddadf3bf29296e20c835389841c  LICENSE
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk +1 -1
index bd8ef6141a..ae6658ed40 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1m
+LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1n
 LIBOPENSSL_SITE = https://www.openssl.org/source
 LIBOPENSSL_SOURCE = openssl-$(LIBOPENSSL_VERSION).tar.gz
 LIBOPENSSL_LICENSE = OpenSSL or SSLeay
Signature · 6 lines
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.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
|  Yann E. MORIN  | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software  Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN     |  ___               |
| +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------:  X  AGAINST      |  \e/  There is no  |
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#2 lore raw
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"Yann" == Yann E MORIN <[email protected]> writes:

Peter, All,
+Peter K.: candidate to be backported, that's a security fix.

Indeed. Why it is not marked as such ("security bump to version 1.1.1n")?

Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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#3 lore raw

Hello *,

Quoted 8 lines · Peter Korsgaard
Quoted 4 lines
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"Yann" == Yann E MORIN <[email protected]> writes:

Peter, All,
+Peter K.: candidate to be backported, that's a security fix.

Indeed. Why it is not marked as such ("security bump to version 1.1.1n")?

Sorry, missed it ;-), did only look at the last version bump ([1]):

package/libopenssl: bump version to 1.1.1m

not marked as security bump, but according to [2] is one fixing CVE-2021-4160...

The security advisory for 1.1.1n is found here [3], fixing CVE-2022-0778...

Regards,
Peter

[1] https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/package/libopenssl?id=2b906b975a956bd2b6352b2eec6c3c697317bbbe
[2] https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220128.txt
[3] https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220315.txt
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#4 lore raw
Quoted 1 line
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"Peter" == Peter Seiderer <[email protected]> writes:

Hi,

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Indeed. Why it is not marked as such ("security bump to version 1.1.1n")?

Sorry, missed it ;-), did only look at the last version bump ([1]):

package/libopenssl: bump version to 1.1.1m

not marked as security bump, but according to [2] is one fixing CVE-2021-4160...

Yes, but that was not known when 1.1.1m was released, E.G. the release is from December (and so is the bump in Buildroot) but the advisory was only made on January 28th:

https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220128.txt

Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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buildroot mailing list
[email protected]
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#5 lore raw
In reply to Yann E. MORIN
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
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"Yann" == Yann E MORIN <[email protected]> writes:

Peter, All,
+Peter K.: candidate to be backported, that's a security fix.

Committed to 2021.02.x, 2021.11.x and 2022.02.x, thanks.

Quoted 92 lines

On 2022-03-15 21:54 +0100, Peter Seiderer spake thusly:

Quoted 31 lines

Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]

*) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever for non-prime moduli.

Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.

It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters.

Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters.

Thus vulnerable situations include:

- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters

Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. (CVE-2022-0778)
[Tomáš Mráz]

Quoted 7 lines

*) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489) to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as required by SECLEVEL >= 3.

[Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]

Applied to master, thanks.

Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.

Quoted 37 lines

---
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash | 4 ++--
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk | 2 +-

2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash +2 -2
index a055cbc270..22bb365bcc 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz.sha256
-sha256  f89199be8b23ca45fc7cb9f1d8d3ee67312318286ad030f5316aca6462db6c96  openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz
+# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz.sha256
+sha256  40dceb51a4f6a5275bde0e6bf20ef4b91bfc32ed57c0552e2e8e15463372b17a  openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz
 
 # License files

sha256 c32913b33252e71190af2066f08115c69bc9fddadf3bf29296e20c835389841c LICENSE

package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk +1 -1
index bd8ef6141a..ae6658ed40 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1m
+LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1n

LIBOPENSSL_SITE = https://www.openssl.org/source
LIBOPENSSL_SOURCE = openssl-$(LIBOPENSSL_VERSION).tar.gz LIBOPENSSL_LICENSE = OpenSSL or SSLeay

Signature · 6 lines
2.35.1

_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Signature · 6 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
|  Yann E. MORIN  | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software  Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN     |  ___               |
| +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------:  X  AGAINST      |  \e/  There is no  |
| http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL    |   v   conspiracy.  |
'------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot