package/libopenssl: bump version to 1.1.1n
PATCH 1/1 package/libopenssl: bump version to 1.1.1n
Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]
*) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever
for non-prime moduli.
Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.
It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters.
Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters.
Thus vulnerable situations include:
- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters
Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. (CVE-2022-0778)
[Tomáš Mráz]
*) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489)
to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as required by SECLEVEL >= 3.
[Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]
--- package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash | 4 ++-- package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash +2 -2
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz.sha256 -sha256 f89199be8b23ca45fc7cb9f1d8d3ee67312318286ad030f5316aca6462db6c96 openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz +# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz.sha256 +sha256 40dceb51a4f6a5275bde0e6bf20ef4b91bfc32ed57c0552e2e8e15463372b17a openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz # License files sha256 c32913b33252e71190af2066f08115c69bc9fddadf3bf29296e20c835389841c LICENSE
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1m +LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1n LIBOPENSSL_SITE = https://www.openssl.org/source LIBOPENSSL_SOURCE = openssl-$(LIBOPENSSL_VERSION).tar.gz LIBOPENSSL_LICENSE = OpenSSL or SSLeay
Signature · 6 lines
2.35.1 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Yann E. MORIN
AppliedPeter, All,
+Peter K.: candidate to be backported, that's a security fix.
On 2022-03-15 21:54 +0100, Peter Seiderer spake thusly:
Quoted 31 lines
Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]
*) Fixed a bug in the
BN_mod_sqrt()function that can cause it to loop forever
for non-prime moduli.Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.
It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters.
Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters.
Thus vulnerable situations include:
- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parametersAlso any other applications that use the
BN_mod_sqrt()where the attacker can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. (CVE-2022-0778)
[Tomáš Mráz]
Quoted 7 lines
*) Add ciphersuites based on
DHE_PSK(RFC 4279) andECDHE_PSK(RFC 5489)
to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as required by SECLEVEL >= 3.[Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]
Signed-off-by Peter Seiderer <[email protected]>
Applied to master, thanks.
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
Quoted 37 lines
--- package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash | 4 ++-- package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash +2
-2@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz.sha256 -sha256 f89199be8b23ca45fc7cb9f1d8d3ee67312318286ad030f5316aca6462db6c96 openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz +# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz.sha256 +sha256 40dceb51a4f6a5275bde0e6bf20ef4b91bfc32ed57c0552e2e8e15463372b17a openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz # License files sha256 c32913b33252e71190af2066f08115c69bc9fddadf3bf29296e20c835389841c LICENSEpackage/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk +1
-1@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1m +LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1n LIBOPENSSL_SITE = https://www.openssl.org/source LIBOPENSSL_SOURCE = openssl-$(LIBOPENSSL_VERSION).tar.gz LIBOPENSSL_LICENSE = OpenSSL or SSLeaySignature · 6 lines
2.35.1 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Signature · 10 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------. | Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: | | +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ | | +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no | | http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. | '------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------' _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
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"Yann" == Yann E MORIN <[email protected]> writes:
Peter, All,
+Peter K.: candidate to be backported, that's a security fix.
Indeed. Why it is not marked as such ("security bump to version 1.1.1n")?
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Hello *,
Quoted 8 lines · Peter Korsgaard
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"Yann" == Yann E MORIN <[email protected]> writes:
Peter, All,
+Peter K.: candidate to be backported, that's a security fix.Indeed. Why it is not marked as such ("security bump to version 1.1.1n")?
Sorry, missed it ;-), did only look at the last version bump ([1]):
package/libopenssl: bump version to 1.1.1m
not marked as security bump, but according to [2] is one fixing CVE-2021-4160...
The security advisory for 1.1.1n is found here [3], fixing CVE-2022-0778...
Regards,
Peter
[1] https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/package/libopenssl?id=2b906b975a956bd2b6352b2eec6c3c697317bbbe
[2] https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220128.txt
[3] https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220315.txt
_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
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"Peter" == Peter Seiderer <[email protected]> writes:
Hi,
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Indeed. Why it is not marked as such ("security bump to version 1.1.1n")?
Sorry, missed it ;-), did only look at the last version bump ([1]):
package/libopenssl: bump version to 1.1.1m
not marked as security bump, but according to [2] is one fixing CVE-2021-4160...
Yes, but that was not known when 1.1.1m was released, E.G. the release is from December (and so is the bump in Buildroot) but the advisory was only made on January 28th:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220128.txt
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
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"Yann" == Yann E MORIN <[email protected]> writes:
Peter, All,
+Peter K.: candidate to be backported, that's a security fix.
Committed to 2021.02.x, 2021.11.x and 2022.02.x, thanks.
Quoted 92 lines
On 2022-03-15 21:54 +0100, Peter Seiderer spake thusly:
Quoted 31 lines
Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]
*) Fixed a bug in the
BN_mod_sqrt()function that can cause it to loop forever for non-prime moduli.Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.
It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters.
Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters.
Thus vulnerable situations include:
- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parametersAlso any other applications that use the
BN_mod_sqrt()where the attacker can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. (CVE-2022-0778)
[Tomáš Mráz]Quoted 7 lines
*) Add ciphersuites based on
DHE_PSK(RFC 4279) andECDHE_PSK(RFC 5489) to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as required by SECLEVEL >= 3.[Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]
Signed-off-by Peter Seiderer <[email protected]>Applied to master, thanks.
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.Quoted 37 lines
---
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash | 4 ++--package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk| 2 +-2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash +2
-2@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz.sha256 -sha256 f89199be8b23ca45fc7cb9f1d8d3ee67312318286ad030f5316aca6462db6c96 openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz +# From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz.sha256 +sha256 40dceb51a4f6a5275bde0e6bf20ef4b91bfc32ed57c0552e2e8e15463372b17a openssl-1.1.1n.tar.gz # License filessha256
c32913b33252e71190af2066f08115c69bc9fddadf3bf29296e20c835389841cLICENSEpackage/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk +1
-1@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1m +LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1n
LIBOPENSSL_SITE= https://www.openssl.org/sourceLIBOPENSSL_SOURCE= openssl-$(LIBOPENSSL_VERSION).tar.gzLIBOPENSSL_LICENSE= OpenSSL or SSLeaySignature · 6 lines
2.35.1 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildrootSignature · 6 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------. | Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: | | +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ | | +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no | | http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. | '------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot