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can: isotp: sanitize CAN ID checks in isotp_bind()

PATCH In review Oliver Hartkopp 2 participants 4 messages Mar 16, 2022

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Oliver Hartkopp

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 can: isotp: sanitize CAN ID checks in isotp_bind()

Syzbot created an environment that lead to a state machine status that can not be reached with a compliant CAN ID address configuration. The provided address information consisted of CAN ID 0x6000001 and 0xC28001 which both boil down to 11 bit CAN IDs 0x001 in sending and receiving.

Sanitize the SFF/EFF CAN ID values before performing the address checks.

Fixes e057dd3fc20f ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 net/can/isotp.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
net/can/isotp.c +21 -20
index d4c0b4704987..1662103ce125 100644
@@ -1146,19 +1146,30 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct isotp_sock *so = isotp_sk(sk);
 	struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
 	int ifindex;
 	struct net_device *dev;
+	canid_t tx_id, rx_id;
 	int err = 0;
 	int notify_enetdown = 0;
 	int do_rx_reg = 1;
 
 	if (len < ISOTP_MIN_NAMELEN)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id & (CAN_ERR_FLAG | CAN_RTR_FLAG))
-		return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+	/* sanitize tx/rx CAN identifiers */
+	tx_id = addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id;
+	if (tx_id & CAN_EFF_FLAG)
+		tx_id &= (CAN_EFF_FLAG | CAN_EFF_MASK);
+	else
+		tx_id &= CAN_SFF_MASK;
+
+	rx_id = addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id;
+	if (rx_id & CAN_EFF_FLAG)
+		rx_id &= (CAN_EFF_FLAG | CAN_EFF_MASK);
+	else
+		rx_id &= CAN_SFF_MASK;
 
 	if (!addr->can_ifindex)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
@@ -1166,25 +1177,17 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
 	/* do not register frame reception for functional addressing */
 	if (so->opt.flags & CAN_ISOTP_SF_BROADCAST)
 		do_rx_reg = 0;
 
 	/* do not validate rx address for functional addressing */
-	if (do_rx_reg) {
-		if (addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id == addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id) {
-			err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
-		if (addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id & (CAN_ERR_FLAG | CAN_RTR_FLAG)) {
-			err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
-			goto out;
-		}
+	if (do_rx_reg && rx_id == tx_id) {
+		err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (so->bound && addr->can_ifindex == so->ifindex &&
-	    addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id == so->rxid &&
-	    addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id == so->txid)
+	    rx_id == so->rxid && tx_id == so->txid)
 		goto out;
 
 	dev = dev_get_by_index(net, addr->can_ifindex);
 	if (!dev) {
 		err = -ENODEV;
@@ -1204,20 +1207,18 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
 		notify_enetdown = 1;
 
 	ifindex = dev->ifindex;
 
 	if (do_rx_reg) {
-		can_rx_register(net, dev, addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id,
-				SINGLE_MASK(addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id),
+		can_rx_register(net, dev, rx_id, SINGLE_MASK(rx_id),
 				isotp_rcv, sk, "isotp", sk);
 
 		/* no consecutive frame echo skb in flight */
 		so->cfecho = 0;
 
 		/* register for echo skb's */
-		can_rx_register(net, dev, addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id,
-				SINGLE_MASK(addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id),
+		can_rx_register(net, dev, tx_id, SINGLE_MASK(tx_id),
 				isotp_rcv_echo, sk, "isotpe", sk);
 	}
 
 	dev_put(dev);
 
@@ -1237,12 +1238,12 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
 		}
 	}
 
 	/* switch to new settings */
 	so->ifindex = ifindex;
-	so->rxid = addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id;
-	so->txid = addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id;
+	so->rxid = rx_id;
+	so->txid = tx_id;
 	so->bound = 1;
 
 out:
 	release_sock(sk);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 can: isotp: return -EADDRNOTAVAIL when reading from unbound socket

When reading from an unbound can-isotp socket the syscall blocked indefinitely. As unbound sockets (without given CAN address information) do not make sense anyway we directly return -EADDRNOTAVAIL on read() analogue to the known behavior from sendmsg().

Fixes e057dd3fc20f ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol")
---
 net/can/isotp.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/can/isotp.c +4 -0
index 1662103ce125..6b6c82206c30 100644
@@ -1044,16 +1044,20 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 static int isotp_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
 			 int flags)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct isotp_sock *so = isotp_sk(sk);
 	int err = 0;
 	int noblock;
 
 	noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
 	flags &= ~MSG_DONTWAIT;
 
+	if (!so->bound)
+		return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+
 	skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
 	if (!skb)
 		return err;
 
 	if (size < skb->len)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 can: isotp: support MSG_TRUNC flag when reading from socket

In reply to Oliver Hartkopp

When providing the MSG_TRUNC flag via recvmsg() syscall the return value provides the real length of the packet or datagram, even when it was longer than the passed buffer.

Fixes e057dd3fc20f ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol")
---
 net/can/isotp.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/can/isotp.c +15 -12
index 6b6c82206c30..f6f8ba1f816d 100644
@@ -1045,45 +1045,48 @@ static int isotp_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
 			 int flags)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct isotp_sock *so = isotp_sk(sk);
-	int err = 0;
-	int noblock;
+	int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
+	int ret = 0;
 
-	noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
-	flags &= ~MSG_DONTWAIT;
+	if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!so->bound)
 		return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
-	skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
+	flags &= ~MSG_DONTWAIT;
+	skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &ret);
 	if (!skb)
-		return err;
+		return ret;
 
 	if (size < skb->len)
 		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
 	else
 		size = skb->len;
 
-	err = memcpy_to_msg(msg, skb->data, size);
-	if (err < 0) {
-		skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
-		return err;
-	}
+	ret = memcpy_to_msg(msg, skb->data, size);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out_err;
 
 	sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
 
 	if (msg->msg_name) {
 		__sockaddr_check_size(ISOTP_MIN_NAMELEN);
 		msg->msg_namelen = ISOTP_MIN_NAMELEN;
 		memcpy(msg->msg_name, skb->cb, msg->msg_namelen);
 	}
 
+	/* set length of return value */
+	ret = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : size;
+
+out_err:
 	skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
 
-	return size;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int isotp_release(struct socket *sock)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
#3 lore raw
In reply to Oliver Hartkopp
Quoted 10 lines · Oliver Hartkopp

Syzbot created an environment that lead to a state machine status that can not be reached with a compliant CAN ID address configuration. The provided address information consisted of CAN ID 0x6000001 and 0xC28001 which both boil down to 11 bit CAN IDs 0x001 in sending and receiving.

Sanitize the SFF/EFF CAN ID values before performing the address checks.

Fixes e057dd3fc20f ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol")
Reported-by [email protected]

Added to linux-can-next/testing.

Thanks,
Marc

Signature · 4 lines
Pengutronix e.K.                 | Marc Kleine-Budde           |
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