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use more system keyrings to verify arm64 kdump kernel image signature

PATCH Superseded Coiby Xu 2 participants 11 messages Mar 18, 2022 – Mar 22, 2022

Subsystems (5)

v4 of 10 Superseded Latest is v10 →

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Coiby Xu

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#0 lore raw

v4 cover use more system keyrings to verify arm64 kdump kernel image signature

This patch set allows arm64 to use more system keyrings to verify kdump kernel image signature by making the existing code in x64 public.

v4:
- fix commit reference format issue and other checkpatch.pl warnings [Baoquan]

v3:
- s/arch_kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig/kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig [Eric]
- clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig [Eric]

v2:
- only x86_64 and arm64 need to enable PE file signature check [Dave]
Coiby Xu (3):
kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic
arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image
signature

 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c   |  4 +--
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 +-------
 include/linux/kexec.h             |  7 +++--
 kernel/kexec_file.c               | 51 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/3 kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig

Commit 9ec4ecef0af7 ("kexec_file,x86,powerpc: factor out kexec_file_ops functions") allows implementing the arch-specific implementation of kernel image verification in kexec_file_ops->verify_sig. Currently, there is no arch-specific implementation of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. So clean it up.

---
 include/linux/kexec.h |  4 ----
 kernel/kexec_file.c   | 34 +++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/linux/kexec.h +0 -4
index 0c994ae37729..755fed183224 100644
@@ -196,10 +196,6 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
 int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-				 unsigned long buf_len);
-#endif
 int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
kernel/kexec_file.c +13 -21
index 8347fc158d2b..3720435807eb 100644
@@ -89,25 +89,6 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					  unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
-		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	}
-
-	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
-}
-
-int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add - apply relocations of type RELA
  * @pi:		Purgatory to be relocated.
@@ -184,13 +165,24 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
+		unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
+		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
+}
+
 static int
 kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
-					   image->kernel_buf_len);
+	ret = kexec_image_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
+			image->kernel_buf_len);
 	if (ret) {
 
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig

Quoted 3 lines · Coiby Xu

Commit 9ec4ecef0af7 ("kexec_file,x86,powerpc: factor out kexec_file_ops functions") allows implementing the arch-specific implementation of kernel image verification in kexec_file_ops->verify_sig. Currently, there is no

Looking back at the old commit 9ec4ecef0af7, it mistakenly added a generic arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() which is marked as __weak, and expects any architecture will add a arch specified version if needed. In fact those arch specified difference has been removed by wrapping them into each architecture's own struct kexec_file_ops methods. Means in the commit, the generic arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is unnecessary at all.

Now, you clean up that uncessary function with code change.

I think description telling above analysis could be clearer.

Quoted 85 lines

arch-specific implementation of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. So clean it up.

---
 include/linux/kexec.h |  4 ----
 kernel/kexec_file.c   | 34 +++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/linux/kexec.h +0 -4
index 0c994ae37729..755fed183224 100644
@@ -196,10 +196,6 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
 int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-				 unsigned long buf_len);
-#endif
 int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
kernel/kexec_file.c +13 -21
index 8347fc158d2b..3720435807eb 100644
@@ -89,25 +89,6 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					  unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
-		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	}
-
-	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
-}
-
-int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add - apply relocations of type RELA
  * @pi:		Purgatory to be relocated.
@@ -184,13 +165,24 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
+		unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
+		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
+}
+
 static int
 kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
-					   image->kernel_buf_len);
+	ret = kexec_image_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
+			image->kernel_buf_len);
 	if (ret) {
 
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig

Quoted 5 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 3 lines · Coiby Xu

Commit 9ec4ecef0af7 ("kexec_file,x86,powerpc: factor out kexec_file_ops functions") allows implementing the arch-specific implementation of kernel image verification in kexec_file_ops->verify_sig. Currently, there is no

Quoted 7 lines

Looking back at the old commit 9ec4ecef0af7, it mistakenly added a generic arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() which is marked as __weak, and expects any architecture will add a arch specified version if needed. In fact those arch specified difference has been removed by wrapping them into each architecture's own struct kexec_file_ops methods. Means in the commit, the generic arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is unnecessary at all.

Thanks for looking at commit 9ec4ecef0af7 for me!

Although commit 9ec4ecef0af7 added some code in arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig so kexec_file_ops->verify_sig can be called, this commit doesn't add __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig itself. And kexec_file_ops isn't supposed to replace arch-specific implementation using __weak considering s390 and x86 still make use of __weak to implement its own version of arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add. How about the commit message as follows?

Currently this no arch-specific implementation of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. Even if we want to add an implementation for an architecture in the future, we can simply use "(struct kexec_file_ops*)->verify_sig". So clean it up.

Quoted 91 lines

Now, you clean up that uncessary function with code change.

I think description telling above analysis could be clearer.

Quoted 85 lines

arch-specific implementation of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. So clean it up.

---
 include/linux/kexec.h |  4 ----
 kernel/kexec_file.c   | 34 +++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/linux/kexec.h +0 -4
index 0c994ae37729..755fed183224 100644
@@ -196,10 +196,6 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
 int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-				 unsigned long buf_len);
-#endif
 int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
kernel/kexec_file.c +13 -22
index 8347fc158d2b..3720435807eb 100644
@@ -89,25 +89,6 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					  unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
-		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	}
-
-	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
-}
-
-int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add - apply relocations of type RELA
  * @pi:		Purgatory to be relocated.
@@ -184,13 +165,24 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
+		unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
+		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
+}
+
 static int
 kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
-					   image->kernel_buf_len);
+	ret = kexec_image_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
+			image->kernel_buf_len);
 	if (ret) {
 
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
--

2.34.1

Signature · 2 lines
Best regards,
Coiby
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig

Quoted 16 lines · Coiby Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 3 lines · Coiby Xu

Commit 9ec4ecef0af7 ("kexec_file,x86,powerpc: factor out kexec_file_ops functions") allows implementing the arch-specific implementation of kernel image verification in kexec_file_ops->verify_sig. Currently, there is no

Quoted 7 lines

Looking back at the old commit 9ec4ecef0af7, it mistakenly added a generic arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() which is marked as __weak, and expects any architecture will add a arch specified version if needed. In fact those arch specified difference has been removed by wrapping them into each architecture's own struct kexec_file_ops methods. Means in the commit, the generic arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is unnecessary at all.

Thanks for looking at commit 9ec4ecef0af7 for me!

Quoted 7 lines

Although commit 9ec4ecef0af7 added some code in arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig so kexec_file_ops->verify_sig can be called, this commit doesn't add __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig itself. And kexec_file_ops isn't supposed to replace arch-specific implementation using __weak considering s390 and x86 still make use of __weak to implement its own version of arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add. How about the commit message as follows?

Yes, arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add has its different version on arches. But arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is different. There's a specific method for that, ->verify_sig().

struct kexec_file_ops {
        kexec_probe_t *probe;         
        kexec_load_t *load;
        kexec_cleanup_t *cleanup;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
        kexec_verify_sig_t *verify_sig;

#endif
};

Quoted 5 lines

Currently this no arch-specific implementation of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. Even if we want to add an implementation for an architecture in the future, we can simply use "(struct kexec_file_ops*)->verify_sig". So clean it up.

That is also fine. I think it's better to put the above in if we have checked the old commit. Anyway, please take the sentences which comforts you more. And there's grammer mistake, please use 'Currently there is not' to replace.

Quoted 96 lines
Quoted 91 lines

Now, you clean up that uncessary function with code change.

I think description telling above analysis could be clearer.

Quoted 85 lines

arch-specific implementation of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. So clean it up.

---
 include/linux/kexec.h |  4 ----
 kernel/kexec_file.c   | 34 +++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/linux/kexec.h +0 -4
index 0c994ae37729..755fed183224 100644
@@ -196,10 +196,6 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
 int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-				 unsigned long buf_len);
-#endif
 int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
kernel/kexec_file.c +13 -22
index 8347fc158d2b..3720435807eb 100644
@@ -89,25 +89,6 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					  unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
-		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	}
-
-	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
-}
-
-int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add - apply relocations of type RELA
  * @pi:		Purgatory to be relocated.
@@ -184,13 +165,24 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
+		unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
+		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
+}
+
 static int
 kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
-					   image->kernel_buf_len);
+	ret = kexec_image_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
+			image->kernel_buf_len);
 	if (ret) {
 
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
--

2.34.1

Signature · 2 lines
Best regards,
Coiby
author
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig

Quoted 29 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 16 lines · Coiby Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 3 lines · Coiby Xu

Commit 9ec4ecef0af7 ("kexec_file,x86,powerpc: factor out kexec_file_ops functions") allows implementing the arch-specific implementation of kernel image verification in kexec_file_ops->verify_sig. Currently, there is no

Quoted 7 lines

Looking back at the old commit 9ec4ecef0af7, it mistakenly added a generic arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() which is marked as __weak, and expects any architecture will add a arch specified version if needed. In fact those arch specified difference has been removed by wrapping them into each architecture's own struct kexec_file_ops methods. Means in the commit, the generic arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is unnecessary at all.

Thanks for looking at commit 9ec4ecef0af7 for me!

Quoted 7 lines

Although commit 9ec4ecef0af7 added some code in arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig so kexec_file_ops->verify_sig can be called, this commit doesn't add __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig itself. And kexec_file_ops isn't supposed to replace arch-specific implementation using __weak considering s390 and x86 still make use of __weak to implement its own version of arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add. How about the commit message as follows?

Yes, arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add has its different version on arches. But arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is different. There's a specific method for that, ->verify_sig().

Quoted 9 lines
struct kexec_file_ops {
       kexec_probe_t *probe;
       kexec_load_t *load;
       kexec_cleanup_t *cleanup;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
       kexec_verify_sig_t *verify_sig;

#endif
};

Thanks for the explanation! This example of arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add is indeed not good and don't illustrate my point. My point is we can't say commit 9ec4ecef0af7 made a mistake since it's not this commit that introduced "__weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig" and I don't think its motivation was to replace __weak with kexec_file_ops. Currently we still have "__weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup" and kexec_file_ops->cleanup.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Currently this no arch-specific implementation of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. Even if we want to add an implementation for an architecture in the future, we can simply use "(struct kexec_file_ops*)->verify_sig". So clean it up.

That is also fine. I think it's better to put the above in if we have checked the old commit. Anyway, please take the sentences which comforts you more. And there's grammer mistake, please use 'Currently there is not' to replace.

Thanks for catching the mistake!

Quoted 98 lines
Quoted 97 lines
Quoted 87 lines

Now, you clean up that uncessary function with code change.

I think description telling above analysis could be clearer.

Quoted 81 lines

arch-specific implementation of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. So clean it up.

---
 include/linux/kexec.h |  4 ----
 kernel/kexec_file.c   | 34 +++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/linux/kexec.h +0 -4
index 0c994ae37729..755fed183224 100644
@@ -196,10 +196,6 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
 int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-				 unsigned long buf_len);
-#endif
 int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
kernel/kexec_file.c +13 -21
index 8347fc158d2b..3720435807eb 100644
@@ -89,25 +89,6 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					  unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
-		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	}
-
-	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
-}
-
-int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add - apply relocations of type RELA
  * @pi:		Purgatory to be relocated.
@@ -184,13 +165,24 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
+		unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
+		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
+}
+
 static int
 kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
-					   image->kernel_buf_len);
+	ret = kexec_image_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
+			image->kernel_buf_len);
 	if (ret) {
 
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/kexec_file.c +0 -1
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
--

2.34.1

--
Best regards,
Coiby

Signature · 2 lines
Best regards,
Coiby
author
#6 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/3 kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic

In reply to Coiby Xu

The code in bzImage64_verify_sig could make use of system keyrings including .buitin_trusted_keys, .secondary_trusted_keys and .platform keyring to verify signed kernel image as PE file. Make it generic so both x86_64 and arm64 can use it.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 +------------
 include/linux/kexec.h             |  7 +++++++
 kernel/kexec_file.c               | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +1 -12
index 170d0fd68b1f..f73aab3fde33 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -531,17 +530,7 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
 static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
-		ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-	}
-	return ret;
+	return kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(kernel, kernel_len);
 }
 #endif
 
include/linux/kexec.h +7 -0
index 755fed183224..2fe39e946988 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
 #include <uapi/linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
 #include <linux/list.h>
@@ -196,6 +197,12 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
 				 const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
 int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel,
+				    unsigned long kernel_len);
+#endif
+#endif
 int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
kernel/kexec_file.c +17 -0
index 3720435807eb..754885b96aab 100644
@@ -165,6 +165,23 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+				      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
+		ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
 		unsigned long buf_len)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author
#7 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/3 arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature

In reply to Coiby Xu

This allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only .builtin_trusted_keys but also .secondary_trusted_keys and .platform keyring.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c +1 -3
index 9ec34690e255..51af1c22d6da 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/pe.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/image.h>
@@ -133,8 +132,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
 static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
-				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	return kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(kernel, kernel_len);
 }
 #endif
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#8 lore raw

v4 cover use more system keyrings to verify arm64 kdump kernel image signature

In reply to Coiby Xu

Hi Coiby,

Quoted 2 lines · Coiby Xu

This patch set allows arm64 to use more system keyrings to verify kdump kernel image signature by making the existing code in x64 public.

Could you tell more about why arm64 need use more system keyrings to verify kdump kernel iamge signature?

What problem have you encountered to make you want to do this?

Thanks
Baoquan

author
#9 lore raw

v4 cover use more system keyrings to verify arm64 kdump kernel image signature

Hi Baoquan,

Quoted 10 lines · Baoquan He

Hi Coiby,

Quoted 2 lines · Coiby Xu

This patch set allows arm64 to use more system keyrings to verify kdump kernel image signature by making the existing code in x64 public.

Could you tell more about why arm64 need use more system keyrings to verify kdump kernel iamge signature?

What problem have you encountered to make you want to do this?

Thanks for raising this question! Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a MOK key, this kernel image would be rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7". I'll improve the cover letter and the 3rd commit message to have this info.

Quoted 4 lines

Thanks
Baoquan

Signature · 2 lines
Best regards,
Coiby
#10 lore raw

v4 cover use more system keyrings to verify arm64 kdump kernel image signature

Quoted 12 lines · Coiby Xu

Hi Baoquan,

Quoted 9 lines · Baoquan He

Hi Coiby,

Quoted 2 lines · Coiby Xu

This patch set allows arm64 to use more system keyrings to verify kdump kernel image signature by making the existing code in x64 public.

Could you tell more about why arm64 need use more system keyrings to verify kdump kernel iamge signature?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

What problem have you encountered to make you want to do this?

Thanks for raising this question! Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a MOK key, this kernel image would be rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7". I'll improve the cover letter and the 3rd commit message to have this info.

Thanks for the effort, Coiby.

Usually, when we post patch to solve issues, or improve, we had better tell

1) what problem we encounter;
2) why the problem happened, what is the root cause after investigation and analysis;
3) how you fix it;

The 1) and 2) are very important to help reviewer understand what's going on, and why this patch is needed. As you can see, in this patchset, only 3) is presented.

Cheers