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af_key: add __GFP_ZERO flag for compose_sadb_supported in function pfkey_register

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 2 messages Mar 21, 2022

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Sasha Levin

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 af_key: add __GFP_ZERO flag for compose_sadb_supported in function pfkey_register

From: Haimin Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9a564bccb78a76740ea9d75a259942df8143d02c ]

Add __GFP_ZERO flag for compose_sadb_supported in function pfkey_register to initialize the buffer of supp_skb to fix a kernel-info-leak issue.
1) Function pfkey_register calls compose_sadb_supported to request a sk_buff. 2) compose_sadb_supported calls alloc_sbk to allocate a sk_buff, but it doesn't zero it. 3) If auth_len is greater 0, then compose_sadb_supported treats the memory as a struct sadb_supported and begins to initialize. But it just initializes the field sadb_supported_len and field sadb_supported_exttype without field sadb_supported_reserved.

---
 net/key/af_key.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/key/af_key.c +1 -1
index a10336cd7f97..9b3756aa7ca2 100644
@@ -1709,7 +1709,7 @@ static int pfkey_register(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sad
 
 	xfrm_probe_algs();
 
-	supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL);
+	supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 	if (!supp_skb) {
 		if (hdr->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC)
 			pfk->registered &= ~(1<<hdr->sadb_msg_satype);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 net: ipv6: fix skb_over_panic in __ip6_append_data

From: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e34af4142ffe68f01c8a9acae83300f8911e20c ]

Syzbot found a kernel bug in the ipv6 stack:

The reproducer triggers it by sending a crafted message via sendmmsg() call, which triggers skb_over_panic, and crashes the kernel:

skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff84647fb4 len:65575 put:65575 head:ffff888109ff0000 data:ffff888109ff0088 tail:0x100af end:0xfec0 dev:<NULL>

Update the check that prevents an invalid packet with MTU equal to the fregment header size to eat up all the space for payload.

The reproducer can be found here:

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +2 -2
index c474e4b4c4bb..fbad7828568f 100644
@@ -1321,8 +1321,8 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 		      sizeof(struct frag_hdr) : 0) +
 		     rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
 
-	if (mtu < fragheaderlen ||
-	    ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen < sizeof(struct frag_hdr))
+	if (mtu <= fragheaderlen ||
+	    ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen <= sizeof(struct frag_hdr))
 		goto emsgsize;
 
 	maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen -
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1