random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
Subsystems (4)
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH 1/1 random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND. But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by setting random.trust_cpu=0/1 on the kernel command line. This allows system builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil hatters. (Or vice versa.)
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is basically the same thing, but regards the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds the corresponding random.trust_bootloader=0/1 toggle.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +7 -1
@@ -948,11 +948,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)**********************************************************************/ static bool trust_cpu__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU ); +static bool trust_bootloader__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER );static int __init parse_trust_cpu (char *arg) {return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_cpu); } +static int __init parse_trust_bootloader (char *arg) +{ +return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_bootloader); +}early_param ("random.trust_cpu" , parse_trust_cpu); +early_param ("random.trust_bootloader" , parse_trust_bootloader);/* * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
@@ -1160,7 +1166,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);*/ void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,size_t size) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER )) +if (trust_bootloader)add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 );else add_device_randomness (buf, size);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Am Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 10:11:23PM -0600 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 12 lines
If
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPUis set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND. But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by settingrandom.trust_cpu=0/1on the kernel command line. This allows system builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil hatters. (Or vice versa.)
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADERis basically the same thing, but regards the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds the correspondingrandom.trust_bootloader=0/1toggle.
Quoted 5 lines
Cc Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Cc Graham Christensen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Thanks,
Dominik
Quoted 13 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
If
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPUis set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND. But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by settingrandom.trust_cpu=0/1on the kernel command line. This allows system builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil hatters. (Or vice versa.)
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADERis basically the same thing, but regards the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds the correspondingrandom.trust_bootloader=0/1toggle.
Quoted 5 lines
Cc Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Cc Graham Christensen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Quoted 38 lines
--- drivers/char/random.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/char/random.c +7
-2@@ -948,11 +948,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)**********************************************************************/ static bool trust_cpu__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU ); +static bool trust_bootloader__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER );static int __init parse_trust_cpu (char *arg) {return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_cpu); } +static int __init parse_trust_bootloader (char *arg) +{ +return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_bootloader); +}early_param ("random.trust_cpu" , parse_trust_cpu); +early_param ("random.trust_bootloader" , parse_trust_bootloader);/* * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts @@ -1160,7 +1166,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);*/ void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,size_t size) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER )) +if (trust_bootloader)add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 );else add_device_randomness (buf, size); --2.35.1
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v2 1/1 random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldIf CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND. But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by setting random.trust_cpu=0/1 on the kernel command line. This allows system builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil hatters. (Or vice versa.)
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is basically the same thing, but regards the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds the corresponding random.trust_bootloader=0/1 toggle.
---
v2 updates the documentation, using the same verbage as the trust_cpu text.
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++ drivers/char/Kconfig | 3 ++- drivers/char/random.c | 8 +++++++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +6 -0
@@ -4400,6 +4400,12 @@ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU. + random.trust_bootloader={on,off} + [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of the + a seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to + fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled + by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. + randomize_kstack_offset= [KNL] Enable or disable kernel stack offset randomization, which provides roughly 5 bits of
drivers/char/Kconfig +2 -1
@@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that - only mixes the entropy pool. + only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with + "random.trust_bootloader=on/off". endmenu
drivers/char/random.c +7 -1
@@ -949,11 +949,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)**********************************************************************/ static bool trust_cpu__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU ); +static bool trust_bootloader__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER );static int __init parse_trust_cpu (char *arg) {return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_cpu); } +static int __init parse_trust_bootloader (char *arg) +{ +return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_bootloader); +}early_param ("random.trust_cpu" , parse_trust_cpu); +early_param ("random.trust_bootloader" , parse_trust_bootloader);/* * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
@@ -1161,7 +1167,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);*/ void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,size_t size) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER )) +if (trust_bootloader)add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 );else add_device_randomness (buf, size);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1