package/gzip: security bump to 1.12
PATCH 1/2 package/gzip: security bump to 1.12
Fixes the following security issues:
CVE-2022-1271: arbitrary-file-write vulnerability
zgrep applied to a crafted file name with two or more newlines can no longer overwrite an arbitrary, attacker-selected file. [bug introduced in gzip-1.3.10]
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/07/8
Other changes:
** Changes in behavior
'gzip -l' no longer misreports file lengths 4 GiB and larger. Previously, 'gzip -l' output the 32-bit value stored in the gzip header even though that is the uncompressed length modulo 2**32. Now, 'gzip -l' calculates the uncompressed length by decompressing the data and counting the resulting bytes. Although this can take much more time, nowadays the correctness pros seem to outweigh the performance cons.
'zless' is no longer installed on platforms lacking 'less'.
** Bug fixes
zgrep now names input file on error instead of mislabeling it as "(standard input)", if grep supports the GNU -H and --label options.
'zdiff -C 5' no longer misbehaves by treating '5' as a file name. [bug present since the beginning]
Configure-time options like --program-prefix now work.
Release Announcement:
https://lists.gnu.org/r/bug-gzip/2022-04/msg00011.html
--- package/gzip/gzip.hash | 4 ++-- package/gzip/gzip.mk | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/gzip/gzip.hash +2 -2
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Locally calculated after checking pgp signature -# https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gzip/gzip-1.11.tar.xz.sig +# https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gzip/gzip-1.12.tar.xz.sig # using key 155D3FC500C834486D1EEA677FD9FCCB000BEEEE -sha256 9b9a95d68fdcb936849a4d6fada8bf8686cddf58b9b26c9c4289ed0c92a77907 gzip-1.11.tar.xz +sha256 ce5e03e519f637e1f814011ace35c4f87b33c0bbabeec35baf5fbd3479e91956 gzip-1.12.tar.xz # Locally calculated sha256 8ceb4b9ee5adedde47b31e975c1d90c73ad27b6b165a1dcd80c7c545eb65b903 COPYING
package/gzip/gzip.mk +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -GZIP_VERSION = 1.11 +GZIP_VERSION = 1.12 GZIP_SOURCE = gzip-$(GZIP_VERSION).tar.xz GZIP_SITE = $(BR2_GNU_MIRROR)/gzip # Some other tools expect it to be in /bin
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH 2/2 package/xz: backport CVE-2022-1271 security fix
Fixes the following security issue:
CVE-2022-1271/ZDI-22-619/ZDI-CAN-16587: arbitrary-file-write vulnerability
Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution.
xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. This patch works for all of them.
This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes a fix for zgrep.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00551.html
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-619/
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/07/8
--- package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch
package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch new file +96 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From 69d1b3fc29677af8ade8dc15dba83f0589cb63d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lasse Collin <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:19:12 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] xzgrep: Fix escaping of malicious filenames (ZDI-CAN-16587). + +Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files +or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution. + +xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are +affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. +This patch works for all of them. + +This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes +a fix for zgrep. + +The issue with the old sed script is that with multiple newlines, +the N-command will read the second line of input, then the +s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end of the +file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern space +is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get escaped. + +One way to fix this would be to read all lines into the pattern +space first. However, the included fix is even simpler: All lines +except the last line get a backslash appended at the end. To ensure +that shell command substitution doesn't eat a possible trailing +newline, a colon is appended to the filename before escaping. +The colon is later used to separate the filename from the grep +output so it is fine to add it here instead of a few lines later. + +The old code also wasn't POSIX compliant as it used \n in the +replacement section of the s-command. Using \<newline> is the +POSIX compatible method. + +LC_ALL=C was added to the two critical sed commands. POSIX sed +manual recommends it when using sed to manipulate pathnames +because in other locales invalid multibyte sequences might +cause issues with some sed implementations. In case of GNU sed, +these particular sed scripts wouldn't have such problems but some +other scripts could have, see: + + info '(sed)Locale Considerations' + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Thanks to Jim Meyering and Paul Eggert discussing the different +ways to fix this and for coordinating the patch release schedule +with gzip. + +Signed-off-by: Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]> +--- + src/scripts/xzgrep.in | 20 ++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +index b180936..e5186ba 100644 +--- a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in ++++ b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +@@ -180,22 +180,26 @@ for i; do + { test $# -eq 1 || test $no_filename -eq 1; }; then + eval "$grep" + else ++ # Append a colon so that the last character will never be a newline ++ # which would otherwise get lost in shell command substitution. ++ i="$i:" ++ ++ # Escape & \ | and newlines only if such characters are present ++ # (speed optimization). + case $i in + (*' + '* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*) +- i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | +- sed ' +- $!N +- $s/[&\|]/\\&/g +- $s/\n/\\n/g +- ');; ++ i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/[&\|]/\\&/g; $!s/$/\\/');; + esac +- sed_script="s|^|$i:|" ++ ++ # $i already ends with a colon so don't add it here. ++ sed_script="s|^|$i|" + + # Fail if grep or sed fails. + r=$( + exec 4>&1 +- (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- ++ (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | ++ LC_ALL=C sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- + ) || r=2 + exit $r + fi >&3 5>&- +-- +2.35.1 +
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] package/xz: backport CVE-2022-1271 security fix
Hi Marcus,
Quoted 17 lines · Marcus Hoffmann
Fixes the following security issue:
CVE-2022-1271/ZDI-22-619/ZDI-CAN-16587: arbitrary-file-write vulnerability
Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution.
xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. This patch works for all of them.
This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes a fix for zgrep.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00551.html
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-619/
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/07/8Signed-off-by Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]>--- package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch
This patch should also add XZ_IGNORE_CVES in xz.mk.
baruch
Quoted 103 lines
package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch new file +96
-0@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From 69d1b3fc29677af8ade8dc15dba83f0589cb63d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lasse Collin <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:19:12 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] xzgrep: Fix escaping of malicious filenames (ZDI-CAN-16587). + +Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files +or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution. + +xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are +affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. +This patch works for all of them. + +This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes +a fix for zgrep. + +The issue with the old sed script is that with multiple newlines, +the N-command will read the second line of input, then the +s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end of the +file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern space +is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get escaped. + +One way to fix this would be to read all lines into the pattern +space first. However, the included fix is even simpler: All lines +except the last line get a backslash appended at the end. To ensure +that shell command substitution doesn't eat a possible trailing +newline, a colon is appended to the filename before escaping. +The colon is later used to separate the filename from the grep +output so it is fine to add it here instead of a few lines later. + +The old code also wasn't POSIX compliant as it used \n in the +replacement section of the s-command. Using \<newline> is the +POSIX compatible method. + +LC_ALL=C was added to the two critical sed commands. POSIX sed +manual recommends it when using sed to manipulate pathnames +because in other locales invalid multibyte sequences might +cause issues with some sed implementations. In case of GNU sed, +these particular sed scripts wouldn't have such problems but some +other scripts could have, see: + + info '(sed)Locale Considerations' + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Thanks to Jim Meyering and Paul Eggert discussing the different +ways to fix this and for coordinating the patch release schedule +with gzip. + +Signed-off-by: Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]> +--- + src/scripts/xzgrep.in | 20 ++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +index b180936..e5186ba 100644 +--- a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in ++++ b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +@@ -180,22 +180,26 @@ for i; do + { test $# -eq 1 || test $no_filename -eq 1; }; then + eval "$grep" + else ++ # Append a colon so that the last character will never be a newline ++ # which would otherwise get lost in shell command substitution. ++ i="$i:" ++ ++ # Escape & \ | and newlines only if such characters are present ++ # (speed optimization). + case $i in + (*' + '* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*) +- i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | +- sed ' +- $!N +- $s/[&\|]/\\&/g +- $s/\n/\\n/g +- ');; ++ i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/[&\|]/\\&/g; $!s/$/\\/');; + esac +- sed_script="s|^|$i:|" ++ ++ # $i already ends with a colon so don't add it here. ++ sed_script="s|^|$i|" + + # Fail if grep or sed fails. + r=$( + exec 4>&1 +- (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- ++ (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | ++ LC_ALL=C sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- + ) || r=2 + exit $r + fi >&3 5>&- +-- +2.35.1 +
Signature · 7 lines
~. .~ Tk Open Systems
=}------------------------------------------------ooO--U--Ooo------------{=
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https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildrootRe: [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] package/xz: backport CVE-2022-1271 security fix
Hi Baruch,
Quoted 29 lines · Baruch Siach via buildroot
Hi Marcus,
Quoted 17 lines · Marcus Hoffmann
Fixes the following security issue:
CVE-2022-1271/ZDI-22-619/ZDI-CAN-16587: arbitrary-file-write vulnerability
Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution.
xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. This patch works for all of them.
This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes a fix for zgrep.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day InitiativeQuoted 8 lines
https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00551.html
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-619/
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/07/8Signed-off-by Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]>--- package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)create mode 100644
package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch
Quoted 3 lines
This patch should also add
XZ_IGNORE_CVESin xz.mk.baruch
Indeed! But Peter already send a better patch that does this:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/buildroot/patch/[email protected]/
Marcus
Quoted 96 lines
Quoted 96 lines
package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch new file +88
-0@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From 69d1b3fc29677af8ade8dc15dba83f0589cb63d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lasse Collin <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:19:12 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] xzgrep: Fix escaping of malicious filenames (ZDI-CAN-16587). + +Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files +or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution. + +xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are +affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. +This patch works for all of them. + +This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes +a fix for zgrep. + +The issue with the old sed script is that with multiple newlines, +the N-command will read the second line of input, then the +s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end of the +file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern space +is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get escaped. + +One way to fix this would be to read all lines into the pattern +space first. However, the included fix is even simpler: All lines +except the last line get a backslash appended at the end. To ensure +that shell command substitution doesn't eat a possible trailing +newline, a colon is appended to the filename before escaping. +The colon is later used to separate the filename from the grep +output so it is fine to add it here instead of a few lines later. + +The old code also wasn't POSIX compliant as it used \n in the +replacement section of the s-command. Using \<newline> is the +POSIX compatible method. + +LC_ALL=C was added to the two critical sed commands. POSIX sed +manual recommends it when using sed to manipulate pathnames +because in other locales invalid multibyte sequences might +cause issues with some sed implementations. In case of GNU sed, +these particular sed scripts wouldn't have such problems but some +other scripts could have, see: + + info '(sed)Locale Considerations' + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Thanks to Jim Meyering and Paul Eggert discussing the different +ways to fix this and for coordinating the patch release schedule +with gzip. + +Signed-off-by: Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]> +--- + src/scripts/xzgrep.in | 20 ++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +index b180936..e5186ba 100644 +--- a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in ++++ b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +@@ -180,22 +180,26 @@ for i; do + { test $# -eq 1 || test $no_filename -eq 1; }; then + eval "$grep" + else ++ # Append a colon so that the last character will never be a newline ++ # which would otherwise get lost in shell command substitution. ++ i="$i:" ++ ++ # Escape & \ | and newlines only if such characters are present ++ # (speed optimization). + case $i in + (*' + '* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*) +- i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | +- sed ' +- $!N +- $s/[&\|]/\\&/g +- $s/\n/\\n/g +- ');; ++ i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/[&\|]/\\&/g; $!s/$/\\/');; + esac +- sed_script="s|^|$i:|" ++ ++ # $i already ends with a colon so don't add it here. ++ sed_script="s|^|$i|" + + # Fail if grep or sed fails. + r=$( + exec 4>&1 +- (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&-
Quoted 10 lines
package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch line 96
Quoted 8 lines
package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch new file +8
-0++ (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | ++ LC_ALL=C sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- + ) || r=2 + exit $r + fi >&3 5>&- +-- +2.35.1 +
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Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] package/xz: backport CVE-2022-1271 security fix
In reply to Baruch Siach via buildrootHi Baruch,
Quoted 29 lines · Baruch Siach via buildroot
Hi Marcus,
Quoted 17 lines · Marcus Hoffmann
Fixes the following security issue:
CVE-2022-1271/ZDI-22-619/ZDI-CAN-16587: arbitrary-file-write vulnerability
Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution.
xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. This patch works for all of them.
This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes a fix for zgrep.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day InitiativeQuoted 8 lines
https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00551.html
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-619/
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/07/8Signed-off-by Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]>--- package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)create mode 100644
package/xz/0001-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch
Quoted 3 lines
This patch should also add
XZ_IGNORE_CVESin xz.mk.baruch
Indeed! But Peter already send a better patch that does this:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/buildroot/patch/[email protected]/
Marcus
_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Arnout Vandecappelle
AppliedQuoted 32 lines · Marcus Hoffmann
Fixes the following security issues:
CVE-2022-1271: arbitrary-file-write vulnerability
zgrep applied to a crafted file name with two or more newlines can no longer overwrite an arbitrary, attacker-selected file. [bug introduced in gzip-1.3.10]
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/07/8
Other changes:
** Changes in behavior
'gzip -l' no longer misreports file lengths 4 GiB and larger. Previously, 'gzip -l' output the 32-bit value stored in the gzip header even though that is the uncompressed length modulo 2**32. Now, 'gzip -l' calculates the uncompressed length by decompressing the data and counting the resulting bytes. Although this can take much more time, nowadays the correctness pros seem to outweigh the performance cons.
'zless' is no longer installed on platforms lacking 'less'.
** Bug fixes
zgrep now names input file on error instead of mislabeling it as "(standard input)", if grep supports the GNU -H and --label options.
'zdiff -C 5' no longer misbehaves by treating '5' as a file name. [bug present since the beginning]
Quoted 6 lines
Configure-time options like --program-prefix now work.
Release Announcement:
https://lists.gnu.org/r/bug-gzip/2022-04/msg00011.htmlSigned-off-by Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Applied to master, thanks.
Regards,
Arnout
Quoted 23 lines
--- package/gzip/gzip.hash | 4 ++-- package/gzip/gzip.mk | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)package/gzip/gzip.hash +2
-2@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Locally calculated after checking pgp signature -# https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gzip/gzip-1.11.tar.xz.sig +# https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gzip/gzip-1.12.tar.xz.sig # using key 155D3FC500C834486D1EEA677FD9FCCB000BEEEE -sha256 9b9a95d68fdcb936849a4d6fada8bf8686cddf58b9b26c9c4289ed0c92a77907 gzip-1.11.tar.xz +sha256 ce5e03e519f637e1f814011ace35c4f87b33c0bbabeec35baf5fbd3479e91956 gzip-1.12.tar.xz # Locally calculated sha256 8ceb4b9ee5adedde47b31e975c1d90c73ad27b6b165a1dcd80c7c545eb65b903 COPYINGpackage/gzip/gzip.mk +0
-0
package/gzip/gzip.mk line 10
Quoted 8 lines
package/gzip/gzip.mk +1
-1@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -GZIP_VERSION = 1.11 +GZIP_VERSION = 1.12 GZIP_SOURCE = gzip-$(GZIP_VERSION).tar.xz GZIP_SITE = $(BR2_GNU_MIRROR)/gzip # Some other tools expect it to be in /bin
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https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Marcus" == Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]> writes:
Fixes the following security issues:
CVE-2022-1271: arbitrary-file-write vulnerabilityzgrep applied to a crafted file name with two or more newlines can no longer overwrite an arbitrary, attacker-selected file. [bug introduced in gzip-1.3.10]
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/07/8
Other changes:
** Changes in behavior
'gzip -l' no longer misreports file lengths 4 GiB and larger. Previously, 'gzip -l' output the 32-bit value stored in the gzip header even though that is the uncompressed length modulo 2**32. Now, 'gzip -l' calculates the uncompressed length by decompressing the data and counting the resulting bytes. Although this can take much more time, nowadays the correctness pros seem to outweigh the performance cons.
'zless' is no longer installed on platforms lacking 'less'.
** Bug fixes
zgrep now names input file on error instead of mislabeling it as "(standard input)", if grep supports the GNU -H and --label options.
'zdiff -C 5' no longer misbehaves by treating '5' as a file name. [bug present since the beginning]
Quoted 6 lines
Configure-time options like --program-prefix now work.
Release Announcement:
https://lists.gnu.org/r/bug-gzip/2022-04/msg00011.htmlSigned-off-by Marcus Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Committed to 2022.02.x, thanks.
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot