Skip to contentSkip to conversation

KVM: arm64: Hypervisor stack enhancements

PATCH Applied Kalesh Singh 2 participants 10 messages Apr 20, 2022 – May 3, 2022

Subsystems (2)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v8 cover KVM: arm64: Hypervisor stack enhancements

Hi all,

This is v8 of the nVHE hypervisor stack enhancements. This version is based on 5.18-rc3.

Previous versions can be found at:
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

Thanks,
Kalesh

-----

This series is based on 5.18-rc3 and adds stack guard pages to nVHE and pKVM hypervisor; and symbolization of hypervisor addresses.

The guard page stack overflow detection is based on the technique used by arm64 VMAP_STACK. i.e. the stack is aligned such that the 'stack shift' bit of any valid SP is 1. The 'stack shift' bit can be tested in the exception entry to detect overflow without corrupting GPRs.

Kalesh Singh (6):
KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range()
KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range()
KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack
KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows
KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP addresses

 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h     |  1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h     |  3 ++
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c                 | 37 +++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c         | 13 ++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mm.h |  6 ++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S       | 24 +++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c   | 18 ++++++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mm.c         | 78 ++++++++++++++++++----------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c      | 31 +++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c     |  7 ++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c                 | 68 ++++++++++++++++--------
 scripts/kallsyms.c                   |  3 +-
 12 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)

base-commit: b2d229d4ddb17db541098b83524d901257e93845

Signature · 1 line
2.36.0.rc0.470.gd361397f0d-goog
#1 lore raw

PATCH v8 1/6 KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range()

hyp_alloc_private_va_range() can be used to reserve private VA ranges in the nVHE hypervisor. Allocations are aligned based on the order of the requested size.

This will be used to implement stack guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor (nVHE Hyp mode / not pKVM), in a subsequent patch in the series.

---

Changes in v8
- Remove !base check in hyp_alloc_private_va_range(), per Marc
- PAGE_ALIGN the size in __create_hyp_private_mapping(), per Marc

Changes in v7:
- Add Fuad's Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags.

Changes in v6:
- Update kernel-doc for hyp_alloc_private_va_range() and add return description, per Stephen
- Update hyp_alloc_private_va_range() to return an int error code, per Stephen
- Replace IS_ERR() checks with IS_ERR_VALUE() check, per Stephen
- Clean up goto, per Stephen

Changes in v5:
- Align private allocations based on the order of their size, per Marc

Changes in v4:
- Handle null ptr in hyp_alloc_private_va_range() and replace IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks in callers with IS_ERR checks, per Fuad
- Fix kernel-doc comments format, per Fuad

Changes in v3:
- Handle null ptr in IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks, per Mark

 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c             | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +1 -0
index 74735a864eee..a50cbb5ba402 100644
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __kern_hyp_va(unsigned long v)
 int kvm_share_hyp(void *from, void *to);
 void kvm_unshare_hyp(void *from, void *to);
 int create_hyp_mappings(void *from, void *to, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot);
+int hyp_alloc_private_va_range(size_t size, unsigned long *haddr);
 int create_hyp_io_mappings(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size,
 			   void __iomem **kaddr,
 			   void __iomem **haddr);
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +43 -21

93 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 6 lines
2.36.0.rc0.470.gd361397f0d-goog

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
#2 lore raw

PATCH v8 2/6 KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range()

In reply to Kalesh Singh

pkvm_hyp_alloc_private_va_range() can be used to reserve private VA ranges in the pKVM nVHE hypervisor. Allocations are aligned based on the order of the requested size.

This will be used to implement stack guard pages for pKVM nVHE hypervisor (in a subsequent patch in the series).

Credits to Quentin Perret <[email protected]> for the idea of moving private VA allocation out of __pkvm_create_private_mapping()

---

Changes in v8:
- PAGE_ALIGN the size in __pkvm_create_private_mapping(), per Marc

Changes in v7:
- Add Fuad's Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags.

Changes in v6:
- Update kernel-doc for pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() and add return description, per Stephen
- Update pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() to return an int error code, per Stephen
- Update __pkvm_create_private_mapping to return an in error code, per Quentin
- Update callers of __pkvm_create_private_mapping() to handle new return value and params.

Changes in v5:
- Align private allocations based on the order of their size, per Marc

Changes in v4:
- Handle null ptr in pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() and replace IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks in callers with IS_ERR checks, per Fuad
- Fix kernel-doc comments format, per Fuad
- Format __pkvm_create_private_mapping() prototype args (< 80 col), per Fuad

Changes in v3:
- Handle null ptr in IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks, per Mark

Changes in v2:
- Allow specifying an alignment for the private VA allocations, per Marc

 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mm.h |  6 ++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c   | 18 ++++++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mm.c         | 78 ++++++++++++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mm.h +4 -2
index 2d08510c6cc1..42d8eb9bfe72 100644
@@ -19,8 +19,10 @@ int hyp_back_vmemmap(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size, phys_addr_t back);
 int pkvm_cpu_set_vector(enum arm64_hyp_spectre_vector slot);
 int pkvm_create_mappings(void *from, void *to, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot);
 int pkvm_create_mappings_locked(void *from, void *to, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot);
-unsigned long __pkvm_create_private_mapping(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
-					    enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot);
+int __pkvm_create_private_mapping(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
+				  enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot,
+				  unsigned long *haddr);
+int pkvm_alloc_private_va_range(size_t size, unsigned long *haddr);
 
 static inline void hyp_vmemmap_range(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size,
 				     unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +17 -1
index 5e2197db0d32..3cea4b6ac23e 100644
@@ -160,7 +160,23 @@ static void handle___pkvm_create_private_mapping(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ct
 	DECLARE_REG(size_t, size, host_ctxt, 2);
 	DECLARE_REG(enum kvm_pgtable_prot, prot, host_ctxt, 3);
 
-	cpu_reg(host_ctxt, 1) = __pkvm_create_private_mapping(phys, size, prot);
+	/*
+	 * __pkvm_create_private_mapping() populates a pointer with the
+	 * hypervisor start address of the allocation.
+	 *
+	 * However, handle___pkvm_create_private_mapping() hypercall crosses the
+	 * EL1/EL2 boundary so the pointer would not be valid in this context.
+	 *
+	 * Instead pass the allocation address as the return value (or return
+	 * ERR_PTR() on failure).
+	 */
+	unsigned long haddr;
+	int err = __pkvm_create_private_mapping(phys, size, prot, &haddr);
+
+	if (err)
+		haddr = (unsigned long)ERR_PTR(err);
+
+	cpu_reg(host_ctxt, 1) = haddr;
 }
 
 static void handle___pkvm_prot_finalize(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mm.c +51 -27

107 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 6 lines
2.36.0.rc0.470.gd361397f0d-goog

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
#3 lore raw

PATCH v8 3/6 KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack

In reply to Kalesh Singh

Map the stack pages in the flexible private VA range and allocate guard pages below the stack as unbacked VA space. The stack is aligned so that any valid stack address has PAGE_SHIFT bit as 1 - this is used for overflow detection (implemented in a subsequent patch in the series).

---

Changes in v8:
- Don't expose hyp_pgtable and kvm_hyp_pgd_mutex. Instead use __create_hyp_mappings() helper, per Marc

Changes in v7:
- Add Fuad's Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags.

Changes in v6:
- Update call to hyp_alloc_private_va_range() (return val and params)

Changes in v5:
- Use a single allocation for stack and guard pages to ensure they are contiguous, per Marc

Changes in v4:
- Replace IS_ERR_OR_NULL check with IS_ERR check now that hyp_alloc_private_va_range() returns an error for null pointer, per Fuad
- Format comments to < 80 cols, per Fuad

Changes in v3:
- Handle null ptr in IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks, per Mark

 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h |  1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c             | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c             |  4 ++--
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +1 -0
index d5b0386ef765..2e277f2ed671 100644
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ struct kvm_nvhe_init_params {
 	unsigned long tcr_el2;
 	unsigned long tpidr_el2;
 	unsigned long stack_hyp_va;
+	unsigned long stack_pa;
 	phys_addr_t pgd_pa;
 	unsigned long hcr_el2;
 	unsigned long vttbr;
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +2 -0
index a50cbb5ba402..b208da3bebec 100644
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __kern_hyp_va(unsigned long v)
 int kvm_share_hyp(void *from, void *to);
 void kvm_unshare_hyp(void *from, void *to);
 int create_hyp_mappings(void *from, void *to, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot);
+int __create_hyp_mappings(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
+			  unsigned long phys, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot);
 int hyp_alloc_private_va_range(size_t size, unsigned long *haddr);
 int create_hyp_io_mappings(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size,
 			   void __iomem **kaddr,
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +34 -3
index 523bc934fe2f..dd257d9f21a2 100644
@@ -1483,7 +1483,6 @@ static void cpu_prepare_hyp_mode(int cpu)
 	tcr |= (idmap_t0sz & GENMASK(TCR_TxSZ_WIDTH - 1, 0)) << TCR_T0SZ_OFFSET;
 	params->tcr_el2 = tcr;
 
-	params->stack_hyp_va = kern_hyp_va(per_cpu(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page, cpu) + PAGE_SIZE);
 	params->pgd_pa = kvm_mmu_get_httbr();
 	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled())
 		params->hcr_el2 = HCR_HOST_NVHE_PROTECTED_FLAGS;
@@ -1933,14 +1932,46 @@ static int init_hyp_mode(void)
 	 * Map the Hyp stack pages
 	 */
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		struct kvm_nvhe_init_params *params = per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_init_params, cpu);
 		char *stack_page = (char *)per_cpu(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page, cpu);
-		err = create_hyp_mappings(stack_page, stack_page + PAGE_SIZE,
-					  PAGE_HYP);
+		unsigned long hyp_addr;
 
+		/*
+		 * Allocate a contiguous HYP private VA range for the stack
+		 * and guard page. The allocation is also aligned based on
+		 * the order of its size.
+		 */
+		err = hyp_alloc_private_va_range(PAGE_SIZE * 2, &hyp_addr);
+		if (err) {
+			kvm_err("Cannot allocate hyp stack guard page\n");
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Since the stack grows downwards, map the stack to the page
+		 * at the higher address and leave the lower guard page
+		 * unbacked.
+		 *
+		 * Any valid stack address now has the PAGE_SHIFT bit as 1
+		 * and addresses corresponding to the guard page have the
+		 * PAGE_SHIFT bit as 0 - this is used for overflow detection.
+		 */
+		err = __create_hyp_mappings(hyp_addr + PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE,
+					    __pa(stack_page), PAGE_HYP);
 		if (err) {
 			kvm_err("Cannot map hyp stack\n");
 			goto out_err;
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Save the stack PA in nvhe_init_params. This will be needed
+		 * to recreate the stack mapping in protected nVHE mode.
+		 * __hyp_pa() won't do the right thing there, since the stack
+		 * has been mapped in the flexible private VA space.
+		 */
+		params->stack_pa = __pa(stack_page);
+
+		params->stack_hyp_va = hyp_addr + (2 * PAGE_SIZE);
 	}
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +2 -2
index 7de1e02ebfd1..088e14eae4cf 100644
@@ -258,8 +258,8 @@ static bool kvm_host_owns_hyp_mappings(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static int __create_hyp_mappings(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
-				 unsigned long phys, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot)
+int __create_hyp_mappings(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
+			  unsigned long phys, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot)
 {
 	int err;
 
Signature · 6 lines
2.36.0.rc0.470.gd361397f0d-goog

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
#4 lore raw

PATCH v8 4/6 KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack

In reply to Kalesh Singh

Map the stack pages in the flexible private VA range and allocate guard pages below the stack as unbacked VA space. The stack is aligned so that any valid stack address has PAGE_SHIFT bit as 1 - this is used for overflow detection (implemented in a subsequent patch in the series)

---

Changes in v7:
- Add Fuad's Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags.

Changes in v6:
- Update call to pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() (return val and params)

Changes in v5:
- Use a single allocation for stack and guard pages to ensure they are contiguous, per Marc

Changes in v4:
- Replace IS_ERR_OR_NULL check with IS_ERR check now that pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() returns an error for null pointer, per Fuad

Changes in v3:
- Handle null ptr in IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks, per Mark

 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c +28 -3
index 27af337f9fea..e8d4ea2fcfa0 100644
@@ -99,17 +99,42 @@ static int recreate_hyp_mappings(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size,
 		return ret;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) {
+		struct kvm_nvhe_init_params *params = per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i);
+		unsigned long hyp_addr;
+
 		start = (void *)kern_hyp_va(per_cpu_base[i]);
 		end = start + PAGE_ALIGN(hyp_percpu_size);
 		ret = pkvm_create_mappings(start, end, PAGE_HYP);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 
-		end = (void *)per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_hyp_va;
-		start = end - PAGE_SIZE;
-		ret = pkvm_create_mappings(start, end, PAGE_HYP);
+		/*
+		 * Allocate a contiguous HYP private VA range for the stack
+		 * and guard page. The allocation is also aligned based on
+		 * the order of its size.
+		 */
+		ret = pkvm_alloc_private_va_range(PAGE_SIZE * 2, &hyp_addr);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		/*
+		 * Since the stack grows downwards, map the stack to the page
+		 * at the higher address and leave the lower guard page
+		 * unbacked.
+		 *
+		 * Any valid stack address now has the PAGE_SHIFT bit as 1
+		 * and addresses corresponding to the guard page have the
+		 * PAGE_SHIFT bit as 0 - this is used for overflow detection.
+		 */
+		hyp_spin_lock(&pkvm_pgd_lock);
+		ret = kvm_pgtable_hyp_map(&pkvm_pgtable, hyp_addr + PAGE_SIZE,
+					PAGE_SIZE, params->stack_pa, PAGE_HYP);
+		hyp_spin_unlock(&pkvm_pgd_lock);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
+
+		/* Update stack_hyp_va to end of the stack's private VA range */
+		params->stack_hyp_va = hyp_addr + (2 * PAGE_SIZE);
 	}
 
 	/*
Signature · 6 lines
2.36.0.rc0.470.gd361397f0d-goog

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
#5 lore raw

PATCH v8 5/6 KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows

In reply to Kalesh Singh

The hypervisor stacks (for both nVHE Hyp mode and nVHE protected mode) are aligned such that any valid stack address has PAGE_SHIFT bit as 1. This allows us to conveniently check for overflow in the exception entry without corrupting any GPRs. We won't recover from a stack overflow so panic the hypervisor.

---

Changes in v8:
- branch to hyp_panic_bad_stack(), instead of branch and link, per Marc

Changes in v7:
- Add Fuad's Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags.

Changes in v5:
- Valid stack addresses now have PAGE_SHIFT bit as 1 instead of 0

Changes in v3:
- Remove test_sp_overflow macro, per Mark
- Add asmlinkage attribute for hyp_panic, hyp_panic_bad_stack, per Ard

 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c |  7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S +24 -0
index 3d613e721a75..09b5254fb497 100644
@@ -153,6 +153,18 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__host_hvc)
 
 .macro invalid_host_el2_vect
 	.align 7
+
+	/*
+	 * Test whether the SP has overflowed, without corrupting a GPR.
+	 * nVHE hypervisor stacks are aligned so that the PAGE_SHIFT bit
+	 * of SP should always be 1.
+	 */
+	add	sp, sp, x0			// sp' = sp + x0
+	sub	x0, sp, x0			// x0' = sp' - x0 = (sp + x0) - x0 = sp
+	tbz	x0, #PAGE_SHIFT, .L__hyp_sp_overflow\@
+	sub	x0, sp, x0			// x0'' = sp' - x0' = (sp + x0) - sp = x0
+	sub	sp, sp, x0			// sp'' = sp' - x0 = (sp + x0) - x0 = sp
+
 	/* If a guest is loaded, panic out of it. */
 	stp	x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
 	get_loaded_vcpu x0, x1
@@ -165,6 +177,18 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__host_hvc)
 	 * been partially clobbered by __host_enter.
 	 */
 	b	hyp_panic
+
+.L__hyp_sp_overflow\@:
+	/*
+	 * Reset SP to the top of the stack, to allow handling the hyp_panic.
+	 * This corrupts the stack but is ok, since we won't be attempting
+	 * any unwinding here.
+	 */
+	ldr_this_cpu	x0, kvm_init_params + NVHE_INIT_STACK_HYP_VA, x1
+	mov	sp, x0
+
+	b	hyp_panic_bad_stack
+	ASM_BUG()
 .endm
 
 .macro invalid_host_el1_vect
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +6 -1
index 6410d21d8695..703a5d3f611b 100644
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return exit_code;
 }
 
-void __noreturn hyp_panic(void)
+asmlinkage void __noreturn hyp_panic(void)
 {
 	u64 spsr = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_SPSR);
 	u64 elr = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_ELR);
@@ -369,6 +369,11 @@ void __noreturn hyp_panic(void)
 	unreachable();
 }
 
+asmlinkage void __noreturn hyp_panic_bad_stack(void)
+{
+	hyp_panic();
+}
+
 asmlinkage void kvm_unexpected_el2_exception(void)
 {
 	return __kvm_unexpected_el2_exception();
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0.rc0.470.gd361397f0d-goog
#6 lore raw

PATCH v8 6/6 KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP addresses

In reply to Kalesh Singh

Reintroduce the __kvm_nvhe_ symbols in kallsyms, ignoring the local symbols in this namespace. The local symbols are not informative and can cause aliasing issues when symbolizing the addresses.

With the necessary symbols now in kallsyms we can symbolize nVHE addresses using the %p print format specifier:

[   98.916444][  T426] kvm [426]: nVHE hyp panic at: [<ffffffc0096156fc>] __kvm_nvhe_overflow_stack+0x8/0x34!

---

Changes in v8:
- Also ignore local symbols prefixed by '.L' in KVM nvhe namespace, per Marc

Changes in v6:
- Add Fuad's Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags.

Changes in v2:
- Fix printk warnings - %p expects (void *)

 arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 13 +++++--------
 scripts/kallsyms.c           |  3 ++-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +5 -8
index 97fe14aab1a3..a377b871bf58 100644
@@ -295,13 +295,8 @@ void __noreturn __cold nvhe_hyp_panic_handler(u64 esr, u64 spsr,
 	u64 elr_in_kimg = __phys_to_kimg(elr_phys);
 	u64 hyp_offset = elr_in_kimg - kaslr_offset() - elr_virt;
 	u64 mode = spsr & PSR_MODE_MASK;
+	u64 panic_addr = elr_virt + hyp_offset;
 
-	/*
-	 * The nVHE hyp symbols are not included by kallsyms to avoid issues
-	 * with aliasing. That means that the symbols cannot be printed with the
-	 * "%pS" format specifier, so fall back to the vmlinux address if
-	 * there's no better option.
-	 */
 	if (mode != PSR_MODE_EL2t && mode != PSR_MODE_EL2h) {
 		kvm_err("Invalid host exception to nVHE hyp!\n");
 	} else if (ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64 &&
@@ -321,9 +316,11 @@ void __noreturn __cold nvhe_hyp_panic_handler(u64 esr, u64 spsr,
 		if (file)
 			kvm_err("nVHE hyp BUG at: %s:%u!\n", file, line);
 		else
-			kvm_err("nVHE hyp BUG at: %016llx!\n", elr_virt + hyp_offset);
+			kvm_err("nVHE hyp BUG at: [<%016llx>] %pB!\n", panic_addr,
+					(void *)panic_addr);
 	} else {
-		kvm_err("nVHE hyp panic at: %016llx!\n", elr_virt + hyp_offset);
+		kvm_err("nVHE hyp panic at: [<%016llx>] %pB!\n", panic_addr,
+				(void *)panic_addr);
 	}
 
 	/*
scripts/kallsyms.c +2 -1
index 8caabddf817c..e6906f79833d 100644
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ static bool is_ignored_symbol(const char *name, char type)
 		".L",			/* local labels, .LBB,.Ltmpxxx,.L__unnamed_xx,.LASANPC, etc. */
 		"__crc_",		/* modversions */
 		"__efistub_",		/* arm64 EFI stub namespace */
-		"__kvm_nvhe_",		/* arm64 non-VHE KVM namespace */
+		"__kvm_nvhe_$",		/* arm64 local symbols in non-VHE KVM namespace */
+		"__kvm_nvhe_.L",	/* arm64 local symbols in non-VHE KVM namespace */
 		"__AArch64ADRPThunk_",	/* arm64 lld */
 		"__ARMV5PILongThunk_",	/* arm lld */
 		"__ARMV7PILongThunk_",
Signature · 6 lines
2.36.0.rc0.470.gd361397f0d-goog

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
maintainer Applied
#7 lore raw
In reply to Kalesh Singh
Quoted 12 lines · Kalesh Singh

This is v8 of the nVHE hypervisor stack enhancements. This version is based on 5.18-rc3.

Previous versions can be found at:
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

Quoted 1 line

[...]

Applied to next, thanks!

[1/6] KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range()

      commit: 92abe0f81e1385afd8f1dc66206b5be9a514899b
[2/6] KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range()
      commit: f922c13e778d6d5343d4576be785a8204c595113
[3/6] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack
      commit: ce3354318a57875dc59f4bb841662e95bfba03db
[4/6] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
      commit: 1a919b17ef012ca0572bae759c27e5ea02bfb47f
[5/6] KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows
      commit: 66de19fad9ef47c5376a99bb2b00661f1c788a94
[6/6] KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP addresses
      commit: 6ccf9cb557bd32073b0d68baed97f1bd8a40ff1d

Cheers,

	M.
Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
#8 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 12 lines · Kalesh Singh

This is v8 of the nVHE hypervisor stack enhancements. This version is based on 5.18-rc3.

Previous versions can be found at:
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

Quoted 1 line

[...]

Applied to next, thanks!

[1/6] KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range()

Quoted 11 lines
      commit: 92abe0f81e1385afd8f1dc66206b5be9a514899b
[2/6] KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range()
      commit: f922c13e778d6d5343d4576be785a8204c595113
[3/6] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack
      commit: ce3354318a57875dc59f4bb841662e95bfba03db
[4/6] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
      commit: 1a919b17ef012ca0572bae759c27e5ea02bfb47f
[5/6] KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows
      commit: 66de19fad9ef47c5376a99bb2b00661f1c788a94
[6/6] KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP addresses
      commit: 6ccf9cb557bd32073b0d68baed97f1bd8a40ff1d

Thanks for applying these Marc.

I was wondering if instead of taking these through kvm-arm64/next, could Catalin consolidated these in arm64 for-next/core with Mark Ruthland's and Madhavan's stacktrace patches[1]? This avoids conflict and would allow for the hypervisor unwinding changes[2] to apply cleanly.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

Thanks,
Kalesh

Quoted 8 lines

Cheers,

        M.

--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm

maintainer
#9 lore raw
Quoted 33 lines · Kalesh Singh
Quoted 19 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 12 lines · Kalesh Singh

This is v8 of the nVHE hypervisor stack enhancements. This version is based on 5.18-rc3.

Previous versions can be found at:
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

Quoted 1 line

[...]

Applied to next, thanks!

[1/6] KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range()

Quoted 11 lines
      commit: 92abe0f81e1385afd8f1dc66206b5be9a514899b
[2/6] KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range()
      commit: f922c13e778d6d5343d4576be785a8204c595113
[3/6] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack
      commit: ce3354318a57875dc59f4bb841662e95bfba03db
[4/6] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
      commit: 1a919b17ef012ca0572bae759c27e5ea02bfb47f
[5/6] KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows
      commit: 66de19fad9ef47c5376a99bb2b00661f1c788a94
[6/6] KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP addresses
      commit: 6ccf9cb557bd32073b0d68baed97f1bd8a40ff1d
Quoted 7 lines

Thanks for applying these Marc.

I was wondering if instead of taking these through kvm-arm64/next, could Catalin consolidated these in arm64 for-next/core with Mark Ruthland's and Madhavan's stacktrace patches[1]? This avoids conflict and would allow for the hypervisor unwinding changes[2] to apply cleanly.

So far, there hasn't been any reported conflict. If Catalin needs to merge the branch or part of it, it is stable anyway and can be pulled from anywhere.

As for the rest of the stacktrace stuff, I haven't had a look yet.

Thanks,

	M.
Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.