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ecdsa: Fix incorrect usage of vli_cmp

PATCH In review Stefan Berger 1 participant 2 messages Apr 21, 2022 – Apr 26, 2022

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Stefan Berger

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ecdsa: Fix incorrect usage of vli_cmp

Fix incorrect usage of vli_cmp when calculating the value of res.x. For signature verification to succeed, res.x must be the same as the r component of the signature which is in the range of [1..n-1] with 'n' being the order of the curve. Therefore, when res.x equals n calculate res.x = res.x - n as well. Signature verification could have previously unnecessarily failed in extremely rare cases.

Fixes 4e6602916bc6 ("crypto: ecdsa - Add support for ECDSA signature verification")
---
 crypto/ecdsa.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
crypto/ecdsa.c +2 -2
index b3a8a6b572ba..674ab9275366 100644
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ static int _ecdsa_verify(struct ecc_ctx *ctx, const u64 *hash, const u64 *r, con
 	/* res = u1*G + u2 * pub_key */
 	ecc_point_mult_shamir(&res, u1, &curve->g, u2, &ctx->pub_key, curve);
 
-	/* res.x = res.x mod n (if res.x > order) */
-	if (unlikely(vli_cmp(res.x, curve->n, ndigits) == 1))
+	/* res.x = res.x mod n (if res.x >= order) */
+	if (unlikely(vli_cmp(res.x, curve->n, ndigits) >= 0))
 		/* faster alternative for NIST p384, p256 & p192 */
 		vli_sub(res.x, res.x, curve->n, ndigits);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author reviewer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Stefan Berger

Fix incorrect usage of vli_cmp when calculating the value of res.x. For signature verification to succeed, res.x must be the same as the r component of the signature which is in the range of [1..n-1] with 'n' being the order of the curve. Therefore, when res.x equals n calculate res.x = res.x - n as well. Signature verification could have previously unnecessarily failed in extremely rare cases.

Actually, I am withdrawing this patch. Before this patch res.x could equal 'n' and then wouldn't match r due to the range of r being [1..n-1]. Now if res.x equals 'n' then res.x - n will be 0 and again will not match 'r' due to the range of r being [1..n-1]. So it makes no difference whether vli_cmp() == 1 or vli_cmp() >= 1 and the concern above about rare cases not verifying the signature is wrong.

Stefan

Quoted 23 lines
Fixes 4e6602916bc6 ("crypto: ecdsa - Add support for ECDSA signature verification")
---
  crypto/ecdsa.c | 4 ++--
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
crypto/ecdsa.c +2 -2
index b3a8a6b572ba..674ab9275366 100644
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ static int _ecdsa_verify(struct ecc_ctx *ctx, const u64 *hash, const u64 *r, con
  	/* res = u1*G + u2 * pub_key */
  	ecc_point_mult_shamir(&res, u1, &curve->g, u2, &ctx->pub_key, curve);
 
-	/* res.x = res.x mod n (if res.x > order) */
-	if (unlikely(vli_cmp(res.x, curve->n, ndigits) == 1))
+	/* res.x = res.x mod n (if res.x >= order) */
+	if (unlikely(vli_cmp(res.x, curve->n, ndigits) >= 0))
  		/* faster alternative for NIST p384, p256 & p192 */
  		vli_sub(res.x, res.x, curve->n, ndigits);