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KVM: SVM: Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel memory leak.

PATCH Superseded Ashish Kalra 5 participants 8 messages May 12, 2022 – May 13, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 KVM: SVM: Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel memory leak.

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data. Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -3
index 7c392873626f..d93dab5c9ce1 100644
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		if (!blob)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
 	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
 	    !IS_ALIGNED(paddr,     16) ||
 	    !IS_ALIGNED(size,      16)) {
-		tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 		if (!tpage)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		if (!blob)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data. Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.

Quoted 6 lines

This looks like it needs one (or more) Fixes: tags pointing to the patch(es) adding those kmalloc calls...

And then Cc: <[email protected]> too.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#2 lore raw
In reply to Ashish Kalra
Quoted 16 lines · Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data. Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.

Quoted 4 lines
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Can we just update all the kmalloc()s that buffers get given to the PSP? For instance doesn't sev_send_update_data() have an issue? Reading the PSP spec it seems like a user can call this ioctl with a large hdr_len and the PSP will only fill out what's actually required like in these fixed up cases? This is assuming the PSP is written to spec (and just the current version). I'd rather have all of these instances updated.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 22 lines · Peter Gonda
Quoted 16 lines · Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data. Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.

Quoted 4 lines
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 7 lines

Can we just update all the kmalloc()s that buffers get given to the PSP? For instance doesn't sev_send_update_data() have an issue? Reading the PSP spec it seems like a user can call this ioctl with a large hdr_len and the PSP will only fill out what's actually required like in these fixed up cases? This is assuming the PSP is written to spec (and just the current version). I'd rather have all of these instances updated.

Agreed, the kernel should explicitly initialize any copy_to_user() to source and never rely on the PSP to fill the entire blob unless there's an ironclad guarantee the entire struct/blob will be written. E.g. it's probably ok to skip zeroing "data" in sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(), but even then it might be wortwhile as defense-in-depth.

Looking through other copy_to_user() calls:

- "blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr()
- "id_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_get_id2()
- "pdh_blob" and "cert_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export()

The last one is probably fine since the copy length comes from the PSP, but it's not like these ioctls are performance critical...

	/* If we query the length, FW responded with expected data. */
	input.cert_chain_len = data.cert_chain_len;
	input.pdh_cert_len = data.pdh_cert_len;
#4 lore raw

Hello Sean & Peter,

Quoted 21 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 20 lines · Peter Gonda
Quoted 19 lines · Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data. Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.

---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Can we just update all the kmalloc()s that buffers get given to the PSP? For instance doesn't sev_send_update_data() have an issue? Reading the PSP spec it seems like a user can call this ioctl with a large hdr_len and the PSP will only fill out what's actually required like in these fixed up cases? This is assuming the PSP is written to spec (and just the current version). I'd rather have all of these instances updated.

Yes, this function is also vulnerable as it allocates the return buffer using kmalloc() and copies back to user the buffer sized as per the user provided length (and not the FW returned length), so it surely needs fixup.

I will update all these instances to use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc().

Quoted 11 lines

Agreed, the kernel should explicitly initialize any copy_to_user() to source and never rely on the PSP to fill the entire blob unless there's an ironclad guarantee the entire struct/blob will be written. E.g. it's probably ok to skip zeroing "data" in sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(), but even then it might be wortwhile as defense-in-depth.

Looking through other copy_to_user() calls:

- "blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr()
- "id_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_get_id2()
- "pdh_blob" and "cert_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export()

These functions are part of the ccp driver and a fix for them has already been sent upstream to [email protected] and [email protected]:

[PATCH] crypto: ccp - Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel memory leak

Thanks,

Ashish

Quoted 7 lines

The last one is probably fine since the copy length comes from the PSP, but it's not like these ioctls are performance critical...

	/* If we query the length, FW responded with expected data. */
	input.cert_chain_len = data.cert_chain_len;
	input.pdh_cert_len = data.pdh_cert_len;
#5 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Ashish Kalra

Hello Sean & Peter,

Quoted 5 lines

Looking through other copy_to_user() calls:

- "blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr()
- "id_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_get_id2()
- "pdh_blob" and "cert_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export()

Quoted 6 lines

These functions are part of the ccp driver and a fix for them has already been sent upstream to [email protected] and [email protected]:

[PATCH] crypto: ccp - Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel memory leak

Ha, that's why I was getting a bit of deja vu. I saw that fly by and then got it confused with this patch.

#6 lore raw
In reply to Ashish Kalra
Quoted 33 lines · Ashish Kalra

Hello Sean & Peter,

Quoted 21 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 20 lines · Peter Gonda
Quoted 19 lines · Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data. Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.

---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Can we just update all the kmalloc()s that buffers get given to the PSP? For instance doesn't sev_send_update_data() have an issue? Reading the PSP spec it seems like a user can call this ioctl with a large hdr_len and the PSP will only fill out what's actually required like in these fixed up cases? This is assuming the PSP is written to spec (and just the current version). I'd rather have all of these instances updated.

Quoted 5 lines

Yes, this function is also vulnerable as it allocates the return buffer using kmalloc() and copies back to user the buffer sized as per the user provided length (and not the FW returned length), so it surely needs fixup.

I will update all these instances to use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc().

Do we need the alloc_page() in __sev_dbg_encrypt_user() to have __GFP_ZERO too?

Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Agreed, the kernel should explicitly initialize any copy_to_user() to source and never rely on the PSP to fill the entire blob unless there's an ironclad guarantee the entire struct/blob will be written. E.g. it's probably ok to skip zeroing "data" in sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(), but even then it might be wortwhile as defense-in-depth.

Quoted 5 lines

Looking through other copy_to_user() calls:

- "blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr()
- "id_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_get_id2()
- "pdh_blob" and "cert_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export()

These functions are part of the ccp driver and a fix for them has already been sent upstream to [email protected] and [email protected]:

[PATCH] crypto: ccp - Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel memory leak

Thanks,

Ashish

Quoted 7 lines

The last one is probably fine since the copy length comes from the PSP, but it's not like these ioctls are performance critical...

      /* If we query the length, FW responded with expected data. */
      input.cert_chain_len = data.cert_chain_len;
      input.pdh_cert_len = data.pdh_cert_len;
#7 lore raw

Hello Peter,

Quoted 32 lines · Peter Gonda
Quoted 31 lines · Ashish Kalra

Hello Sean & Peter,

Quoted 28 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 27 lines · Peter Gonda
Quoted 15 lines · Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data. Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.

Quoted 4 lines
---
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Can we just update all the kmalloc()s that buffers get given to the PSP? For instance doesn't sev_send_update_data() have an issue? Reading the PSP spec it seems like a user can call this ioctl with a large hdr_len and the PSP will only fill out what's actually required like in these fixed up cases? This is assuming the PSP is written to spec (and just the current version). I'd rather have all of these instances updated.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Yes, this function is also vulnerable as it allocates the return buffer using kmalloc() and copies back to user the buffer sized as per the user provided length (and not the FW returned length), so it surely needs fixup.

I will update all these instances to use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc().

Do we need the alloc_page() in __sev_dbg_encrypt_user() to have __GFP_ZERO too?

Actually this is used to allocate intermediate buffers to do copy_from_user, so it should be safe as size here is used for actual guest memory size to be encrypted.

Thanks, Ashish

Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 8 lines

Agreed, the kernel should explicitly initialize any copy_to_user() to source and never rely on the PSP to fill the entire blob unless there's an ironclad guarantee the entire struct/blob will be written. E.g. it's probably ok to skip zeroing "data" in sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(), but even then it might be wortwhile as defense-in-depth.

Quoted 5 lines

Looking through other copy_to_user() calls:

- "blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr()
- "id_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_get_id2()
- "pdh_blob" and "cert_blob" in sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export()

These functions are part of the ccp driver and a fix for them has already been sent upstream to [email protected] and [email protected]:

[PATCH] crypto: ccp - Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel memory leak

Thanks,

Ashish

Quoted 6 lines

The last one is probably fine since the copy length comes from the PSP, but it's not like these ioctls are performance critical...

       /* If we query the length, FW responded with expected data. */
       input.cert_chain_len = data.cert_chain_len;
       input.pdh_cert_len = data.pdh_cert_len;