ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v5 1/1 ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size
The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended attributes. However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous operation (MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.
This patch adds support for decoding the xattrs maximum size setting that is distributed in the mdsmap. Then, when setting an xattr, the kernel client will revert to do a synchronous operation if that maximum size is exceeded.
While there, fix a dout() that would trigger a printk warning:
[ 98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 98.719012] precision 65536 too large [ 98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600
...
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
--- fs/ceph/mdsmap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 12 ++++++++---- include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
* Changes since v4
- Dropped definition of MDS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE, which isn't needed anymore
- Fixed (finally?) the compilation warning detected by bot (also dropped the RFC from the subject)
* Changes since v3
As per Xiubo review:
- Always force a (sync) SETXATTR Op when connecting to an old cluster
- use '>' instead of '>='
Also fixed the warning detected by 0day.
* Changes since v2
Well, a lot has changed since v2! Now the xattr max value setting is obtained through the mdsmap, which needs to be decoded, and the feature that was used in the previous revision was dropped. The drawback is that the MDS isn't unable to know in advance if a client is aware of this xattr max value.
* Changes since v1
Added support for new feature bit to get the MDS max_xattr_pairs_size setting.
Also note that this patch relies on a patch that hasn't been merged yet ("ceph: use correct index when encoding client supported features"), otherwise the new feature bit won't be correctly encoded.
fs/ceph/mdsmap.c +18 -4
@@ -352,12 +352,10 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end, bool msgr2)__decode_and_drop_type (p, end, u8, bad_ext); }if (mdsmap_ev >=8 ) { -u32 name_len;/* enabled */ ceph_decode_8_safe (p, end, m->m_enabled, bad_ext); -ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, name_len, bad_ext); -ceph_decode_need (p, end, name_len, bad_ext); - *p += name_len; +/* fs_name */ +ceph_decode_skip_string (p, end, bad_ext); }/* damaged */ if (mdsmap_ev >=9 ) {
@@ -370,6 +368,22 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end, bool msgr2) }else { m->m_damaged = false; } +if (mdsmap_ev >=17 ) { +/* balancer */ +ceph_decode_skip_string (p, end, bad_ext); +/* standby_count_wanted */ +ceph_decode_skip_32 (p, end, bad_ext); +/* old_max_mds */ +ceph_decode_skip_32 (p, end, bad_ext); +/* min_compat_client */ +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad_ext); +/* required_client_features */ +ceph_decode_skip_set (p, end,64 , bad_ext); +ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, m->m_max_xattr_size, bad_ext); + }else { +/* This forces the usage of the (sync) SETXATTR Op */ + m->m_max_xattr_size =0 ; + } bad_ext:dout ("mdsmap_decode m_enabled: %d, m_damaged: %d, m_num_laggy: %d\n" , !!m->m_enabled, !!m->m_damaged, m->m_num_laggy);
fs/ceph/xattr.c +8 -4
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ static int ceph_sync_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, flags |=CEPH_XATTR_REMOVE ; } -dout ("setxattr value=%.*s\n" , (int )size, value); +dout ("setxattr value size: %zu\n" , size);/* do request */ req =ceph_mdsc_create_request (mdsc, op,USE_AUTH_MDS );
@@ -1184,8 +1184,14 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,spin_lock (&ci->i_ceph_lock); retry: issued =__ceph_caps_issued (ci,NULL ); -if (ci->i_xattrs.version ==0 || !(issued &CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL )) + required_blob_size =__get_required_blob_size (ci, name_len, val_len); +if ((ci->i_xattrs.version ==0 ) || !(issued &CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL ) || + (required_blob_size > mdsc->mdsmap->m_max_xattr_size)) { +dout ("%s do sync setxattr: version: %llu size: %d max: %llu\n" , + __func__, ci->i_xattrs.version, required_blob_size, + mdsc->mdsmap->m_max_xattr_size); goto do_sync; + }if (!lock_snap_rwsem && !ci->i_head_snapc) { lock_snap_rwsem = true;
@@ -1201,8 +1207,6 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, ceph_cap_string(issued));__build_xattrs (inode); - required_blob_size =__get_required_blob_size (ci, name_len, val_len); -if (!ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob || required_blob_size > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len) {struct ceph_buffer *blob;
include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap {u32 m_session_timeout;/* seconds */ u32 m_session_autoclose;/* seconds */ u64 m_max_file_size; +u64 m_max_xattr_size;/* maximum size for xattrs blob */ u32 m_max_mds;/* expected up:active mds number */ u32 m_num_active_mds;/* actual up:active mds number */ u32 possible_max_rank;/* possible max rank index */
Quoted 140 lines · Luís Henriques
The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended attributes. However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous operation (
MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.This patch adds support for decoding the xattrs maximum size setting that is distributed in the mdsmap. Then, when setting an xattr, the kernel client will revert to do a synchronous operation if that maximum size is exceeded.
While there, fix a
dout()that would trigger a printk warning:[ 98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 98.719012] precision 65536 too large [ 98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600...
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
Signed-off-by Luís Henriques <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/mdsmap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 12 ++++++++---- include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)* Changes since v4
- Dropped definition of
MDS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE, which isn't needed anymore
- Fixed (finally?) the compilation warning detected by bot (also dropped the RFC from the subject)* Changes since v3
As per Xiubo review:
- Always force a (sync) SETXATTR Op when connecting to an old cluster
- use '>' instead of '>='
Also fixed the warning detected by 0day.* Changes since v2
Well, a lot has changed since v2! Now the xattr max value setting is obtained through the mdsmap, which needs to be decoded, and the feature that was used in the previous revision was dropped. The drawback is that the MDS isn't unable to know in advance if a client is aware of this xattr max value.
* Changes since v1
Added support for new feature bit to get the MDS
max_xattr_pairs_sizesetting.Also note that this patch relies on a patch that hasn't been merged yet ("ceph: use correct index when encoding client supported features"), otherwise the new feature bit won't be correctly encoded.
fs/ceph/mdsmap.c +18
-4@@ -352,12 +352,10 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end, bool msgr2)__decode_and_drop_type (p, end, u8, bad_ext); }if (mdsmap_ev >=8 ) { -u32 name_len;/* enabled */ ceph_decode_8_safe (p, end, m->m_enabled, bad_ext); -ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, name_len, bad_ext); -ceph_decode_need (p, end, name_len, bad_ext); - *p += name_len; +/* fs_name */ +ceph_decode_skip_string (p, end, bad_ext); }/* damaged */ if (mdsmap_ev >=9 ) {@@ -370,6 +368,22 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end, bool msgr2) }else { m->m_damaged = false; } +if (mdsmap_ev >=17 ) { +/* balancer */ +ceph_decode_skip_string (p, end, bad_ext); +/* standby_count_wanted */ +ceph_decode_skip_32 (p, end, bad_ext); +/* old_max_mds */ +ceph_decode_skip_32 (p, end, bad_ext); +/* min_compat_client */ +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad_ext); +/* required_client_features */ +ceph_decode_skip_set (p, end,64 , bad_ext); +ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, m->m_max_xattr_size, bad_ext); + }else { +/* This forces the usage of the (sync) SETXATTR Op */ + m->m_max_xattr_size =0 ; + } bad_ext:dout ("mdsmap_decode m_enabled: %d, m_damaged: %d, m_num_laggy: %d\n" , !!m->m_enabled, !!m->m_damaged, m->m_num_laggy);fs/ceph/xattr.c +8
-4@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ static int ceph_sync_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, flags |=CEPH_XATTR_REMOVE ; } -dout ("setxattr value=%.*s\n" , (int )size, value); +dout ("setxattr value size: %zu\n" , size);/* do request */ req =ceph_mdsc_create_request (mdsc, op,USE_AUTH_MDS );@@ -1184,8 +1184,14 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,spin_lock (&ci->i_ceph_lock); retry: issued =__ceph_caps_issued (ci,NULL ); -if (ci->i_xattrs.version ==0 || !(issued &CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL )) + required_blob_size =__get_required_blob_size (ci, name_len, val_len); +if ((ci->i_xattrs.version ==0 ) || !(issued &CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL ) || + (required_blob_size > mdsc->mdsmap->m_max_xattr_size)) { +dout ("%s do sync setxattr: version: %llu size: %d max: %llu\n" , + __func__, ci->i_xattrs.version, required_blob_size, + mdsc->mdsmap->m_max_xattr_size); goto do_sync; + }if (!lock_snap_rwsem && !ci->i_head_snapc) { lock_snap_rwsem = true;@@ -1201,8 +1207,6 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, ceph_cap_string(issued));__build_xattrs (inode); - required_blob_size =__get_required_blob_size (ci, name_len, val_len); -if (!ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob || required_blob_size > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len) {struct ceph_buffer *blob;include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h +0
-0
include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h struct ceph_mdsmap { · line 31
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h +1
-0@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap {u32 m_session_timeout;/* seconds */ u32 m_session_autoclose;/* seconds */ u64 m_max_file_size; +u64 m_max_xattr_size;/* maximum size for xattrs blob */ u32 m_max_mds;/* expected up:active mds number */ u32 m_num_active_mds;/* actual up:active mds number */ u32 possible_max_rank;/* possible max rank index */
Merged into the testing branch. Thanks Luis.
-- Xiubo